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PREFACE ■
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the ecclesiology of George
Hill. I desired to determine the doctrine of the church in the federal scheme
of theology. This bi-polar desire was fostered by two corresponding factors.
I desired to study the doctrine of the church, not only because "the doctrine
of the church has come in recent years to occupy a central place in theological
discussion," but also because "scarcely any concept of Christian doctrine in
the present time stands so greatly in need of clarification from the ground
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up as that of the 'Church'."' I desired to study the doctrine of the church
in the federal scheme of theology because I am a member of a denomination
in which that theological system is given confessional status. George Hill
was suggested by Professor Torrance as a worthy example of this theological
school, and one the study of whose theology might supply the desired information.
The suggestion has proven to be an excellent one.
To understand Hill"1 s theology, however, it has been absolutely prerequisite
to determine the factors which contributed to the formulation of his doctrine
of the church.^ Without this background, the study itself would have been
superficial, and the question as to whether Hill was a fair representative of
federal theologians would have cast a shadow of doubt over any conclusions
that would have been reached. Furthermore this background study was necessary
in order to determine the specific influence of federal theology as distinguished
from the influence of other factors which.contributed to his ecclesiology. The
1 J.E.L. Newbingin, Household of God, p. 11.
2 Emil Brunner, "Foreword", Realm of Redemption.
3 "It has never been the case that theology was able to cut itself off,
in method, logic, terminology or concepts from parallel disciplines....Philosoph¬
ical, scientific, ethical theories have, in the history of theology, been
known to be incorporated without change of substance of nature into systems of
theology...such theories may exercise very considerable influence in theology."
Prof. John Mclntyre's inaugural lecture, "The Open-ness of Theology", Hew
College Bulletin, Vol. IV, No. 3«
thesis, therefore is divided into two major sections.
In Section One, entitled "The Development of Hill's Ecclesiology," an
attempt is made to establish Hill's ecclesiastical principle, that is, the
key which unlocks his doctrine of the church. To this end three contributing
factors have been examined in:.some detail, and the examination of each forms
one of the first three chapters. These chapters are arranged, not by degree of
influence, but chronologically. Chapter I treats of Hill's philosophical
background in the school of common sense philosophy, and the fact that this
philosophy had primarily a negative influence upon Hill's ecclesiology dimin¬
ishes not one whit its importance. More positively Chapter II treats of his
theological background in the school of federal theology, and an effort is
made to trace the rise and development of this particular theological system
as well as to set forth its salient features. Chapter III treats of his
ecclesiastical background by giving a historical sketch of the Moderate
Party in the established Church of Scotland and by denoting his place as a
leader of that Party. Chapter IV, by way of summary, indicates the particular
contributions each of these factors made to the final formulation of Hill's
ecclesiastical principle. A word in defense of this arrangement might be in
order. The particular contributions of each factor are held in abeyence until
Chapter IV for basically two reasons. It is thought that this organization
sheds the clearer light on the actual influence of the background on the
principle, and also it allows us to state the principle itself without con¬
fusing this with comments which Hill made on the basis of the principle.
Chapter IV then serves not only as a summary of Section One but as a transition
to Section Two.
In Section Two, entitled "The Exposition and Evaluation of Hill's
Ecclesiology,"' we shall be concerned with just that. Following the example
and advice of Professor Torrance, I have, wherever possible, allowed Hill to
V
speak for himself. In an effort to he fair to his position, I have presented
his own thoughts in running form without breaking the continuity of hjs argu¬
ments and reasons. Critical comments have been made only after the exposition
has been completed. Chapter V is concerned with several factors which in
most theologies are considered essential to the doctrine of the church, but
which in Hill's theology are relegated to the periphery of ecclesiology.
Specifically we examine what he has to say, by way of incidental reference
and inference, about the necessity, unity, and marks of the church. Since
Hill himself gives no systematic exposition of these subjects, this chapter is
primarily critical in its content. Chapter VI, entitled "The Polity of the
Christian Society," brings us from that which is marginal to that which is
central for Hill, namely, the government of the church. Here we treat the
foundation, form and actual formation of church government. Chapter VII
deals with the power of the church and leads us to consider several of the
problems involved in this doctrine, such as the relationship of church and
state, the right of the church to form doctrinal creeds, and the authority of
the church over the individuals who compose it.
Basically, though-not consistently at every point, Hill is evaluated
against the background of three theological periods relative to himself.
(l) His position is examined in the light of the theology of his predecessors,
particularly of those in the tradition of the Reformation. We shall be at
pains to compare Hill's thoughts with Calvin's thoughts on the same subject,
especially since Hill claims to be following Calvin. No doubt Hill was familiar
with men in this tradition whom he fails to mention by name, but who nonethe¬
less made their influence felt. Hence the references to Knox, Rutherford,
Gillespie, Hooker, and others who preceded him in Scottish and English
theology. (2) We examine Hill's position in the light of the theology of
his contemporaries, whenever possible. It should be noted, however, that Hill
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lived in a period when the dominant party in the Church of Scotland, the
Moderates, spurned theological writing. Therefore, there is not a great
deal of contemporary material on the subjects at hand. Hill is himself an
exception in that he produced a book on systematic theology. (3) Finally,
we. examine Hill's position against the growth and development of theology in
succeeding generations. Although it is unfair to use concepts of which Hill
was not aware to criticize him, it is nevertheless permissible for me to
evaluate him in the light of my own position. Theologians since Hill have been
used to clarify and define my own thought and are, therefore, justifiably used
in the evaluation of Hill's thought.
Two further words about the critical sections of this thesis are in
order. One, an anachronic licence ha3 been exercised. That is to say,
although contemporary scholars do not direct their comments to Hill personally,
but only to the general position which he expounded, modern commentators and
theologians are presented as though their remarks are directed to Hill himself.
This has been done for two reasons. It avoids long, involved phrases with
the impersonal pronoun, and it indicates more clearly the relevancy of the
remarks cited to the point in Hill which is being evaluated. Two, following
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the suggestion of Harold B. Prince, critical comments have been dispersed and
placed at the end of each chapter or main division of the chapter rather than
all together at £he end of the thesis. It was thought that the evaluations
would-be more meaningful if they followed closely upon the sections to which
they were directed. Evaluations are clearly obvious in the chapter analyses
and are easily found in the text.
Since I determined to give an unbroken exposition of Hill's position, and
determined to follow it closely with critical comments, each chapter or main
1 Harold B. Prince, A Form For Thesis Writing, p. 3«
division of the chapter in Section Two is composed of two parts: first there
is an exposition of Hill's subject matter under review; then there is my
evaluation of Hill's position.
According to Bruce Metzger, a thesis conclusion must contain a brief
1
recapitulation of the text. Such a summary has been prepared, but in keeping
with the regulations of the University of Edinburgh, it is to be found at the
2
beginning of this volume. A conclusion, again according to Metzger, should
3include an evaluation of the most significant points in the text. This
evaluation has also been given, but, as stated, critical comments are placed
throughout the text. Often the conclusion to a thesis which deals with the
work of one man is devoted to a discussion of the contributions which the man
made to a particular field of study. A short treatment of this subject is
to be found in Appendix D. The conclusion of this thesis, therefore, is given
over entirely to a concise statement of the findings which have been reached
through an exposition and evaluation of George Hill's ecclesiology. An
attempt is made to formulate the doctrine of the church in federal theology
in terms of the effects which the chief characteristics of this system have
upon that doctrine.
Throughout I have tried to use standard American spelling (Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary), except in quotations where the original has been
retained. The format of the thesis (outline, form for quotations and footnotes
capitalization, bibliography, etc.) has been influenced by Turabian, Manual
1 Bruce Metzger, A Guide to the Preparation of a_ Thesis, p. 1A.
2 Regulatory Standards for the Format and Binding of Theses (Approved
by the Senatus Academicus, University of Edinburgh, March, 1967)7 Section 5-9.
3 Metzger, _od. cit., p. 1A.
VIXi.
for the Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations♦
I am grateful for this opportunity to thank those who have made this
study possible. A special word of appreciation is due to Columbia Theological
Seminary, Trinity Presbyterian Church of Jackson, Mississippi, Mr. William B.
Sanders, Jr. of the American Tent and Canvas Company, and certain individuals
for the financial assistance they have afforded; my relatives, friends, and
teachers in the States for the prayerful support and personal encouragement
they have offered; my wife, Pamela, and son, Louisp for their cheerful
cooperation despite the sacrifices they have been called on to make; the
Staff of New College Library for the time and effort they have spent in secur¬
ing necessary materials; my advisors, Professor T.B. Torrance and the Reverend
J.B. Torrance, for their faithfulness in reading each cha.pter and for their
practical suggestions; and Mrs.. Rena Graham for her typing.
SUMMARY
This analysis of George Hill's ecclesiology is concerned with the devel¬
opment, exposition, and evaluation of his doctrine of the church. Ecclesiology
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does not develop in a vacuum; it is influenced by various factors. In the
case of Hill, the factors were three-fold: philosophical, theological, and
ecclesiastical. Each of these caused Kill to emphasize specific aspects of
ecclesiology, and each caused him to de-emphasize specific aspects.
Common sense philosophy, by accentuating first principles, deterred Hill
from examining the origin and foundation of the church; by accentuating the
cause-effect relationship, it caused him to push the church to the periphery
of doctrine, divorcing it from meaningful connection with the rest of his the¬
ology; by accentuating the external reality, it precluded for him any under¬
standing of what the church ought to be as opposed to what it actually is.
On the other hand, common sense philosophy's concern for the practical caused
Hill to emphasize the government and authority of the church.
Federal theology, by discribing the covenant of Scripture in contractual
terms, by replacing the one Scriptural covenant with the covenant of works and
the covenant of grace, and by thrusting up the doctrine of limited atonement,
destroyed for Hill true concern for the unity of the church, precipitated a
sharp distinction between the visible church and invisible church, and focused
attention on the church as an exclusive, external company of believers. But
precisely because Hill was interested in this select society, he was interested
in how it was to be organized and governed, and how it was to be related to
society at large.
»
The above-mentioned strands of philosophy and theology flowed together
in the moderatism characteristic of the Moderate Party of the Church of Scotland.
But whereas these prior factors had primarily a negative influence upon
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the development of Hill's ecclesiology, the greater effect of his Moderate
hackgroup was essentially positive. Moaeratism compelled Hill to evaluate the
church in terms ofyits moral and social worth; and it encouraged, if not forced
him to substitute concern for tolerance in place of concern for unity. Its
most significant contribution to Hill's ecclesiology lay in its concept of
the church as an external society analogous to civil government.
All three of these factors worked together to produce Hill's ecclesiology.
Common sense philosophy and federal theology caused him to de-emphasize every
aspect of the doctrine of the church except the fact that it is a group of
people somehow joined together on earth for the purpose of performing specific
actions inaugurated by its founder. The Moderate Party offered Hill the prin¬
ciple upon which to unite these people and to establish the order and define
the power necessary for the observance of their distinctive ceremonies. For
Hill the church is an external society constituted by its Author for the
purpose of performing certain rites.
In his exposition of this doctrine of the church, Hill is primarily con¬
cerned with the polity and power of the church. A comprehensive discussion of
these matters, however, necessitates at least an incidental mention of other
aspects of ecclesiology. Three such "incidental" aspects are treated: the
necessity of the church, the unity of the church, the marks of the church. The
church is necessary as the instrument of the Spirit in effecting the salvation
of the elect, and as the place of performance for Christian rites and cere¬
monies. The unity of the church is grounded in the exercise of brotherly
love, the acceptance of prepositional truth, and the performance of religious
rites. The tension between the unity and disunity of the church is resolved
in the "branch theory." The marks of the true church are the true preaching
of the word, the right administration of the sacraments, the exercise of
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ecclesiastical discipline. Preaching is an incidental aspect of the church's
life, engaged in for the purposes of imparting information, interpreting the
word, and influencing opinion. The sacraments of the church are federal acts
in which those who receive them solemnly engage to fulfill their part of the
covenant and God confirms His promises to them. Baptism is the initiatory rite
of Christianity in which believers contract with God to accept the gospel and
repent of sin, and thereupon receive a pledge of divine blessing. The Lord's
Supper is celebrated to exhibit by significant action the death of Christ, to
give believers an opportunity to publicly profess their allegiance to Him, and
to impress upon believers their duty to follow Him. As believers fulfill,
these stipulations, they receive the grace and strength which this sacrament
is intended to convey. The exercise of discipline is necessary to preserve the
order required for the preaching of the, word and the administration of the
sacraments.
Hill's doctrine of the church's polity is expounded in terms of its
foundation, form, and formation. The foundation of church government resides
in Christ's command to assemble for the worship of God through the performance
of Christian rites and ceremonies. Large assemblies require some form of
government; the rites require some one to administer them. No one form of
government, however, is specifically set forth in Scripture. The form,
therefore, must be determined by general Scriptural principles and contemporary
circumstances. In Scotland these guidelines led to the establishment of
presbyterianism. The actual formation of the presbyterian form is accomplished
by the ordination and election of office-bearers, ministers and lay-elders.
Ordination 3s'an act of Jesus Christ conveying a special character to the
person ordained. Election, always subsequent to ordination, is an act of men
determining the ordained person's sphere of service. All those ordained are
xii
orderly associated in a system of courts.
Church power is not created ty the state, but is derived from Christ.
Therefore, it is purely spiritual; is subordinate to Christ; and must be
exercised in a manner consistent with the liberties of His disciples. It
embraces three legitimate objects; doctrinal statements, ecclesiastical canons,
and the conduct of church members. The judicial, legislative, and executive
powers of the church are distributed among the several judicatories.
The doctrine of the church in federal theology is an impoverishment of
New Testament ecclesiology. It represents only a meagre concept of the church
as the Body of Christ on earth; restricts the content and extent of the church's
proclamation of God's free grace to all men; radically alters the nature and
purpose of the church's worship, ministry, discipline, and unity; and drives
a wedge between the visible and invisible aspects of the church's life.
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SECTION ONE
THE DEVELOPMENT OP HILL'S ECCLESIOLOGY
"In the light of evidence, it is histori¬
cally inaccurate to claim that theology
has, in the past, been open only to the
Word of God and closed in every other
direction; and intellectually impossible
that it ever should be so. Theology
always has been and always will be open
tov/ards logical, epistemological,
ethical, psychological, cultural,
scientific and technological concepts,
principles and methods."
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Prom the genesis of his formal education George Hill seemed destined for
academic excellence, and his earliest intellectual endeavors afforded him a
place of pre-eminence among his peers. After taking first place honors in the
Grammar School of St. Andrews, he was matriculated in the University of that
city at the age of ten. By the time he was fourteen he had obtained the Master
of Arts degree.^ In the perusal of that degree Hill stood examinations in Latin
Greek, mathematics, natural philosophy, logic and moral philosophy. Of
particular interest to us is the training young Hill received in the latter area
During Hill's tenure at the United College the Professor of Philosophy was
Robert Watson (17307-1781) ,3 best known for his history of Philip III, King of
Spain. Watson, a native of St. Andrews, had studied successively at the
Universities of St. Andrews, Glasgow, and Edinburgh, with the intention of
entering the ministry; but when he failed to receive a presentation to one of
the churches in St. Andrews, he obtained the chair of Henry Rymer, Professor of
Logic in St. Salvator's College, through payment of a small sum of money.^ When
Watson assumed his professorial duties in 1772, "the study of logic in
St. Andrews, as in most other places, was confined to syllogisms, modes, and
figures."5 Watson, however, "whose mind had been expanded by intercourse with
the most enlightened men of his day, and by the study of the best modern
literature prepared and read to his students a course of metaphysics and logic
on an improved plan.Though Watson never published these lectures, the
1 Elizabeth Rodger, A Book of Remembrance, p. <37
2 James Grierson, History of St. Andrews, p. 207.
3 J.M. Anderson, Matriculation Roll of the University of St. Andrews, p. 1
4 Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. LX, p. 29.
5 Biographical Dictionary of Emminent Scotsmen, Vol. VIII, p. A21.
6 Ibid., p. A21.
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University Library at St® Andrews ha3 fortunately preserved two hand-written
manuscripts which contain their substance. One copy was written by Watson
himself, and the other presumably by a student. These documents leave no doubt
as to the philosophical camp to which Watson belonged. In spite of the fact
that one "enlightened" man with whom Watson had personal contact was David Hume
and even though he received the approval and friendship of Hume upon delivering
a series of lectures in Edinburgh,'' he is, nevertheless, opposed to the sceptical
philosophy of Hume. He writes point blank; "Scepticism is contrary to the
o
constitution of the human rnind."^ And in the student's copy of Watson's
lectures, vre find this further appraisal of Hume;
According to the Author of the Philosophical Essays on Human Understanding,
Belief is nothing but a more vivid forcible conception of an object, than
what the Imagination alone is able to attain. But that in this the Author
is mistaken it appears from hence that in fiction or Poetry our conception
of innumerable events, is infinitely livelier and stronger, than of many
Events recorded in real History.
Such statements cause one to suspect that 'Watson pitched his tent in the
opposite camp - the camp of Common Sense Philosophy. This opinion is verified
as fact by Watson himself in his dissent from John Locke's theory of perception.
According to Ml". Locke and some other Writers, there </is?7 i-n every
perception three things 1st the object itself 2d an idea picture, or
imago of the object and 3d the act of the mind by which that idea or
image is perceived. It will afterwards be of use to remember that
between the mind perceiving and the object perceived nothing whatever
intervenes, the object itself being the immediate subject of perception.
As more positive proof of his allegiance to the conmon sense school, Watson
writes in perfect harmony with common sense principles on a significant contro¬
versial issue of the day upholding the validity of human testimony;
1 Biographical Dictionary of Emminent Ifen of Fife, pT 4V'9»
2 Robert Watson, handwritten manuscript, p. 170.
3 David Brown, handwritten copy of Watson's lectures, p. 5*1.
4 Watson, op.cit., p. 44.
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That it is natural for us independently of experience to regard
testimony, appears from hence 1st that there is implanted in our minds
a desire to know what passes in the minds of others 2dly that corres¬
pondence in this the Author of our Constitution has bestowed on us the
faculty of speech and implanted in us a strong propensity tc coiimunicate
our real sentiments, a propensity is this which has all the Sanctions of
law, and therefore these branches of our constitution would be
insignificant and useless, if when others Communicate their Sentiments,
it had not been natural for us to believe them...,1
Watson's employment of such phrases as "the constitution of the human mind,"
his critical evaluation of Locke and Hume, his treatment of belief and the value
of human testimony - all support the conclusion that George Hill was taught the
philosophy of common sense. But since \7atson himself was more interested in
rhetoric than logic, since what he did say about logic was second-hand, and
since Hill never refers to Watson but to his predecessors, it is advisable
for us to go to the source of this philosophy for our understanding of it's
principles.
A. The Provenance of Co.nr.on Sense Philosophy
The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense originated as the protest of
Thomas Reid^ against the scepticism of David Hume. Hume's scepticism was
disliked by many for it assailed the sacred beliefs of the established churchj
1 Ibid., p. 124.
2 Thomas Reid (1710-1796), the son of a minister, was licensed to preach
in 173"'. He was appointed a regent at King's College, Aberdeen, in 1751 and the
same year became Professor of Philosophy. He was a founder of the Aberdeen
Philosophical Society ("The Wise Club") and it was in this group that he developed
his philosophy. "A little philosophical society here," wrote Reid to Hume, "is
much indebted to you for its entertainment. Your company would, although we are
good Christians, be more acceptable than that of St. Athanasius; and since we
cannot have you upon the bench, you are brought oftener than any other man to the
bar accused and defended with great zeal, but without bitterness"(Reid, Works,
Vol. II, p. Reia's own views on Hume's philosophy were made known to this
club in several papers which were later systematized in An Inquiry Into The
Human Mind, published in 1764. That same year Raid succeeded Adam Smith as
professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, a position he held
for sixteen years. In 1780 Reid retired from active lecturing in order to
complete his philosophical system, a labor which produced the Essays on the
Intellectual Powers of Man (1785) and the Essays on the Active Powers of the
Human~Mind (1788).
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yet no one could adequately refute it. Rejection, however, was not enough; it
had to be answered. And it belonged to the genius of Thomas Reid to do just
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that. Raid's chief claim to originality lay in the fact that he located the
root of Hume's scepticism. Retrospectively, it would seem that no particular
perspicuity was required in discovering that Hume's conclusions were based on
Locke's premises, and that Hume could never be successfully opposed by any
critic who accepted Locke's assumptions. But this Yras precisely one of those
obvious things which no one noticed.1 Even Reid's critics, however, never
disparaged his work on the basis that to uncover something so obvious was a
trivial achievement. Reid himself gives an account of the way in which he made
this discovery. In the Dedication of the Inquiry he writes:
I acknowledge, my Lord, that I never thought of calling in question the
principles commonly received with regard to human understanding, until
the Treatise of Human Nature was published in the year 1739. The ingenious
author of that treatise upon the principles of Locke - -who was no sceptic -
hath built a system of scepticism, which leaves no ground to believe one
thing rather than its contrary. His reasoning appeared to me to be just;
there was therefore a necessity to call in question the principles upon
which it was founded or to admit the conclusion.'"
Since Reid was determined not to acquiesce in the sceptical conclusions,-^ he
was forced to undertake a criticism of the assumptions on which that sceptical
conclusion was based. "For my own satisfaction, I entered into a serious
examination of the principles upon which this sceptical system is built; and
was not a little surprised to find that it leans its whole weight upon a hypo¬
thesis, which is ancient indeed, and hath been very generally received by
philosophers, but of which I could find no solid proof.The hypothesis to
1 G-.A. Johnston, Selections from the philosophy of Common Sense, p. 2;
A.D. Woozley, Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of' Han, p. x.
2 Thomas Reid, Works, Vol. I, p. 95*
3 For three reasons Reid seeks to avoid scepticism: it destroys the
science of a philosopher; it undermines the faith of a Christian; it renders
nugatory the prudence of a man of common understanding. Works, Vol. I, p. 95*
k Reid, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 96.
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which Raid makes reference is the hypothesis of Locke, that is, the postulation
1
of a world of ideas betv/een the knowing subject and the object known* Locke said
that ''since the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate
object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident
p
that our knowledge is only conversant about them." Reid contended that the
necessary consequence of this principle that ideas are the mind's only
immediate objects is that they are its only objects, "the only things that
3there are at all.This is exactly, says Reid, the conclusion Hume reached in
Treatise - he merely laid bare the universal scepticism implicit in the
ideal system of Locke. It is at this point that Reid put to himself the
question: "What evidence have I for this doctrine, that all the objects of
my knowledge are ideas in my own mind?" He accuses both Locke and Hume of
failure to produce any evidence for the assumption.
Though it is true that Hume is the primary figure in Reid's intellectual
world, and other philosophers matter to him only as they are implicitly Humeian
it is nonetheless true that Reid criticizes Hume via Locke. He points out that
if Locke's premises be proved untenable, Hume's conclusions will collapse.
Therefore, while it is true that it is Hume who elicited Reid's philosophy,
that philosophy must be understood not only in terms of Hume but also in the
light of Locke. G.A. Johnston suggests that in Reid's own mind ahe was not
clearly conscious how far* his views owed their origin to criticism of Locke,
and how far to antagonism to Hume."^
1 A.S. Pringle-Pattison (ed•), Locke's Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, p. xxxvii.
2 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London: 'Ward,
Lock, and Co.), p. 2|2"k. Cf. "The mind knows not things immediately, but only
by the intervention of the ideas it has of them." p.
3 S.A. Grave, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense. Cf. S.A. Grave,
"Reid, Thomas", Encyclopedia of Philosophy^ Vol. VII, p. 119-
U G.A. Johnston, op.cit., p. 8.
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To trace the development of Reid's thought, then, we must trace the
development of philosophy from Locke to Hume. According to S.A« Grave there
is a simple illustration of this development: "Three concentric circles would
represent Locke's position, the outer one standing for material objects, the
middle one for ideas, and the inner one for the self. Berkeley deleted the
first of these circles; Hume deleted the first and the third, leaving nothing
O
but ideas.n~ And Reid suggests that "ideas...have something in their nature
unfriendly to other existences.
Two assumptions of the "ideal theory" acknowledged and formulated by
Hume were; (1) "that all our distinct perceptions (i.e., ideas and
impressions) are distinct existences"; and (2) "that the mind never perceives
any real connection among distinct existences."^ Hume found that he could not
"renounce either of them"; but Reid rejects them both. He asks, if the mind is
limited to its own ideas and thus cut off from immediate knowledge of the real
5
world, how is it to know if its ideas sgree or disagree with things? And if
Hume be right in asserting that we can never escape the circle of our own
ideas, then we can never compare ideas with the tilings which they represent
for to compare two things, it is necessary to know both. Further it is noted
1 Irish-born George Berkeley was a scholar, fellow, and tutor in Trinity
College, Dublin, from 1700-1713. During this period he published two mathe¬
matical tracts (1707), his Essay towards a Hew Theory of Vision (1709), and his
Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I (1710)".' " In these and later works Berkeley
sets forth his "immaterial hypothesisteaching that only persons exist and
that "all other things are not so much existence as manners of the existence
of persons." Commonplace Book, p. 2<.„ Cf. "First dialogue between Hylas
and Philonous," Hew Theory of Vision and Other Select Writing, p. 224.
2 Grave, Common Sense, p© 53; "Reid, Thomas", p. 119. Cf. A.D. Wooslay,
Theory of Knowledge" ("1949) , pp. 21f.; E.L. MascalX, Words and Images (1957),
PP® 32-33.
3 It should be remembered that Reid is no stranger to this thought. In
early manhood he tells us he had believed the current "doctrine of ideas so
firmly as to embrace the whole of Berkeley's system in consequence of it."
Quoted in Henry Laurie's Scottish Philosophy in its National Development, p. 130.
4 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 636.
5 Cf. A.D. Woozley, Theory of Knowledge, pp. 3
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that if the external world does exist it can not be like any idea, since
nothing but an idea is like an idea* Reid concludes that the ideal theory went
wrong at the outset by assuming that ideas are primary data and that we must
first receive these before proceeding to make judgments about them. The ideal
system "teaches us that the first operation of the mind about its ideas, is
simple apprehension - that is the bare conception of a thing without any belief
about it; and that, after we have got simple apprehensions by comparing them
together, we perceive agreements or disagreements between them; and that this
perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, is all that we call
1
belief, judgment, or knowledge. Now this appears to me to be all fiction."
Y/hy? Because "Nature does not exhibit these principles separate, to be
p
compounded by us." Simple apprehension of ideas is possible only by an
abstract analysis of our "natural and original judgments," for judgment
itself, not the simple idea, is the basic unit of knowledge. Moreover, when
the elements of judgment are separated by a process of abstraction, they support
a different order. The simplest act of the mind is both logically and psycho¬
logically prior to simple apprehension. For example, says Reid, "When I
perceive a tree before me, my faculty of seeing gives me not only a notion or
simple apprehension of the tree, but a belief of its existence, and of its
figure, distance, and magnitude; and this judgment is not got by comparing ideas,
it is included in the very nature of the perception."^ Though this judgment
is so coirenon as to defy definition, it can be said with assurance that every
operation of the senses implies judgment or belief as well as simple
apprehensions.^ Since Reid can find no proof of the fact that we first
1 Reid, op.cit., Vol. I, p.~To57
2 Ibid., p. 107.
3 Ibid., p. 209.
k For an analytical discussion of Raid's concept of judgment, cf.
G.E. Davie, The Scotch Metaphysics (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, E.U.L.),
pp. 77f., especially pp. 95-96.
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perceive isolated ideas, and since experience contradicts the concept of
judgment as the result of comparative apprehensions, he rejects completely
this principle of the ideal system.
A more basic question than the relationship of ideas, however, is the
question of their very existence. Reid attacks the ambiguity of the term
"idea" as used by Locke and "impression" as used by Hume. These words may
refer either to the operation of the mind or the object of that operation; and
it is the idea as object who3e existence Reid calls into question. "The ideas
of whose existence I require the proof, are not the operations of any mind,
but supposed objects of those operations." As he is not presented with any
proof, he denies the existence of all such "images of external things" in the
mind.
2
It is of interest that Reid found a high place for ridicule in his
negative criticism of the ideal theory. Opinions which "contradict first
principles are distinguishable from other errors, by this: that they are not
only false but absurd."'' Reid points out that in one aspect his own doctrine
forms the reductio ad absurdum of the whole ideal system. "Locke starts with
minds, ideas, and matter. Berkeley disproves matter and retains minds and
ideas, Hume denies the existence of minds and preserves only ideas. And Reid
1 Ibid., p. 208.
2 Reid said that if Hume's friends had suspected that he tried to put
into practice when alone the principles he professed when in society, they
would have had the charity never to leave him in solitude. Ibid., p. 102.
3 Ibid., p. 438® Reid clearly follows Shaftesbury at this point:
"Soma Mora'L and Philosophical Truths there are withal so evident in themselves,
that it would be easier to imagine half Mankind to have run mad and joined
precisely in one and the same Species of Folly, than to admit any thing as
Truth which should be advanced against such natural knowledge, fundamental
reason, and common sense." Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions,
Times, p. 147*
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in turn denies ideas. Thus the development of thought has by a necessary process,
A
led to the destruction of the whole apparatus with which Locke started."
Reid's work, however, was not only criticial but also constructive. Having
got rid, by whatever means of the only existences which Hume allowed, he is able
to reassert the real existence of mind and external objects. He did not start
absolutely de novo with the convictions of common sense, but rather arrogated in
large measure the results of Locke's work, simultaneously subjecting it to common
sense investigation. G-.A. Johnston states: "In one aspect, then, Reid may be
regarded as Locke purged and Locke re-created. It is only a mild exaggeration
2
to say that Reid's system is a critical reconstruction of Locke." Even so
Reid reached his own position, not by mere assertion, but by means of a new
analysis of relations. These are not produced by comparing distinct ideas.
"It is not by having first the notions of mind and sensation, and then comparing
them together, that we perceive the one to have the relation of a subject...,
and the other that of an act or operation: on the contrary, one of the related
3
things - to wit sensation - suggests to us both the correlate and the relation."
Sensation differs from perception in that sensation is an act of the mind which
has no object distinct from the act, and perception is an act of knowledge whose
object is the real external thing.^ Though he is not consistent in his use of
5
these terms, Reid lays great stress on this distinction. The universal tendency
is to confuse the sensation with the external quality perceived; and though we
1 Johnston, op.cit., p. 7.
2 Ibid., p. 8.
3 Reid, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 111.
4 Ibid., p. 229.
5 Cf. E.L. Mascall, Words and Images, p. 114, where he refuses to "launch"
himself "down the slippery slope at the bottom of which lies Locke with his
identification of perception with sensation."
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draw no distinction in language, the distinction does really exist. For
example, a rose may give rise to a certain sensation of smell, but our
sensation of' smell is quite distinct from the smell which actually exists in
the rose. Y/e are apt to confuse these two different things because they are
amalgamated in experience. In thinking out the relation of sensation and
perception Reid states that on the occasion of sensation, we perceive material
objects and their qualities, existing independently of the percipient mind.
Sensation is the condition of perception; yet bare sensation itself is neither
an object of knowledge nor can it give complete knowledge of an object; for that
perception is necessary. In short, there is first a sensation in the mind, and
then this sensation "suggests" a perception by which we know the external thing.
Hume had said that his difficulties would disappear if his perceptions inhered
1 Though it is not our intent to give a'critical evaluation of Reid's
philosophy, several problems should be mentioned at this point, a) Kis choice
of the word "suggests" makes ambiguous his doctrine of immediate perception.
Though he is aware of this ambiguity, he does not effectively guard against
it. The word gold "suggests" a certain metal and a sensation of touch "suggests"
hardness; but there is an important difference between the two "suggestions":
"in the first, the suggestion is the effect of habit and custom; in the second,
it is not the effect of habit, but of the original constitution of our Hinds"
(Works, Vol. I, p. 121). He uses the word "suggestion" in the latter sense
because he knows "not one more proper to express a power of the mind, which
seems entirely to have escaped notice of the philosophers, and to which we owe
many of our simple notions which are neither impressions nor ideas, as well
as many original principles of belief" (Works, Vol. I, p. 111). b) Reid is
inconsistent in maintaining the distinction between sensation and perception.
So vacillating is his language that one wonders whether he held that in percep¬
tion we have an immediate knowledge of the material world, or that we have a
conception of material things and also a belief in their existence. At some
points he broadly asserts that material things are the immediate objects of
perception ("Works, Vol. I, pp. 183-186, 208, 427); and at other points he says,
with equal clearness, that there are two ingredients in the operation of
perception, "first, the conception or notion of the object; and secondly, a
strong and irresistible conviction and belief of its present existence"
(Works, Vol. I, p. 258). c) Perhaps the root of the above problems is to be
found in Reid's abstract division of the act of knowing into sensation and
perception. He summons no proof for this analysis; in fact he plainly
admits that sensations have no name in any language and that they are almost
inseparable in our imagination (Works, Vol. I, p. 123). He sets forth no
evidence that sensations are precursors of perceptions, and admits again
that sometimes sensations merely accompany perceptions. Here Reid appears
to be guilty of the fault for which he criticizes Looke and Hume, that is,
the separating of a single concrete act into various elements by a process of
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in something simple and individual, or if his mind could perceive some real
connection among them. Raid's proposed theory of knowledge claimed to give
' 1
positive assurance at these points. The dominant points in his theory were
the assertion of a material world known by the human mind, the universality of
belief in this reality apart from the perception of it, and the absurdity of
doubting its existence in favor of the doctrine that we are cognizant only of
ideas. There is here a thoroughgoing dualism. On one hand is the perceiving
mind, with its sensations, conceptions and beliefs; on the other are material
substances and their qualities.
B. The Principles of Common Sense Philosophy
In support of this theory, Keid pointed to certain principles manifested
in the course of human experience, principles more basic than "ideas" and
"impressions," These principles "are judgments of nature - immediately inspired
o
by our constitution."'" He, therefore, chooses to call them "first principles
3of common sense" - "first principles" because they "are no sooner understood
than they are believed....There is no searching for evidence, no weighing
of arguments; the proposition is not deduced or inferred from another; it
has the light of truth in itself, and has no occasion to borrow it from
abstraction. In so doing Reid has created "suggestions" and "sensations" which
"might be quite as troublesome intermediaries as ideas" and "impressions"
(James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy, 1875 > p. 212. Cf. G-.E. Davie, The
Scotch Metaphysics. pp. 153f- Cf. A.D. Woozley, Reid's Essays on the
Intellectual Powers of Man, pp. xviiif.).
1 W.R. Sorley, A History of British Philosophy to 1900, p. 206.
2 Reid, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 110 - see also p. 111.
3 Ibid. , p. 108, This term was formally introduced into philosophy by
Shaftesbury, though he admits it was in use before. For a historical survey of
the phrase "common sense" and its significance in philosophical works see James
McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy, pp. 220-222. Reid's own treatment of the term
is found in Works, Vol. I, pp. U21-2+26, where he concludes that common sense is
but "another name for one branch or one degree of reason." He ascribes to
reason two offices: "The first is to judge of things self-evident; the second
to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. The first
of these is the province, the sole province of Comaon sense." Works, Vol. I,
p. 425. For a discussion on Reid's use of the term, cf. A.D. Woozley, Re id's
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, pp. xxxiif.
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another" - "of common sense" because all men possessed of common sense, "the
2
gift of Heaven for judging things self-evident," agree in these principles.
The philosophy of common sense then is an attempt to establish prior
principles or primary beliefs which might be accepted as criteria of truth
and these principles inhere in the constitution of human nature.
It is most interesting to note that though Reid put forward these
principles as "the foundation of all reasoning and of all science," he
never seeks to prove them - and that for several reasons. First, they
cannot be logically inferred, for to do so would require premises more obviously
true than the truths of "common sense" itself, and there are none. Second,
arguments for the existence of the obvious are often more harmful than helpful.
Such arguments are weak at best; and those sensitive to the fallacies of the
arguments are liable to deny the reality along with the weak reasoning. Third,
proof is altogether unnecessary as common sense principles are strong enough
to support themselves. They are simply taken for granted.
Though it is contrary to the nature of first principles to admit of
apodictical proof, yet there are certain ways of reasoning about them so that
the true are confirmed and the false deleted. Reid mentions three such methods
of reasoning.^ 1) An ad^ hominem argument proposes to show "that a first
principle which a man rejects stands upon the same footing with others which ha
4
admits." If this is true, the man must be guilty of inconsistency. 2) An
ad absurdura argument supposes that the contradictory proposition is true,
traces the consequences, and, if any be found absurd, concludes that the
sux:position from which it came is fals9, and therefore the contradictory,
r~Ibid., p.~434^ 2 Ibid., P. 230. 3 Ibid.T p. 439*
4 An excellent illustration of this argument is to be found in Butler's
Analogy. Infra, p. 46.
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is true. 3) Ihe general agreement among men of different ages and nations,
educated and uneducated, "ought to have great authority with regard to first
principles." .Reid believed that men of candor and capacity, who are not
misled by some bias or mistaken religious principle, but who love truth and
have the patience to examine things "cooly, " always come to unanimity with
regard to common sense principles and deductions from them. Hence proceeds
his repetitious appeal to the universal opinion of the common man. In any
thing beyond the reach of common understanding "the many are led by the few
and willingly yield to their authority." But where common sense is concerned,
"the few must yield to the many."
Ultimately however, when pressed as to why he supports a world consisting
of minds plus matter as opposed to a world consisting of minds plus ideas,
Reid's only answer is that the former is more "consentaneous" with common sense
than the latter. And although he begins his philosophy by calling into
question the presuppositions of Hume's conclusions, he finds himself faced
with the equally impossible task of proving his own. He simply has no answer
to the question, "How do I know the first principles of common sense to be
true?" Sir James Mackintosh once remarked to Thomas Brown that "Reid and Hume
differed more in words than in opinion"; and Brown answered, "Yes; Reid
bawled out, We must believe an outward world; but added in a whisper, We
can give no reason for our belief. Hume cries out, We can give no reason
1
for such a notion; and whispers, I own we cannot get rid of it."
But what are these first principles of common sense, these self-evident
propositions inherent in the constitution of human nature? Reid divides these
2
principles into those of contingent and those of necessary truths. The
1 James Mackintosh, Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy
(1872), p. 236.
2 For an evaluation of this classification, cf. A.D. Woozley,
Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. xxxiii.
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former assert the validity of knowledge derived from sense, memory, or
immediate consciousness of mental operations; and while these principles are
but statements of what is or has been, the principles of necessary truths
tell us what must be. Contingent truths are mutable, "depending upon some
effect of will and power," but necessary truths are immutable and their
A
contrary is impossible. These principles are given in Reid's own words,
o
slightly compressed.
I. Principles of Contingent Truths.
1. The existence of everything of which I am conscious.
2. The thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a being which
I call myself, my mind, my person.
3. Those things did really happen which I distinctly remember.
4. Our own personal identity and continued existence as far back as
ws remember distinctly.
5. Those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our
senses, and are what we perceive them to be.
6. We have some degree of power over our actions, and the determinations
of our wills.
7. The natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error,
are not fallacious.
8. There is life and intelligence in our fellow-men with whom we
converse.
9. That certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and
gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions
of the mind.
10. There is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact,
and even to human authority in matters of opinion.
11. There are many events depending on the will of man in which there is
a self-evident probability, greater or less according to circumstances.
12. In the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like to
what has been in similar circumstances.
II. Principles of Necessary Truths.
1. Grammatical Principles: such as, that every adjective in a sentence
must belong to some substantive expressed or understood; that every
complete sentence must have a verb.
2. Logical axioms; such as, that every proposition is either true or
false; that no proposition can be both true and false; that
reasoning in a circle proves nothing.
3. Mathematical axioms.
1 Reid, Works, Vol. I, pp. 441-442.
2 Ibid., pp. 1(42-461. Raid's own division and enumeration is
retained for the sake of later reference.
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4. Axioms in matters of task.
5. Moral Principles: such as, that a generous action has more merit
than a merely just one; that no man ought to be blamed for what it
was not in his power to hinder.
6. Metaphysical principles: such as,
a. That the qualities which we perceive by our senses must have a
subject, which we call body, and that the thoughts we are
conscious of must have a subject, which we call mind.
b. That whatever begins to exist must have a cause which
produced it.
c. That design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred, with
certainty, from marks or signs of it in the effect.
C* 'fbe Pliance of Common Sense Philosophy
At this point our attention is arrested, not by the principles per se,
1
nor by a critical analysis and evaluation of these principles, but by the
applicability of these principles in the area of theology. Remembering that
Reid was himself a theologian as well as a philosopher it is not suprising to
find some application of these principles to points of doctrine in his own
p
philosophical writings. Often introduced as examples or illustrations, thas
applications are not fully developed; yet the line of reasoning is obvious.
1 For an evaluation of these principles see: 1) James McCosh
The Scottish Philosophy, pp. 2l8f. 2) Henry Laurie, Scottish Philosophy in
it's National Development, pp. 149f• 3) The most complete examination of
Reid's whole philosophical system is to be found in S.A. Grave's Scottish
Philosophy of Common Sense.
2 Neither is it surprising, on the other hand, to find Reid's
discussion of credulity and belief couched in and tinted by his theology.
The very principles of common sense "which the constitution of our nature
leads us to believe" are no less than the "inspiration of the Almighty."
(Works, Vol. I, p. 209)- the "handiwork of the Almighty" (ibid., p. 252).
No reason can be given for them but the "will of our l£aker"~*(lbid, p. 247).
In fact all the faculties of knowledge are given to man by G-oci" (ibid, p. 2485)
It is, therefore, the divinely created mind of man that leads him to faith.
For that reason faith is found in all men irrespective of Christianity.
"I am persuaded," writes Reid, "that the unjust live by faith as well as
the just." (ibid., p. 95).
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For example, his treatment of metaphysical first principles leads Reid to
discuss arguments for "the being and existence of the Supreme Being." From
certain signs or indications in the effect we are able to infer intelligence,
wisdom, and other intellectual or moral qualities in the cause. This first
principle is regarded by Reid as the strongest argument for "the being and
providence of the Deity." Its adaptability is so obvious that he "need
hardly mention its importance in natural theology." Nevertheless he does by
saying that when "we attend to the marks of good contrivance which appear in
the works of God, every discovery we make in the constitution of the material
or intellectual system becomes a hymn of praise to the great creator and
A
Governor of the world." This teleological argument for the existence of God
will be further treated in chapter II, but suffice it to note here that such
an argument is the logical result of such a principle when the principle is
so applied.
In his explanation of the sixth contingent principle Reid touches upon
the origin and consequential responsibility of Ban's free will. If we have
"some degree of power over our actions," from whence comes such power?
2
Reid's answer is that "all power must be derived from the fountain of power."
He adds that its continuance is also dependent upon God's "good pleasure...,
and it is always subject to his control." The application of this first
principle in theology leads to the doctrine of human responsibility. "Beings
to whom God has given any degree of power, and understanding to direct them
to the proper use of it, must be accountable to their Maker.
In seeking to establish the first principle that "there is life and
intelligence in our fellow-men," Reid concludes that the best reason far this
conviction is the awareness that other men's "words and actions indicate like
1 Reid, Ibid., p. 460.
3 Ibid., p. 446.
2 Ibid., p. 446.
powers of understanding as we are conscious of in ourselves." By elevating
this process we are given insights into the nature of the Deity, and on the
basis of this same principle we are justified in assuming life and intelligence
in the Author of nature. Though undeveloped, these comments give hints as to
how theologians might make use of the principles of common sense.
Although Reid himself was more interested in stating first principles than
in applying them to points of theology, some of his associates in the Aberdeen
society did concern themselves with the latter task. One such man was George
2
Campbell (1719-1796) who, in his Dissertation on IrLracles sought to oppose
the scepticism of Hume on the basis of common sense principles. The work is
worthy of a brief survey for several reasons. It will further enlighten our
understanding of the philosophical background of Hill by bringing into focus
the sharp conflict between Hume and the theologians of tradition; it will enable
us to see more clearly how common sense principles were applied to doctrinal
issues; and it was a work well known and often quoted by Hill, one which
obviously molded much of his own thinking at particular points. In
acknowledging his debt to this book, he says it is "one of the best polemical
treatises that was ever written...I consider this dissertation as a standard
book for students of divinity.
Campbell's first reply to Hume's Sssay on Miracles came in a sermon
preached before the Synod of Aberdeen on October 9, 1760. Upon their request
to prepare it fox* wider circulation, he modified the form and published it in
1762 under the title, A Dissertation on I.'iracles. To understand the
significance of Campbell's answer to Hume, we must understand the force of
Hume's sceptical argument; and to understand Hume's argument we must
1 Ibid. , p. 44% "
2 Though published before Reid's earliest work, it nonetheless rests
its argument on many of Reid's principles. It should be remembered that Reid
propounded his theory in the Aberdeen club long before organizing its various
facets for publication.
3 George Hill, L.I.P.. Vol. I, p. 69.
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1
•understand two basic elements in his thought - his conception of God, and his
2
doctrine of causation.
Though Hume always professed belief in a Supreme Being, however
inconsistently this notion may have fitted into his system, he is not a theist
in the true sense of the term. In fact James Orr states that the principles
of Hume's philosophy destroy the foundations of theism; and yet if his
repeated professions carry any weight at all, "he did stop short in practice
of this extreme position (/atheis_m7, and gave theism the benefit of Academic
doubt."-'' In a letter to Hugh Blair conoarriing Campbell's comments about him,
Hume objects to being considered an atheist, writing, "I could wish your
friend had not deraoninated me an infidel writer, on account of ten or twelve
pages which seem to him to have that tendency....Is a man to be called a
drunkard because he has been fuddled once in his lifetime."^ Orr concludes,
however, that even -when granted the utmost to his claims, Hume's "Theism
is found to be purely a speculative, inoperative thing, hardly deserving
to be described by so dignified a name.
1 N. Kemp Smith says that Hume's treatment of miracles rests upon the
premise "that we have and can have, no grounds either in reason or in
experience for postulating the kind of God to whom alone the Scriptural or
other miracles can b<2 fittingly ascribed. This, and not the sheerly
logical considerations bearing on belief, testimony, and evidence generally,
is the context within which the issues regarding miracles properly arise."
Hume's Dialogue concerning natural Religion (with introduction by Smith), p. 6A-
2 Concerning the cause ~ effect principle Smith again writes, "What
Hume seeks to show is that this argument, even if its own explicit assumption
be not questioned, fails to establish the kind of Deity that belief in a
particular providence (or in miracles) must require us to suppose."
Ibid., p. 65. Cf. Smith, Philosophy of David Hume, pp. 391ft
3 James Orr, David Hume and His Influence on Philosophy and Theology,
pp. 207-203.
4 George Campbell, Dissertation on Piracies, p. 9.
5 Orr, op.cit., p. 208.
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Hume's concept of God is seen most clearly in his Dialogues Concerning
i 2
Natural Religion. 1 Philo, representing the main current of Hume's thought;
prosecutes the refutation of both the argument a_ posteriori and the argument
a priori for an intelligent Being behind the universe. Man's mental endowments
simply do not enable him to comprehend the nature of' an infinite, omnipotent,
and omniscient Being. "We must be far removed from the smallest tendency to
scepticism not be be apprehensive, that we have here got quite beyond the reach
of our faculties.""' When we speculate about such a Being, we become like
foreigners in a strange country who may at any moment transgress the laws and
customs of the people among whom they live® The difference between human
intelligence and infinite intelligence is so immense that we cannot reason from
the one to the other (just the opposite of Reid's principle). "Let us beware,
lest we think that our ideas anywise correspond to his perfections, or that
his attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among men.God's
manner, ways, and attributes are simply incomprehensible.
But there is besides this vacuum in the mind of man, positive evidence
to refute the reality of the kind of Deity that belief in miracles requires
us to hold. The miser3r, catastrophe, and imperfection of the universe
5
nullify the idea of a benevolent, kind Being. Lock, says Philo, upon the
1 Composed 1751-1755, but not published until 17/9, three .years after
Hume's death.
2 As interpreted by K. Kemp Smith. For other interpretations see
Smith's Hume's Dialogues, p. IS.
3 David Hume, Philosophical Works, Vol. II, p. 429®
4 Ibid., p. 457®
5 R.W. Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox (1958), p. 69. "This is a
special case to which David Hume drew memorable attention.. .he argued that
if we are.. .relying exclusively on a x;roof of God from the.. .marks of
benignity, found in the world...we have no right to say that despite the
evil and the suffering he is morally perfect."
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human sphere alone and see what tremendous ill it inculcates. "Man is the
greatest enemy of man. Oppression, injustice, contempt, violence, sedition,
war, calumny, treachery, fraud; by these they mutually torment each other;
and they would soon dissolve that Society which they had formed were it not
•1
for the dread of still greater ills, which must attend their separation."
With this tirade Philo the sceptic rests his argument against the theistic
conception of God. Now, if his argument be admitted, theism falls to the
ground, and with it the idea of divine revelation. Consequently, there is no
place for miracles, for theism is a necessary presupposition to the idea of
a miracle. Hume's rejection of the miraculous, then, is the inevitable
result of his rejection of theism.
The second element in Hume's philosophical thought which bears a relation
to his treatment of miracles is his doctrine of causation. This doctrine
ordinarily implies that a definite cause will produce a definite effect, and
that, given a certain set of conditions, we may reason _a priori to a certain
effect or set of events; i.e., from like conditions, we may reasonably expect
like effects. It is this thesis which Hume rejects, for he argued that reason
cannot discover any constant conjunction between one object and another.
Such a connection is discernible only through experience. For instance when
we infer heat from the sight of a flame, this inference is the product of
habitual or customary experience. The one object we reckon to be the cause,
the other to be the effect. Cause and effect, then, signify nothing more than
conjoined phenomena; and when we say that one object is connected with another,
we only mean that they "have acquired a connection in our thought, and give
rise to this inference by which they become proofs of each other's existence...."
When this theory is pushed to its logical conclusion as Hume wished to do, we
find that there is no causal nexus. The order and regularity discoverable in
~
1 Hume, philo'sor.hical Works, Vol. II, p. 503«
2 Ibid.. Vol. I, p. 89.
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the universe is always relative to the experience of the observer. In the
final analysis pure experience is the only guide to truth, and it is not
infallible.^
Bearing in mind these ideas of Deity and causation, let' us consider Hume's
Essay on Miracles. He begins with reference to Archbishop Tillotson's argument
against the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. The principle
which Tillotson employed is that the testimony of others taken by itself is
inferior to the evidence of our sense; and that the evidential value of the
testimony diminishes with the passing of time. Hume suggests that this same
argument may be applied with great force against any historical account of an
extraordinary or miraculous event. The use of this principle is intended to
show that miracles do not admit the sort or the amount of evidence necessary
2
to prove their occurance.
Since, in accordance with his doctrine of causation, Hume rejects
experience as an infallible guide, he says that "a wise man...proportions
his belief to the evidence."3 if the past experience of this "wise man"
has shown that a certain event proceeds invariably from a given cause, then
he accepts this experience with full assurance of the future existence of that
event; but in those experiences which show no conjunction of events, the most
he can posit about the future is a "probability." In such cases the "wise man"
weighs the evidence cautiously, balancing the instances of regular sequences
with irregular ones, and determines his acceptance or rejection of the evidence
1 Ibid., p."T2U7
2 A.E. Taylor points out that alongside this purpose there is another,
namely, to show whether or not miracles prove the control of events by a
divine purpose. Since one is logical and the other theological, Hume intro¬
duces a source of confusion into his argument. Yet, Taylor suggests that
this confusion was intentional for without it Hume could not have attracted
any special attention; "and Hume was above everything, determined that he
would be talked about." David Hume and the uiraculous, p. 21.
3 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 110.
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mathematically. The weightier evidence, "the scale with the greatest number
of instances," carries the strength of acceptance.
Hume states that there are a number of particulars which make human
testimony at best a most precarious sort of evidence. These are, primarily,
the facts of opposing testimony, the character and number of witnesses, their
relation to the event, their manner of delivering the testimony, and all
these conditions taken together. The presence of these factors often cause
us to regard with suspicion testimony about the most general facts of
experience. Nov/ supposing that the fact which, human testimony is seeking to
establish is of an extraordinary or miraculous character, then we surely will
be predisposed, he holds, to doubt the truth of that fact upon the evidence
of testimony alone. Besides, an extraordinary phenomenon falls outside the
sphere of common experience, and thus the testimony in support of it is auto-
2
matically opposed by our ordinary experience of the course of events. There¬
fore, evidence in support of such an extraordinary event, derived from human
testimony, "admits of a diminuation, greater or less, in proportion as the fact
is more or less unusual."^
Hume's next step is to press his inquiry into the realm of the miraculous.
In a pertinent footnote, N.K. Smith writes,
In substance, Hume's professedly 'decisive' argument against miracles
is that a complete induction based on all previously experienced
instances of the kind can never be overturned by testimony (itself a
mode of experience) to what, as miraculous, is ex hypothesi, contrary
to this induction - i.e., 'a water evidence (numerically considered)
can never destroy a stronger.* ^
1 Ibid<< pp> 112-113. ~ 2 Ibid., pp. 113-114.
5 Ibid., p. 113.
h N. Kemp Smith, Hume's Dialogues, p. 59, footnote 1.
Infra, p. 30.
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To strengthen this point Hume defines a miracle as "a violation of the
ilavs of nature"; and adds that since a "firm and unalterable experience has
established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of
2
the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can be possibly imagined."
Therefore, there is no necessity for examining the testimony to a miraculous
event, however great that testimony may be, for the nature of the event
precludes its reality. The fact that all men die is an acknowledged lav/ of
nature, and is in no way miraculous; but that a man should rise from the dead
is an event which contradicts e^erience. Uniform experience, therefore,
provides "a direct and full proof" against the reality of this miracle.^
Hume soon turns from this first definition of a miracle and introduces
a second. Now a miracle is regarded as "a transgression of a law of nature
by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some
invisible agent. It is a means whereby God manifests immediate intervention
in the ordinary sequence of events. With this "surprising and famous volte-
face," as Taylor calls it, Hume concludes the first part of his Essay. From
his first definition he has argued for the inviolability of the laws of nature;
from the second he argues that events may occur outside the order of nature.
1 Hume, Enquiry, p. 114. Smith observes that by the phrase "violation
of the laws of nature," Hume merely means to indicate what is contrary to
the ordinary course of nature, that is, the supernatural. Hume's Dialogues,
p. 61. Hume himself wrote, "Nothing is esteemed a miracle if it ever
happens in the common course of nature." Enquiry, p. 115.
2 Ibid. , p. 114« Leslie Stephen has pointed out that this whole
notion of "laws of nature" established by "unalterable experience" is
extraneous not only to Hume's argument here, but to his whole philosophical
theory. As he understands it, the very purpose of Hume's argument is to
dismiss the question of the _a priori possibility of miracles as irrelevant,
and to set aside the whole discussion as to the meaning of natural laws,
th^ir adoption and modification. English Thought in the Eighteenth
Century, Vol. I, p. 339.
3 Ibid., p. 115. 4 Ibid. , p. 115.
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Hums, undoubtedly aware of the difficulty involved in his reasoning, is eager
to return to the position he has temporarily abandoned; that is, that no
sort or amount of evidence can establish the reality of a miracle.
The second part of Hume's Essay is essentially an amplification of the
argument pursued in the first part, freed from the conflicting definitions
of miracles. In this section he concedes that the testimony for- miracles
may amount to entire proof; but, in reality, he adds, when we consider the
several circumstances intricately involved in testimony, we find that "there
1
never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence." In the
first place, the number, ability, and character of witnesses are such that vre
can never believe their reports. Secondly, the tendency of human nature is
to be over-credulous of strange and extraordinary events, a fact proven by
numerous instances of forged miracles. Thirdly, accounts of miraculous
events abound chiefly among "ignorant and barbarous nations." And finally,
the fact that miracles have been wrought is support of rival systems of
2
religion diminishes their authority. The major point Hume is laboring is that
though a miracle may possibly be proved by human testimony, it "can never be
proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion."^
Hume's last point serves as a sensational conclusion, for he declares
that he has rescued the Christian religion from all its enemies who would
place its defense upon the judgment of the human race. "Our most holy
religion is founded on Faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of
4
exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure,"
1 Ibid. ,"p"7 116." " 2 Ibid. , pp. 116-1217
3 Ibid., p. 127. The significance of this point for Hill will be seen
more clearly in the next chapter when we discuss the "evidences" of Christianity
in which miracles are used to support the divine origin of Christian revelation.
Had this point been granted, a major portion of the rationalistic proof for
Christianity would have been nullified.
4 Hume, Ibid., p. 130. This statement of Hume has given rise to various
interpretations. James Orr says this "mocking deference to a religion in
which he had no particle of real belief is one of the most offensive features
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It is noteworthy in the light of this conclusion, to find Campbell, in
the Advertisement of his Dissertation, disavowing any intention of meeting
Hume on less than reasonable grounds: "The argument of the essayist I have
endeavoured to refute by argument: Mere declamation I know no way of refuting
but by analysing it; nor do I conceive how inconsistences can be answered
otherwise than by exposing them."'' In a brief introduction, Campbell reviewed
his own position regarding the use of reason in the Christian religion. He
forthrightly rejects any belief in the ability of unaided reason to produce
the Christian faith. "...the religion of Jesus could not, by the single aid
of reasoning, produce its full effect upon the heart....No arguments,
unaccompanied by the influences of the Holy Spirit, can convert the soul
from sin to God....The principles of our religion would never have been
2discovered by the natural and unassisted faculties of man...." This, however,
does not mean for Campbell that reason has no place in the Christian religion.
Both the gospel and common sense rebel against the notion that the truths of
Christianity can admit no rational evidence. On the contrary Campbell insists
that Christ himself "argued, both with his disciples and with his adversaries,
as with reasonable men, on the principles of reason."^ We then, like Jesus,
must employ reason in order to show that God has given evidence of Himself in
the world, both moral and external, "sufficient to convince the impartial,
to silence the gainsayer and to render inexcusable the atheist and the
unbeliever."^
in his writings...the adding, if that -were possible, of insult to injury."
David Hume, p. 196. More moderate, however, is the judgment of N.K. Smith who
points out that Hums deliberately patterned his conclusion after the declared
teaching of the Reformed Churches, that faith is not possible unless one has
the assistance of divinely-bestowed grace. Surely, says Smith, "...in these
circumstances his irony is not unpardonable." Hume's Dialogues, p. 60.
1 George Campbell, Dissertation on Miracles, p. vi.
2 Ibid. , p. 12. 3 Ibid. , p. 12. 4 Ibid., p. 1jJ.
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Like Hume's Essay, Campbell1 s Dissertation is in two parts. Part I is
entitled, "I/dracles are capable of Proof from Testimony, and Religious Piracies
are not less capable of this Evidence than others." Part II bears the heading,
"The Miracles on which the Belief of Christianity is founded, are sufficiently
-j
attested." Campbell's early case against Hume may be summarised under
several points. 1) Hume's argument is "built upon a false hypothesis."
Testimony does not, as Hume maintains, derive its validity as evidence from
experience, but rather has a "natural and original influence on belief,
antecedent to experience." This fact is demonstrated in the life history of
an individual, A person is more credulous of testimony when a child than
when an adult, for as an adult he relies more upon experience. In other
2
words, inexperienced youth is unsuspecting; age is cautious and doubting.
Hume's theory, however, suggests the reverse of this in that testimony must
be tried if it is to carry any weight as evidence. Campbell's contention on
the other hand is that "there is the strongest presumption in favor of testi¬
mony, till properly refuted by experience." This argument rests upon a first
principle of common sense that "there are, and must be, in human nature, some
original grounds of belief, beyond which our researches cannot proceed, and
of which therefore it is vain to attempt a rational account."-^ 2) Hume's
refutation of testimony is unreasonable. "It supposes by consequence that
contrary observations have a weight in opposing testimony, which the first
1 Our interest lies in those aspects of Campbell's argument wnica
manifest the adoption of common sense principles to this particular theological
issue. No good is served by giving a full exposition of Campbell's position,
as he has done that himself. Summary extracted from Dissertation, pp. 18-29.
2 Cf. Reid, Works, Vol. I, p. 450. "If children were so framed as to
pay no regard to testimony or to authority, they must, in the literal, sense,
perish for lack, of knowledge. It is not more necessary that they should be
fed before they can feed themselves, than that they should be instructed in
many things before they can discover them by their own judgment. But, v/hen
our faculties ripen, we find reason to check that propensity to yield to
testimony and to authority which is so necessary and so natural in the first
period of life."
3 Campbell, op.cit., p. 19.
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and most acknowledged principles of human reason, or if you like the term
■\
better, common sense, evidently show that they have not." Hume had argued
that the nature of the event determines the worth of the testimony - the greater
the uniqueness of the event, the less the validity of the testimony. Campbell
allows that the content of the report influences the value of the testimony,
but to make this the deciding factor in determining the truth of the
testimony exceeds the limits of nature and contradicts the principles of
common sense. According to Campbell testimony may be "reasonably" refuted
in only one of two ways: by contradictory testimony or by evidence of the
incapacity or bad character of the witnesses sufficient to discredit their
reports. 3) The "magical balance and arithmetic for the weighing and
subtracting of evidence"which Kurue proposes is impractical and "tends to
2
mislead the judgment." By means of a rather lengthy illustration Campbell
seeks to show how this mathematical procedure is contrsry"to the nature of
things." His basic appeal is to the universal agreement that everyone with
common sense will concede that the highest anterior improbability of an alleged
event is counter-balanced by the slightest direct evidence.
In the remainder of the first section Campbell attacks Hume's ambiguous
use of the word "experience," his distinction between what is contrary to
experience and what is not conformable to experience, his concession that a
miracle may possibly be proved by human testimony, though it can never be proved
so as to be the foundation of a system of religion, his "misuse" of Tillotson's
principle. He employs a form of the common sense argumentum ad hominem to
refute Hume's contention that the presence of belief in miracles among many
religions may be accounted for by pointing to the "passion for the marvellous"
and the "religious affection" in human nature.
1 Ibid. , p. 29.
2 Ibid., p. 29. Smith refers to this as "Hume's unfortunate emphasis
upon mere number of instances."
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The second part of' the Dissertation, like the latter part of Hume's
Essay, is largely illustrative of the principles set forth in Part I, and
adds little to Campbell's case. It is -worthy of mention only as an excellent
example of the treatment given miracles in the popular "Evidences of Christianity."
At least to the extent that George Hill incorporated this -work into his
own lectures, he adopted the principles of common sense philosophy; and so in
readily admitting the plenary appropriation of Campbell's argument he leaves
no doubt as to the fact that he aligned himself with common sense as opposed
to scepticism.
It is not true that our belief in testimony rests wholly upon experience;
for, as every man has a principle of veracity which leads him to speak
the truth, unless his mind be under some particular wrong bias, so we
are led, by the consciousness of this principle, and by the analogy
which we suppose to exist between our own mind and the mind of ethers, '
to believe that they also speak the truth, until we learn by experience
that they mean to deceive us. It is not accurate to state the firm and
unalterable experience which is said to establish the laws of nature
as some-,That distinct from testimony; for since the observations of any
individual are much too limited to enable him to judge of the uniformity
of nature, the word experience, in the sense in which it is used in this
proposition, presupposes a faith in testimony, for it comprehends the
observations of ethers communicated to us through that channel. It is
not true that a firm and unalterable experience hath established the
laws of nature, because the histories of all countries are filled with
accounts of aiviations from them.J
1 Infra, p.45 • Campbell's criticism of Hume is well taken at
many points, but his general argument is weak for two reasons. 1) He
founded it on Hume's own grounds without a knowledgeable appreciation
of his own. Alan Richardson has said, "The Church's apologists during
the first half of the eighteenth century failed not because they did not
understand Newtonian science, but because they did not understand the
nature of the biblical revelation." History, Sacred and Profane, p. 22.
2) He built his case without an adequate understanding of Hume's purpose.
Due to this typically shallow treatment of Hume, the theologians of Hill's
day (himself included) failed to realize that Hume had pulled the support
from under rationalized natural theology. It remained therefore, for a
later generation, at a distance sufficiently removed from the turmoil,
to praise Hume for his efforts.
2 Cf. Reid's eighth principle of contingent truth; "There is
life and intelligence in our fellow men with whom we converse."
3 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. I, pp. 69-70.
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It is interesting to note in passing that this book also reflects Kill's
own attitude toward Hume. When Hill, as a young man, first met Hume, he was
* 1
not favorably impressed with him as a person, and years later he was no more
impressed with him as a philosopher. He writes, "Mr. Hume boasted of /Til£y
reasoning as unanswerable, and he holds it forth in his Essay on Miracles as
an everlasting check to superstition. The principles upon v/hich the reasoning
proceeds have been closely sifted and their fallacy completely exposed in
2
Campbell's Dissertation on Miracles."
The unique objective of our investigation, however, is the discovery of
ways in which Hill employs the principles of common sense philosophy in his
own theological writings. It can be said generally that his whole approach
to theology is in harmony with the characteristics of the common sense school.
He makes known his intention to adhere consistently to the method of observation
and inductive reasoning."* Reid had followed Bacon in this regard/" and Hill,
aware of this, encourages his own students to Improve their use of reason "by
5
reading Bacon." Since in agreement with this manner of inquiry we must "try
1 "Mr. Campbell ^Hill's tutorial charge/ and I dined on Mond*ay'at General
Abercrombie's, where we met David Hume. I was very glad to be in the company
with a man about whom the world has talked so much; but I was greatly
surprised with his appearance. I never saw a man whose language is more
vulgar, or whose manners are more awkward. It is no affectation of rudeness,
as being a philosopher, but mere clownishness, which is very surprising in
one who has been so much in high life, and many of whose writings display
so much elegance." From a letter quoted by Cook in his Life of Principle
Hill, p. 42.
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. I, p. 69.
5 Ibid. , pp. 19, 62, 265, 418.
4 In a letter to James Gregory, Reid congratulates him on his
acquaintance with Bacon's works, adding "I am very apt to measure a man's
understanding by the opinion he entertains of that author."
Works, Vol. I, p. 11.
5 Hill, L. I.D. . Vol. I, p. 2|28,
every opinion by the touchstone of fact,"^ it ensues that "the trkth of
Christianity turns upon a question of fact; which, like every other question
'
.2
of the same kind, ought to be judged calmly and impartially." The only safe
course of arriving at the truth of Christianity, then, is "by bringing to the
search after it, a mind unembarrassed with any prepossession." Yet, even when
people do come to Christian truth with prejudices, a full consideration of the
facts erases them®
In unison with all common sense philosophers Hill employs self-consciousness
as the instrument of observation. He is forever appealing to certain principles,
beliefs, and affections in the mind.-' In fact, his starting point in theology
is the self-evident first principle that "God is, and that He is a rewarder of
them that seek him" (Heb. 11:6). Characteristically Hill rests this principle
upon the diathesis of human nature; "A foundation so deeply laid in the
constitution of the human mind for the belief of a Deity has produced an
acknowledgment of his being.At this point we note a further influence of
common sense philosophy upon Hill - his constant summoning of universal
opinion to support some statement. He speaks of certain beliefs as being "almost
universal," and of others that are "found amongst all nations civilized in the
smallest degree." He invokes the reinforcements of "general reasonings,"
the "general sense of mankind," and those sentiments that are "universally
allowed.Though ultimate appeal is to necessity rather than this universal
agreement, nevertheless, general concensus has an authority which can not be
minimized.
1 Reid, Works, Vol. I, p. 2yo.
2 Hill> L.I.D., Vol. I, p. 19.
3 Ibid,. ? PP. 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 16. The introductory chapter of Hill's
Lectures in Divinity is an illustration in summary of this fundamental element
of Reid's philosophy.
4 Ibid. , p. 8.
5 Ibid., pp. 8, 14; Vol. II, pp. 17, 36, 328.
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Not only in advancing first principles, but also in defending them Hill
concurs with common sense methodology. He makes use of the argumentum ad
absuraum against the opponents of his basic first principle:
The Atheist allows it to be necessary that something should have
existed of itself from eternity. But he is accustomed to maintain that
matter in motion is sufficient to account for all those appearances
from which we infer the being of God. The absurdities of this hypothesis
have been ably exposed. He supposes that matter is self-existent,
although it has the marks of dependence and imperfection inconsistent
v/ith that attribute. He supposes that natter has from eternity been in
motion, that is, that motion is an essential quality of matter, although
we cannot conceive of motion as any other than an accidental property of
matter, impressed by some cause, and determined in its direction by
foreign impulses. He supposes that all the appearances of uniformity
and design vrtiich surround him can proceed from irregular undirected
movements. And he supposes lastly, that although thei-e is not a plant
which does not spring from its seed, nor an insect -which is not
propagated by its kind, yet matter in motion can produce life and
intelligence, properties repugnant in the highest degree to all the
knoYm properties of matter.''
Thus evidence is counting to indicate how greatly Hill v/as influenced by
common sense philosophy. But more convincing than these general statements are
the specific applications of certain common sense principles. Let it he said
here that Hill's adoption of these principles is so complete that no exhaustive
list can be- given of the particular points at which one can find parallels in
phraseology, modes of reasoning, common appeals, and conclusions dravm; yet a
few illxistrations should be noted in support of our contention. For example,
we detect an application of the first contingent principle ("the existence of
everything of which I am conscious") in Hill's discussion of the moral universe-
the second first principle of his theology. "That God is a rewarcfer of them
that seek him" means that "the government of God is a moral government." Hill
sets forth three particulars of this government acknowledged by God's rational
creatures: the "distribution of pleasure and pain in the mind of nan"; the
"faculty in the human mind which approves of virtue and condemns vice"; and
conscience, which "forbodes that it shall be well with the righteous and ill
with the wicked." Man's awareness of these things is proof of their reality.
1 Ibid., p. 9.
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The pleasure which accompanied one set of affections and the pain which
accompanies the opposite afford an instance in the government of God of
virtue being rewarded, and vice being punished; - the faculty which
passes sentence upon human actions is a declaration from the Author of
our nature of that conduct which is agreeable to Him, because it is a
presentiment of the future consequences of our behavior is a declaration
from the Author of our nature of the manner in which his government is
to proceed with regard to us...to suppose that the Almighty engages
his creatures in a certain course of action by delusive, hopes and fears,
is at once absurd and impious * and if we think worthily of the supreme
Being, we cannot entertain a doubt that He, who by the constitution of
human nature has declared his love of virtue and his hatred o^ vice,
will at length appear the righteous Governor of the universe.
The principle is obvious. Since man, by these means, is conscious of a moral
universe, a moral universe must exist. Hill also makes use of this principle
in the defence of limited atonement and the refutation of universal salvation;
Since many, therefore, to whom the Gospel is published, appear, as far
as we can judge from our own observation, and from the complaints of
Scripture, to remain under the wrath of God, we do not seem to draw an
unwarrantable conclusion, when we infer from the event, that it was not
a part of the intantign of the Almighty to deliver them from wrath by
the death of his Son. ^
Since we are conscious of men's rejection of Christ, this rejection must exist.
In his treatment of the "degrees of inspiration Hill applies the third
principle of contingent truth. Since the things one distinctly remembers
really did happen "it is unnecessary to suppose that this highest degree of
1 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
2 Hill, op.cit,, Vol. Ill, pp. 12-13. Cf. p. 10. "For if faith in
Christ be the condition upon which men become partakers of the propitiation
which ha offered to God, it seems to follow that aLl those who have not
this faith are excluded from the benefit of the propitiation."
3 According to Hill, God may act upon the minds of His creatures in
different ways so as to produce varying degrees of inspiration. "He may
superintend the minds of those who write, so as to prevent the possibility
of error in their writings. This is the lowest degree of inspiration.
He may enlarge their understandings, and elevate their conceptions beyond
the measure of ordinary men. This is second degree. Or he may suggest
to them the thoughts which they shall express, and the words which they
shall employ, so as to render them merely the vehicles of conveying his
will to others. This is the highest degree of inspiration...all three
degrees are possible." L.I.D. , Vol. I, p. 33"''. Note here Hill's use
of Reid's vague term "suggest." He is no more unambiguous in his use of
it than was Reid. Supra, p. 13.
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inspiration is extended through, all parts of the New Testament because there
are many facts in the Gospels, which the apostles might know perfectly from their
own observation or recollection...." ' On the basis of this principle the New
Testament writers were allowed to exercise their own memories and to "bring
forward those discourses and facts which had made the deepest impressions
upon their minds." It is this principle of common sense, thus explained, which.
accounts for the historical value of all New Testament facts, even when such
facts are not always recorded as the result of the highest degree of inspiration.
Since the writer distinctly remembered them, they must have happened.
We have already indicated Hill's use of the tenth principle concerning
human testimony via the Hume-Campbell treatment of miracles, but he makes
further application of this principle in his defense of the canon. If "we
readily receive, upon the authority of tradition, the History of Thucydides,
the Orations of Cicero, the Dialogues of Plato, as really the composition of
these immortal authors, we have much more reason to give credit to the
explicit testimony which the judgments of contemporaries, and the acknowledg-
2
rnents of succeeding ages, have born to the writers of the New Testament."
Though there are both external and internal evidences to support the canonicity
of Scriptural books, none is as satisfying as the evidence of ancient testimony;
and this testimonial assurance is heightened upon remembering that it is the
product of a world which "was very far from being prone to receive every book
which claimed inspiration.
Hil'l did not limit himself to the co-optation of contingent principles.
He speaks of Reid's second metaphysical principle as the principle "which is
prior to all reasoning" - the principle itself being "that every new event,
1 Ibid., Vol. I, p.TdgT ~~~~ "2 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 23-26." "
3 Ibid., p. 23.
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everything which, ws see coming into existence, every alteration in any being
is an effect," Of course, concerning the origin of this principle, "we can give
1
no other account than that it is part of the constitution of the human mind,"
But just because it is so basic we find Hill resting arguments, supporting
conclusions, and defending propositions upon it from start to finish of his
theology. For instance he uses it to "establish" (not prove) the antecedent
first-principle of all theology, that "G-od is." He adapts it in arguing for
the divine origin of Christianity. ^ He employs it to support the necessity of
inspired and infallible Scriptures.^ It is a proper understanding of this
principle which enlightens the mind to comprehend the divine origin of man's
5 6 7
redenption, the deity of Jesus, and the dispensation of faith by the Spirit.'
Though more isolated than the mataphysical principles, the moral principles
of common sense are no less obvious in the writings of Hill, particularly in
his sermons and lectures on Old Testament characters. Raid said that "no man
ought to be blamed for what it was not in his power to hinder"; and Hill said
that "no man is answerable to God, or to his country for the faults of his
progenitors,"^ Raid said, "a generous action has more merit than a merely
just one"; and Hill said, "you do right in improving your dexterity, in
refining your taste, in extending your information, enlarging your views, and
*1 Ibid., p. /o
2 Tbid. , p. 7, His reasoning clearly parallels that of Reid in his
discussion of the eighth principle of contingent truth. See above p. 19®
"Thus from the intelligence of men, we necessarily infer that of their
Creator; while the number of intelligent beings with whom we converse cannot
fail to give us the noblest idea of that original primary intelligence from
which theirs is derived."
7 i PP® 354-357.
8 Sermon preached May 28, 1794, before the Society incorporated by Royal
Charter for the Benefit of the Sons of the Clergy of the Established Church
of Scotland, Scots Magazine, Vol® 56, 1794, P® 544®
3 Ibid., p. 264.
5 Ibid. , pp. 346-347.
4 Ibid. , pp. 310-311.®
6 1646®, PP. 194f.
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following any path to distinction which Providence opens. But all this is not
enough, unless you learn in the school of Christ those graces which profit
others.««'Let all .your things be done with charity.Eeid said that "we
ought not to do to others what we would think unjust or unfair to be dene to
us in like circumstances"; and Hill makes reference, with the same negative
2
amplification, to the "golden rule*"
This last point might well bring into focus a question which has been
beneath the surface throughout this discussion. Since these principles under
observation are so general, are we correct in attributing their presence in
the theology of Hill to the influence of common sense philosophy? Reid's own
position suggests an affirmative answer to the question for he disavows the
creation of anything novel.- He does not claim to be the originator of a
system of philosophy but only one who brings to light in a systematic way and
defends the principles which are known to all men due to the constitution of
their nature. Corarion sense principles did not become operative with his precise
statement of them, but have been in active existence in the mind of man since
God created Adam. No doubt, however, his clarification of" them made men aware
of them as never befox^e. Since Hill apparently accepts this explanation,^ and
1 Hill, Lectures upon Portions of the Old Testament, p. 1G2.„
2 Hill, Theological Institutes, pp. 382»383«
3 Common sense philosophy "is not valuable as a search after truth;
it has made no positive discoveries and will make none. It is not even a
school of instruction in other people's discoveries, for its claim is that
the truths in which it is interested have always been known and are indeed
momentous platitudes. Some of them might need a little clarification and
precision of statement, but that is not a task which could absorb all the
powers of' a philosopher... .The philosophy of common sense is called for
only because these platitudes have been attacked and the attack against them
should be broken up. Its philosophical value is polemical....Something
like this would be Reid's estimate of his philosophy." S.A. Grave,
Common Sense, pp. 130-131. Cf. A.D. Woozley, Reid's Bssays on the
Intellectual Powers o_f Man, p. xi.
4 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. I, pp. 2-7, 194, 195, 210-215.
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since, as we have noted, he evidenced an understanding of, and allegiance to,
the principles as set forth by Reid, we are justified in saying that Hill
was influenced in great measure by the philosophy of common sense. In
Chapter IV" we shall address ourselves to the particular question of our
interest: In what way did the influence of common sense philosophy affect
the development of Hill's ecclesiastical principle?
After completing his study in the University of St. Andrews, where he was
instructed in this philosophy, Hill entered the Divinity Hall of St. Mary's
College. His studies there were soon interrupted, however, by the death of
his father, the Rev. John Hill. As the oldest child of his mother Hill
0.
felt a responsibility for the livlihood of the family, and thus left St. Mary's
in search of employment. Through his uncle Joseph McCormiek he was introduced
to principle William Robertson, who in turn recommended him for a tutorial
position with the London family of Pryse Campbell, Member of Parliament and
Lord of the Treasury. In November, 1767, Hill went to London and assumed his
duties, described by his biographer as "the direction of a youth who might be
p
called to act a distinguished part on the theatre of public life." His
acquaintance with a family of such high station afforded Hill many opportunities
for social and intellectual betterment. He was introduced to prominent men,
attended the best plays, cultivated the art of public speaking, went often to
the House of Commons and enjoyed generally the privileges of his honorable
position. The full pursuit of entertainment, however, did not cause him to
neglect the prosecution of his own studies nor the reading of the most
celebrated modern publications. Nevertheless, he admitted to his mother that
the pressures of family life and tutorial responsibility limited his academic
1 Hill's mother was his father's second wife, a grandniece of Principle
William Carstares, Counsellor of King William III. Seven children were
born of this union of whom George was the oldest.
2 Cook, op.cit. , p. 11.
¥)
enterprises, and that he would "have been a better preacher, a better
ji
philosopher and a better scholar, if (ho) hod staid in St. Andrews." And so,
though he appreciated the advantages of London, it is not with regret that ha
learned of his forthcoming return to Scotland.
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THEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
In 1770 George Hill returned to Scotland. Mr. Campbell had intended that
since hi3 son would inherit large estates in the north of Scotland, he should
receive at least part of his education in a university of that country. Thus it
was as future Scottish laird and devoted tutor that young Campbell and Hill
entered the University of Edinburgh. During the two winters passed there Hill
took opportunity to finish his divinity course, interrupted sorae three years
previously by the death of his father.
Since any formal education makes its impress on the mind of a student,
particularly if the subject matter under review is of primary interest to the
student, it is necessary for us to examine the theological training Hill received
at Edinburgh in our attempt to trace the development of his ecclesiastical
principle, for without doubt, this determined to a large degree the theological
stance from which he formulated this guiding principle.
At least in sorae ways history repeats itself for Hill was no more blessed
with an outstanding theology professor at Edinburgh than with an outstanding
philosophy professor at St. Andrews. During his period of residence the Professor
of Divinity was Robert Hamilton (1707-1787), son of a former principal (William
Hamilton, 1669-1732), and a man noted for his candor and liberal attitude. In a
period of extreme partisanism, he wa3 so well received as to be elected moderator
of the General Assembly in 1754 and again in 1760. Concerning the execution of
his lectureship, Alexander Dower describes Hamilton as "a man of abilities...
o
particularly well skilled in controversial theology." "Controversial theology"
1 We are not to think that Hill's time was given over completely to
theological studies. Evidence arises to prove that he was still vitally
interested in secular history, politics, and the general social life of which
he imbibed so fully while-in London. Cook records in this regard Hill's prize
winning discourse on Aristocracy, his intention to write a history of the
House of Commons, particularly concerning its origins, and his intercourse with
the High Society of Edinbia-gh. Life of Hill, pp. 40-46.
2 Alexander Bower, History of the University of Edinburgh, pp. 366-367.
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was but another name for the discipline of Christian evidences, the application
of logic to the problems of Christianity. Those engaged in this discipline
sought by the use of reason to establish the truths of the Christian faith.
That Hamilton was indeed interested in these rationalistic proofs and that he
incorporated them in lectures to his students is verified by an examination of
the only extant portion of h.is discourses. The Edinburgh University Library
possesses a hand-written manuscript which according to a marginal note was once
part of Hamilton's Frclectiones Theologicae. The pages available for study aro
limited and deal mainly with the doctrine of Scripture, but they serve our purpose
well in that they indicate the course of Hamilton's instruction. It was a
generally accepted dogma of the day that if Scripture could be shown to be the
inspired Word of God, then it should naturally follow for the reasonable man that
the doctrines it contained would be true beyond question, i.e., the inspiration
of Scripture was "proof" of the truth of Christianity. Hamilton follows closely
the popular procedure of the time in attempting to establish inspiration. He
points to the future predictions of the Old Testament and shows how they are
i
fulfilled in the New Testament. He notes the prophecies of Christ and their
subsequent fulfillment. He appeals to the character and claims of apostolic
authority and calls attention to the church's unbroken testimony about the
divine origin of canonical books. He concludes that, since Christianity rests
2
upon a supernatural basis, it must be true.
Though we have no direct way of knowing if Hamilton called forth other
"evidences" in support of Christian truth, we can safely assume that he did.
James Walker remarks that the Scottish divines produced nothing like the English
works on evidences, nevertheless the work was taught to young Scottish
1 This methodology was propounded earlier by William Whiston in The
Accomplishment of Scriptural Prophecies (Boyle Lectures for 1708). Whiston went
so far as to suggest that the evidence furnished by fulfilled prophecy alone was
conclusive. J.A. Dorner, History of Protestant Theology, Vol. II, p. 84.
2 Robert Hamilton, Hand-written manuscript in Edinburgh University Library.
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theologians of the eighteenth century. There is no doubt that Hill was trained
O
in this tradition. And though we have no copy of the other evidences which
Hamilton probably summoned as proof of Christianity, we are not at a loss as
7
to what they ware. The many volumes of "evidences" studied at that time all
contained much the same material, and the most popular arguments were often
quoted directly from the same author. We must as*., then, what constituted the
system of evidences in which. George Hill was instructed®
A. System of Evidences
There were basically two ways of approach to the system of evidences, one
negative, the other positive. The negative approach begins with the presupposition
that any given proposition is liable to one of three verdicts, "proven, not proven,
or disproven.The sole intent of the negative approach is to elevate the claims
of Christianity from the state of disproven to the state of not-proven, to put
c
them on neutral ground, or as Chalmers says, "to bring them up to aero."' The
The sceptic, who states that there is no reason for believing in Christianity,
says something quite different from the adversary who states that there are many
reasons for disbelieving it. The negative approach strives to answer the latter,
1 James Walker, The Theology and the Theoiogians of Scotland, p. A0.
2 At the tender age of nine Hill composed a sermon on the text, "If
they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they bo persuaded though
one should rise from the desd"j and according to his biographer, he "attempted
to state the sufficiency of that evidence which has been actually afforded to
establish the truth of Christianity." Cook, op.oit., p. 5« It is a pity that
a fit of modesty caused Hill to destroy this sermon in later years.
3 For a listing of such volumes see Hill's L, I.D. , Vol. I, pp. 17, 21,
31-33,50-51,103.
4 Thomas Chalmers, Prelections on Butler's Analogy, Palsy's Evidences
of Christianity, and Hill8s Lectures in Divinity, p. d.
5 Ibid., p. 8.
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A classical example of the negative approach is to be found in Butler's
A
Analogy,' one of the most influential theological works ever written in Britain®
Joseph Butler (1692-1752), Bishop of Durham, was in his day the most eminent
opponent of the Deists, eighteenth century rationalists believing in "God" but
not in any unique supernatural revelation or scheme of salvation® They
considered reason to be the solo judge of belief, and though they felt compelled
by reason to accept the arguments of natural religion, they refused to accept
2
the necessity for revealed religion®" Butler's book was entitled, The Analogy
of Religion» Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature.
Taking his stand on the same philosophical ground as his Deist opponents, that
is the empiricist tradition, he intended to show the inconsistency of accepting
natural religion and rejecting revealed religion.
If in spite of all difficulties, you believe the one, you must, in
common fairness, and to be consistent, believe the other® If they
come from the same God there is an _a priori probability that they
will each have the same or similar difficulties, and if, in spite of
all its acknowledged difficulties, you are firmly persuaded of the
1 Hill tells his students that the Analogy "should be particularly
studied." L.I.P. , Vol. I, p. 17. For a list of works on the Analogy see
Chalmers, op.cit., pp. xlvi-1.
2 The distinction between natural and revealed religion should bs
defined. "In the first place, Natural Religion may be used to denote that
knowledge of religious truth and duty which the works of nature ought to
teach us, and which they would actually impart to a pure and upright spirit,
if appointed to dwell in our world for a season." Such knowledge includes
that there is one supreme God, the Creator and Governor of the world, that
His natural works yield evidence of His divine power and wisdom, goodness and
benevolence, and that He chiefly is to be worshipped by men In piety and
virtue. "There is, however, another meaning which may be given to the phrase,
Natural Religion. It may denote that knowledge of religious truth and duty
which a heathen would actually gain from the works of nature in the entire
absence of revelation." What percentage of 'available' knowledge is 'actual'
knowledge remains an open question, but at least enough is known to keep
"the first elements of religious truth" from being "wholly blotted out even
frora the minds of savages." In contrast the meaning of Revealed Religion is
singular. The term refers consistently to the unique and particular concepts
of the gospel of Jesus Christ, known to men through Holy Scripture, and
perpetrated in the teachings of the Christian Church. No attempt is made to
differentiate 'Christianity' from 'Revealed Religion'. T.R. Brink,
Introduction to Paley's Evidences, pp. 6-14.
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truth of Natural Religion, you are bound to accept Revealed Religion,
in spite of an equal amount of possible or actual objections that
may ba summoned up against it. !
Butler, in seeking to vindicate (not establish) the credibility of Christian
beliefs, readily concedes that his arguments, based on analogy, are only
probable in their conclusions but is quick to add that "with us, probability
o
is the very guide to life."
The book itself is divided into two main sections® The first section
argues for natural religion, and would presumably be accepted by both Butler and
his opponents in light of his intended line of argument. Throughout this section
we find him applying, by analogy, empirical observations to doctrines of
religion. Take far example his argument for immortality*
Prom oiur being born into the present world in the helpless imperfect state
of infancy, and having arrived from thence to mature ago, we find it to
be a general law of nature in our own species, that the same creatures,
the same individuals, should exist in degress of life and perception,
with capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of
their being, greatly different from these appointed them in another
period of it. And in other creatures the same law holds. For the
difference of their capacities and states of life at their birth (to
go no higher) and in maturity? the change of worms into flies, and the
vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by such change; and birds
end insects bursting the shell of their habitation, and by this means
1, Joseph Butler, Analogy, p. 1. Butler's argument is not addressed
to the atheist, for ha assumes that the existence of God is not denied.
Ha admits that the principal assertion in the argument is not now. Ha
quoted Origen as saying that "he who believes the Scripture to have proceeded
from him who is the Author of Nature, may well, expect to find the same sort
of difficulties in it as are found in the constitution of nature." (p. 75)®
By reference to this quotation Butler is not setting forth difficulties in
Scripture as a proof of its divine origin, but is making his point by adding
that "he who denies the Scripture to have been from God upon account of
these difficulties, may for the same reason, deny the world to have been
formed by him." Though Butler's already condensed argument hardly admits
of summary, his view of things as a whole may be expressed in the one word
'teleological'. For an excellent discussion on the structure and development
of Butler's argimient, cf. Anders Jeffner, Butler and Hume on Religion; A
Comparative Analysis (1966), pp. 69-110.
2 Ibid* > P® 73. "That which chiefly constitutes Probability is expressed
in the word Likely, i.e., like some truth, or true event; like it, in itself,
in its evidence, in some more or fewer of its circumstances. For when we
determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an event has or will come
to pass, it is from the mind's remarking in it a likeness to some other event,
which we have observed has come to pass." p. 72.
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entering into a new world furnished with new accommodations for them,
and finding a new sphere of action assigned them; these are instance3
of this general law of nature. Thus all the various and wonderful
transformations of animals are to be taken into consideration here.
But the states of life in which we ourselves existed formerly in the
wombs and in our infancy are almost as different from our present in
mature age, as it is possible to conceive any two states or degrees
of life can be. Therefore that we are to exist hereafter, in a stats
as different from our present, as this is from our former, is but-
according to the analogy of nature. ■
Having established the credibility of a future life Butler moves to
establish the fact that men will be held responsible in the future life for
their lives now on earth. In this life men stand under moral obligations which
are known to them by the exercise of reason; and in the future life, they will
be "rewarded or punished" according to whether they have done their duty.
After having shown the moral nature of man's earthly life and his
responsibility for it to God in the life to come, Butler then turns to the
second section of the book - Revealed Religion. The question: Yliy is revealed
religion necessary? The answer: It serves two important functions. First, it
is a "republication" of natural or essential religion. Secondly, it adds
distinct precepts; "for though natural religion is the foundation and principal
2
part of Christianity, it is not in any sense the whole of it." " Neither the
necessity nor the usefulness of natural religion is called into question, for
it is acknowledged that reason is capable of leading man to a knowledge of God;
but it has its limits. Though Butler concedes to his Deist opponents that without
special revelation man could still know God, and his obligation to Him, he insists
that it is only as Creator, and perhaps in some way as Father, that He is known.
It is only in revealed religion that the Son (God as mediator) and the Spirit
(God as sanotif'ier) are known. Man conceives his relation to these divine
1 Ibid."7 pp. 82-8JT The guiding idea behind this argument is that-
human nature is a system or constitution; the same is true of the world at
large; and both point to an end or purpose. Thi3 thought was suggested by
Shaftesbury, to whom due credit is given.
2 Ibid., p. 195.
Persons and the obligation due that relation "not at all by reason" but only
"in the Gospel dispensation.Thus having shown the inconsistency of
objections to Revealed Religion, and having indicated the necessity of special
revelationj he leaves Christianity as an "open possibility." Since it has
already been agreed (presumably) that man has a responsibility in connection
with the duties imposed by these divine-human relations, the importance of
knowing both the relationship and the duty is apparent,, Hence, the necessity
of Scripture.
However, due to the distinction made between obligations ax-ising from the
discovery of reason and obligations ax*ising from the revelation of Scripture,
a question naturally presents itself: What if these duties conflict? What if
the demands known by reason's observation of nature contradict those known
through special revelation? Butler's own answer is that "if in Revelation there
be found any passages the seeming meaning of which is contrary to Natural
Religion, we may most certainly conclude such seeming meaning not to be the real
one."2
It is at this point that the Analogy is of interest to us, not because
7
it influenced Hill's approach to the "evidences" of Christianity,' but because
it sets forth a relationship of revelation end reason which had a significant
impact upon Hill. Hill even goes so far as to adopt Butler's terminology in
speaking of Christianity as "a republication of the religion of nature."^" He
1 Ibid., p. 2Q2. 2 Ibid., p. 210. " -
3 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. I, p. 374- "The common method is, to place what is
called the necessity of revelation before the evidences of it, and to argue
from the necessity to the probability of its having been given. But I have
always thought this an unfair and a presumptuous mode of arguing. It appears
to me that we are so little qualified to judge what is necessary, and so little
entitled to build our expectation of heavenly gifts upon our own reasonings,
that the only method becoming our distance, and our ignorance of the divine
counsels, is first to establish the fact that a revelation has been given,
and then to learn of its importance by examining its contents."
4 Ibid., p. 375. This is not to imply that the phrase is original with
Butler, but Kill was made aware of it through him.
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is quick, however, to guard this phrase against two misunderstandings. The
phrase, republication of natural religion, does not mean that the gospel is
merely a restatement of the doctrines and duties which are discoverable by the
light of reason; nor does it mean that the essence of natural religion is
defective either in its constitution or mode of promulgation. The phrase
implies a more positive function for Christianity. It means that special
revelation dispels the ignorance created in the mind of man by "unfavorable cir¬
cumstances. M Estrangement from God darkened men's reason to the extent that they
were not able to perceive all that was possible for them to discern through natural
religion. In the words of Paul, "When they knew God, they glorified him not as
God, nor were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations and their foolish
heart was darkened; and they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an
image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and
creeping things. And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge,
God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do tilings which are not convenient."
(Romans 1?21~23> 28. Hill's own translation). It is one purpose of Christianity
to restore to man "the knowledge of one Supreme Being, the Creator and the Ruler
of all things, the rewarder of those who seek him, the friend and protector of
the good, ana the avenger of the wicked...," knowLedge which is possible through
. o
natural religion (and still is to some degree), but which has been marred and
clouded by the evil passions of men. Christianity, then serves the cause of
natural religion by
imparting that knowledge upon this subject, which is agreeable to the
deductions of the most enlightened reason, but which unfavorable circum¬
stances had prevented any man from attaining by means of reason, removing
those errors to which no other method of instruction had applied any
effectual remedy, and diffusing by its institutions to men of every con- 7
dition the information, the instruction, and the c cmfort which it conveys.''
1 Hill simply says that natural religion "has no original defect."
L.I.P.. Vol. I, p. 393.
2 See Hill's treatment of the "degrees" of darkness, Ibid., pp. 380f.
3 Ibid. , p. 388.
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But if reason is benefited by Christianity, the relationship is reciprocal*
and if space allotted to each side is any judge of importance, then Hill was far
more enamoured with the ways in which Christianity is benefited by reason.
•i
Hill lists four particulars whereby reason is used in the service of revelation.
1) Reason is used to examine the evidence of revelation. It is through the
exercise of reason that we become finally convinced of the divine origin of
Christianity and subsequently yield in complete submission to its demands.
Actually, says Hill, it is quite understandable that reason should render this
service, for it would be hard to conceive of a creature, who is accustomed to
exercising his reason upon every other subject, laying it aside upon an issue
as important as the evidences of special revelation. 2) Reason is used to
discover the truths revealed in special revelation. Since these truths are
communicated to us, not by immediate inspiration, but by books written in a
remote country and foreign tongue, it is necessary for us to study this language,
the country, and the general context of the writer so as to ascertain the precise
meaning of these words. And as reason leads us into the meaning of single words
and phrases of Scripture, so it also enables us to attain a comprehensive view
of the whole system of Scriptural doctrine by relating truth to truth. Thus
the gospel is rescued from abuses to which partial consideration often gives
occasion. 3) The third service rendered by reason is an apologetic one.
"Reason is of eshinent use in repelling the attacks of the adversaries of
Christianity.Thanks to reason, Christianity should never dispair of attacks,
for through reason's masterly exposition of various misunderstandings Christian
doctrine has been vindicated. Actually Christianity is better off for the
attacks for in repelling them reason has expounded doctrines which otherwise
may have been 16ft undeveloped. 4) Finally, and crucially, reason benefits
Christianity by judging the truths of revelation, that is. by determining
what is to be accepted as true and what is to be rejected as false at a point
of apparent contradiction. In his exposition of this principle Hill is not
so bold as John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist, v,ho writes "To follow reason
'j
is to follow God." In spite of his confidence in reason Hill admits that
reason has "her own limit*8 and that "we must expect to find in religion many
things which we are not able to comprehend." Nevertheless he concludes,
"Nothing can be received by us as true which is contrary to the dictates of
2
reason®" The conservative cloak under which reason reached this place of
control over revelation is well put by Locke who said, "it is an unquestioned
fact that a 'positive revelation* has been communicated by God in addition to
the light of reason..What our God hath revealed is certainly true, no doubt
can be made of it. This is the proper object of faith, but whether it be a
divine revelation or no, reason must judge."--1
It is fitting to quote Locke at this point for Hill acknov?ledges his debt
to him in understanding the relation of faith and reason. To his students he
says, "I would recommend to you particularly to read and study upon this
subject...five chapters of the 4th book of Locke's Essay on the Human
Understending, which treat of assent, reason, faith ana reason, enthusiasm,
wrong assent and error. They contain a most rational, and I think, when properly
^"~"Q~uo'ted by "Basil Wil'ley in SevenTeentlTcVnti^'y Background, p. "72T
2 Hill, L.I.D.. Vol. I, p. 425.
5 John. Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, p. 588. According to
Basil Willey this compromise' between traditional beliefs and rationalistic
philosophy "served the eighteenth century as a veritable Act of Settlement."
op.ext., p. 2G7.
understood, a just view of reason in judging of the truths of religion; and
A
every student ought to be well acquainted -with thorn.n
Surely such endorsement from the pen of Hill justifies a brief, if not
thorough survey of the chapters mentioned. Beginning with the propositions
that "assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of probability" and that
"probability is either of matter-of-fact or speculation," Locke moves to discuss
the three degrees of probability in the area of fact. In descending order ha
lists: individual experience plus the general consent of all men in all ages;
individual experience plus the related argument of other men; and the concurrent
testimony of unsuspected witnesses. In the area of speculation that is, "in
things which sense cannot discover, analogy is the great rule of probability."
In fact for things beyond the scrutiny of human sense, analogies from within
the realm of observation are the only ground of probability. The great
exception in both cases, however, is "the proper case of miracles.5* This
exception causes Locke to write:
Besides those we have hitherto mentioned there is one sort of propositions
that challenge the highest degree of our assent, upon bare testimony,
whether the thing proposed agrees or disagrees with common experience and
the ordinary course of things or no. The x-eason whereof is, because the
testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be deceived, and that is
of God himself. This carries with it assurance beyond doubt, evidence
beyond exception. T^is is called by a peculiar name, revelation, and our
assent to it, faith."
T Hill, L.I.D., Vol. I, p. Iko. The following discussion presupposes that
an important epistdmological question has been answered. In realist epist^mology
(such as that developed by Keid) that which controls the process of reasoning
is not x-eason itself, but that about which we think. That is to say, the
given reality or object determines what and how we are to think about it.
In idealist epistjtaology (such as that developed by Locke) reason becomes
autonomous and concerns itself with idea3 detached from the reality or object
about which we think. That is to say, the representative perception determines
what and how we are to think about any particular reality or object. Now, is
Hill basically an idealist who conforms things to the mind, or basically a
realist who conforms the mind to things? Connors sense philosophy is basically
realist, but it appears that Hill's propension toward Locke moves him away
from that position at this point.
2 Locke, op.cit., p. 566.
In a final analysis, however, faith for Locke is "nothing e3.se but an
assent founded on the highest reason,Hill accepts this rationalistic under¬
standing of faith and seeks to give it Biblical, support. Though he says that
"an assent upon evidence,•.is not the whole of faith," he nevertheless describes
faith as a "permanent state of mind, proceeding upon previous acts, and embracing
many kindred dispositions. As it implies an. exercise of the understanding
illuminated by the Spirit, it supposes previous knowledge; a knowledge of the
facts which constitutes the history of our religion, of the arguments which
constitute the evidence of it, of the doctrines and precepts which constitute
the substance of it,"- Because Hill never realised the full impact of Hume's
thought upon natural theology, he never asserted the primacy of faith over
reason. It remained for Kant to take seriously the achievement of Hume in this
regard, Richard Kroner says:
As Luther stressed the primacy of faith against any objective guarantee on
the part of man, so Kant defended the primacy of God against any objective
knowledge of God, Of course Luther and Kant do not mean the same thing
when they speak of faith,...But despite the difference...there is common
ground for both Luther and Kant to stand on. Both mean by faith a
relation of God to man, a practical relation, i.e., a relation which
concerns primarily man's will in its moral aspect; both mean, therefore
1 This point is clarified by J.M, Martin and J.S.B. Smith in their
book, Religions Thought in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 6-7. The faith which
Jesus required of His contemporaries, according to Locke, was a belief that
He was the Messiah, the One promised to the world by God, One came to this
belief by an e?:amination of the evidence supporting this fact, that is,
by reason. Hence it follows that faith is simply belief founded tipon
reason.
2 Hill, L,I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 203» See also Hill's description of
faith as "a firm persuasion of the truth of Christianity," "an exercise
of understanding," "a reasonable act proceeding upon evidence."
L„ IoD., Vol. I, pp. 357, 358, 359. Kill admits that people with limited
powers of reason may exhibit faith, but this is the exception rather than
the rule. Thus we see why Basil V/illey says that "even the orthodox, who
retained the supernatural basis, felt faith must be grounded firmly upon
nature before one had recourse to super-nature." Eighteenth Century
Background, p. 3-
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something that affects a person as a person, and not something which
■would satisfy the human intellect or reason in general. '
It is this rationalistic understanding of faith which both Luther and Kant reject
that Hill adopts as his own. Hill concludes that "in thus representing faith
as a rational act, we follow the direction of our Lord, who commands Christians
to 'search the Scriptures'j and the direction of peter who exhorts them to 'be
ready always to give an answer to every one that asketh a reason of the hope
O
that is in them'."
In his chapter on Reason, Locke asks the basic question, "What need is
there of reason?" He gives a four-fold answer:
The first and highest is the discovering and finding out of proofs;
the second, the regular and methodical disposition of them, and
laying them in. a clear and fit order, to make their connection and
force be plainly and easily perceived; the third is the perceiving
their connection; and the fourth, the malting a right conclusion.-5
So obvious is Hill's adoption of this outline that it hardly needs mentioning.,+
Locke's concluding statement that reason and faith are not opposite leads to a
further discussion in the next chapter of their differences and distinct
provinces.
Reason therefore here, as contradistinguished to faith, I take to be
the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or
truths which the mind arrives at by deduction made frora such ideas which
it has got by the use of its natural faculties, vis., by sensation or
reflection. Faith on the other side, is the assent to any proposition,
1 Kroner, The Primacy of Faith, p. 4?» The dominant problem here
concerns the relation of assent to evidence, and we must avoid pushing the
Lutheran and Kantian disjunction of faith from reason too far. According to
Alan Richardson, there can be no conflict between faith and reason "for faith
is ancillary to reason"; "faith is a condition of rationality" (christian
Apologetics, pp. 235, 23"/). Likewise T.F. Torrance rules out any a/bhesis
between~IraTth and reason, "for faith is the behaviour of the reason in
accordance with the nature of its divine Object" (Theological Science,
p. 33, Note 2). Cf. also the way in which Nels Ferre/ relates the functions
of faith and reason (Reason in Religion, pp. 28f.).
2 Ibid., p. 20 2(.„ 3 Locke, op.cit., p. 568.
4 Supra, pp. 51-52.
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not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit
of the proposer, as coming from G-od in some extraordinary way of
communication.'
These distinctions ere amplified in a series of propositions:^ 1) No man
inspired by G-od can, by any revelation, communicate to others any§iew simple
ideas which they had not before from sensation or reflection. 2) Traditional
revelation can make us know propositions knowable also by reason, but not with
the same certainty that reason does. Revelation cannot be admitted against the
clear evidence of reason. 3) There are many things wherein we have very
imperfect notions, or none at all; end other things, of whose past, present,
or future existence by the natural use of our facilities, we can have no
knowledge at all: these, as being beyond the discovery of our natural facili¬
ties and above reason, are when revealed, the proper matter of faith. Locke
ends this chapter by saying that the motto "Credo quia impossible est, would
prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by.15^
Though Hill's incorporation of these principles is not as thorough as some
points we have mentioned, nevertheless the manifestation of influence is obvious.
Compare, for instance, Locke's second and third propositions with this statement
of Hill:
One of the most important offices of reason is to recognize her own limits.
She never can be moved by any authority to receive as true what she
perceives as absurd. But if she has formed a just estimate of the measure
of human knowledge, she will not shelter her presumptions in rejecting the
truths of revelation under the pretence of contradictions that do not really
exist; she will readily admit that there may be in a subject some points
which she knows and ethers of which she is ignorant; she will not allow
her ignorance of the latter to shake the evidence of the former; but will
yield a firm assent to that which she does not understand, without
presuming to deny what is beyond her comprehension.'4'
1 Locke, op.cit., p. 583. This description, however, does not nullify
the accusation of H.R. Mackintosh that though the rationalists professed "to
prove everything by reason" they never 'iraised the question what reason is.
The common assumption was that everybody knew." Types of Modern Theology, p. 23.
2 Ibid» » PP« 583-587. 3 Ibid., p. 589.
K Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. I, pp. IZG-lJLl
57
In the next chapter Locke turns to consider what he calls, along with
reason and faith,,"a third ground of assent" - enthusiasm. "Season is natural
revelation" and "revelation is natural reason"; and the two are inseparably
connected. Enthusiasm, then, in removing reason to make way for new revelation,
destroys both, substituting in their place ungrounded fancies. Tiiose guided by
enthusiasm think that "whatever groundless opinion comes to settle itself
strongly upon their fancies, is an illumination from the Spirit of God, and
presently of divine authority: and whatsoever odd action they find in themselves
a strong inclination to do, that impulse is concluded to be a call or direction
from heaven, and must be obeyed."''' Since "reason must be our last judge and
guide in everything";^ and since enthusiasm is "founded neither on reason nor <rn
divine revelation,"3 enthusiasm must be rejected as a ground of assent.
In much the same manner, Hill warns his students against ignoring the
faculty of reason in judging matters of fact "by the wishes it may be natural
to form," through the imposition of "opinions without proof"; by taking action
prompted by "zeal which is not according to knowledge," and in speculating
without data. ^ Perhaps Hill was first cautioned about enthusiasm, understood
in this restricted arid precise way, by his philosophy teacher at St. Andrews,
Robert Watson, who taught that men guided by enthusiasm "mistake their own
fancy for the impression of Deity and imagine that their intercourse with
heaven is more intimate than what is vouchsafed to ordinary men. "5
This discussion of a false ground of assent leads Locke to treat of Wrong
Assent or Error. By definition "error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a
mistake in our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true."0 There are
basically four reasons for making errors in judgment, namely, lack of proofs,
lack of ability to use them, lack of will to use them, and "wrong measures of
1 Locke, op.cit., p. 591. 2 Ibido, p. 595. 3 Ibid., p. 590.
4 Hill, L.I.D. . Vol. I, p. 10, Vol. H, p. A3, Vol. Ill, p. 418.
Institutes, p. 422.
5 R. Watson, op.cit., p. 163. 6 Locke, op.cit. , p. 597.
probability," Of these, the final one receives the greatest attention by Locke,
When men rely on wrong measures of probability they take doubtful, propositions
for principles; they receive hypotheses as facts; they allow passions to sway
beliefs (Quod volumus, facile creclimus); they give up their assent to common
received opinions with no other ground for their tenets than the supposed
A
honesty, learning, or number of those of the same profession.
That Hill accepted Locke8s analysis of error may be seen most clearly in
his own diagnosis of doctrinal mistakes end his prescription for correction.
We are guilty of errors in theology when;
...by not making a proper use of our reason in the interpretation of
the gospel we suppose that it contains doctrines which it does not teach:
or we give the name of right reason to some narrow prejudice which deeper
reflection and more enlarged knowledge will dissipate; or we consider a
proposition as implying a contradiction when, in truth, it is only
imperfectly understood. Hero, as in every other case, mistakes are to be
corrected by measuring back our steps..,.There may be preconceived notions
hastily taken up...; there may be pride of understanding...; or reason
may need to be reminded, that we must expect to find in religion many
things which we are not able to comprehend."
In summarizing his own position on the relation of faith and reason, Hill
might well have echoed the words of George Campbell; "I say not...that our most
holy religion is founded on reason, because this expression, in my opinion is
both ambiguous and inaccurate; but I say that we have sufficient reason for the
belief of our religion.Though the sincerity behind such statements cannot
be called into question, the meaning behind them raises very fundamental questions.
When Butler says "Christianity is a promulgation of natural religion"; when Locke
says "Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of reason"; when
Hill says "Nothing can be received by us as true which is contrary to the
dictates of reason" - one cannot but question the logical conclusions of such
1 Ibid., pp. TiOV^bGo* *~™
2 Hill, L.I.I).. Vol. I, p. 2,26.
3 Campbell, op.cit. , p. 12,0.
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propositions. If the knowledge which Christianity adds to natural theology
cannot contradict reason, is not reason the judge and final arbiter of what God
can reveal? And if knowledge gained by revelation is merely added to what is
already known in such a way as not to contradict it, doe3 this not mean that
revelation must take the form and fit the pattern of existing thought? And if
this is true is it not a],so true that reason, not revelation, determines the
A
content of theology? We have already noted tangentially how such, thinking
results in a rationalistic understanding of faith, but more fundamentally doss
it not mean that every doctrine is determined anthrcpocentrically? We concur
with the assessment of Chalmers who said, "It is under the cover of such sentiment
that both infidelity and heresy have indulged in all sorts of licentiousness -
O
the one in rejecting Christianity, and the other in transforming it." Certainly
Hill did not reject Christianity, but did his amalgamation of reason and
revelation transform it? We shall attempt to answer this question in Chapter IV
by indicating the influence of this thought on the formation of his ecclesias¬
tical principle.
A second approach to the system of evidences is a more positive one than
that found in Butler's Analogy. It starts with the presupposition that natural
religion cannot be denied by any 'reasonable man'; and that if the revealed
religion of the Scriptures be examined fairly, it too will be accepted. The
'reasonable man' is the major premise; sufficient rational 'evidence' to
persuade 'reasonable man' of the truth of Christianity is the minor premise;
1 This point is well made by Paul Tillich in his illustration of the
"two-storied theology." "The lower story is called 'natural theology' which
works with reason, and the upper story is called 'revealed theology'. The
theologians always had difficulty determining what belonged to each....Thus
it was that a revolution occurred by the lower story fighting against the
upper story. As often happens in society the lower classes fight against the
upper classes. But during the Enlightenment it was the lower story of the
building of theology which revolted against the upper story. Th.6 lower claimed
the right to become the whole building and denied the right to have any
independent story at all!" Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century
Protestant Theology, pp. 14-15*
2 Chalmers, op.cit., p. 51 •
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the conclusion is to be a Christian,, The idea is to amass such an array of
proof as to remove all doubt about the divine origin of Christianity. Whereas
the negative approach stopped with the open probability of Christianity, the
positive approach strives to prove that what is probable is actually true.
Account is taken of all credentials whatever which might be alleged to support
the conclusion that the revelation of Christianity is a message from God. The
great bulk and body of Christian evidences were usually arranged and presented
in a systematic way, moving from Biblical to extra-Biblical material. Brink in
his introduction to Paley's Evidences gives a concise presentation of the
■1
standard positive approach.
The 'evidences' summoned to uphold the validity of Christianity are presented
raider three broad categories. The first is the External or Historical, where
appeal is made primarily to the consciousness of a super-human power. This
general category is further divided into three sections. Direct evidence, founded
upon the miracles of Christ and his apostles, depends chiefly on the marks of
divine power, wisdom, and goodness observable in these miracles. Since "no man can
do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him," the miracles prove
that Christianity is of divine origin. The employment of miracles results in a
survey of the possibility of miracles, the miracles themselves, the authenticity
of the Nev; Testament Canon which records the miracles, ana the application of all
these facts to prove the truth of supernatural revelation. Retrospective evidence
depends on the connection of the gospel with previous revelation. The 'reasonable
man' is convinced of the truth of Christianity vixen he understands that
Christianity is no isolated event, "but only completes and crowns a series of
Divine Messages."^ The procedure here is to establish the credibility of the
Old Testament, particularly the prophecy concerning the Messiah, and then show
1 Brink, op.cit., pp. 15-30* Paley's Evidences are recommended for
study by Hill, L.I.D., Vol. I, p. 51.
2 Ibid. , p. 19.
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how these predictions are fulfilled in gospel history., Prospective evidence,
the third category of Historical evidence, is to be found in the early triumphs
of the gospel which can be explained in terms of divine power, in its historical
influences on the subsequent history of mankind (as an agent of social reformation
and moral advancement) and in the fulfillment of Christ's prophecy since His
ascension.
Though this was by far the most widely used branch of evidences, it was by
no means the only one. Ritschl would have found little support for his contention
that only facts drawn from the New Testament itself are valid as evidences of
Christianity. The second broad category is usually termed "I.bral Evidences" or
"Intermediate Evidences." Obviously appeal here is made primarily to roan's
faculty of* moral discernment. Moral evidence consists in all marks of goodness
and excellence discernible to unbiased inquirers. It is normally discussed under
four headings. The first is composed of the positive precepts of the gospel end
the purity of its ethical code. The second consists in the character of Christ
Himself, particularly in the manifestations of worth, holiness, and love which
characterize all His works and actions. The third embraces the character of the
evangelists and apostles, with special emphasis on the candour, sincerity, and
devotion which mark all their writings and missionary labors. The fourth and
final heading of moral evidence involves the moral effects of the gospel upon
all those who receive it in real faith.
The third broad category of Christian evidence is called "Internal" or
"Spiritual." These evidences are addressed only to true believers who have
received the gospel and purified their reason through the power of its truth.
They are more in line with the nature of confirmations than proofs. The procedure
is to exanine one's own Christian experience in the light of Scripture; one
1 Cf. Robert Mackintosh, Albreeht Ritschl and His School, p. 5'i»
recalls his spiritual needs and acknowledges that the gospel alons has met
these needs; one compares his life with the Biblical doctrines of sin, repentance,
faith, etc., and realizes the two are in complete agreement; one concludes that
Christianity is indeed true because it has happened to him.
Perhaps the actual application of all these various branches of Christian
Evidences is seen in no better place than in Bishop Porteus' Summary of Principal
Evidences;
•..when we consider the deplorable ignorance and inconceivable depravity
of the heathen world before the birth of Christ, which rendered a divine
interposition essentially necessary, and therefore highly probable; the
appearance of Christ upon earth at the very time when his presence was
most wanted, and when there was a general expectation throughout the East,
that some great and extraordinary personage was soon to come into the world;
the transcendent excellence of our Lord's character, so infinitely beyond
that of every other moral teacher; the calmness, the composure, the dignity,
the integrity, the spotless sanctity of his manners, so utterly inconsistent
with every idea of enthusiasm or imposture; the sublimity and importance
of his doctrines; the consummate wisdom and perfect purity of his moral
precepts, far exceeding the natural powers of a man born in the humblest
situation, and in a remote and obscure comer of the world, without
learning, education, languages, or books; the rapid and astonishing pro¬
pagation of his religion, in a very short space of time, through almost
every region of the East, by the sole efforts of himself and a few
illiterate fishermen, in direct opposition to all the power, the authority,
the learning, the philosophy, the reigning vices, prejudices, and super¬
stitions of the world; the complete and marked opposition, in every
essential point, between the character and religion of Christ, and the
character and religion of Mahomet, exactly such as might be expected
between truth and falsehood; the minute description of all the most
material circumstances of his birth, life, sufferings, death, and
resurrection, given by the ancient prophets many hundred years before he
was born, and exactly fulfilled in him, and him only, pointing him out
as the Messiah of the Jews and the Redeemer of mankind; the various
prophecies delivered by Christ himself, which were all punctually
accomplished, more especially the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans;
the many astonishing miracles wrought by Jesus, in the open face of day,
before thousands of spectators, the reality of which is proved by
multitudes of the most unexceptionable witnesses, who sealed their testimony
with their blood, and was even acknowledged by the earliest and most
inveterate enemies of the Gospel; and lastly, the most astonishing and well-
authenticated miracle of' our Lord's Resurrection, which was the seal and
confirmation of his own Divine Origin, and that of his Religion: when all
these various evidences tire brought together, and impartially weighed, it
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seems hardly within the power of a fair and ingenuous mind to resist the
impression of their united force. If such a combination of evidence ss
this is not sufficient to satisfy an honest enquirer into truth, it is
utterly impossible that any event, which passed in former times, and
which we did not see with our own eyes, can ever be proved to have
happened, by any degree of testimony whatever. It raair safely be
affirmed, that no instance can be produced of any one fact or event,
said to have taken place in past ages, and established by such evidence
as that on which the Christian Revelation rests, that afterwards turned
out to be false. We challenge the enemies of our faith to bring forward,
if they can, any such instance. If they cannot (and we know it to bo
impossible) we have a right to say, that a religion, supported by such
an extraordinary accumulation of evidence, must be true; and that all
men who pretend to be guided by argument and by proof, are bound, by the
most sacred obligations, to receive the Religion of Christ as a real-
Revelation from God. 1
It is of little value to reproduce the abovo in the name of Hill, for a
mere glance at the Table of Contents in his Lectures in Divinity, Vol. I, mil
indicate how deeply immersed he was in this approach. Though, he changes the
titles of the evidences, the content is basically the same, excluding the third
2
general category. It is of interest to us to note how the church fits into
this scheme of things. So certain is its own existence that it can be used to
prove the existence of that which it propagates. We shall soon see more
specifically how this affected the whole of Kill's ecclesiology, but suffice it
to say here that so pragmatic a view is not likely to lead to a high doctrine
of the church as the Body of Christ.
System of Divinity
In the Scottish divinity colleges of Hill's student days the system of
3
evidences which has been under review was followed by a system of divinity.
Whereas the former proved the existence of special x'evelation, the latter
expounded the truth which it contained in methodical order. Though we have no
1 Beilby Portcms, Summary of Principle Evidences, pp. 102^-10?. Also
recommended for study by Hill, L.I.D., Vol. I, p. 5"'«
2 Hill makes little use of expei-iential evidence, and does not deal
with it as a major heading.
3 Of. Stewart Mechie, Records of the Scottish Church History Society,
Vol. XIV, p. 116.
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trace of the lectures Robert Hamilton delivered on this subject, there is little
doubt as to the scheme he employed. In his sermon on John 3s16 there is an
undeniable, though, perhaps oblique, allusion to the peculiarity of a particular
system. He writes, "had it been told us before our savior's appearance that
he was to come and propose terms of reconciliation with God we would have been
ready to think that the very least he would require would be absolute obedience
to the laws of God," since this is what God "himself did in the first covenant."
Admittedly, this is a veiled reference, yet highly significant, for it implies
a plurality of covenants, a characteristic unique to the system of divinity known
as federal theology. Since, in all probability, this is the system Hill was
taught, and since without doubt, it is the system which he taught, we must ask;
What is federal theology?
1. The salient features of federal theology
Because it is impossible to give a complete exposition of the federal system
of theology we shall ask and answer three questions by way of survey. First,
what were its salient features? T.F. Torrance says one of its disparate charac¬
teristics was the tendency to isolate the concept of the covenant and make it
into an "abstract systematic principle."" The concept of the covenant itself
was not original with federal theologians (Calvin, Bullinger, and the Heidelberg
theologians all used it), but it is given a unique meaning by them. Whereas its
original use was to express in a vivid way the essence of God's promise to His
people, its use in federal theology became much more logical and precise. In
fact, the early use of the covenant to refer to God's promise "...was one of
the improper ways of using it according to Witsius and the other federalists.
In this Covenant Theology (another name for Federal Theology), the covenant is
a contract, a bargain, a mutual agreement between parties with respect to
1 Robert Hamilton, hand-written volume entitled Sermons and Lectures,
sermon No. 12.
2 T.F. Torrance, The School of Faith, p. lxiii.
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something." ' It was this concept of the covenant as a business transaction
which was detached by federal theologians and erected as the canonical rubric
for all doctrineo
Another great differentia of federalism besides this legalistic understanding
of divine-human relations and the ruling place given to the idea of the covenant,
was the replacement of one covenant with twos the covenant of works and the
covenant of grace. The covenant of works, promulgated in creation, and the
covenant of grace, revealed in Christ, were expounded in terms of their contract¬
ing parties, terms of contract, and certain symbols intended as sanctions or
guarantees. The covenant of works was considered first because of its historical
priority and because it formed the backdrop against which the covenant of grace
is to be viewed. Its contracting parties were God, the moral governor of the
universe, and Adam, the free moral agent under the inalienable obligation of the
moral law. The terms of the contract were that if Adam, fedora]., representative
of all mankind, would obey this law, then he would obtain eternal life, not only
for himself, but for all whom ha represented! and if he disobeyed, then he would
bring death upon himself and his representees. The guarantees of this bargain,
or "seals of the covenant" (sometimes called sacraments as well), took on outward
and visible form in the possession of paradise and the tree of life. Witsius
and others added two more seals, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and
2
the sabbath. "These signs served to remind man of the good promised in the
1 T.M. Lindsay, British and Foreign Lvangelical Review, Vol. XXVIII,
p. 524. According to Cocceius a covenant is "conventio de pace et amicitia
sive ante bellum, rebus integris, aut ab altera parte violato alterius jure,
sive etiam post bellum inita." Summa Doctrin^e de Foedere et Testamento Dsi,
p. 1. As defined by Witsius: "A covenant of God with man is an agreement
between God and man about the way of obtaining consumate happiness, including
a commination of eternal destruction, with which the contemner of the
happiness, offered in that way, is to be punished." Witsius, The Economy of
the Covenants, Vol. I, p. 25.
2 Witsius, The Economy of the Covenants, Vol. I, p. ?6.
covenant? and of the duty and. obligation which the covenant imposed on hint."
Since Adam, however, failed to keep the conditions of the covenant,
neither he nor his descendants will be able to secure eternal life in this way,
so God intervened with the covenant of grace. When federal theologians came
to discuss this covenant there was more fundamental disagreement than in their
treatment of the covenant of works, particularly concerning the contracting
parties. There were basically three views held by federalists. The first view
2
regards the covenant of grace as made by God and elect sinners. " God promised
to save sinners on the condition of faith and promised obedience. Christ is
seen not as a contracting party, but as the mediator who guarantees that all the
conditions demanded of the elect shall be fulfilled by them through His grace.
This view appealed to the Arminian federalists who always insisted in some sense
that man might be said to work out his own salvation, at least as a contracting
party. The second view posits a parallel between the first Adam, representing
the entire race in the economy of nature, and Christ, the Second Adam,
representing the whole body of the elect in the economy of grace. The covenant
of grace is understood as formed in the counsels of eternity between the Father
and the Son as contracting parties. Christ represents all His people by assumin
their place in history and undertaking to fulfill for them the unsatisfied
covenant of works. This view appealed to men like Cocceius who "maintained that
God's people are absolutely dependent upon God's grace in salvation, and that
the covenant was outside them. The third view, a combination of the prior two
1 Lindsay, op.cit., p. 526.
2 There was always a difference between those who said the covenant of
grace applied to all mankind and those who limited it to the elect. Since the
majority of federal theologians (Hill included) held to a doctrine of limited
atonement, this survey is developed from that perspective.
5 Lindsay, op.cit., p. 526.
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supposes iv,"o covenants within the covenant of grace. The first is called the
covenant of redemption. Formed from eternity upon the decrees of the Trinity,
it involved a contract between the Father and the Son in which the Father
promised the Son full preparation and support in His work along with a glorious
reward consisting in the exaltation of His purpose and the salvation of' all those
for whom He was acting; and in which the Son agreed to become incarnate, made
A
under the law, and to assume and fully to discharge, on behalf of His elect,
all violated conditions and incurred liabilities of the covenant of works. The
second covenant is itself called the covenant of grace, but to avoid confusion
it is often referred to as the subsequent covenant of grace. This covenant is
established in time by God and the elect sinner in Christ. Christ is the
Mediator who bestows redemption, or the right to eternal life which He earned in
fulfilling the covenant of works upon all men vtho fulfill the condition of faith.
"But because the covenant of grace was made by God with Christ and all believers
in Him, primarily with Christ as the head who gathers up the covenant in Himself,
and with all who close with Him by faith, the condition of faith is itself
regarded as a gift of grace. It was called a 'consequent condition,' but it was
nevertheless a condition,Regardless, however, of whether the covenant of
grace was understood to be singular or plural, the guarantees of the covenant
were the same - circumcision and Passover in the Old Testament dispensation,
1 "...either man himself, or some other for him must perform or fulfill
the condition of the law, as it is the covenant of works, or else he remains
still under it in a damnable condition; but now Christ hath fulfilled it for
all believers...." Edward Fisher, Marrow of Modern Divinity, p. 56.
^ Baptism Commission Report of the Church of Scotland, 1958, p. .
See also Patrick Gillespie, The Ark of the Testament Opened, p. 257; Samuel
Rutherford, The Covenant of Life Opened, p. 253; David Dickson,
Therapeutics Sacra, p. $7.
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baptism and the Lord's Supper in the New. But in the case of two covenants
within the covenant ox' grace the question arises as to which covenant the
sacraments belong as signs and seals*
2. Historical flow of federal theology"
Prom where or from what did federal theology flow? The answer to this
question is hard to disc-over for as AdansBrown has stated; "A good monograph on
the history of covenant theology is still a desideratum." Federal theology is
usually connected with the name of John Koch or Cocceius (1603-1669) in whose
Suroma doctrinae de foedere et Testamento Dei (1648), it reached its classical
p
and most systematic formj but it is a misconception to hold that he was its
founder. It is just as wrong to go to the earlier extreme and seek to find the
origin of federal theology in Calvin's Institutes. It is true that Calvin speaks
of a covenant under two dispensations yJ the old and the new, but nowhere does he
speak of two covenants, one of works and the other of grace. The problem of
origin arises when the covenant concept is taken to mean the same thing as the
federal system of theology, when the two terms are used synonymously. There is
an apparent semantic difficulty which should receive attention. The Latin
foedus, used by the earliest reformers,^ and by the last of the federal theologians
~1 Adams Brown, "Covenant Theology"T^nc'ycIopaQdl'a of ■Religion'"and~
Ethics, Vol. IV, p. 224.
2 K.R. Hagenbach, A History of Christian Doctrine, Vol. II, p. kh6.
"A peculiar theological system, in the so called federal method, was inaugurated
by J. Cocceius." Cf. Alexander Mitchell, "The Theology of the Reformed Church
with special reference to the Westminster Standards." Second General Council
of the Presbyterian Alliance, p. 476. Strong, Systematic Theology, p. 612 .
3 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2% 10:2. 2:9-11
make clear Calvin's position on this question.
4 It should not be forgotten that the covenant concept itself appeared
in pre-Reformation theology. For example Irenaeus speaks of "four general
covenants...given to mankind": that of Noah, of Abraham, of the law of Hoses,
of the C-ospel of Christ. Early Christian Fathers, p. 383. This, however,
is not to imply that Irenaeus schematized the covenant concept. More often
than not he speaks of two covenants corresjxonding to the two testaments, old
and new.
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to use Latin, is quite properly translated "covenant." At the same time the
English word "federal" with its roots in this same Latin -word was coming into
use. Though even in English the precise use of the word "federal" does not convey
the same meaning as the word "covenant" (the former being largely influenced by
ideas of federal government based on representation and delegation of power),
there is moreover a greater difference between foedus as used by a reformer like
Zwingli and foedus as used by a federal theologian like Witsius in his
De Qsconomia foedsrxri "del cum hominibus. While the use of the covenant idea
was prevalent in the Reformation period, we cannot accurately refer to thai-
usage as a form of federal theology because, for one thing, it lacked the
distinctive characteristic of two covenants. For the sake of clarity in this
review/ we shall use the term "covenant" to refer to the earlier and less highly
developed system of what is truly called covenant theology, and the term "federal-"
to refer to the later and more complex system in which two or more covenants are
propounded.^
If the covenant concept lies behind the federal system of theology, we must
ask from whence it came. Karl Earth states that the first use of the covenant
concept is to be found in Zwingli8s defense of infant baptism against the
2
Anabaptist. " Bullinger also speaks of a foedus Dei aeternum with the whole
1" This procedure follows T«M. Lindsay as opposed to liexnrich. Heppe.
Heppe uses the term "Foeaeraltheologie" to describe the theology of German
Reformed dogmatics in that "einen Begriff, der dsn eigentlichen Schgpfungs und
ErlQsungssweck ausspricht, als Grundbegriff aufstellt, in welchem able ihre
einzelnen Telle ihre innere Einheit haben, auf den daher auch alle ihre Sitze
zurftck woisen. Es ist dieses der Begriff des foedus De&...." Dogmatik des
Deutschen Protestantismus ira Sechaebnten Johrhundert, p. 1 1+3» But Lindsay
says that the distinguishing mark for federal theology must be the further
development of one covenant into two covenants and "the peculiar relation
which one covenant bears to the other." op.cit., p. 523.
2 Karl Berth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. XV/1, p. 60. Cf. Gottlob Schrenk.,
Gottesreich und Bund ira alteren I-rotestantismus (1923), p. . "Zv/ingli ist der
eigentliche Erneuerer des biblischen Bundesgedankens fur die reformierte
Theologie, aber die Anregung dazu kain ihm wohl von tauferischer Seite."
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human race, which ceased not to be a covenant of grace, or to apply to all men,
because of the intervention of the law of the covenant of Israel, It remains,
however, the task of Calvin to develop more fully the Biblical concept of the
covenant. And yet in spite of his many statements about the covenant, one finds
absolutely no suggestion of a covenant of works. Even in Genesis three where one
might expect to find some suggestion if in any place, Calvin goes no further than
Paul, in Romans 5: 15 or I Corinthians 15:11.^ But to remove all doubt as to the
number of covenants, listen to Calvin's own words on Jeremiah :31~34: "God has
never made any other covenant than that which he made formerly with. Abraham, and
at length confirmed by the hand of Moses."3 Rather than any radical dissection
of the covenant into works and grace, Calvin speaks only of the Biblical covenant
with Abraham which is fulfilled in Jesus Christ.
Theology, however, was not to remain so Biblically oriented for long. Barth
sees the beginning of a distinction between a covenant of works and a covenant
of grace in the combination of the covenant concept with a primitive lex naturae.
This idea, traced to Melanchthon,^ caused Muscuius to divide the one covenant into
a f'QQdus generals, the temporal covenant of God with the universe, the earth, and
man as part of creation, and a foedus spedale, the eternal covenant of God
5
with all the elect from the beginning of the world as the true seed of Abraham.
^ achrenk, opVcxt.p." Al'i ""
2 John Calvin, Commentary on Genesis, 3»
3 John Calvin, Commentary on Jeremiah, 3^:3^~34. For Calvin's most
comprehensive statement concerning this covenant, see his Commentary on
Genesis, 17:11.
h Barth, op.pit., Vol. IV/1, p. 58. Though associated with Kelanchthon,
the notion of lex naturae was common prior to the Reformation.
5 Wolfgang Musculus, Loci Communes (15^0), p. 179. Cf. Stephen Szegedin,
Loci Communes de Deo et Hotsine (1588) , p. 71.
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The foedus spedale is further split up into three periods, ante legem, sub lege,
1
post legem. There is also a two-fold concept apparent in Ursinus's Suitgna
Theologiae of 1584. Ho writes of 8. foedus naturae known to man by nature, and
2
a foedus gratia© indiscernible through nature. Already law, which could be
known by autonomous reason, was given the dominant place which grace had
occupied in the theology of the reformers, and by 1585? under the influence of
Olevianus, joint-author along with Ursinus of the Heidelberg Catechism, the
covenant had become central to the whole theological system,^
But if the roots of federal theology are to be found on the continent? the
actual development of it may be attributed to English and Scottish theologians,
Robert Howie (1565-1645), Principal of Marischal College, Aberdeen, developed in
4
his own teaching the distinction between a foedus legale and a foedus gratiae.
It was? however, Robert Rollock (1555-1598), first Principal of the University
of Edinburgh, who is said to have been the earliest in Scotland to use the precise
phrase foedus operum,5 and the first to enlarge upon the contrast between the two
1 Mascuius op.citV7 p. 163, "Sunt quidem tria tempore principalis, quibus
totus mundus comprehend!fair; utpote primura quod fuit ante legem, secundum,
sub lege, tertium post legem," Szegedin, op,clt., p, 71, Note the part allotted
to the law as a principle of order, Schrenk, on,ext., p. 50,
2 "Lex continet foedus naturals, in creations a Deo cum hominibus inituni,
hoc est, natura hominibus nota est, et requirit a nobis perfectam obedientiam
f erga Deura, et poenit^ntibus earn prcmittit vitam aeternam, non praestantibus
minatur aeternas poenas: Euangelium vero continet foedus gratia©, hoc est,
minima natura notum existens," Ursinus, Summa Theologlae, p, 14, cited by
Schronk, op.cit., p. 58,
3 Schrenk, op.cit., p. 59.
4 Howie studied under Olevianus at Herborn and it was from Olevianus1
commentary on Galatians that he took these terms, (Cf, In Epistolam D. Pauli
Apost. ad Galatas (1578), p, 98,) Latex* Hov/ie became principal of St, Mary's
College, St, Andrews, succeeding Andre?/ Melville who was himself interested in
federal theology. In a treatise recorded by his nephew Melville is said to
have expound eel "the contract, bond, and obligation whereby God binds and obliges
Himself to be my loving God and Father in Christ," G.D. Henderson, The Burning
Bush, pp. 67-68,
5 Robert Rollock, Select Works, Vol. I, p. 25. Leonard J. Trinterud thinks
perhaps the Puritan Dudley Fenner (i558?-1587) was the first to use the phrase,
while in exile in Holland, "The Origins of Puritanism", Church History,
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covenants. He followed Olevianus in making the covenant the pivotal point in
theology by contending that "all the words of God appertain to sane covenant;
for God speaks nothing to men without the covenant"; but he went even further
in speaking specifically of "God's two covenants; both that of works and that of
grace." The covenant of works was a "legal or natural" covenant founded in
nature and in the law of God originally engraved on man's heart. The covenant
of grace was a "free" covenant founded in Christ crucified which satisfies the
justice of God on account of the breach of the covenant of works, and on the
-j
mercy of God. Rollock taught that man had originally been able to keep the
covenant of works because he was created just ana perfect and yet while promised
eternal life upon condition of fulfilling the covenant of works, these works did
p
not merit eternal life, but were simply pledges of thankfulness to his Creator.
It was, however, a British theologian, William Ames (1576-1633) who was
3
most responsible for the development of federal theology. His work, translated
into English in 1639 Q3 the Harrow of Sacred Divinity, no doubt had a great
influence on John Cocceius, who was one of Ames's pupils. There were others
as well who lent their genius to the development and, spread of federalism.
John Downame's The Christian Warfare (1604) was one of the most influential works
in the early development of the idea. John Ball, the Oxford Puritan, completed
A Treatise of the Covenant of GracrA just before his death in 162$. It contained
Vol. XX, No. 1 (March, 1951), P® 4b. Cf. Dudley Penn'srl Sacra TheologiT*Tt632) ,
p. 49. "Foedus duplex est: Operum foedus, Gratuitse promissionis foedus."
1 Ibid., pp. 33f. 2 Ibid., p. 37.
3 G.D. Henderson, Religious Life in Seventeenth Century Scotland, p. ?'3®
For the influence of other British theologians, infra, p. B7.
4 On the covenant of works Ball wrote; "The forme of this covenant stood
in the special Promise of good to be received from justice as a reward for his
work, Doe this and live: and the exact and rigid exaction of perfect obedience
in his own person, without the least spot or failing for matter on matter. The
good that God promised was in it(s) kind a perfect system of good, which was to
be continued so long as he continued obedient,...we call it happiness, life, and
everlasting happiness." Treatise of the Covenant of Grace, pp. 9-10. It is
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many of the finer distinctions of federal theology and Mitchell refers to it
as "one of the fullest and most mature specimens of Puritan teaching on the
-I
subject of the covenants...In 1629 Jelm Preston published eighteen sermons
2
entitled The New Covenant. These horailetical expositions of the covenant concept
were so popular that in the succeeding ten years the book underwent on the average
one new printing each year. Fox* the sheer abundance of federal literature in
this period one should consult the long list cited by Perry Miller.^
Federal theology did not remain on the pages of individual works, but very
early was elevated to a confessional position. Due to the ideas of covenant,
promise and penalty^ the Irish Articles of Religion (1615?) claim to be the first
public confession ou include elements of federal theology. However, because its
influence has been greater, and because it specifically uses the terms "covenant
of works" and "covenant of grace," the Yfestminster Confession of Faith is
commonly known as the first public confession to teach the federal system of
theology. It certainly marked the most explicit introduction of federal theology
interesting to note that Ball does not teach confirmation in righteousness as
the reward for obedience, but still more significant is his emphasis that even
in the covenant of works Adam was the recipient of God's grace; "it was of
grace that God was pleased to bind himself to his creature, and above the desert
of the creature; and though the reward be of justice, it is also of favor.
For after perfect obedience performed according to the will of God, it had been
no injustice in God, as he made the creature of nothing, so to have brought
him unto nothing; it was then of grace that he was pleased to make that
promise...." op.cit., p. 7®
1 Mitchell, op.cit., p. 478.
2 It is encouraging to find Preston more concerned with the covenant made
with Abraham than with the covenant of works. According to W. Haller the
point of these sermons "was the all-sufficiency of God and of the saints he
had covenanted to save." The Rise of priritanism, p. 164®
3 Perry Miller, The Hew England Mind, pp. 502-504®
4 Article Twenty-one; "Man being at the beginning created according to
the image of God (which consisted especially in the wisdom of his mind and the
tr\xe holiness of his free will) , had the covenant of the law ingrafted in his
heart, whereby God did promise unto him everlasting life upon condition that he
performed entire and perfect obedience unto his Commandments, according to that
measure of strength wherewith he was endued in his creation, and threatened
death unto him if he did not perform.the same." Philip Schaff, The Creeds
of Evangelical Protestant Churches, p. 530® " " "
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into a major creed to that date,, On the one hand the federalism of the
Confession is described as MmildH in that it has only the essential elements
of two covenants; on the other it is described as "high" in that it reflects
1
the sentiments of Dort.
This general survey of the growth of federal theology has so far dealt with
only two of three states towards its final formulation. We have followed the
development of the covenant concept and the use of the doctrine of the covenant
of works and covenant of grace up to the time of their most systematic exposition
by Cocceius and Witsius. The third and final stage, the division of the covenant
of grace into an eternal covenant of redemption and a temporal covenant of grace,
2
can be traced in Scotland to the work of David Dickson and James Durham. In
1637 Dickson wrote of three covenants, redemption, grace, and works, in his
Therapeutics S&cra (not published until 1656) in addition to natural law which
no longer- enjoyed the covenant status it had for a time in the sixteenth century.
It was Dickson along with James Durham who co-authored the Sum of Saving
Knowledge which also taught the triple covenant scheme. Its impact was
heightened greatly by the fact that it was bound with the Confession of Faith
and Catechisms as though equally a part of the Y/estminster Standards. From that
time forward federal theology has been characterized not by two, but three
separate and distinct covenants; and everything in the whole system is seen in
the light of these divine and human contracts.
3» Motivating factors of federal theology
To complete this survey of Hill's theological background, we must ask a
1 "The Westminster Confession stands at an extreme point in the general
development of Calvinism, is high and severs in its doctrine, so conceived and
so expressed throughout as to condemn in an equal measure the Arminian theory
and any attempt to modify the Calvinian in the direction of Universality or
Conditionality." A.M. Fairbairn, "The Westminster Confession of Faith and.
Scotch Theology", The Contemporary Review, Vol. XXI, (December, 1877), P. 67.
2 This division, as G-.D. Henderson intimates, was not original with Dickson.
Henderson believes the concepts of three covenants had previously appeared in
Musculus and William Cowper. The three-fold division may indeed be found in
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third question. What were the motivating factors which gave rise to fedex-al
theology? While it would bs the height of impertinence to say that a single
answer, or any answer for that matter, may be given, perhaps suggestions can
bs offered, categorized and evaluated. The origins and development of federal
theology can be fully understood only as the result of a number of different
causes, some minor, some major.
One minor factor, perchance, is the combination of natural law and the
rationalistic or logical conclusion of the reformed concept of the imago dei.
In Lutheran theology man is called into being by God as the apex of creation,
and in this condition he is perfect. ' In the Reformed view, however, there is
2
something wanting, something yet to be. Calvin therefore says that "the image
of Cod was only shadowed forth in man till he should arrive at his perfection"?^
that "the state of man was not perfected in the person of Adam";^ that "before
the fall of Adam, man's life was only earthly seeing it had no firm and settled
constancy.Calvin understood the imago del as a dynamic relationship, not as
a static quality. The imago "is God's action on man by the imprint of the Truth
upon his mind, and becomes man's possession only in the active response of love
and obedience. Therefore the strength of the imago del and its continued main¬
tenance in man lies in the Word of God and not in the soul of man. In a real
sense the image of God in man is the Conimunicated Word in which God's glory
shines forth.
Cov/per, but it is doubtful that Mascuius entertained such an ideal [cf7 Mus'culus,
op.cit«, p. 183. "Unicorn est ac perpetum foedus Dei cum Electis omnibus
sancitum & firmatura.") Perhaps Henderson confused the tria tempore principalis
with tria feeders. Musculus, however, clearly states, "Inde tamen non
consequitur, esse tria foedera substantialia." (op.cit. , p. 183.)
1 P.F. Keller, Studies in Lutheran Doctrine, p. 4.
2 Heinrich Iieppe, Reformed Dogmatics, p. 249.
3 Calvin, Commentary on Genesis.1:26.
4 Ibid., 2S7. 5 Ibid., 2:7.
6 T.F. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine of Idan, p. 52. For a full discussion
of this point see pages 35-82.
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Because man is not regarded as being created perfect in every respect, the
covenant of works can arise® If man in some way must work out his perfection,
there must be son® method of achieving that goal. Federal theology answers the
question concerning this "way" in terms of a covenant of nature or works. If
man had kept the natural law for a probationary period, he would have been con-
•j
firmed in righteousness thus realising his perfection.1 This rise of the "covenant
of nature" is a direct result of the reintroduction of the Aristotelian concept
of natural law, Christianized by the Schoolmen. Perhaps in Thomas Hobbes'
explanation of natural law, we can see how easily adaptable its principles were
to the federal scheme. Hobbes distinguished between "lex naturalla and ,yas
naturale. The lav/- of nature "is a Precept, or general Rule, found out by Reason,
by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or
taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that by which he thinketh
Q
it may be best preserved." The right of nature "is the Liberty each man hath
to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature;
that is to say of his own Life."-' The former enjoines an obligation; the latter
asserts a liberty; and both are equally necessary for man's preservation. This
calls for an agreement of wills among men, or a contract. Contracts, however,
require a power to enforce them,^ and the only way to obtain such a power is for
all men to give up their rights to one man, or one assembly of men, and to
acknowledge his acts as their own. This man or assembly will thus bear the
"person" of the whole multitude. -
Many are the points of parallel between this concept of natural law and
the federal system, such as, the covenant of work and one's obligation to it
1 Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 120.
2 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 66. 3 Ibid., p. 66.
4 "Covenants of mutuall trust where there is no feare of not
performance on either part, are invalid." Ibid. , p. 74.
5 Ibid., p. 89.
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being discernible in nature through reason, the threat of death upon disobedience
to the natural law, the legal understanding of a covenant as a contract, and the
idea of a federal representative. Earth places the responsibility of introducing
this scholastic lex naturae upon Melanchtpn, but attributes Musculus with the
actual application of its principles to the covenant concept. But since federal
theology was already beginning to take shape before it conjoined with
Aristotelian natural law, it may be more proper to speak of the latter as a
supporting factor, rather than a motivating factor, of the former. In that
federal theology looked to natural law .for support, however, the latter may
correctly be called a minor motivating factor. At any rate the two are
certainly interrelated.
Another minor factor in the motivation of federal theology may have been
the tension between divine predestination and human responsibility. Perry Miller
comes to this conclusion on the basis of his findings in the Puritan life and
thought of New England, Federal theology is understood in part as an attempt
to hold in balance these two great doctrines:
Here then was a revision of Calvinism which by skillful dialectic preserved
the essential tenets of piety « the absolute God, the depraved man, the
redeeming and unmerited grace - and yet contrived at the same time that
justification by faith should not produce a moral laxity.
But since the dialectic was not as skillful as it seemed, this concept of the
rise of federal theology has validity only so long as it is remembered that
federal theology is seen as a reconciling agent between aspects of a
Rationalized Calvinism® The characteristic elements of Calvin's own theology -
1 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. IV/T7 p,~"S7 ThisHls not' to imply""
that the concept of natural lav/- originated at this time, but that it was
introduced to theology at this time. Professor T.P. Torrance, in conversation
with the author, stated that the concept is to be found as early as the
fourteenth century.
2 Miller, op.cito, p. 1+1.
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grace, gratitude, union with Christ, eschatology - have all been amputated,
leaving of necessity a deformed theology. Though Calvin spoke of predestination
and responsibility, he created no contradictions between the two. The problem
arises in that while Calvin spoka first of the election of Israel, and then of
the individual, within Israel, the later "Calvinists" corrupted this doctrine of
predestination by making election pointedly individual with no reference to Christ
at all. Hence the question arises: Is not the tension between predestination
and responsibility more of an effect of federal theology than a cause?
Undoubtedly, there is some merit in this suggestion for federal theology had
not yet become crystallised into a definable system; yet one wonders if the
apparent tension between the "absolute God" and the "depraved man" is not
occasioned by the rigid predestinarianism of the rationalized Calvinist ana the
pure unrestricted reason of autonomous man. Which gave rise to which?
A third motivating factor, suggested by Adams Brown, is the need for
assurance:
This problem was in a word, the reconciliation of the sovereignty of God
with man's assurance of salvation. The federal theologians, as they are
called, were Calvinists. Their major premise was the absolute sovereignty
of God. Man, in their view, had no independent right as against his
Maker....Perfect obedience, were such possible, carried with it no merit
and could guarantee no reward. If, then, man was to be admitted to the
Divine fellowship or assured of Divine favor, it could be only by some
voluntary condescension on God's part, establishing by arbitrary enactments
relations which had no necessary foundation in nature. The importance of
the covenant for these theologians consisted in its assurance that such
condescension had, as a matter of fact, taken place.1
However, just as the tension between predestination and responsibility becomes
a progressively valid factor as Calvinism becomes progressively corrupt, so too
does the need for assurance. Once again it would seem that federal theology
with its impersonal unGhx-istological decrees of election and reprobation created
1 Brown"7~~op.citpp. 216-217.
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a need for assurance rather than the need of assurance giving birth to federal
theology. This "logical doctrine" served as a crutch for the federalists.
A
Though Calvin speaks of reprobation there is no uncertainty as to God's
purpose that would give cause for erecting a federal theology to prove His
condescension to man. God's purpose has been plainly revealed in Christ. Even
though theoretically God1s sovereignty is such that He owes man nothing, yet
in Christ He makes it clear that He wishes to bring man to Himself:
Christ, therefore, is the mirror in which it behoves us to contemplate
our election; and here we may do it with safety. For as the Father has
determined to unite to the body of his Son all who are the objects of
his eternal choice, that he may have, as his children, all that he
recognises among his members, we have a testimony sufficient clear and
strong, that if we have communion with Christ, we are written in the 'book
of life...what folly do we betray in seeking out of him, that which we 9
have already obtained in him, and which can never be found any where else.5
It is because God reconciles man to Himself in Christ that the problem cannot
be a motivating factor for the true Calvinist.
For a consideration of the remaining motivating factors we mus. change
from a minor to a major key, because the factors now to be revierred exerted
positive influence on the actual rise of federal theology. Certainly one
important factor in the development of federal, theology was the changing
political thought of the period. Perry Miller says:
Federal theology was essentially part of a universal tendency in European
thought to change social relationships from status to contract...it was
one expression of late Renaissance speculation v/hich was moving in general
away from feudalism....There can be no doubt that these theologians inserted
the federal idea into the very substance of divinity, that the3r changed the
relation even of God to man from necessity to contract, largely because
contractualism was becoming increasingly congenial to the age....-1
1 Calvin, Institutes, 3:24:15.
2 *£id»> 3:24:5.
3 Miller, op.cit., p. 399. Later Miller qualifies this thesis and
finally admits that it is impossible to tell whether early Puritans extended the
idea of contract from social to religious thinking, or vice versa. Note in
this regard Lindsay's comment that Cocceius' concept of federal representation
was carried over from Grotius, the great jurist of the period, op.cit., p. 523.
For further study in the related area of social contracts and natural rights
cf. J.W. Gough, The Social Contract.
An assessment of the relationship between the political and theological uses of
the covenant concept is beyond the scope of this work, and although it is neces-
sary to give this suggestion of changing social theory a major place among the
factors contributing to the rise of federal theology, it would be of little pur¬
pose to repeat the findings of work already done in the area. I refer specifically
to G.D. Henderson's Religious Life in Seventeenth Century Scotland and The Burning
Bush, "The Idea of the Covenant in Scotland," along with S.Ac Burrell's article
^-n Ohurch History on "The Covenant Idea as a Revolutionary Symbol."
Another suggestion along the same line is made by T.M. Lindsay concerning
the relation of historical thinking and federalism. In brief, Lindsay believes
that whereas a renewed interest in Aristotle resulted in an abstract reformed
theology, federal theologians sought to secure federal theology to its historical
moorings. "What Federalism tried to do...was to bring the Reformed theology
into real living connection with the historical development of God's plan of'
salvation in the actual salvation of men and women and with the historical
proclamation of that plan in Scripture....The Covenants were categories which
were used to translate the timeless into the temporal, the ideal into the
historical, what belonged to a past eternity into the present moment of time."
According to Lindsay this was accomplished when Cocceius and Witsius used the
term "covenant" in the sense of "contract" or "bargain":
...it was used for the purpose of showing how the present grew out of the
past, and how the actual was produced from the ideal....The rule of the
idea of covenant marks the age when men were beginning to look at things
in an historical way, and yet could not do it fully and clearly....The
federalists took the well known term, covenant or pact, and used it to make
plain the actual and historical character of God's work of salvation.5
1 S.A. Burrell, Church History, Vol. XXVTI, Ho. 1+, (December, 1958),
pp. 338-550. Primary sources which should be consulted include the anonymous
Hugenot work Vindiciae contra Tyrannos (1579), translated into English as A
Defense of Liberty Against Tyrants (trans, by n.J. Laski); George Buchanan's
De Jure Regni apud Scotas (15/9); Samuel Rutherford's Lex, Rex (16l+l+); and
Robert Douglas' sermon at the coronation of Charles II, The Duty of King and
People.
2 Lindsay, op.cit., pp. 534-535. 3 Ibid., p. 536.
Two questions are raised at this point. Granted, Cocceius* method of
theologizing resulted in a return to historical thinking, but is not the real
impetus to be found in the historical thought-forms of the reformation rather
than in mere opposition to the abstract non-historical thought forms of the
Aristotelians? Though renewed interest in history may have been a contributing
factor in the rise of federal theology, one should refrain from crediting federal
theology alone with ths whole development of historical theology. The second
question is this: granted, Gocceius' federal theology "is the most important
attempt, in the older Protestant theology, to do justice to the historical
A
development of revelation," but does this not refer more to his methodology
7
than to the contents of his theology. At this point one should refrain from
blaming historical thinking with the production of federalism. It should be
remembered that while federal theology provides the vehicle and, perhaps, the
encouragement for a more historical interpretation of revelation, it also
provides the possibility of scholastic elements. Even Lindsay himself is forced
O
to admit that "it lent itself readily to incipient rationalism." The work of a
man like Gocceius bears this out for his system is affected by rationalism in spite
of the important place it holds in the development of a more historical theology.
The third major factor in the motivation of federal theology is perhaps the
most basic cf all. There seems to be enough available evidence to substantiate
the claim that it inoro then any other factor gave birth to federalism. This
factor was a particular form of logic and i-hetoric which was popular when federal
theology was in it3 formative years.J It was identified as Ramism, being named
1 Robertson Smith, Prophets in Israel, p. 3?5»
2 Lindsay, op.cit., p. 537.
3 Research into this area was prompted by Perry Miller's The Hew England
Mind in which are found such suggestive conments as "Ramist logic was presented
as...applicable to jurisprudence, physics or theology"; and "Not all Puritans,
to be sure, were Ramists, but many Ramists were puritans."
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fox* a Frenchmanj Pierre da la Ramee, better known by his Latin name of Petrus
Ramus (1515-1572). Frustrated by the confusion and lack of clarity in scholastic
logic and traditional rhetoric, Ramus intended to remove these barriers to
communication. He sought to accomplish this objective first by criticising the
schoolman for having falsified Aristotle, and secondly by daring to criticise
Aristotle himself. Though his revisions seemed spectacular in his own day, partly
because they appeared a threat to the theology of the Church of Rome -which was
expressed largely in Aristotelian terms, they "seem now to be little more than a
scholasticism with certain procedures newly emphasized, and certain reorganizations
A
effected."1 Rather than having a fine line of distinction between the two it is
best to understand Randsm as a modification of the Aristotelian tradition.
Certainly the two went together.^ Ramus's unique contributions however, were
given particular theological significance by two interrelated events; his con¬
version to protestantism and his martyrdom in the St. Bartholomew Day Massacre
in 1572."'
It is not our intention to survey Ramus's logic and rhetoric in detail since
this has been done already/1 but there are certain characteristics of his views
which should be reviewed in our attempt to understand the motivating factors of
federal theology. One of those characteristics was his strong confidence in
reason. In the extreme application of this confidence to religion, it could be
said that for Ramus logic was "the chief instrument of man in the quest for
salvation. In fact the strength of Ramus' passion for this subject can be
1 W.S. Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, p. 312.
Cf. T.F. Torrance, Theological Science, p. 8, Note 1.
2 While continental federal theology developed in the midst of both
pressures, the British development took place within the Ramist camp. Hence
our primary concern will be with Ramisin.
3 F.W. Cuno, "Ramus, Fetrus," The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia of
Religious Knowledge, Vol. IX, p. 388.
4 See Walter J. Ong, Ramus and Talon Inventory (1958), and Ramus, Method
and the Decay of Dialogue (1958)". —~ - .
83
inferred from his own statement that God is the only perfect logician, that
man surpasses the beast by virtue of his capacity to reason syllogistically, and
that one man surpasses another only so far as his address to the problem of method
A
is superior." In contrast to the empirical tradition he does not consider
/»■»
induction as a species of argument alongside the syllogism, but as Howell points u-
outj. "If his procedure in this respect seems far from progressive, it should be
remembered not only that the time was not yet ripe for sciences based on
experience, observation, and the minute descriptions of particulars, but also
2
that a logic of induction in advance of that time would have had no influence."
However true that may be, Ramus gave a far lower place to induction than to
syllogism, speaking of the latter in man as "the image of some sort of divinity."
Another characteristic of Ramus and perhaps the one having the greatest
influence en our subject was his emphasis on "method." The term as used by Ramus
has to do with the method of communicating knowledge, or the method of exposition,
rather than the method of discovery or research."^ This emphasis is reflective
of four presuppositions. The first is a twofold confidence in the ability of
man to know, and in the "knowledge" of that which is known. The second is an
assumption that the form of presentation is to be determined by the desire for
communication rather than the nature of the subject matter. The third is that
the cause of a thing i3 more evident than a statement of its effect. And the
fourth, a general and universal is more evident than a particular and single.
It is from the fourth that Ramus took his cue. His "method" itself was quite
simple; in any treatise or argument, ideas should be arranged in the order of
~~1 Howell, opTcit., p. 133T~"gI'o T.F. Torrance", iTxeoIogTccl dcSmce", p. 3¥).
2 Ifrici> , p. 59.
3 Ramists "are interested rather in the art of persuasion and exposition
than in the art of discovering Truth." Meyrick H. Carre', Phases of Thought
in England, p. 205.
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their conspicuousnes s; the most conspicuous things being given primary place,
and the less conspicuous being given subordinate places. Within the framework
of this general method Ramus distinguished two specific methods , the natural
and the prudential. While both are governed by the general, "the natural method
attempts to arrange ideas according to their degree of conspicuousness in an
absolute sense, whereas the prudential method attempts to arrange them according
to their degree of conspicuousness in the consciousness of the inexpert listener
or reader."'* Ramus himself prefers the natural to the prudential method. We
can best understand the natural method by citing a translation of his own
explanation of it. This
method of teaching...is the arrangement of various things brought down
from universal and general principles to the underlying singular parts,
by which arrangement the whole matter can be more easily taught and
apprehended. In such method, this alone has to be prescribed? that in
teaching the general and universal explanations precede, such as the
definition and a kind of general summary; afterwards follows the special
explanation by distribution of the parts; last of all comes the definition
of the singular parts and clarification by means of suitable examples.'
Ramus's method had several other distinctives which made its presence
rather obvious. One was the arrangement of ideas in two's in the descending
order of generality. Although Ramus himself did not always dichotomize, as the
above example indicates, "dichotomizing" became a characteristic of his followers.J
According to them, it seemed "as if any given idea had only two members, one
completely insulated from the other.Because this dichotomizing was often
forced, Bacon accused later Ramists of contorting things "with their law of
1 Howell, op.cite, p. 160T
2 Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method and Decay of Dialogue, p. 245.
3 Ramus was not the first philosopher to dichotomize. Plato had done it
and was criticized by Aristotle.
4 Howell, op.clt., p. 163.
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method" and either omitting or perverting beyond nature "whatever does not
-j
conveniently fall in these dichotomies."
S
A second distinctive feature of the Ramus method was the use of charts
to illustrate the interrelation of the parts of knowledge. These charts were
but a visible representation of the structure of Ramist logic. Since the logic
of Ramus was "simply a schematic arrangement of logical termswith emphasis
on laying out in a series, "this logic was built up as an architectual unit,
all its parts fitting together, represented on this chart exactly as a house may
2
be represented in the architect's plan." Ong points out that this characteristic
of Ramus' method led to thinking only in terms of spatial modes apprehended by
3
sight and that this in turn led to impersonal knowledge.
What is of interest to us, however, is the effect which all of this had on
the theology of the time; more precisely we are concerned to know whether Ramism
influenced federal theology. We know that both Ramism and federalism began
about the middle of the sixteenth century, but is there any evidence of their
conjunction? Several points arise which indicate that Ramism did play an
important role in the development of federal theology. In the first place, the
universities where those who became federal theologians received their education
were impregnated with Ramist philosophy. Kemp Smith has stated that "up to the
17th century philosophy as studied in the Scottish Universities was a rudimentary
version of Aristotelianism, supplemented, perhaps, by the logic of Peter Ramus.
Speaking of the period 1574-1700 W.S. Howell writes of an almost "complete
1 Francis Bacon, Works, Vol. I, p. ~6§3.
2 Perry Miller, op.cit., p. 125. Forta copy of one of these charts
see Appendix A,
3 Ong, op.cit,, p. 9.
4 N. Kemp Smith, The philosophy of David Hume , p. 23.
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monopoly for Ramus' logical and rhetorical theory in England in the early part
1
of that epoch and...a position of considerable weight throughout." He goes on
to point out that though St. Andrews was the first center of Ramism in Britain,
Cambridge and Oxford were not far behind.
In the second place we note that too many men influential in the rise of
federal theology ware also Ramists for this to be a mere coincidence. It was
through the efforts of Andrew Melville that Ramist logic spread to the Scottish
Q
universities," and it is obvious that Robert Home could not have escaped Ramist
influence since he followed Melville as principal of St. Andrews. This seems
also the case with Robert Rollock, for he was a student at St. Andrews. He was
admittedly a Ramist, giving his philosophy students Aristotelian texts with a
Ramist commentary. later he taught theology in the same university, and the
editor of his works noted that if his system of divinity "be compared with the
Confession of Faith by the Westminster Divines it will be found to follow very
nearly the same order.Thus we find the marriage of federal theology and
Ramist philosophy in the work of a single man.
We find the same obvious connection between federal-ism and Eamism among
the Puritan divines who developed the federal theology that found its way into
the Westminster Confession. Perry Miller says that
though Puritan literature abounds with condemnations of scholasticism,
almost no limits can be set on its actual influence. At every turn we
encounter ideas and themes which descend, by whatever states, from
medieval philosophy, while the forms of thin Icing, the terminology, the
method of logic - though this was believed to have been drastically
revolutionized in the sixteenth century - were.still duplications of
medieval habits, modified, but not transformed.
1 Howell, op.cit., p. 187.
2 R.S. Rait, "Andrew Melville and the Revolt Against Aristotle in
Scotland," Bnglish Historical Review, Vol. XIV, 1899, pp. 250-260.
5 Robert Rollock, Works, Vol. I, p. xiii.
4 Perry Miller, op.cit., p. 104.
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While this continuing scholasticism was plainly Aristotelian in some points,
it appeal's to have bsen more acceptable to many protestants in the form of
Ramism. One of the earliest Puritan federal theologians was also one of the
earliest Ramists. In 1584 Dudley pennor anonymously published The Artec of
Logiks and Rethorike which was thoroughly Ramist. "The logical doctrine in this
treatise is an unacknowledged translation of the main heads of Ramus' Dialecticae
Libri Duo, although these heads fere illustrated, not from the classical authors
A
whom Ramus used, but from the Bible," It is important to note that William
Perkins (1558-1602), another Puritan federalist, was also a Ramist, Concerning
the influence of Perkins and his works, William Haller has said, "No books, it
is fair to say, were more often to be found upon the shelves of succeeding
generations of preachers, and the name of no preacher recurs more often in later
Puritan literature,8*^ The effect of Ramism on Perkins may be clearly seen in two
of his works. In the Golden Chains he expounds the federalist doctrine of
predestination by means of charts in which he sets forth in parallel columns
3the steps ascending to heaven end those descending to hell, and in Arte of
Prophesying we find the characteristic dichotomous structure in his suggested
division of the preacher's material. Similar advice is given by Ronald
Macllmaine, a Scottish federalist:
If you are a divine,.,you will have to accommodate the principles of Ramist
logic to your own special needs. Thus instead of beginning your sermon
with a definition, as the strict method of logic would dictate, you begin
instead with a statement of the sum of the text you have taken in hand to
interpret. Next you divide the text into a few heads, so that the hearer
may better remember your discourse. Next you treat each head in terms of
the ten places of invention, shov/ing causes, effects, adjuncts, comparisons,
and so on. Lastly, you make your matter plain and manifest with familiar
examples and authorities from the Word of God. 'A
1 Howell, op.cit., p, 219,
2 William Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, p. 65.
3 William Perkins, Works, pp. 75, 96, 107. See Appendix B.
4 Howell, on.cit_,, p. 184. In 1574 Macllmaine translated Ramus's
Dialecticae Libri Duo.
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Besides these, England produced such Ramist Puritans as Antony Rooten, George
Downham and William Gouge. The latter is of particular interest because ha
manifested the influence -which Eamism had directly upon the Westminster theology.
Re played a leading role in the Westminster Assembly as a member of the committee
1
charged with the preparation of the Confession of Faith.
In the third place we are led to believe Ramism was a major factor in the
development of federal theology because of the obvious application of Ramist
principles within that system. It would be impossible to examine every point of
connection, but a few may be cited to support this contention. Several have
already been mentioned by way of allusion, namely, the practice of moving from
2
the general to the particular" (federal theology moves from the general covenant
of nature to the particular covenant of grace) , and the dichotomy of doctrine
(federal theology speaks of nature and grace, reprobate and elect, merey and
justice, etc.). Nowhere, however, do we find a clearer combination of Ramist
methodology and federal theology than in William Ames. He wrote a number of
books strictly about Ramism, but of more concern to us is his classic, The Harrow
of Sacred Divinity. In the preface he states his purpose to be the condensation
of "the Sum of Divinity." This, he believes, can be accomplished "if the chief
heads be handled in a Rhetoricall way" and if great "cere of Method, and Logicall
3form" be taken into account." The reference is obviously to Rarrdst rhetoric,
method and logic; and from beginning to end the work is embedded in those prin¬
ciples. It opens vdth a large folding chart which illustrates Ames's system of
1 Minutes of the Sessions of the Westminster Assembly of Divines
(eds. A.F. Mitchell, John Struthers), p. lxxxvii.
2 This is not to imply that Ramus originated this practice, only that
he made extensive use of it. It was a common characteristic of medieval logic.
3 William Ames, The Marrow of Sacred Divinity, pp. 3"4.
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theology, a dichotomy having as its two parts faith and observance; and it closes
with a summary of tabulated doctrines. Ames gives us the reason for his intentional
wedding of theology and Ramist methodology; it was to simplify the material so
•i
that it could "bee understood, known, and committed to memory." It was this
practical concern to have theology in a fox-ra that was both teachable and
memorable that lay behind much of the Ramist influence of federal theology. One
must admit, too, that in this attempt it succeeded. A popular argument in favor
of federal theology was its systematic simplicity. Once the basic structure of the
covenants had been grasped, then all other doctrines could be related to them.
This evidence leaves little room for doubt that Ramist philosophy was a
major motivating factor in the rise of federal theology, but it should be re-
emphasized that no one factor can account for the existence of a whole system
of theology. Surely each factor mentioned in this survey, and perhaps many
others as well, made its own contribution to the development of a theological
system still very much alive today.
Evaluation ojf Federal Theology
What can be said in evaluating federal theology as a whole? Karl Barth
grants federal theology a certain merit in that "it tried to understand the work
and word of God attested in Holy Scripture dynamically and not statically, as an
p
event and not as a system of objective and self contained truths.""* Llore
specifically T.F. Torrance says the employment of the covenant idea confirmed
within Reformed theology a two-fold characteristic:
It gave Reformed theology a universal perspective, inasmuch as theology
takes into account the whole economy of the Covenant before the Incarnation
and the whole economy of the Covenant after the Incarnation. There can be
no doubt that the Federal Theology achieved a magnificent and comprehensive
unification of Biblical teaching. But it also gave theology its great
1 Ibid. , p. 4* See Appendix C.
2 Barth, op.cit., IV/1, p. 55.
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historical perspective , as that which is concerned with the history of
the people of God in Covenant relation and conversation with Him through¬
out all ages from the very beginning of the world to the present day,
reaching out to the Parousis. It was indeed in the course of this
development of the Federal Theology that there arose the conception
of the Hellsgeschichte wh^ch has played such a significant part in
modern Biblical theology.
Bi.it once these points are granted it must be asked whether the system used to
unify the whole of Biblical teaching, and the categories used to make it
historical, are faithful to the nature of the truth which they present or whether-
some alien systematic principle has been employed. At these points federal
theology "is weighed in the balance and found wanting." The starting point for
this "historical" system was the covenant of works which was related in federal
theology to nature, to lav/-, and to reason, end is without Biblical foundation.
This caused a subtle shift in the point of departure from theology to anthropology.
In the dominant position given this doctrine in federalism, we have a classic
example of how a systematizing principle may be allowed to assume an independent
and authoritarian role, thus becoming the master rather than the servant of truth.
There was an increasing tendency among federal theologians to relate every his¬
torical event to the covenant of works. This controlling nature of the covenant
of works is most clearly developed in the federalism of Cocceius. According to
him, everything following the covenant of works was understood as belonging to
2
one of a series of abrogations of this covenant. The first is that of man's sin
in which he makes the covenant of works a thing of damnation to himself and falls
under the curse of God. The second abrogation comes from (tod's side and consists
in the establishment of the covenant of grace, a pre-temporal agreement betv/een
the Father and the Son. The third is the temporal proclamation of the covenant
1 T.F. Torrance, The School of Faith, p. Ixv. In conversation with the
author, Professor Torrance stated that the true starting point for this
historical interest can be traced through Calvin to Irenaeus, both of whom
treated the concept of redemptive history.
2 Barth, op.cit., IV/1, pp. 59-60.
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of grace. The fourth is that sanctifies.tion of the body which goes hand in hand
with justification. And the final abrogation concerns eschatological redemption
and the final consummation of the covenant of grace. In thus elevating the
covenant of works to this special status, even the strong point of federal
theology, its concern for history, was in danger of being lost, for to speak
of the covenant of .grace as an abrogation of the covenant of works is to express
it in eternal and non-historical terms. It is at this point that we can under¬
stand the reason for the development of a third covenant. Those who considered
the eternal covenant between Father and Son to be. insufficiently related to
mankind in time and space, added the third covenant between G-od and the elect
sinner in Christ. One derivation simply led to another.
Also, as a result of making the covenant of works the starting point, the
inter-Trinitarian relationships of Father and Son were understood in legal
terms; for the former provided the pattern of the latter. The God of the covenant
of works was seen as a stern judge, related to man in terms of law, and God the
Son was seen, in contrast, as the gracious defender of men. This cleavage between
the Persons of the Godhead became so great that Ames, for example, could speak of
faith and repentance as having different objects. "Faith is properly carried
unto Christ, and by Christ unto God; but repentance is carried to God himself
A
who was before offended by sin."1 This sever© separation of Father and Son
affects other doctrines as well. Even astute Thomas Halyburton, aware of the
2
dangers of rationalism and legalism, speaks of Christ's heavenly intercession
in legal terms;
1 Ames, op.cit., p. 113.
2 Thomas Halyburton, Memoirs, p. 199. "I dread mightily that a rational
sort of religion is coming in among us; I mean by it a religion that consists
in a bare attendance on outward duties and ordinances, without the power of
godliness; and thence people shall fall into a way of serving God which is
mere deism, having no relation to Jesus Christ and the Spirit of God."
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Christ's Intercession^ tho' tis represented as a Prayer; yet it is
not strictly so: But in so far as it concerns himself, tis a Claim of
Right, tho* as other legal claims out of a Regard to the Majesty of
the Judge, it's managed in the Form of a Prayer...or rather it is
represented in Condescension to our capacity after this manner: The
way of Transacting things in Heaven, betwixt the glorious Judge and
Advocate being above our Reach* '
As a third result of beginning with the non-Biblical covenant of works
concerned with lew and nature, the Biblical covenant of grace has been forced
into second place. Since, as all federal theologians knew, law can be grasped
by natural reason and grace demands revelation, and since Ramist principles
insisted upon presenting first the most clear and distinct points, lav,' could not
fail to be presented more clearly and more forcibly than grace* Undoubtedly, in
all fairness to federal theologians, this was done as a result of their chief
desire to communicate Christian doctrine. They wanted to make theology "logical"
so that the common man could comprehend its truth* But granted it is an admirable
intention to communicate Christian doctrine, we must ask whether the method of
communication has in fact endangered the message of Christianity. Cannot extreme
insistence upon a particular method of presentation corrupt the very nature of
that which is to be presented? In the case of federal theology, the answer is
affirmative, for, no doubt, Ramism did endanger many insights of the Reformation,
even though done unintentionally. Certainly the method of presenting doctrine
by moving from the general to the particular could not help but influence theology.
Doctrines were thought out in general abstract terms rather than in concrete
particular terms; yet how can the Person of Christ be faithfully treated in
abstraction? Similarly, once we move down the descending order of generalities
to speak of particulars, we must interpret these particulars in the light of the
1 Thomas Halyburton, A Modest Inquiry Whether Regeneration or
Justification has the Precedency in Order of Nature, p. 7.
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generals which have produced them; yet how can the covenant in the blood of
Christ be accurately interpreted against the background of an ambiguous concept
of a covenant? In like manner grace must be thought out in terms of a general
concept of law rather than in terms of a particular Person and His acts.
Perhaps, too, it was this emphasis which accounts for the depersonalization of
the doctrine of providence into a doctrine of necessity.
Certainly the desire for "simplicity" had its effect on theology. It might
be asked, far example, if the Ramist tendency to exclude those points which did
not fit into a rigid mold did not contribute to the de-emphasis on the
incarnation, the Person of Christ, the place of the Holy Spirit in redemption
and reconciliation. No doubt the popular exposition of justifying faith as a
condition' of salvation turned the Biblical concept of covenant as "communion"
into a "contract" analogous to the legal and commercial transactions drawn up
2
between, men. Once again the intention was merely to supply the common people
with a simplified plan of salvation, therefore the language of the market place
was used. Its effect, however, was to mislead. As G.C. KcCrie points out;
Detailed descriptions of redemption as a bargain entered into between
the first and second Persons of the Trinity in which conditions were laid
down, promises held out, ana pledges given, the reducing of salvation
to a mercantile arrangement between God and the sinner, in which the
latter signifies contentment to enter into a relation of grace, so that
ever after the contented, contracting party can say, 'Lord let it be a
bargain,* - such presentations have obviously a tendency to reduce the
Gospel of the grace of God to the level of a legal compact entered into
1 Though The Westminster Larger Catechism (Question 32) spoke of
faith as a "condition," there was much controversy over this term and by no
means a unanimity of opinion among federal theologians. Whereas some regarded
the covenant of grace, no less than that of works, as conditional, others
thought it "an abuse of language to speak of any condition to be fulfilled
on the part of the elect as distinct from Christ." Adams Brown, op.cit.,
pp. 217-218.
2 The danger here did not go unnoticed. Patrick Gillespie pointed out
the difference between a divine and human covenant and -warned that man cannot
take it upon himself to make a covenant with God. Ark of the Covenant Opened,
p. 100.
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between two independent and so far as right of status is concerned,
two 6qual parties * The blessedness of the mercy seat is in danger
of being lost sight of in the bargaining of the market placej the
simple story of salvation is thrown into the crucible of jjhe logic
of the schools and it emerges in the form of a syllogism®
Is it not possible, too, that the emphasis upon dichotomies could have
led to the covenant of works - covenant of grace dichotomy, a breakdown of the
essential unity between creation and redemption, the unfortunate distinction
between the 44elect" and the "reprobate" (making the Incarnate Son not head of
all men but only the elect), the almost pagan concept of a wrathful God and a
merciful Christ? Such questions are not easily answered, but it can be said
that the "great difference between Calvin and the so-called Calvinists of the
seventeenth century is symbolized bjr the vast importance they attached to the
one word 'method'. Systematic organization of the creed had been of great
2
concern to Calvin, but never the obsession it was to his followers."
Observations
There is no question but that George Hill was a federal theologian. Even
though he did not "testify" to this fact, a cursory survey of his theology
will support this conclusion; yet Hill cannot consistently be characterized by
the extreme federalism set forth above. At certain points he deviated from the
rigid Calvinism as presented in the gum of Saving Knowledge. Though he speaks
of Adam "as the representative of the human race,"^ and though he speaks of the
death of Christ as a "federal act,"':' he tried to establish a Biblical understanding
of the covenant concept. He states that 5ta0f]XT) , "according to its etymology,
and according to its classical use, may denote a testament, a disposition, as
1 G.C. McCrie, The Confession of the Church of Scotland, p. 777
2 Perry Miller, op.cit., p. 95.
3 Hill, L.I.P.. Vol. Ill, p. 276.
4 Ibid., p. 12. It is remembered that Hill defends limited atonement
because that is what "reason teaches and Jesus Christ declares." p. 14.
Note the order of priorityl
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well as a covenant; and the Gospel may be called a testament, because it is a
signification of the will of our Savior ratified by his death end because it
conveys blessings to be enjoyed after his death.In spite of his attempt,
however, to define covenant in terms of blessing and promise, he succumbs to
the pressure of the times and concludes that StaGrpn} generally appears to
proceed upon its meaning as covenant, that is, a "transaction" implying
2
"two parties, and a mutual stipulation."
Two things need to be noted, however, about Hill's concept of the
covenant. First, Hill insisted that "there are only two covenants,.. .the
covenant of works, made with the first man, intimated by the constitution of
human nature to every one of his posterity, and having for its terms, 'Do this
and live*; - and the covenant of grace, which was the substance of the Abrahamic
covenant, and which entered into the constitution of the Sinaitic covenant, but
which is more clearly revealed and more extensively published in the Gospel.
It is interesting to trace the way in which Hill expounds the covenant of grace
in terms of the covenant made with Abraham. Whereas the covenant of works was
made with Adam ss the representative of his natural posterity, the covenant of
grace is made with Abraham and his seed, i.e., all those who "walk in the steps
of his faith.Like the earlier federal theologians Kill speaks of the Father
and man as the contracting parties. Christ is seen as the mediator, fulfilling
the offices of prophet, priest, and king. Since the mediator is essential to
the covenant of grace, and since all who have been saved were saved by that
covenant, it follows that Christ as mediator acted in that capacity before He
was manifested in the flesh.
Secondly we should note Hill's explanation of the conditions of the
1 Ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 2757
3 Ibid.» p. 279.
2 Ibid., p.~ 274.
4 Ibid., P. 279.
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covenant of grace* In harmony with market place terminology he states that
it could not be a covenant unless there were terms something required as well
as something promised or given He is aware, however, that this is "language
...dangerous to hold," and unless properly explained is offensive. He therefore
seeks to explain what he means by the "duties to be performed." He is at pains
to emphasize that these duties must be interpreted in terms of the nature of'the
i
covenant as a covenant of grace, and it is precisely because Hill thinks of
2
the covenant "as having its source purely in the grace of G-od" that he has
difficulty with its conditions.
By the conditions of the covenant of grace, therefore, are meant, not
any circumstances in our character and conduct which may be regarded as
inducements moving G-od, to enter into a new covenant with us, but purely
those expressions of thankfulness which naturally proceed from the
persons with whom G-od has made this covenant, which are the effects and
evidences of the grace conveyed to their souls...with this caution, we^
scruple not to say that these are conditions in the covenant of grace.
It may be asked why Hill does not, with the general stream of federalism, speak
of faith as a condition of the covenant, and in a sense he does. He makes a
distinction between the acceptance of the covenant, the continuation of the
covenant, and the condition of the covenant. Faith is the means by vhlch the
covenant is accepted, and in line with federalist teaching, is understood to be
a gift of God; good works, originating in a changed character which is the fruit
of the operation of the Spirit, are the means "by which Christians continue to
keep the covenant"; and gratitude is the condition of the covenant. Because
of this unique emphasis one would like to think that Hill is reverting to the
Reformed teaching of obligations rather than conditions of the covenant; yet
1 So called "because, after man had broken the covenant of works, it was
pure grace or favor in the Almighty to enter into a new covenant with him;
and because by the covenant there is conveyed that grace, which enables man
to comply with the terms of it." Ibid., p. 279.
2 Ibid., p. 279. 3 Ibid., pp. 280-281. 4 Ibid. , p. 280.
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this idea is held uneasily together with the concept of covenant as contract.
It should he further noted that Hill makes reference to the fact that
i
he had "departed from the order of the Confession of Faith," ' This is significant
because of the dominant place given to the divine decrees in the Confession,
According to its arrangement, the Confession takes God in His general relation¬
ships with the world as its first datum, and then understands Ki3 election as one
function in this general relation. Only within the context of this general decree
can there be any mention of the special decree, the purpose of which is the self-
glorification of God in creation and redemption. Over against that Barth says,
"we are commanded by the Bible and oxu* Christian profession to take and to under¬
stand first the living God in His electing, in the specific relationship which He
has established with man in Jesus Christ, Only from this point can we go on to
p
consider His general relationship with the world and His deeraturn generals."
In. the light of this, it is interesting to find Hill discussing the divine decrees
in a section dealing with "The Remedy bought by the Gospel," and describing the
controversy between the supralapsarians and infr*olapsariana as "insignificant.
It is because of his insistanca upon only two covenants as opposed to three,
because of his explanation of the conditions of the covenant: oi grace in terms of
gratitude, and because of his unwillingness to let an abstract general decree
govern all his thought, that George Hill's theology has been called a "mild
federalism."U A survey of this federal theology has been undertaken in an attempt
to understand one factor influencing Hill's ecclesiastical principle. Heedless to
1 Hill, Institutes, p. vi. "According to that scheme, the doctrine of
predestination followed closely upon the doctrine of God, preceding directly
to the doctrine of creation and the whole remaining content of the Confession
and dogmatics...the arrangement was not that of Zwingli, or Bullinger, even
Calvin himself." Barth, op.cit. , Vol. Il/2, p. 277.
2 Barth, op.cit., Vol. II/2, p. 278.
3 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, pp. 29-38. Institutes, pp. 93-95.
Cf. the Order of the Scots Confession.
^ Baptism Commission Report, 1958, p. 57.
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say, such a consummate and coherent system of divinity affected greatly his
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CHAPTER III
ECCLESIASTICAL BACKGROUND
While completing his divinity cowse in Edinburgh, Hill boarded in the home
of Mrs. Syme, sister of William Robertson, Principal of the University.
According to his biographer, this arrangement afforded Hill "uninterrupted
intercourse" with Robertson, -who was then Scotland's most outstanding ecclesias¬
tic and leader of the Moderate Party in the established church. No doubt this
close association with such an influential raan, who had already befriended him
beyond repayment, shaped Hill's attitude in the arena of church politics. This
■]
xs not to disparage the role played by his own background and personal tempera¬
ment in determining his ecclesiastical inclinations, but the strength of the
2
former cannot be over-emphasized. For whatever reasons, Hill, at the outset
of his ministerial career cast his fortunes with the Moderate Party. Perhaps
this more than any other factor determined the final form of his ecclesiastical
principle.
To describe Kill as a "Moderate" is both enlightening and confusing. Like
all party labels, the meaning behind this one is also decided by the person
employing it. On the lips of their opponents, the term became a byword of
reproach, but for the men who arrogated it, the phrase "Moderate" implied
toleration, liberality, and openmindedness. These characteristics, however,
might have been justly appropriated by men who denied all claim to membership
in the Moderate Party, which is to say a distinction must somehow be drawn
1 Over a space of five generations Hill was related to no less than
twenty-five ministers in the Church of Scotland, most of whom identified
themselves with the moderate movement in the church.
2 Throughout his biography Cook stresses time and again the influence
which Robertson had upon Hill, not only at this point, but at every point
in his life. Upon the death of his father, Hill turned to his senior
colleague and friend for advice concerning many personal matters as well as
for direction in church affairs. So close was the relationship ana so
intimate was the communication between Hill and Robertson that Dugald Stewart
requested Hill to write the chapter on Robertson's ecclesiastical policy
for his proposed Life of Robertson; Hill readily complied.
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between the Moderate Party and the general mood of moderation. On the other
hand there were some clergymen who could be placed in both categories. These
we may call the Moderate clergy, men affected by the spirit of moderatism
who were also members of the Moderate Party.
Therefore, to say simply, "Hill was a Moderate," leaves many questions
unanswered. Yrtio were the Moderates? What were their origins? What did they
believe? It is regrettable that even the more credible of Scottish church his¬
torians speak generally of "the Moderates" and "Lloderatisra" with no attempt at
clarification of terms,"' and thus offer little help in answering these questions.
The present writer, unwilling to formulate a definition when others more know¬
ledgeable in this area have refrained, only suggests a line of approach designed
to iMLuminate certain facts. For the sake of perspicuity let us segregate par¬
ticular elements of the broad moderate movement within the Church of Scotland and
examine these individually. More specifically let us discuss the general climate
of moderetism, the creation of the Moderate Party, and the characteristics of
Moderate clergymen.
Climate of I.Joderatism
In 1o90 William III sent his lirst Royal Letter to the General Assembly
of the Church of Scotland stating; "Moderation is what religion enjoins,
p
neighbouring Churches expect from, and v,e recommend to you."' In many v/ays,
it is fair to say, the Revolution Settlement had been moderate. Episcopacy
1 J. II. S. Burleigh, A Church History of Scotland, pp. 2$>1f. A .J. Campbell,
Two Centuries in the Church of Scotland, pp. 34, 72. John Macleod,mare of this
weakness does no more than define the difficulty, Scottish Theology, p. 198, An
effort has been made to correct this deficiency by Henry R. Sefton, The Early
Development of Moderatism in the Church of Scotland (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Glasgow, 19o2), who deals with the moderates and moderatism in
the first half of the eighteenth century; and I.D.L. Clark, Moderatisra ana the
Moderate Party in the Church of Scotland 1752-1803 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
King's College, Cambridge, 19^4), who deals more specifically with the Moderate
Party and its policy in the second half of the same century. Both works make a
distinction between moderatism and moderate clergymen.
2 "To the Reverend, Trusty, and Well-Beloved, Ministers and Elders met in
the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland at Edinburgh Acts of the General
Assembly of Church of Scotland, 1690.
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had been abolished and Presbyterianism recognised as the only form of church
government permitted in Scotland, but there vas no mention, of the divine rirjit
of Presbyterianism nor was the Biblical basis of Episcopacy denied. Furthermore
the Covenants of 16/+3 were not even mentioned, and silence reigned over most
doctrinal issues. In spite of these factors, hov/ever, moderation was easier
professed than px-aciiced. The men who listened to the Commissioner as he
read William's letter were man who had driven out two hundred Episcopal curates
by mob violence. Many of them bore in their bodies the scars of religious
struggles. Now that they had been freed by an act of parliament from the "heel
of oppression," the tendency was to revenge the sufferings endured at the hands
of Bishops. William himself was not free from suspicion, though he had anulled
the Act of Supremacy, and the very fact that he urges moderation is a just
indication that it was conspicuously absent.
In 1766 James Oswald preached a sermon before the General Assembly in
which he noted the trends of the Church of Scotland. He deplored the prevailing
vogue of "politeness" which clouded religious issues, the alien forms of thought
which united philosophy and theology, the artificiality which obscured the
gospel message, and the charge that Christian piety was a mark of enthusiasm;
It is remarkable, that many divines of manly sense and unquestionable
piety are sometimes restrained from mentioning, or at least from
insisting upon the operation of gospel-truths by a panic fear of
enthusiasm; and very possibly a panic of the same kind may hinder some
ministers of this church, v/ho are sincerely pious, from making
proficiency which otherwise they should in that essential quality.
Two questions arise at this point: Was Oswald correct in his analysis
of the day, and if so, what effected so dramatic a change in the mood and attitude
1 James Oswald, A Sermon, Preached At the opening of the General Assembly
of the Church of Scotland, To which are annexed Letters on soms points of
importance contained in the Sermon, p. b3~.
104
of the church? Besides Hume Brown's vague generalisation that "religion....
bore the stamp of mediocrity throughout the whole period," a survey of history
verifies Oswald's suspicions as truth. Whereas his predecessors had appealed
to Scripture alone as the final arbiter in theological controversy, his
o
contemporari.es appealed to naturax religion along with revelation. The
emphasis upon God's grace in man's salvation of a former era was replaced by
preoccupation with the ethical content of religion.* The Biblical understanding
of the Person of Christ was once again challenged by a revival of ancient heresies/5
5
and the traditional understanding of sin and the fall was drastically modified®
What brought about these changes? Paul Hazard answers in terms of a
movement,
1 P. Hume Brown, The History of Scotland to the Present Time, Vol. Ill,
p. 265.
2 Cf. John Erskine's, "The Law of Nature sufficiently promulgated to
the Heathens" (1741), Theological Dissertations, p. 22Jf„, where he refutes
the idea that man is unable by reason alone to discover the being of God
and the immortality of the human soul.
3 Drysdale (1718-1788) was commended by his biographer because "he never
lost sight of what he had conceived to be the great object of all religious
instruction, practical improvement." Sermons, "Account of Life Prefixed",
p. xix. Tillotson was likewise praised at his funeral for portraying "the
great design of Christianity" as "the reforming men's natures and governing
their actions, the restraining their appetites and passions and softening
their tempers and sweeting their humors." Cragg, Prom Puritanism to the
Age of Reason, p. 77.
4 Alexander Duncan explained away the deity implied in Christ's title,
"Son of God", by stating that in "the language of holy Scripture, good men,
the worshippers of the true God, rulers and prophets are all called the
Sons of God." A Preservation against the Principles of Infidelity, p. 173*
5 John Simson taught that sin was not necessarily connected with
Adam, and that the fall conveyed, if anything, a moral taint to Adam's
posterity. Infra p. 117.
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a movement European in. scops and aiming at freeing religion from the
accretions which had accumulated about it, and at presenting a creed
so liberal in doctrine that no one in future could accuse it of
obscurantism," so transparently clear in its moral teaching that no
one henceforth could deny its practical efficiency. Nothing tentative
here, but the firm guarantee that the principles which had upheld
civilisation for eighteen hundred years were valid still, and would
remain so.
More specifically Barth attributes this change in the area of theology to the
recrudescence of the Renaissance and the revival of the ideal of "humanism"
2vrithin the heart of Christendom. On a broad basis this movement is generally
referred to as the "Enlightenment,"3 but in a restricted sense, that is, in the
field of theology, it is usually called "Moderatism." This is our primary area
of concern, and though we cannot fully understand moderatism except against the
background of the Enlightenment in Europe, the scope of this work forces us to
concentrate on the former, and that within the bounds of Scotland.
There is no unanimity of scholarly opinion about the forces which created
the climate of moderatism in the Church of Scotland. Since no one theory is
satisfactory in itself, yet since each contains an element of truth let us
review several of the most prominent. The first is that moderatisra was the
product of Scottish Bpiscopalianism. William Cunningham, propounder of this
theory, attributes the growth of moderatism to "the corrupting influence of the
Episcopalian conformists."^ It is interesting to note that both the defenders
1 Paul H&sard, European Thought in the Eighteenth Century, pp. "85-67.
2 Karl Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl, p. 54. According to Barth the
idea central to humanism "was that the perfect life consisted in the complete
autarchy of rational man in a rational world on the basis of the existence
and dominion of a Doity guaranteeing this association and thus too man's
complete autarchy."
3 This movement in eighteenth century Scotland is sometimes called
"The Scottish Renaissance."
4 William Cunningham, "Defense of the Rights of the Christian people",
Works, Vol. IV, p. 455. These "conformists" were ministers ordained as
Episcopals before the revolution in 1690, but Y/ho qualified themselves for
Presbyterian ordination by appropriate oaths after the revolution, and thus
retained their pulpits.
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and opponents of moderatism agree on this point of provenance. A.P. Stanley
approvingly regards the moderate attitude in Scottish history as the faithful
purveyor of the Knoxian reformations1 Etna contrasts it with the austere theology
of Andrew Melville. He emphasizes the stream of continuity to be found in the
Reformers, the "Aberdeen Doctors," the leaders of the Second Episcopate such as
Archbishop Leighton, "one saint corrmon both to the Presbyterian and Episcopal
Church," and the outlook of the moderates. On the other hand, and in a completely
different tone, John Kacleod said, "In hundreds of parishes...the old Episcopal
incumbents sat tight" (1690) and introduced a strain of preaching "which, when
it was not positively unsound, was neutral in its character. It steered clear
of committing itself to distinctive Reformed doctrine.
The explanation as to how these Episcopalian conformists may have actually
contributed to the rise of moderation is well put by Principal Rainy.
Moderation in the Scottish Church
is often traced to certain elements which found a place in the church at
and shortly after the Revolution settlement - viz., the ministers who had
previously accepted the indulgence. ..and still more the "curates" - those
who, having held cures under the Episcopacy, cane in and submitted to the
Presbyterian regime. Then, since many of the curates were not very good
to begin with, and since, presumably, it was not the best of them who
were so ready to conform, and since the very process itself must have
been rather damaging and demoralizing in the case of those who had
previously professed high Episcopalian principles, it can be explained
that this party was not merely cold in reference to the principles of
their Church, but also at the same time low in tone, morally and
spiritually.... Such Materials, reproduced in successive generations with
their moral identity unaltered formed an element in the Moderate party;
they bulked largely in the rank and file, and conraunicated to the whole
party much of the temper, and the temperature, which afterwards
distinguished it.4
1 "John Knox himself had a tinge of moderatism, which has been but little
recognized either by his friends or his enemies." As proof of this assertion
Stanley cites Knox's acknowledgment of the fallibility of his Confession of
Faith and his departure from the rigid Sabbatarianism of the day, noting that
on one Sunday evening he joined Calvin in "a game of bowls." Lectures on the
History of the Church of Scotland, pp. 98-99.
2 Ibid., pp. 98~'!20. 3 John Macleod, Scottish Theology, p. 113.
4 Robert Rainy, Three Lectures in Scottish Church History, pp. 1if3-*l44»
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Though there may he some truth in this line of argument, it is a gross
exaggeration to charge the Episcopalian conformists with corrupting the newly
established church. Struthers rejects this theory on the ground that the
Moderates appeared precisely in those areas where anti-Episcopalian feelings
were the strongest. Another matter which casts doubts on the validity of
this theory is the fact that Episcopal conformists did not have a great deal
of influence following the Revolution Settlement, Many Presbyterians found it
difficult to accept those who had been persecuting them, and the church courts
failed to look upon them as equals. It is true (and herein lies the contribution
of this theory) that individuals among the Episcopals may have exerted a
moderating influence within the bounds of their own parishes, but it is certain
that no conformist ever held a place of authority in the new ecclesiastical
structure. Finally the insinuation of a low moral character' on the part of
Episcopalians is questionable. Close study reveals that the differences between
pre-revolution Episcopal doctrine and post-revolution Presbyterian doctrine were
not as radical as is sometimes thought; and the fact that many Episcopals
accepted Presbyterianism does not necessarily imply a cosnpromise of conscience
or principle.
A second theory set forth to account for the rise of Moderatism is that of
"rejection." In many ways it forms the antithesis of the former theory of
continuity, and though entirely negative in tone, it is worthy of mention.
Ernst Cassirer in The Philosophy of the Bnli.htenment says one of the
universally recognised characteristics of the period under review was its
2
rejection of "systems" of all kinds. The wind blew freely in the areas of
1 He does admit, however, that the social manners of the English clergy
were often "aped and copied by the leading Moderates of the Church of
Scotland." Struthers, History of the Rise of the Relief Church, p. 167.
2 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. vii.
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philosophy, politics, science, education - and everyone could feel the breath
of a change in the air. No one wanted to be trapped by the caim of convention
and tradition. Men wanted to hoist their sails and let the new spirit blow
where it would. Consequently they were casting off the moorings of standardiaed
systems in every field. This is not to deny that men of the Enlightenment had
a propensity for analyzation, classification, and arrangement, but a distinction
must be made between the "esprit de systdrae" and the "esprit systematiaue," ana
'method' must not be confused with 'object'. In all departments men believed
themselves to be coming into clearer light and on more solid ground. Experience,
practicality, the reliability of nature were now to be the guides, not a static
out-dated system of principles.
The breezes of this new mood rippled the waters of theology and men,
therefore, began to question the accuracy and authority of exceeds and
confessions. There seemed to be no place for a closed corpus of beliefs drawn
only from a single Booh. Men enlightened by reason were inclined to experiment
with their own theories and to delve into heretofore forbidden areas.
Theologians dared to make assertions and ask questions which would have sent
their fathers to the gallows. Though that which attracted interest and
attention was often unconnected with the supernatural or the celestial, mere
fascination made resistance too painful to bear; and if pursuit of controversial
principles meant rejection of an unenlightened system - then the system must go.
The extrinsic standard of 'orthodoxy' must yield to the intrinsic and natural
one of the 'reasonable man'.
This theory of x-ejection also receives support from the area of theological
controversy. According to Hugh Watt all factions "were tired of fighting and
A
wanted rest." Men were striving to find points of agreement rather than points
1 Y/att, Representative Churchmen of Twenty Centuries, p. 228.
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of difference. Clergy and laity alike -were growing impatient with, if not
actually bored with, wranglings over doctrinal minutia. Because of the horrors
of the "killing times" men were suspicious of over zealous breathern continually
on the lookout for diviation from orthodoxy. As we noted earlier this disinclina¬
tion to discuss theology was present in some sense as early as 1690: and in spite
of the hard core resistance among the incorrigible Cameronians it resulted xn
a doctrinal cease-fire. Once the theological tension within the church had been
reduced, men were able to broaden their scope of interest and turn to those
things which previously had been considered alien and harmful to Christianity.
For doctrine men substituted science and philosophy, and debate within the
Calvinistic framework was replaced by apology directed against the adversaries
2
without. This rejection of the stringencies of scholastic Calvinism and the
modification of its dogma left the way open for the growth of moderatism.
Finally, we find in this period a rejection of the austere, Puritanical
way of life. This was an age of affluency, high society, manners and fashions.
A monied middle class was emerging and public entertainment was a booming
business. Men, therefore, denounced the stem and unrelenting solemnity of the
previous generation which prevented them from enjoying these things. They
resented the watchful scrutiny of the kirk-session and the severity with which
wrongdoers were disciplined. They said, "Let us cultivate manners, letters,
material interest; good sense and good taste will furnish us with all the
1 The Cameronians, followers of Donald Cameron, disowned Charles Stewart
in 1680 because of his tyranny and breach of Covenant, and alienated themselves
fk'om all v/ho recognized him as king. The principles which inflamed this
original action and sustained subsequent rebellion can be found in "The
Declaration and Testimony of the True Presbyterian, Anti-Prelatic, and
Anti-Erastian and Persecuted Party in Scotland", recorded in Wodrow's History
of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland, Vol. Ill, p. 212.
2 Ecclesiastical thinkers, says McCosh, spent their strength "not so
much in discussing doctrinal disputes among Christians, as in defending
religion in general." op.cit., p. 13.
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religious views we need." Though some indulged in this new-found social, life
more readily than others, any contact with secular culture was bound to broaden
the thinking of educated people, and no doubt they would be disposed to the
spirit of the age in which they lived - the objects which it recommended, the
benefits it promised to confer, the methods on which it relied.
Undoubtedly the theory has merit but by itself, it cannot account for the
climate of moderatisra, and that for several reasons. In the first place so
negative a theory cannot adequately explain the presence of an attitude which
had such a positive influence upon the life of the church. Moderatism is not
to be characterised simply as a reaction against and rejection of the status
quo, for it made many concrete assertions of its own. In the second place mere
rejection cannot account for the continued existence of moderatism over a
sustained period of time. At best this theory can only explain the presence
of this attitude in the church for one or two generations. Finally, though
'rejection' may have provided favorable conditions for the growth of moderatism,
it cannot independently account for all its characteristics.
A third and more satisfactory theory is that of amalgamation. If the above
theory may be said to involve a movement from theology, this theory may be said
to involve a movement within theology, a mingling of theology with many varied
factors such as natural science, history, secular culture, natural religion.
Though each of these areas could be studied in its own unique relation to
theology, WoL. Mathiescn suggests a way in which they might be incorporated in
a single unit. He sees rooderatism as the result of an ingenious blending of the
strands of theology and philosophy current in Scotland at the beginning of the
eighteenth century.^
1 Rainy, op.cit., p. *143.
2 W.L. Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, pp. 250-256. G-.R. Cragg
concurs with Mathieson's analysis of the roots of moderatism, stating that
"its immediate origin can be found in the influence of Shaftesbury's ethics,
as mediated through the persuasive teaching of Professor Hutchison of
1 i 1
We gain insight into the wedding of theology and rationalistic philosophy
by drawing into focus the early eighteenth century debate over the problem of
religious authority. In order that theology might successfully meet its adver¬
saries as well as settle its own internal disputes the point of ultimate appeal
had to be fixed. There was little or no debate over the fact that the final
principle of authority was to be found in Scripture, the highest court of appeal
in any doctrinal controversy, but there was still a sense in which a secondary
authority of some kind was needed to gu3.de men in their interpretation of
Scripture and the translation of its precepts into practical terms. It was
over this secondary authority that differences arose. Some supported individual
inspiration and personal interpretation under the guidance of the Holy Spirit,
but this smacked of 'enthusiasm', which, according to Bishop Butler, was "a very
horrid thing." Others suggested an appeal to tradition, the historical inter¬
pretations of the church, but this brought forth accusations of Romanism and
popery, often with the result that the Reformers were quoted only timidly.
As has been determined, the age was averse to confessions and creeds so the way
was left open for an appeal to the prevailing vogue of reason. Actually, the
appeal to reason, as noted in chapter two, was no new thing; v/aat was new was
the confidence with which it was consulted and the decisiveness with which it
spoke. Men submitted to it as the ultimate standard in the formulation of
doctrine, the criterion of accepted belief, and the basis for Christian
apologetics.
Glasgow.1' The Church in the Age of Reason, p. 8i% H.R. Mackintosh, who also
countenanced this theory, illuminates three main stages in the process of this
amalgamation: "First, then, comes the stage at which it was said; We can
defend the orthodox creed by reason, and we ought to....In the next place, men
proceeded to make distinctions between the orthodox faith which might ligitimately
be professed in public, and the private views cherished by the initiated few....
The third stage is that which puts reason - conceived not as embracing all man's
cognitive powers but as the mere understanding that operates with common sense
or rule-of-thumb logic - on the seat of judgment, and insists that every
Christian doctrine must undergo trial in the court of reason thus defined."
Types of Modern Theology, pp. 21-22. We are concerned with the process in
its maturity.
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Rather than dealing with this theory abstractly, it seems best to treat
the man who was responsible in large measure for the amalgamation of philosophy
1
and theology. Any work which refers to moderatism, even if only slightly,
always mentions the name of Francis Hutcheson (1691-1745), either generally as
"the Apostle of the Enlightenment in Scotland,"4" or more specifically as "the
teacher of the Moderates.""' In many ways he may be regarded as the
personification of the theory of amalgamation. Born in Ulster as the soncf a
Presbyterian minister, he himself began preparation for the ministry. He
attended Glasgow University (1711-1717) and there was influenced by the teaching
of Professor Simson. After pastorates in Ireland Hutcheson returned to Glasgow
in 1729 as the Professor of Moral Philosophy. His lectures reflected the ideas
of Shaftesbury, interpreted psychologically. Like Shaftesbury he sought to
discover the central principle which is the source of human virtue, but whereas
Shaftesbury spoke of "Moral Sense," Hutcheson spoke of "disinterested
benevolence.This benevolence he identified with virtue, and in the tendency
toward general benevolence he found the standard of goodness, that which
"approves and recommends such dispositions as tend most to the public good."
In this respect he was historically the precursor of the utilitarians and in
his first work he even used the formula - "The greatest happiness for the
T Though there is a danger of over-simplification in such a procedure,
for reasons which, I trust, shall become obvious, this method is justified.
It should be remembered, however, tuac our primary concern is not an analysis
of Francis Hutcheson, but an understanding of moderatism.
2 J.H.S. Burleigh, A Church History of Scotland, p. 295.
3 A.J. Campbell, Two Centuries of the Church of Scotland, p. 94. An
interesting study could be done on the influence of federal theology in the
writing of Hutcheson. Note particularly his definition and employment of the
covenant idea. System of'Moral Philosophy, Vol. II, p. If.
4 F. Hutcheson, System of Moral. Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 32.
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greatest numbers,," As he spoke of these themes, "the orthodox doctrines of
the Kirk of the total corruption of human nature, of reprobation, or salvation
2
by faith alone, became to his audience strangely unreal,,"
This teaching was received with diverse reactions. On the basis of his
published works Hutcheson was charged with two heresies: (1) "that the standard
of moral goodness was the promotion of the happiness of others; and (2) that we
could have a knowledge of good and evil without a knowledge of God. The case
against him got no further than the Presbytery of Glasgow. On the other hand
*
his pupil Alexander Carlyle said he never "taught any heresy," but rather
"opened and inlarged the minds of the students, which soon gave them a turn for
free inquiry; the result of which was, candour and liberality of sentiment";^' and
his lectures are said by Dugald Stewart "to have contributed very powerfully to
diffuse in Scotland, that taste for analytical discussion, and that spirit of
liberal enquiry to which the world is indebted for some of the most valuable
productions of the eighteenth century."-'
These coHEients from Carlyle and Stewart call attention to another aspect of
Hutcheson's teaching beyond the content, that is, his methodology, unique in
many points. He was the first in Scotland to break with the academic tradition
of delivering lectures in Latin. He championed the cause of "free inquiry" and
thus bypassed the whole ediface of traditional Calvinism. He made it his avowed
aim to promote "more moderation and charitable sentiments in religious matters
in this country; where yet there remains too much warmth and animosity about
1 P. Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty
and Virtue, p. 164.
2 K.G. Graham, Social Life in Eighteenth Century Scotland, p. 352.
3 Burleigh, op.cit., p. 295.
4 Carlyle, Autobiography, p. 94*
5 Cited by W.R. Sorley, op.cit. , p. 161.
114
1
matters of no great consequence to real religion. He warned his pupils to
avoid theological speculation, and encouraged them to concentrate on practical
y
matters. This emphasis together with hi3 popularization of philosophical inquiry
prepared the way for the rise of common sense philosophy, developed by Thomas
Reid, a Moderate and student of Hutcheson.
This moderating influence which Hutcheson exerted in the early eighteenth
century was strengthened by several factors, not least of which was his own
winsome personality. A.J. Campbell says, "This attractive personality, the
nobility of his character, his large heart and open hand, his rare gift of
making his teaching interesting to those who heard it, the friendliness and
accessibility of the man gave him a power both in the Church and in the
p
University such as men of greater talent did not possess."" Carlyle testifies
that it was Professor Kutcheson himself who brought many students to Glasgow.
Hutcheson's influence was further widened by the suspension of Professor Simson
from the Chair of Divinity. Prom that time until the appointment of his
successor in 1744 Hutcheson, though he made no claim to be a theologian,
provided virtually all the theological instruction at Glasgow. Even under
William Leechara, whose appointment to the vacant chair Ilutcheson personally
engineered, his influence continued to be felt for Leechman was an admitted
compatriot of his professor in thought and intention. Together they aimed at
putting "a new face upon theology in Scotland."3 Leechman shared Hutcheson's
antipathy to dogmatism and wrarned the clergy against presenting Christianity
as "a chain of abstract speculations, and metaphysical 'truths linked together
in a certain order, and in a certain form of human contrivance.
^ Carlyle",opecit.', p. '/ST
2 Campbell, op.cit., p. 96.
3 Letter of Hutcheson, cited in Appendix, McCosh, op.cit. , p. 4^5.
4 Leechman, The Temper, Character, and Duty of _a Minister of the Gospel,
pp. 36-37.
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To be more specific, however, we must ask: In what concrete way did the
amalgamation of philosophy and theology contribute to the climate of moderatism?
/
Looking at Hutcheson and Leechman as representatives of this movement, we note
several particulars. First, the conjunction of theology with autonomous reason
is bound to produce certain results. The most obvious has already been
discussed, that is, the subtle viay in which reason becomes the supreme arbiter
in any dispute. If every religious belief is to be tested in the light of
reason, then reason is without a doubt the final source of authority. But there
are other ways in which this amalgamation produced moderatism* Preoccupation
with reason led to preoccupation with man, and he in turn became the center of
the universe. Emphasis, if not content, in theology was anthropologically
determined, and consistent with this, the humanity of Christ received greater
stress than His deity. Arianism was always one of the chief accusations brought
against the Moderates. This concern for human life and society had ramifications
in the area of church polity. Hutcheson said, "ecclesiastical power, in any
-j
body associated, seems to me founded in the same manner with the civil" - an
idea picked up by William Robertson. Further, the appeal to reason produced
a certain irrefutable tolerance. An inherent principle of the Enlightenment
itself required that having appealed to another man's reason one must abide by
2
the verdict he reached. More specifically G-.E. Davie attributes this attitude
of tolerance to the influence of common sense:
The appeal to common sense as a sovereign judge on all questions of
knowledge is bound to temper zeal..., and where one maintains that on
the whole, it is humanity which is right, one does not assume an
aggressive attitude and one exhibits animosity only against the
pretensions of hypotheses and paradox. The Scotch philosophy thus
was naturally calculated to inspire moderation.-^
1 Letter of Hutcheson, cited in W.R. Scott, Francis Hutcheson: Life and
Teaching, p. Id.
2 Cassirer, op.ci.t,, p. I60f.
3 G-.E. Davie, The Democratic Intellect, p. 257.
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Secondlyf insistance upon the authority of conscience along with emphasis upon
"disinterested affections" provided the basis for the typical Moderate Moralism.
The profligate and the prodigal were to be restrained tbom their evil ways,
and this restraint was accomplished (at least to their thinking) by demonstrating
the unreasonableness of licentious conduct on the grounds of society and economy
as •well as Christianity. Thus when the Lbderates wanted to make men "virtuous,"
they pointed not only to the ethical teaching of Scripture and the example of
Christ, but to the demands of reason speaking to the enlightened understanding
and wall. That is why Moderate preachers were often criticized for putting a
crude and shallow philosophy in the place of the gospel. Thirdly, concern for
the practical created a pragmatic apologetic stance. Berkeley's conclusions
were ridiculed not so much because of any obvious fallacy in his argument, but
because the theory of the non-existence of the material world (which he -was
A
supposed to have taught) appeared ludicrous in the light of experience.
Similarly the Moderate opponents of Hume rejected his idea of causation on the
basis of practical not logical absurdity. Finally the amalgamation of philosophy
and theology fostered a new spirit of critical inquiry and liberal investigation.
Men were encouraged to approach every subject with neutral minds devoid of
presuppositions. Dogmatism was a sure sign of irrationality and the "enlarged
mind" was the order of the day. No doubt this accounts in part for the Moderate
attitude of indifference toward the Westminster Confession and the proclivity
to theological neutrality.
If the climate of moderatism was produced by the amalgamation of philosophy
and theology then it was tempered by the controversies within theology itself.
Though we have maintained that there was a departure from theological hair¬
splitting, nevertheless significant issues were debated with great vigor. A
1 After attending one of Berkeley's lectures,' Samuel Johnson was asked how
he would refute the line of reasoning he had just heard, whereupon he, disgusted,
gave a swift kick to the nearest stone and cried, "That's how I refute itj"
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brief survey of two well-known and highly important cases will shed more light
on the practical welding of philosophy-theology and further indicate the lines
along which moderatism actually developed v/ithin the church. The first is
the cas6 of Rev. John Simson, Professor of Divinity in Glasgow (1708-1729).
Among other things Simson was accused (1715) of maintaining that natural
reason discloses the "placabilitas et reconciliabilitas" of God, that no
covenant was made with Adam, that sin was not necessarily propagated through
Adam, that the divine decrees of election and reprobation are dependent upon
the foreknowledge of God, that the imputation of Christ's righteousness is
purely formal, that the primary motive for the worship of God is the hope
of happiness, and that reason is the "principle and foundation of theology
together with Scripture."1 Because of the strenuous objections of James Hog
and James Webster the General Assembly appointed a committee on purity of
doctrine to investigate the charges, thus delaying its decision until 1717.
In the meanwhile Simson admitted to using questionable language, but reaffirmed
his acceptance of the Confession, and was thus acquitted with a warning "not
to attribute too much to natural reason and the power of corrupt nature -
which undue advancement of reason and nature is always to the disparagement
2of revelation and efficacious free grace."
On the same day this judgment was pronounced the assembly dealt with a
matter which precipitated the second controversy. William Craig, a former
student of Simson appealed against the action of the Presbytery of Auchterardor
for requiring him to declare that it was "not sound or orthodox to teach that
we roust forsake sin in order to our coming to Christ and instating us in c-ovenant
1 II.M.B. Reid, The Divinity Professors in the University of Glasgow,
1640-1905, p. 255.
^ Acts of The General Assembly, 1717, p. 518.
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v/ith God." The Presbytery was taken to task for acting irregularly in as Icing
candidates more than the prescribed questions, and for the use of a statement
tending "to encourage sloth in Christians and slacken people's obligation to
gospel holiness." Though the case itself was soon dropped (when the Presbytery
abandoned the use of such questions and proved to the satisfaction of the
Assembly that it had intended no heresy), the debates prompted the publication
of a Scottish edition of the Harrow of Llodern Divinity, first published in 1645
by Edward Fisher. In 1719 Principal Jaines Hadow of St. Andrews, preaching before
the Synod of Fife, drew attention to what he regarded as its erroneous doctrines,
and the following year the assembly condemned five propositions, six "antinomian
paradoxes" and several miscellaneous errors which had been tediously culled from
its pages.3 Ministers were enjoined to warn their people against it.^ Thomas
^ ibid., p. 519.
2 For a concise survey of the debates between James Hadow and James Hog,
wiio republished the Marrow, see C.G. McCrie, "Studies in Scottish Ecclesiastical
Biography: III. Rev. James Hog of Carnock and Principal Hadow of St. Andrews,"
British and Foreign Evangelical Review, No. CXXX, (Oct. 1884), p. 669.
5 The heresies listed were as follows: That assurance was the nature of
faith, that the atonement was universal in scope, that holiness was not
necessary to salvation, that the fear of punishment and the hope of reward
were not allowed to be motives of a believer's obedience, and that the
believer is not under the law as a rule of life. The six "antimonian
paradoxes" were: "1. A believer is not under the law, but is altogether
delivered from it. 2. A believer doth not commit sin. 3° The Lord can
see no sin in a believer. 4. The Lord is not angry with a believer for his
sins. 5. The Lord dcth not chastise a believer for his sins. 6, A believer
hath no cause, neither to confess his sins, nor to crave pardon at the hand
of God for them, neither to fast nor mourn, nor humble himself before the Lord
for them." Acts of the General Assembly, 1720, pp. 534-536.
4 Campbell states that it was this injunction which caused the book to
be so widely circulated. He cites an amusing antidote in this regard:
"A worthy divine, who spent some of his time at one of our universities,
bestowed several Sabbaths on the Marrow: holding forth the damnable errors
in the book and beseeching his dear people...to be aware of it. Now this
happening ere his people had either seen or heard of the Marrow, they were
mightily alarmed, and had much discourse among themselves on that subject, but
could not agree upon the true name. Some alleged it was the Harrow of Morality;
but they were corrected by others who told them it vras the Mother of Divinity....
However, they were all of them very desirous to see the book." Quoted in
McKerrow, History of the Secession Church, Vol. I, p. 24.
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Boston, however, who had recommended the book for study at the time of the
Auchterarder dispute, was greatly impressed by the doctrine of free grace
and the spiritual comfort he found in the volume. He, along with Iiog and ten
other men (who became known as the Marrow Men) drafted a strongly worded
Representation in which they challenged the action of the assembly. The debates
which ensued revolved around the dual problem of the atonement and the law.
The Harrow was condemned for teaching universal redemption, and it was taken
for granted that the men who stood behind this book were likewise guilty of this
heresy. The common argument advanced against 1 universalism' ran like this:
If Christ died for all men then only one of two conclusions can be logically
reached - all men will actually be saved, or else man the creature has the
power to thwart and bring to nought the purpose of the Creator in refusing to
be saved. Since both conclusions are contrary to the teaching of Scripture,
the premise itself must be judged as false.
In emphasizing this reasoning, however, the opponents of the Marrow were
erecting a straw man, for the Marrow Men clearly denied the universal range of
the atonement. Thomas Boston specifically wrote:
There is no universal redemption, nor universal atonement. Jesus Christ
died not for all and every individual person of mankind; but for the
elect only....For if the covenant of grace was made with Christ as a
representative, and the elect only were the party represented by him in
it; then surely the conditions of the covenant, his doing and dying,
were accomplished for them only; and he died for no other....
The real point of debate is indicated in the sentence quoted by the assembly
as objectionable;
The Father hath made a deed of gift and grant unto all mankind, that
whosoever of them ail shall believe in his Son shall not perish....
1 Thomas Boston, Works, Vol. VIII, pp. 404-405«
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Hence it was that Christ said to his disciples, 'Go and preach the
Gospel to every creature under heaven'; - that is, Go ana tell
every man, without exception, that here is good news for him;
Christ is dead for him.1
The primary point of conflict concerned the universal offer of the gospel.
Rather than following the cold light of reason to its logical conclusions, the
Harrow Men stopped at the point of particular redemption, and then adjusted
their reasoning to make possible the free offer of salvation. In this regard
the Harrow was all important because it x^esolved the tension between limited
atonement and the universal offer. The solution offered by the Marrow was to
be found in tho hiddenness of the decrees:
1 beseech you to consider, that although some men be ordained to
condemnation, yet so long as the Lord has concealed their names...do
not you say, it may be I am not elect, and therefore I will not believe
in Christ; but rather say, I do believe in Christ, and therefore 1 am
sure I am elected. And check your own heart for meddling with God's
secrets, and prying into his hidden counsel, and go no more beyond
your bounds for election and reprobation is a secret; and the Scripture
tells us "that secret things belong unto God, but those things that
are revealed belong to us," Deut. ;odx, 29.
Boston's adaptation of this solution is clearly seen in his sermon on Kosea
2; 10, "And I will betroth thee unto me for ever." Applying the figure of a
wedding He speaks of two copies of the marriage-contract between God and man,
a sealed copy In heaven, and an opened copy on earth. The earthly copy is
the Bible. "It bears not the names of those who are to be espoused to Christ,
but runs (as it were) in that form, 'Y/e, underscribers,1 etc. Now the Royal
Bridegroom has signed this, and it is incumbent on you to sign it likewise,
consenting to take Christ as he is offered to you in the gospel....Because
the Marrow Men thus reconciled limited atonement and universal offer they
preached the free offer of God's grace in Christ to all men. But even if they
had not conceived some reconciliation, they would have preached it nonetheless,
for they understood this to be the command of Scripture.
^ Acts of the General Assembly, p. 535.
2 Edward Fisher, Harrow of Modern Divinity, p. 268.
3 Boston, op.cit., Vol. VII, p. 498.
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Many reasons were given for objecting to this teaching and practice, but
Hadow, the most articulate opponent of the Marrow doctrine, rested his case on
logical grounds. He reasoned thus: Since God has decreed the number of the
elect, and since Christ has died only for the elect, it would be a lie to tell
the non-elect that Christ has died for them. Kadow did not object to proclaiming
to all men, "He that believeth shall be saved,but he refused to say to every
man that "Christ is dead for him."
This Doctrine is not to be admitted, because of many Absurdities and
Evils, that would follow upon it. As (1) That Ministers would be
thereby engaged to tell their Hearers, that Christ is dead for every
one of them without Exception, which would be a going beyond their
commission. (2) This Doctrine leads to an universal Redemption....
That God by absolute Promise hath given eternal Life to all who
live under the Gospel.... (4) This doctrine...thus calls men to
believe things that are not true...."3
Hadow reasoned that only after a man can examine his life and there find the
fruit of faith may he begin to have some assurance that Christ died for him.
It is important to note his tendency toward legalism, and his emphasis on works
to "show forth" salvation, for it was such phraseology that brought charges cf
Arminianism^ from the Marrow Man. They combatted vigorously the idea that
salvation must be preceded by conscious repentance, a change of heart, and
positive moral efforts and achievements. According to them "coming to Christ"
must necessarily precede repentance and change of life since union with Christ-
is the condition and amendment of life.
1 For example see James Adams, The Snake in the Grass, p. 33 •
2 Hadow, The Record of God and Duty of Faith Therein Required, p. 31.
"The Essential Acts of saving Faith are required of all that hear the
Gospel, by that call and command that hath Salvation annexed to it,
Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved."
3 Ibid. , p., 32.
4 G.D. Henderson comments that in spite of this accusation, the
Moderates were not interested enough to take sides in the Arminian
controversy. "Dutch Influences in Scottish Theology", Evangelical
Quarterly, Vol. V, 1933, p. 37.
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Par from discrediting the law, the Harrow Men held it in high esteem*
They accepted at face value, however, the statement that "the believer is not
/
tmder the Law as a rule of life." Distinguishing between the "Lav/ of Works"
and the "Law of Christ" they attacked the emphasis on positive duties as
evidence of a man's "effectual faith." They firmly believed that the
acceptance of this principle is to make salvation conditional upon human co~
operation and the performance of works in obedience to the law. The Marrow Men
taught that the promise of Christ as Saviour is to be held out to sinners, not
saints.
This teaching brought forth accusations of antinomianism from the opponents
of the Marrow. It was felt that such doctrine not only gave men the liberty to
3in, but actually encouraged them in moral laxity and unholiness. Once more tho
chief antagonist was Principal Hadow. In his tract The Antinomianism of the
Harrow of Modern Divinity Detected, he attacks the Marrow distinction between
the "law of works" and the "law of Christ."
This Doctrine, if put into Practice would...take off all Request unto
the Divine Commandments, and all Use, Force, and Influence of the
promises and Threatnings, which God in his Word hath appointecj for
promoting and encouraging true Religion, and Gospel-iioliness. '
HadoY/'s real bone of contention with the Harrow is that it places fox'giveness
chronologically and causally prior to repentance.
The truth therefore which I undertake to prov6 against the Marrow, is,
that the Evangelical Grace and Duty of Repentance goeth before Pardon
of Sin, in God's Method of bestowing them; that Remission of Sin is
a Consequent Blessing annexed unto Repentance by Divine Promise; and
that therefore Ministers in preaching the Gospel, may, and ought to
call sinners to repent, and forsake their Sins, in Order unto their
obtaining the Pardon of them...."
It is of no consequence that he failed in his purpose in the estimation
of the present author, for he persuaded the General Assembly of 1722. The
assembly passed a new act condemning the Marrow more vigorously than before,
1 Hadow, The Antinomianism of the Harrow, p. 97.
2 Ibid*, p. 51.
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only five members voting against it. The Harrow Men themselves were rebuked,
but no further action was taken. Thomas Boston spent the next four years
preparing a new edition which was published in 1726 along with copious notes.
This reprinting passed unnoticed by the ecclesiastical courts, and the same
year the Marrow Men and their opponents were thrown into the same camp by the
second Simson trial.
This time Simson was accused of teaching Arianism after the manner of
Samuel Clark's The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity. The case was protracted
for four years in which time Simson was repeatedly interviewed, minute metaphysical
investigations were carried out by a special committee, and Sirnson's students
wer6 rigorously interrogated. The committee finally reported to the assembly in
1728 and there followed a great debate not only about Trinitarian theology, but
also concerning canon law affecting heretics. Again Simson protested that he
held no opinion contrary to the Westminster Confession, but admitted that in
certain matters not specifically defined in the Confession he had used
ambiguous phrases. If these were thought heretical by the assembly, he
1
professed willingness to withdraw them. By now many clamored for his deposition,
but the Assembly, finding itself divided over the matter, resolved to put the
case before the presbyteries. The lower courts, with the exception of three,
favored the decision to suspend Simson indefinitely from teaching, without
however, depriving him of his chair. Only Thomas Boston dissented from this
p
judgment as "derogatory to the Supreme Divinity of Christ."
It was within these doctrinal controversies that the amalgamation of
philosophy and theology was given concrete expression. In its condemnation of
the Marrow teaching, the church indicated how greatly influenced it was by
1 It was suggested by an unknown writer that Simson, like Charles the I,
"made concessions, but they always came too late."
2 Boston, Memoirs, Appendix..
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reason. The chief obstacle to the acceptance of free grace for all was the
way in which this doctrine contradicted the structure of logic upon which
federal theology had been built. Neither would reason allow the federates to
accept the Marrow understanding of the relationship of grace and law. Had this
been granted, the foundation of their moral ism and legalism would have crumbled.
It was, however, due to the tolerance of the Moderates that the Marrow Men
received no harsher treatment than they did. It is highly significant that
Boston was allowed to reprint a book condemned by the assembly, and that his
cohorts were permitted to propound the Marrow interpretation of the gospel from
their pulpits. This same spirit of tolerance prevailed in Professor Simson's
case, though his case involved almost completely opposite heresies. Yet the
lenient treatment and latitude of belief which was allowed indicate, without
doubt, where the sympathy of the majority lay.
If the Marrow debates show how deeply affected the church was by reason,
the case of Simson makes clear the limits to which the church would allow reason
to run unfettered. The words of Simson's first warning and the action in his
second case indicate that the church was not willing to demolish the citadel
of orthodoxy completely. Though it had opened its doors to strange and alien
teachings, it still professed allegiance to the basic doctrines of Christianity,
and not even unmitigated reason could cause it to reject them. This tempering
of the amalgamation of philosophy and theology, therefore, caused men to reject
exclusive adherence to either. Men affected by the spirit of moderatism strove
for balance between those who refused to make any concessions of thought or
phraseology in the midst of changing religious attitudes, and those -who v/ere
repelled by the old orthodoxy and were tempted to reject revealed religion
altogether. They believed the Calvinistic system was flexible enough to
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accomodate the new emphasis -while still retaining the traditional teachings of
the reformation. Therefore, rejecting the dogmatism of the church, they
x-einterpreted the dogmas of Christianity in terms which were comprehensible to
'enlightened men', thus bringing the church in line with the spirit of the age.
This meant that although the doctrines of the sovereignty of God, the fall of
man, the justification by faith of those who believe in Christ, and the doctrine
of election were not rejected, they were re-appraised and ambiguously
formulated. This concern for balance is well put by William Craig:
It is to the honor of the present age that it has sufficiently exposed
the madness of fanaticism and the absurdity of those superstitions
which prevailed in the former times and by its liberty and moderation,
put an end to that rage of theological persecution and dispute, which
had too long disturbed the peace and order of society....If on the
other hand, the ingenious attempts which have been made to rid the world
of the mischiefs which arise from superstition...have been conducted by
such principles•as are destructive of genuine and useful piety, is not
this...a sad example of that weakness and precipitance...by v/hich
avoiding one, we run into a different and opposite extreme."
In summary it is quite correct to say, "Hyper-Calvinism moderated by inherent
rationalism and moralism led to moderatism.
B. Creation of the Moderate Party
We turn now from a general survey of the climate of moderation to the
creation of the Moderate Party within the Church of Scotland. Obviously this
is a move from the general to the specific, nevertheless it is a step v/hich must
be taken. We have discovered that moderation was a virtue much admired by
enlightened men, and we have noted several examples of moderation in church
affairs. It is, therefore, proper to speak of "Moderate Presbyterians" in the
first half of the eighteenth centuryand correct to say that the Moderate
Party had its X"oots in the moderatism of that period; but the distinctives
1 G.D. Henderson, Heritage: A Study of the Disx'uption, p. $8.
2 William Craig, Sermons, Vol. I, p. 300«
3 Baptism Commission Report, 1958, p. 58.
4 W.M. Hetherington, History of the Church of Scotland, p. 518.
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which indicate an ecclesiastical party structure within the church come suddenly
to light in the General Assemblies of 1751 and 1752. That which actually
identifies the Moderate Party has to do not so much with the mood ofmoderation
as with a certain ecclesiastical principle, the principle of the subordination
of judicatories. The practical expression of this principle is to be found in
the treatment of Wo related problems of the period, that of church discipline
and lay patronage. Though discipline rather than patronage was the major
concern, the former cannot be understood apart from the latter, for it was in
support of x-atronage that discipline was exercised.
The decision of the Revolution Settlement in 1690 was reversed by the
Patronage Act of 1712, and one© again the right to present a minister to a
parish fell into the hands of lay patrons. In the years immediately following
this legislation there was little reaction to this practice. Patrons were
reluctant to present one whom they knew to be unacceptable, and many consulted
parishioners before making a presentation. Presbyteries, who still ruled on the
suitability of those who were presented for ordination, were careful not to
induct those of questionable character or reputation. In 1719 the original act
of 1712 was amended so that the presentation was held void unless the presentee
accepted, and most would not accept if they knew they were not welcomed.
However, due to the shortage of ministers, presbyteries began to scrutinize
would-be ministers less closely, and congregations were less narrow in their
demands. Soon patronage was to prove disastrous. Patrons began to insist on
their legal rights and ignored the wishes of the congregation. Theological
controversies made it desirable to have men of one's own persuasion in the
General Assembly and patrons made this the primary, if not so3.e, criterion in
presenting a minister. On the other hand the congregations were becoming more
conscious of their rights in this matter and were sensitive to the slights of the
patrons. The General Assembly began to enforce the Patronage Act with increasing
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vigor, and in 1728 -went so far as to disregard the popular 'call1. So many
dissents were registered in the next two years that the General Assembly of
1730 stated that no congregational dissent would be received on record. Many
presbyteries sided with the people as opposed to the patrons and refused to
induct men who had been presented. This rebellion led to the establishment of
Hiding Committees, a group of men from other presbyteries commissioned by the
Assembly to overrule the insurgent presbytery and induct the presentee in spite
of popular opinion. If the patron himself failed to present a minister to a
vacant church, the right of presentation went to presbytery; and there a diversity
of procedures was followed. Some presbyteries acted straight-forward as an
individual patron; others consulted the kirk session; and still others went
so far as to poll the wishes of the parishoners.
It was from these chaotic and confused circumstances that the Moderate
Party emerged, and emerged victorious. The field of battle -was well chosen by
the Moderates, for when ministers were expected to make up their minds and vote
for or against a presentee in the church courts, it was difficult to remain
neutral. In 1751 the General Assembly was faced -with the disobedience of the
Presbytery of Linlithgow, whose moderator John Adams had been appointed to
preside at the induction of a presentee at Torphichen. Despite the injunction
of the previous Assembly, Adams ana the majority of his brethern claimed that
conscience would not allow them to ordain a man so unpopular as to produce
certain schism in the parish. The Presbytery did not contest the right of the
Assembly in ordering the settlement to take place, but objected to being
appointed to carry it out themselves when a Riding Committee could have
performed the task.
This situation was regarded as thoroughly unsatisfactory by a group of
ministers and elders, and Alexander Carlyle describes how "some friends and
1 The names of those present for this secret meeting can be found in
Carlyle's Autobiography, p. 257.
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companions" met in an Edinburgh Tavern during assembly week to consider how
they might best "re-establish the authority of the church." In the debate which
followed in the assembly two young men, John Koine and William Robertson, took a
revolutionary step in speaking on the matter without waiting, as was customary,
for the Moderator to call upon the more experienced members of their views.
They proposed that Adams should be suspended from his ministerial functions
for six months. Though they were defeated, Carlyle records that the arguments
which he ana his friends had advanced had a considerable effect, and the decisions
of the following assembly verify his contentions. The shiftless expediency and
aimless drifting which had hitherto characterised the assembly's ruling on
patronage were swept away by the details of the Inverkeithing case and the
deposition of Thomas Gillespie.
In November 175*1 the Commission of the Assembly ordered the Presbytery of
Dunfermline to ordain a presentee to the parish of Inverkeithing. Thomas Gillespie
and friends of like mind refused to comply and in March, 1752, the Commission
decided not to censure the members of the presbytery for disobedience. A dissent
was entered against this decision of the Commission and the Reasons ojf Dissent
1
(called "the Moderate Manifesto") brought the patronage-discipline question to
a head.
The arguments for and against the exercise of lay patronage are too well
known to require elaboration, but a few points should be mentioned. The
q
opponents of the Moderates insisted that "the people" have an inherent right
to select their minister, and argued rather practically that a man forced into
a parish against the will of the people would do precious little spiritual, good,
regardless of his qualifications. Analogies were freely drawn from human experience.
1 Korren, Annals of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland,
Vol. I, p. 231.
2 There was division, however, as to whether "the people" referred to the
whole congregation, heads of families, or heritors and elders. Ebenezer Erskine
said, "God's promise of guidance is given not to heritors or patrons, but to the
church." Sermon preached in 1732 before synod of Perth and Stirling.
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Men, it was pointed out, have a right to choose their* oral doctor or lawyer
to care for physical and legal needs, so why should they be denied the right
-j
to choose the one to whom they commit the care of their immortal souls.
In answer to this argument the Moderates (those who signed the Reasons of
Dissent along with sympathizers of the views therein expressed) also drew an
analogy, but for a different source. They regarded the church as a society,
governed by principles analogous to civil society, and insisted that in
presbyterian polity the parity of ministers is balanced by the subordination of
judicatories. They argued that a clear distinction must be drawn between man
as an individual following the light of his conscience, and man in society
relinquishing certain individual rights and submitting to lawfully constituted
authority:
Y/hen men are considered as individuals, we acknowledge that they have no
guide but their own understanding, ana no judge but their own conscience.
But we hold it for en undeniable principle, that as members of society,
th6y are bound in many cases to follow the judgment of the society.
By joining together in society, we enjoy many advantages, which we could
neither purchase nor secure in a disunited state. In consideration of
these we consent that regulations for public order shall be establishedj
not by the private fancy of every individual, but by the judgment of the
majority, or of those with whom the society has consented to intrust the
legislative power. Their judgment must necessarily be absolute and
final, and their decisions received as the voice and injunction of the
whole.^
When the opponents of the manifesto insisted upon rejecting this principle as a
matter of conscience, the Moderates, by rather exaggerated over-simplification,
made 'conscience' to be a cut-and-dried choice between "independency" (implying
anarchy) and "obedience" (implying law/ and order). By pressing the assumption
that "a church" is "a society" analogous to civil society, the Moderates were
1 See Annals for what Morreri calls the "manifesto of the Popular Party"
pp. 243f. This argument was usually refuted by pointing out that whereas the
private individual paid the doctor or the lawyer for his services, the patron
provided the minister's stipend.
2 Annals, p. 231.
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able to dismiss the argument from conscience and the right of private judgment
as irrelevant;
We allow to the right of private judgment all the extent and obligation
that reason or religion require; but v,re can never admit, that any man's
private judgment gives him a right to disturb with impunity, all public
order. We hold, that as every man has a right to judge for himself in
religious matters, so every church, or society of Christians, has a
right to judge for itself, what method of external administration is
most agreeable to the laws of Christ; and no man ought to become, a
member of that church, who is not resolved to conform himself to its
administration. We think it very consistent with conscience, for
inferiors to disapprove in their own mind of a judgment in execution...
for conscience sake; seeing we humbly conceive it is, or ought to be a
matter of conscience with every member of the church, to support the
authority of that church to which he belongs.''
It may also be noted in this regard that their opponents never answered the
Moderates' query as to vhy a man whose conscience would not allow him to obey
the rules of a church which he had voluntarily joined, would allow him to draw
a stipend and account himself a member of that church.
In a numerous society it seldom happens that all the members think
uniformly concerning the wisdom and expedience of any public
regulation... .But as long as he /ja member/* continues in it, professes
regard for it, and reaps the emoluments of it, if he refuses to obey
its lavs, he manifestly sets both a disorderly and dishonest part; he
lays claim to the privileges of the society, whilst he condemns the
authority of it. They who maintain that such disobedience deserves
no censure, maintain in effect, that there should be no such thing as
government and order. They deny those first principles by which men
are united in society....^
In stressing this issue of obedience, the Moderates argued that they were
not trying to introduce a new principle of church order, but were merely
reviving the inherent authority of the Assembly by insisting that its decisions
be carried out by synods and presbyteries. This, they claimed, had always been
a cardinal principle of church government since the reformation, and the
disobedience of a presbytery, or minister within a presbytery, to the lawful
command of the assembly struck at the very root of presbyterianism. Thus
Carlyle suggested that the departure from the old strictness of discipline was
1 Ibid. , p. 234. 2 Ibid., pp. 231-232.
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of recent origin due to the futile struggle against patronage, and said that
the Assembly "had only to recur to her first principles and practice to
restore her lost authority®"
Not only did the Moderates contend for discipline, but also for consistency®
At this point they were forced to acknowledge a fallacy in their church-society
parallel. Although they did not claim that the Acts of the Assembly were
irreversible, they did insist that, unlike a secular parliament, a church,
O
"founded by the laws of Christ," cannot manifestly contradict herself from
year to year. A kingdom divided against itself cannot stand. This desire for
consistency focused attention upon the Siding Committees. The Moderates were
violently opposed to the use of a Riding Committee to relieve a presbytery of
the irksome task of ordaining some unpopular presentee. Interestingly enough
their opponents agreed, but for different reasons. The opponents argued that
if it was unlawful to compel a presbytery to ordain a man to a parish which
objected to his settlement, it was equally wrong to allow other and disinterested
clergy to do so. The Moderates, on the other hand, insisted that if the Assembly
was entitled to order such a settlement to take place at all, it was justified
in commanding the appropriate presbytery to carry it out. Carlyle presents this
principle of consistency as an axiom of presbyterian government:
Church courts that should be variable in their decisions, and inconsistent
in their measures, could never acquire or deserve the confidence of the
public....Our supreme court has justly obtained a due authority over the
minds of the people, on account of the uniformity of its decrees and the
wisdom of its preceedings®
Thus it was because the Moderates were thinking in terms of discipline and
consistency rather than of the theoretical rights and wrongs of patronage per se
1 Carlyie', op.citr , p. 257. ~
2 Annals, p. 233.
3 Carlyle, The Usefulness and Necessity of Liberal education for
Clergymen, p. 32.
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which caused them to support that practice. In the beginning they were not
committed to the view that lay patronage was in any way inherently desirable
or justified. It was simply the law of the land, and being the law, the church
must strive to make it as effective as possible. It was to be carried out
irrespective of popular displeasure. It should be noted, however, that William
Robertson, leader of the Moderate Farty in its formative stages actually welcomed
patronage. He pointed out that the church could extract certain advantages
from the system without necessarily condoning it in the abstract. He believed
the system would raise the intellectual and social status of ministers. By
accepting its de_ facto existence the church was placed in a better bargaining
position (a fact borne out by the clergy1 s exemption from the Window Tax).
Patronage was an expedient method of appointing ministers to vacant parishes.
And there was a check-point. Since the church courts had complete control over
the licensing of probationers, and since only a licentiate could be validly
presented to a parish, the church had only herself to blame if the calibre of
ministers was questionable. In calling attention to these factors Robertson
was not suggesting that patronage was thereby justified; he only offered them
as reasons for acquiesing in the law as it stood since there was no prospect
of obtaining its repeal.
The Reasons of Dissent had accomplished its purposes for when the assembly
met in May the members of Dunfermline presbytery were peremptorily ordered to
admit the presentee and to report in three days that they had obeyed. This was
obviously a test case for the number of a quorum was raised from three to five
so objectors could not just stay away. Six men absented themselves and one of
their number, Thomas G-illespiq was deposed. The Moderates had wron the day, and
remained in th6 position of authority for the next half-century. The fact
1 Dugald Stewart, Life of Robertson, pp. I73f»
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that in winning they had ostracized many from the Established Church did not
bother them at all. In fact the Moderates thought it was perhaps a good thing.
In the words of Thomas Somerville;
So far from believing recession and schism to be evile, I am inclined to
think that they have been productive of beneficial effects with respect
to the ecclesiastical establishment, as well as to the more important
interest of religion....The first and most obvious effect of secession
is to excite, if I may so express it, a competition for character between
the Established clergy and their Dissenting brethern...1 have no doubt...
that the ministerial duties of preaching, examination, visiting the sick,
etc., are generally performed with more exemplary diligence and regularity
in parishes where the dissenting interest has got footing, and the
parishoners enjoy the opportunity of choosing between the Church and the
Secession.
Dissent was attributed to the free spirit of inquiry, and the right to secede
was seen as a sign of tolerance, not lightly to be condemned or restrained.
One speaker (Robertson has been suggested) expressed the view that the beauty
of the garden lay in the diversity of the flower bed. The significance of thi3
line of reasoning is to be found in its implications for a national church. The
reformation idea of "one face of the kirk" ceased to exist. It was not disavowed
nor adamantly refuted; it Just "slipped out of mind." Preoccupation with matters
at hand simply clouded the vision of a single united church. Roman Catholics
were outside the established church; so too were the Episcopalians. Perhaps
Presbyterians might exist outside as well. "Sweet reasonableness" demanded
such an attitude.
For the next thirty years the new-formed party was steered by the singular
hand of William Robertson. Since he is looked upon as the one "in whom the ideal
of Ivloderatism was realized,"-* and since his influence over Hill was so great,
1 Thomas Gillespie, upon his deposition, surrendered his church and
manse and began preaching in the open air, holding "communion with all who
visibly hold the Head." In 1761 he was instrumental in establishing the
Presbytery of Relief for Christians oppressed in their church privileges
(later the Relief Church), and by 1766 there were among the various dissenting
bodies 120 places of worship attended by some 100,000 persons.
2 Soraerville, My Own Life and Tiroes, pp. 86-87.
3 Burleigh, o£. cit., p. 297.
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it is well that w© look briefly at his ecclesiastical principles and the
manner in which he implemented them. These factors have been concisely stated
by George Cook, nephew of Hill, and leader of the Moderate Party in its
declining years.
His rigorous and enlightened mind discerned the necessity of introducing
fixed maxims with regard to settlements, which might put an end to tne
uncertainty that prevailed respecting the course to be adopted by the
inferior Judicatories; and forming the justest notions as to the nature
and constitution of society, he determined to assert the supremacy of the
Assembly, and the duty incumbent upon the lower courts of yielding to
its mandates and decrees unqualified obedience. '
The determined opposition aroused by unswerving adherence to this policy was
conquered by the tact and skill with which Robertson executed it.
He carried his faculties so meekly, he -was ever so ready to listen with
calmness and fairness to whatever was advanced against him, and he
inforced his opinions with such mildness, yet with such power, that it
was impossible not to reppect or to venerate him, even when assent to
them could not be given.11"
It is little wonder that the Moderate Party and indeed the assesribly at
large was shocked by the sudden AvithdraAwal of Robertson from the affairs of the
church in 1780. Much debate has centered on the reasons for Robertson's
abdication of the Moderate throne, but the fact remains that he did retire,
in spite of pleas to the contrary by his friends. For the next decade the
Moderate Party was unable to produce a single individual with the leadership
ability of Robertson. Organisation and structure were loosely maintained by
a "committee" of the most prominent clergymen of the Moderate persuasion in
and around Edinburgh. Finally George Hill emerged as the acknowledged leader
of the party. In 1772 he was appointed Professor of Greek at St. Andrews after
defeating John Bisset, a vehement and determined opponent of patronage. His
ability was early recognised by Robertson and having been ordained in 1778 he
1 Cook, op.cit., p. 113.
2 Ibid., p. 111.
135
was pressed to accept a call to an Edinburgh church.. Hill, in spite of the
"tempting offer," refused and in 1780 he became second-Minister at 3t. Andrews
(a charge of plurality having been dismissed by the General Assembly). In 1782
he was entrusted with the task of composing the Moderate motion on calls, and
in 1784 he spoke eloquently on behalf of Drysdale, the Moderate candidate for
moderator. In 1787 the University of St. Andrews conferred on him the degree
of Doctor of Divinity and the same year he was appointed Dean to the Order of
A
the Thistle, Although he gave cogent reasons for refusing, he was elected
Moderator of the General Assembly in 1789. Through the influence of his dose
friend Henry Dundas, he was appointed Principal of St. Mary's College in 1791
and his leadership of the Moderate Party may be reckoned from that date.
Even after Hill's ascendency to the place of authority, however, the
structure of Moderate power remained oligarchic rather than monarchic.
J.G. Lockhart spoke of "a small college of cardinals" within the Moderate
o
Party, and Hill, in his annual report to Dundas confirms this picture of
organisation.5 it should be noted that things were not always smooth between
1 Hill to Carlyle, E.U.L. , D.C. , 4.41. no. 72. "You agree with me tiiat
the chair must soon be given to Hunter. His station, his estate, and, with
all his enthusiasm, a degree of candour and gentlemanliness that I have often
observed in him, entitle him to it. And the world would blame you if you was
to keep him out long. You should make him feel that the chair is the gift
of the Moderate Clergy. But still it is desirable to pay him a compliment.
Nov/ if he comes in after me a much younger man, and a Divinity Professor
of yesterday, the compliment is lost."
2 J.G. Lockhard, Peter's Letter to his Kinsfolk, Vol. Ill, p. 48.
3 Hill reports drafting legislation on Chapels of Ease "In concert
with Blair, Carlyle, Finlayson, Macknight"; and in 1806 he says the Moderate
candidate for clerkship was decided by "the persons about Edin, who commonly
manage those matters." Hill to Dundas, S.A.U.L. 4765 and 4S17. Prom the
corresx^ondence in St. Andrews Library it appears that at an undeterminable
time Hill began writing an annual report to Dundas on the proceedings of the
General Assembly. The information contained in these documents, for the
most part ignored by historians of the period, sheds certain light on the
later Moderate policy in the late eighteenth century.
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the "pope" and his "cardinals." In the words of Cunningham, the Edinburgh
Moderates were inclined to lay the egg and hatch it, "entrusting the chick
to the Principal's care,11'' The rifts which caused the greatest dissention
(Leslie's case, 1805, and the Strathaven Teind Case, 1807) are too detailed to
receive attention in this work but suffice it to say here that confidence was
destroyed between senior members of the party. This,along with ill health,
and the death of Dundas, caused Hill to retire from church affairs in 1811.
C* Characteristics of the Moderate Clergy
The general climate of moderatism together with the creation of the
Moderate Party worked to produce certain recognizable characteristics in ministers
of the moderate persuasion. Aware of the dangers of generalisation and over¬
simplification, let us examine the most prominent of these characteristics, with
special attention to those which may have influenced the development of Kill's
ecclesiastical principle, and in so doing we can determine the character of
Hill himself as a churchman of his day.
In 1753 John Y4Ltherspoon published his Ecclesiastical Characteristicsa
biting bit of satire on the characteristics of Moderate clergy. Making his
observations in the form of maxims, he says Moderates "have as has been shown,
got hold of the sum-total of learning."^ Though he meant the statement as
uncomplimentary, the Moderates themselves would gladly, if not humbly, have
accepted his judgment. In a now-famous speech before the General Assembly of
1789 Alexander Carlyle, eloquent exponent of the Moderate interest, called
attention to the various ramifications of the Scottish enlightenment within the
ministry:
1 Cunningham, History, Vol. II, p. 434.
2 The full title being, Ecclesiastical Characteristics, or the Arcana
of Church Policy, Being an Humble Attempt to open the Mystery of Mbderation,
Wherein is s hown, A plain way of attaining to the character of a Moderate
man, as at present in repute in the Church of Scotland.
3 Ibid., p. 182.
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There are few branches of literature in which the ministers of this
Church have not excelled. There are few subjects of fine writing in
which they do not stand foremost in the rank of authors, which is a
prouder boast , than all the pomp of the Hierarchy. We have men who
have successfully enlightened the world in almost every branch, not
to mention treatises in defense of Christianity, or eloquent illus¬
trations of every branch of Christian doctrine and morals. Who have
wrote the best histories, ancient and modern? - It has been clergymen
of this Church. Who has wrote the clearest delineation of the human
imd6i%s't8.Tidi.ng snd gQ_1. i"ts povrSrs? *■* ^ of* *th.is Cixui*c'ri«
has written the best system of rhetoric, and exemplified it by his ovn
orations? - A clergyman of this Church. Who wrote a tragedy that has
been deemed perfect? - A clergyman of this Church. Who was the most
profound mathematician of the age he lived in? - A clergyman of this
Church. Who is his successor1, in reputation as in office? . Who wrote
the best treatise on agriculture?"®
Many members of the Moderate Party were co-founders of Edinburgh's
"Select Society," a club where ministers, noblemen, judges, writers, professors,
medical and business men met on equal terms for "refreshments" and literary
2
and philosophical discussions. Even for those who were not fortunate enough
to belong to this elite group, monkish withdrawal was a contradiction of
Scriptural principles. In the words of William Hoodie:
The religion which the Scriptures contain, is a liberal, enlightened
system. It recommends, indeed an occasional retreat from the world,
for the purpose of reviewing our actions, and exercising those pious
affections which are due to our Father in Heaven. But it doth not
suppose that the exercise of retirement and contemplation are to fcrm
our chief employment. It addresses itself to men as engaged in the
business of active life, and by a circumstantial detail of duty, it
enforces on them a strict attention to the minutest parts of their conduct.
As a result of this thoroughly wor Id-affirming attitude the Moderates were
keenly alive to the social issues of the day. At a time when strong feelings
on the subject of slavery were considered by many as signs of 'enthusiasm';
Robertson attacked the slave trade in America as degrading to mankind and
1 Carlyle, Autobiography, p. 589.
2 Burleigh, op. cit., p. 301.
3 William Moodie, Sermons, p. 277.
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contrary "to that original equality in which they were at first placed and are
still viewed by their impartial Creator."'' And Blair said that it belonged to
the very nature of Christianity to "abolish slavery" and to rescue "human
O
nature from that ignominious yoke."
This general interest in every branch of culture caused the Moderates to
search for a cultural basis for Christianity,"^ and thus they spoke often of the
"social usefulness of religion." This theme is developed by Thomas Scmerville:
How indispensably necessary is religion to the very existence of society....
As the powers that be are ordained by God, so to the belief of his existence
and the fear of his name, they are continually indebted for the support
and efficacy of their authority. Feeble and unregarded the threatenings
of law must often prove, were they not ratified by the sanction of future
rewards and punishments.^
On the basis of this characteristic alone, Hill could be called a typical
Moderate. From his early seizure of opportunities afforded by London society
throughout his travels abroad in later life, Hill proved himself to be one
interested in the enlightenment and refinement of taste acquired by intellectual
and aesthetic training in varied fields. Not only were his daily lectures
filled with passages from classical Greek writings, but his advanced students
were given courses in Grecian history, customs, manners, and amusements,
biographical sketches of the more famous Greek authors, stimulating evaluations
of Grecian literature, and even an examination of the various dialects used in
5
Greece. His sermons were outstanding for their use of historical
1 William Robertson, The Situation of the World at the Time of Christ's
Appearance, p. 27.
2 Hugh Blair, Sermons, Vol. I, p. 154*
3 Rolf Sjolinder says, "The Moderates were unable to justify religion
by stating that thejr believed it to be the truth. They were compelled instead
to refer to its moral worth for society." IRresbyterian Reunion in Scotland
1907-1921, p. 29.
4 Thomas Somerville, The Scottish Pulpit, pp. 57-58.
5 Excerpts from these lectures are to be found in Cook's Life of Kill,
pp. 387-395* Included are such topics as the Olympic games, the Greek
theatre, the Greek calendar, and the Grecian orades.
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illustrations. Though Hill was removed from the "select society" of Edinburgh
he was often found in the high society of St. Andrews. He mixed freely with the
most prominent men of the landed gentry in Fife and was often seen in intimate
conversation with Henry Dundas, the Lord Viscount Melville. From an early age
2
he was acutely aware of the social and political issues of the times, and like
3
all good Moderates he heralded the cultural contributions of Christianity.
Another Witherspoon maxim stated that it "is a necessary part of the
character of a moderate man, never to speak of the Confession of Faith, but
with a sneer; to give sly hints that he does not thoroughly believe it, and
to make the word 'orthodoxy', a term of conteript and reproach."^1" The Moderates
would have balked at this description, and not without cause. The insinuation
is that they sought to destroy the whole of reformation theology, yet this is
not a true picture of the Moderates. It is true that many delighted in a
"dash of heresy," and it is also true as Struthers records, that some men refused
to sign the Confession, but we must consider the motive behind their refusal.
It v/as not so much an objection to anything in the Confession as it v/as a
desire to remain theologically neutral, to be uncommitted to precise doctrinal
6
statements, which caused them to withhold their signatures. They made no claim
~~1 Hill, Sermons. iTote particularly sermons on: Lieut', 33T2"9; "
Genesis L8;15-1b; Daniel 6:28; Matt. 11:18-19; Mark 2:7; II Peter 1:12.
2 See Cook's account of young Hill's reaction to the Wilkes riots in
1768 and his comments cn Parliament's treatment of "Beckford's celebrated
remonstrance." op.cit., p. I7f»
3 Infra, p. 2>.25.
k Vfitherspoon, op.cit., p. 162.
5 Struthers, op.cit., p. 279.
6 There were, of course, exceptions. William McGill in A Practical Essay
on the Death of Jesu3 Christ, "Appendix Sermon" (1788), not only attacked
compulsory subscription, but the Confession of Faith itself. Later he retracted
his statements about the Confession but held firm to the idea that compulsory
subscription prevented free inquiry. Is it not most interesting to find the
Moderates appealing to "conscience" and the right of the individual to examine
Scripture and decide for himself in doctrinal matters, yet denying the same
individual the right of appeal to "conscience" for failure to participate in
the ordered establishment of an unpopular presentee?
1^0
for doctrinal deviations, only doctrinal indifference. Thus when Macleod
A
called thQ Moderates "heretics," he used a false nomenclature. To be a
heretic, one must be interested in theology, and generally speaking the
Moderates were not. "Their temper was philosophical and ethical rather than
p
theological." They remained discreetly silent on many of the fundamentals
of scholastic Calvinism, and it was this silence rather than the positive
teaching of 'unorthodox doctrine which caused their opponents to be suspicious.
For example, Professor Leechman was called to task over a sermon he preached
on prayer, not because of what he said, but because of what he did not say ~
he failed to mention the mediatorial role of Christ.^ Principal Burleigh,
therefore, seems fair in his judgment at this point; "In doctrine the
Moderates were ostensibly if tepidly orthodox, but theology did not figure
among their interests. They did not encourage heresy hunting, but neither did
they promote theological liberalism."^
Here the Moderate cloak fits improperly about the shoulders of Hill. Even
a hostile critic of the Moderates said that he was "definitely and ably
Calvinistic."5 Hill proved himself worthy of that assessment in a Letter to
the Editors of the British Critic, dated August 2, 1803. In responding to
their representations of Calvinism, he wrote;
Being fully aware, that the writings of polemical authors of every sect
abound with foolish and extravagant positions, 1 do not undertake to
vindicate all that Calvinists have said... ..But in thinking, that
1 "It would have been unjust," says Honcrieff, later leader of the
opposing party, "to accuse them of heresies. Their peculiarities were adopted
rather that they might be believed to be, if not original and profound, at
least ingenious or fashionable thinkers than from any systematic hostility
to Christian doctrine." Life of John Brskine, p. 61.
2 Campbell, op.cit., p. 136.
3 Leechman, The Nature, Reasonableness, and Advantages of prayer.
h Burleigh, op.cit., p. 3O3. Uf. Campbell, qp.cit., pp. 134, 13&.
5 Macleod, op.cit., p. 208.
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'Calvinism resembles a machine so modelled and constructed, that if any
one wheel, or any one peg, were taken away, the whole would fall in
pieces,16 so I profess to be a consistent Galvinist; and I have persuaded
myself, by that close investigation of the subject which my situation
in this established Church prescribed, that a man who adheres steadily
to the system deduced from scripture by our church - who understands all
the parts of it - who follows them out in their natural consequences, and
attends to all their bearings and connections, may and must remain at
a wide distance from any doctrines which deserve the name of gloomy,
dangerous, and presumptuous. You will recollect your own words in
page 680.1
Though Hill alarmed some brethern by informing his students that Calvinism
2
was definitely not for the pulpit, he left no doubt as to the stand he took
upon the Confession of Faith and subscription to it. In a sermon preached
June 25, 1780, he said;
Our church, by the standards which she requires her Ministers to
subscribe, hath wisely provided for the uniformity of teaching, and
for the peace of your minds. These standards contain the present
truth...in which we trust you are established.-^
Hill broke with the bad tradition which i-egarded the subject of theology
as of minor importance, end produced the only surviving theological treatise
of the Moderate Party. Published under the title, Lectures in Divinity, this
manual became the standard textbook in St. Andrews and Edinburgh.^ In giving
the reason why he selected it for his own lectures Thomas Chalmers said, "I
know of no treatise which professes to exhibit the whole range of theological
doctrine, and does it in more of a lucidus ordo than the one we have fixed
upon." He hastens to add, however, that although "the substance of
Christianity is there," it is "not impregnated with the full force and
1 British Critic, Vol. XXII, No. 2 (1803), P. 220. See also
Lectures, Vol. Ill, pp. 188-189.
2 Hill, Institutes, p. 347f. L.I.D., Vol. II, pp. 528-529.
3. Hill, Sermons, pp. 11-12.
4 Cunningham, History, Vol. II, p. 455. "What licskine's Institute
is to the Scotch Lawyer, Hill's Lectures are to the Scotch divine."
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vitality of Christian sentiment. We have the whole orthodoxy of the subject
although not the feeling of it."''
The general desire, however, for theological neutrality fostered a spirit
of toleration among the Moderates. They frankly admitted that the goal of a
national church was unattainable, and though they enjoyed the status of estab¬
lishment, they had a high regard for the rights of dissenting groups. This
attitude is well put by Blair:
While to the established church is given that protection and support
from government, which both interest of religion and the welfare of
the state render proper duej yet no rigid conformity to it is exacted.
All persecution for conscience sake is unknown. They who...differ
from the established church, are at full liberty, without reproach to
worship God according to their own opinions and the rites of their
fathers, as long as they infringe not the public tranquility, nor
disturb the state.^
The Moderates also maintained a rather warm feeling tov/ard the Church of
England. This is exemplified by the action of young Hill in London. He tells
of his attending a worship service and receiving the sacrament of tiie Lard's
supper. "I think it but a decent piece of respect to the established religion
of the country in which I live, to observe it in the manner, and at the time,
which it has prescribed.
This spirit of toleration caused the Moderates to adopt a liberal attitude
to life in general. Truth was to be received from every quarter and all
scholarship was looked upon as a worthy thing. It was because of Moderate
intervention that David Hume was never tried for "infidel writings." This
defense of Hume caused Witherspoon to write:
1 Chalmers, op.cit., pp. 125-127. Cf. Hugh Miller, op.cit., p. 1M0.
"His work is that of a masterly theologian, who at least saw clearly, though
he could not feel strongly."
2 Blair, Sermons, Vol. V, pp. 133-132*.
3 Cook, op.cit., p. 37.
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As to the world in general, a moderate man is to have great charity for
Atheists and Deists in principle, and for persons that are loose and
vicious in their practice: but none at all for those that have a high
profession of -religion^ and a great pretense to strictness in their
Y/alk and conversation.
The Moderates argued that whereas a heresy trial would serve no purpose at all,
freedom of inquiry, even if untraditional, might prove the source of many
blessings. Besides, the object of censure v/as not to be freedom of thought,
but licentious action."
This liberal outlook on life is further reflected in Carlyle's Autobiography.
He boasts of being the first son of the manse to learn to dance and the first
minister to play cards openly. He speaks often of his wining and dining with
the heritics of his parish and felt he had rendered the church a great service
in enabling it to discriminate the artificial virtues and vices, formed by
ignorance and supersitition, from those that are real.^ It v/as, however, the
controversy over theatre-going which publicised the Moderates broad-mindedness.
John Home, a Moderate minister, wrote a tragedy, 'Douglas', and staged it in
Edinburgh's Canongate theatre. It was an immense success and v/as attended by
many ministers, mostly from outside Edinburgh, who made themselves as
inconspicuous as possible, that is all but Alexander Carlyle who occupied a
prominent side-box. The presbyteries reprimanded their worldly members, and
all submitted, that is all but Alexander Carlyle! who maintained that he had
broken no law of the church. He determined
not to yield but to run every risk rather than furnish an example of
tame submission, not merely to a fanatical, but an illegal exertion
of power, which would have stamped disgrace on the Church of Scotland,
kept the younger clergy fox* half a century longer in the trammels of
bigotry or hypocrisy, and debarred every gensrous spirit from entering
into orders.^
1 Witherspoon, op.cit., p. 213. Campbell interestingLy notes that
though Hume "lived on terms of affectionate friendship with the leading
Moderates in Edinburgh...his philosophy...was one of the influences which
in the end led to trie decay and disappearance of Moderatism." on.cit. , p. 76.
2 Anna!s, Vol. II, pp. 55-59.
3 Carlyle, Autobiography, p. 339. 4 Ibid., pp. 331-332*
1u
Though the Assembly passed an act forbidding ministers to attend the theatre,
the act remained a dead letter. A few years later Carlyle notes with glee that
when the great actress Mrs. Siddons first appeared in Edinburgh, during
the setting of the General Assembly, that court was obliged to fix all
its important business for the alternate days when she did not act, as
all the younger members, clergy as wall as laity, took their stations
in the theatre on those days by three in the afternoon.^
Though Hill joined in the movement for religious toleration, belonged to
an order-, and attended the theatre,2 the robust enjoyment of life seems to have
escaped him. This may have been due in part to ill health which plagued him
from young manhood,3 or it may have been the result of his peculiar temperament.
Whatever the reason, the stark picture painted by his biographer is that of a
rather pomcus stodgy individual. Certainly against the background of Edinburgh's
'Golden Age' Hill appeared cold and humorless, and perhaps it is not without
cause that Hugh Miller accused him of possessing "a freezing chill of sentiment."^
In spite of their tolerant attitude, the Moderates were strong supporters
of established religion and cooperation with the existing government. To
their way of thinking the two went hand in hand.
By a Religious Establishment is generally understood, such an intimate
connection between Religion and Civil Government, their laws, their public
officers and general administrations, as may most effectively secure the
best interest, and great end of both. That establishment is the most
perfect, in which the two interfere the least with each other's functions
and immediate objects, and in which, at the same time, they can most
readily co-operate in promoting successfully the present order, and the
future happiness of man.5
The relationship of church and state shall be mentioned in greater detail later
as this was of primary concern for Hill, but it should be noted here that the
cooperation which Moderates enjoined was cooperation as equals. The Moderates,
1 Ibid., p. 339.
2 In an amusing letter of 1775 Hill relates his own account of the riot
in an Edinburgh theatre occasioned by the refusal of the manager to ridicule
recently deceased George Wnitfield. Cook, op.cit., p. 38O.
3 Ibid., p. 36. 1+ Hugh Miller, Headship of Christ, p. 1A0.
5 Alexander Rankin, The Importance of Religious Establishments, p. 3-
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even in the defense of patronage, never encouraged docile submission of the
church to the state. It should be fur thai- remembered that the Moderates'
loyalty was to 'government* in general rather than to any particular
administration. Hill thought himself to be in harmony with this principle
both when he extolled the British Constitution as the best guarantee of liberty
and security known to man, and when he condemned the French Revolution
Government for profaning Easter, and for "effacing from the public mind the
impression of a Deity, and the belief of a future state."
Finally, the Moderates introduced a new style of preaching. They abandoned
the idea of preaching on a single text for months; they consciously avoided
controversies in the pulpit;^ they omitted the standard phrases and religious
expressions. For passion and mystery they substituted the beautiful and the
obvious, and for the urgency of evangelism, the religion of reasonable man.
In short, their preaching was ethical, rational and polished. Here more than
elsewhere Witherspoon's sarcasm is justified;
A good preacher must...have the following special narks and signs of a
talent for preaching. 1. His subjects must be confined to social
duties. 2. He must recommend them from only rational considerations,
vis. the beauty and comely proportions of virtue, and its advantages
in the present life, without regard to a future state of more extended
self-interest. 3* His authorities must be drawn from heathen writers,
'None', or as few as possible from Scripture^
Thomas Chalmers compared a Moderate sermon to a fine winter day ~ short, clear,
and cold. "The brevity is good, and the clearness better, but the coldness
is fatal. Moonlight preaching ripens no harvest."^
Less picturesquely, but more concretely, two words, deliberately chosen
1 Hill, Sermons , pp. 406 , 413 > 414, 418.
2 "What is known by the name of Theological Controversy, does not
form an essential part of preaching." Hill, Sermons, p. 8.
3 Witherspoon, op.cit., p. 166.
4 G.R« Cragg, The Church in the Age of Reason, p. 90.
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by their opponents, were most often used to describe the Moderate preaching -
legal and moral. Legal preaching signified the tendency to malce sinners'
acceptance with God dependent upon their repentance and obedience to the moral
law. Though Moderates stressed the fact that saving faith cannot be separated
from holiness of life, they never represented repentance and obedience as the
1
ground of justification. They did, however, stress works more than faith
in spite of their attempts to hold them together,^ and it was this emphasis on
the former, almost to the exclusion of the latter, which brought upon them the
charge of legalism.
Moral preaching denoted the tendency to dwell upon virtue in the abstract,
and to present it as a grace to be desired for its own inherent worth. What ever
their motives, this insistence upon holiness in salvation opened the way for the
exclusive preaching of "mere morality." But while some Moderates preached Plato
more than Paul, others were more balanced, in their appeal for morality. Once
again it proved to be a matter of emphasis and the truth which the Moderates
were at pains to express is aptly put by Blair*:
He who divides religion from virtue, understands neither the one, nor
the other. It is the union of the two which consumates the human
character and state.2
More fundamental than either of these accusations, however, is the charge
that the "Moderates had lost faith in the office of preaching.They were
1 Hadow, Antinomlanlsm of the Harrow, pp. 50-51. "When we affirm it
(repentance) to be required in Order unto the Remission of Sins, we do not
mean that a sinner spiritually dead can produce it himself, by the natural
Powers of his own free Will; or that he must bring it to God as any Part
of that Righteousness, whereupon he is justified."
2 Blair, Sermons, Vol. Ill, p. 355. "The error of resting wholly on
faith, or wholly on works is one of those seductions, which most easily
mislead men; under the semblance of piety on the one hand and virtue on
the other."
3 Ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 20.
4 Campbell, op.cit., p. 151.
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apparently unconcerned with the exegesis and exposition of Scripture. Having
composed enough sermons to suffice for a year or two, they were content to
repeat them in rotation for the remainder of their ministries. Hill had
"only a three years' course of sermons ana...after he had delivered these, he
A
regularly began them again." Legend has it that in some quarters men banded
together to produce a corpus of sermons and then exchanged them as needed. It
is no wonder that Principal Burleigh concludes:
i
The contribution of the Moderates was to the intellectual ^nd cultural
development of Scotland rather than to its evangelization.^
1 J.P. Leishman, Matthew Leishman of Govan, p. 173• Cf. Institutes,
p. 338. Hill encourages his students to schedule a "portion of time for
gradually forming a stock of regular sermons, to be the furniture of ^/theiiy7
future life."
2 Burleigh, op.cit., p. 3O3.
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C. Moderatism and the Moderate party . . . . . * p. 165
1. De-emphasized: The "Doctrine" of the Church
2. Emphasized
a. Relation of Church and State
b. The Attitude of Tolerance
c. The Analogy of Civil Government
D* Statement of Hill's Ecclesiastical Principle ... p. 169
CHAPTER IV
THE STATEMENT OP HILL'S ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPLE
Having canvassed the major factors which influenced the development of
George Hill's ecclesiastical principle, we are now in a position to trace the
progress of his thought in these areas and to arrive at a concise statement of
the controlling idea which governs his doctrine of the church. To avoid
repetition, let us mark the precise contributions each factor reviewed made
to the final formulation of this idea, noting particularly the emphasis and de-
emphasis prompted by each. These words "emphasis" and "de-emphasis" have been
chosen deliberately, for they best explain the relationship of the factors
studied to the statement of the principle itself. As we move through this
chapter and the next, it might occur that "inclusion" and "exclusion" would
have been more appropriate headings, but in a final analysis the matter turns
upon a question of accentuation rather than repudiation. It will become
progressively clearer that Hill overemphasised soma points of ecclesiology at
the expense of others, but at the same time many points de-emphasized do receive
some treatment, even if only incidently. However, since the purpose of this
chapter is to arrive at the actual statement of Hill's principle, xra shall be
concerned here, not with the comments he made upon points he either emphasized
or de-emphasized (this shall come later), but rather with the effect his
emphasis and de-emphasis had upon the moulding of the key which unlocks the
whole of his theology of the church. . As Hill's own comments shall receive
detailed attention in due course, this shell be a brief, yet highly
significant, chapter.
1 Although there is a certain account of circular reasoning in this
procedure, it is nonetheless proper that wa determine the central idea of
Hill's ecclesiology before proceeding to discuss the particulars of that
subject, especially since the particulars cannot be fully understood apart
from an understanding of his primary principle. Many points mentioned here,
both those which Hill de-emphasized as well as emphasized, shall be examined
in Section Two of this thesis, but that we might see clearly the influence of
the various factors in Hill's background, we shall not break the line of
thought with an exposition of his comments at this point.
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A® Common Sense Philosophy
Because Hill was committed to the philosophy of common sense, he was
committed to a belief in, and acceptance of, first principles, principles so
basic, so universally received, that they needed, and indeed, admitted no
apodictical proof. This, the cutting edge of conroon sense philosophy, struck
deep within the doctrine of the church, in fact to its very roots. Regardless
of what may be said about the church, it does exist, and has existed since first
"constituted" by its Author. So commonplace is the presence of the church, "in
our daily experience" that it is accepted as normally and as naturally as the
air we breathe and the food we eat. So undeniable is its reality that its very
existence is proof of the "system" which it propounds. In short, the church
itself is a first principle and thus neither requires, elicits, nor encourages
discussion pertaining to its origin and foundation. The church simply is, and
no purpose would be served by Inquiring into how it came into being. Its
existence is merely accepted as it would be contrary to the principles of common
sense to deny the reality of a universal phenomenon acknowledged by believers
and unbelievers alike.
Were it not for the common sense principle of cause and effect, the origin
of the church would be deprived of the paltry treatment it does receive from
2
Hill. Yet, In spite of the fact that this principle causes Hill at least to
predicate the incipience of the church, it does more harm than good in his
attempt to discern how the church came to be. Common sense gives assent to both
3
"cause" and "effect" but plainly states that "we know not how they are connected.""
1 "You ask why I believe what is self-evident? I may as well ask, why you
believe what is proved? Neither question admits of an answer; or rather, to both
questions the answer is the same, namely, Because I must believe it." Reasoning
of common sense philosopher as stated by Grave, Common Cense, p. 124.
2 Hill, L, U"4 , Vol. I, p. 33®
3 Reid, Works, Vol. I, p. 157®
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We may be able to determine the nature, constancy, and invariability of the
effect, but we are "unable to see the connexion between what went before and
A
what came after."'
Hill's whole-hearted acceptance of this principle2 produced two outstanding
results in his ecclesiology. First, the church is pushed to the periphery of
doctrine and is severed from all vital relation with the rest of his theology.
Whereas in the Apostles' Creed the doctrine of the church belongs to the doctrine
of saving faith, being bracketed together with "the forgiveness of sins, the
resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting," in Hill's theology it is
relegated to a marginal area and is considered in itself alone. When he cornss
to this section in his Lectures in Divinity, he simply says, "I next consider
the church"; and the very first thing discussed is the foundation of church
government, not the foundation of the church. If someone were to ask Hill why
he should consider the church at all, his own answer would be, "This branch of
our course.. .demands youx- particular attention, not only from the mention made
of it in Scripture, but also from the many violent controversies to which it has
given birth";3 which is to say, the church itself is to be studied primarily as
a "cause," and the antecedent upon which it x^ests is of no importance. Secondly,
thou^x Hill is forced to admit on the basis of Scripture that Christ is in some
way "connected" with the church, he is committed to the presupposition that the
nature of this connection can never be determined; and the result, therefore,
is an almost total failure to relate the Body of Christ with the person of
Christ. He clearly abhors any idea of "mystical union" which he thinks belongs
to the enthusiasts.^ This indicates how far Hill was from understanding the
5
teaching of Calvin, which he claims again and again to be expounding.
~1 Grave," Common Sense', p. '137. 2 Supra, p. 37.
3 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. I, P. 455. 4 Hill, L.I.D.. Vol. Ill, p. 479.
5 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. I, pp. 446-447; Vol. II, pp. 348-356, 537;
Vol. ill, pp. ?235, 89-190.
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The idea which Kill neglects, if not rejects, is the central idea of
Calvin's theology, that is, union with Christ,. This concept is absolutely
necessary to the Y/hole understanding of the church, for "through union with
Christ the Church becomes the Body of which He is the Head." "We ought not,"
says Calvin, "to separate Christ from ourselves or ourselves from him.Why? ~
because "a3 long as Christ remains outside of us, and we fire separated from him,
all that he has suffered and done for the salvation of the human race remains
useless and of no value for us. Therefore, to share with us what he had
received from the Father, he had to become ours and to dwell within us. For
this reason, he is called 'our Head' (2ph. 4:15)."^ This concept of the church's
participation in Christ cannot be overemphasized simply because the life of the
church is the life of Christ,^" the glory of the church is the glory of Christ,-'
the holiness of the church is the holiness of Christ.*^ It is from the standpoint
of this comprehension of the church as ingrafted into Christ that Calvin
7
describes the relation of the church to the Father and the Spirit. Because the
church is incorporated into the one Christ who is the same yesterday, today, and
forever, Calvin is able to unite the Old Testament and New Testament church in
He is given to see the church growing tip historically into the mature
manhood of Christ.
The Church therefore conceived, when the people returned to their native
country</~from the Babylonian captivity/, for the body of tire people was
gathereu together from which Christ snould proceed in order that the
pure worship of God and true religion might again be revived. Hitherto,
indeed, this fertility was not visible; for the conception was concealed,
as it were, in the Mother's womb, and no outward appearance of it could
1 T.F. Torrance, Kingdom end Church, p. 101.
2 Calvin, Institutes, '$'.2*24. 3 Ibid. , 3s 1:1.
^ , 3s2;35, Commentary on John, 6:35.
5 Calvin, Commentary on Cole, 3:3.
6 Calvin, Institutes, 4:1:17, 21.
7 Ibid. , 4:15:6. 8 Commentary on EzeldLel, 17:22.
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be seen; but afterwards the people were increased, and after the birth the
Church grew from infancy to manhood, till the Gospel wis preached. This
v/8s the actual youth of the Church; and next follows the age of manhood,
down to Christ's last coming, when all things shall be fully accomplished.1
This approach not only saves one from a view of the church as a static
institution, but also underlines the inherent unity of the church in all ages
rj)
as the one Body of the one Head, a point Calvin is at pains to emphasise."
Further, it is from the perspective of union with Christ that Calvin approaches
the power of the church ana the authority entrusted to it.^ 'He might go on
ad infinitum citing examples to show the centrality of union with Christ in
the ecclesiology of Calvin, but the point has been well made by ??rofessor
Torrance:
It is through union with Christ that we become sons of the heavenly
Father for, as we share brotherhood with Christ, we share withhim
also the Fatherhood of God, It is through union with Christ that we
participate in all his benefits, regeneration and justification,
election and resurrection, and it is through union with Christ that
we can pray to the Father and worship him, and live the Chris tian life
on earth. It is this union with Christ that is sacrameritally mediated
to us in baptism in vdiich we are initiated- into God's family, and this
same union that is nourished at the Table of the Lord as we partake of
the body and blood of Christ and grow up into the full statue of his
humanity. It is through union with Christ that we grow in sheer
humanity which alone can recreate the broken relationships of society,
and which it is the task of the state to protect by the power of the
sword. It is the doctrine of union with Christ that lies atfthe heart
of Calvin's doctrine of the Church as the Body of Christ...,''
If it is not, therefore, surprising to find Calvin saying that the church
"cannot be severed from Christ its Head," it should not be surprising to find
Hill, who does just that, left with a mutilated doctrine of the Body of Christ.
1 Commentary on Isaiah, 54:2. T.F. Torrance states that had Calvin
written on the Apocalypse lie would have followed this same line, "the application
of the whole course of Christ's life and obedience from His birth to His death
and resurrection to the course of the Church's life from birth at Pentecost,
and growth through history to the fulness of Christ at His advent."
Kingdom and Church, p. 147.
2 Institutes, 4; 1:2. 'j> Ibid., 4:11:1.
^ A Calvin Treasury, introduced by T.F. Torrance, p. xii.
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Because Hill is predisposed to reject as harmful speculation till attempts at
understanding the church's union -with its risen Lord, he never reaches an
adequate understanding of the source of the church's life, nor the power which
sustains its life. The church simply lives by sane means or other, and, according
to Scripture, always will until Christ returns, so why be bothered about the
origin of its life. Hill never makes any attempt whatsoever to understand the
relationship of the church to the Persons of the Godhead, The "connection"
with Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is mentioned incidentally, but Hill has no
concept of the church as the work of the Trinity, and no appreciation of the
peculiar relations i t sustains with each divine Person. This in turn means that
Hill is never able to understand the church as the temple of God, the dwelling
place of the Spirit; nor as the family of God, sharing in the Sonship of Christ.
He never sees the church in the light of the incarnation or the atonement. The
church is never discussed in terms of Pentecost as the communion of life,
constituted and quickened by the power of the Spirit, Since Hill refuses to
discuss the church's union with Christ, he has rejected the Biblical basis for
any discussion of the growth of the church in history as a movement of divine
love, the relation of the Old and New Testament church, the being and nature
of the church, an understanding of the purpose of the church in the world, the
unity of the church in heaven and on earth. The church simply is, and one
begins at this point.
This principle, as devastating as it is, does not, however, exhaust the
influence of common sense philosophy on the ecclesiology of Hill. It was the
common sense emphasis on the practical which caused him to de-emphasize even
more aspects of the reformed doctrine of the church. There is in Hill no con¬
sideration of what the church is now as opposed to what it will become escha-
tologically, no mention of what Calvin calls the two conditions of the church,
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i.e. , the present stats of the church as distinguished from its future glory."'
For j. though the Church be now tormented by the malice of man or even broken
by the violence of the billows, and miserably torn in pieces, so as to have
no stability in the world. yet we ought always to cherish confident hope,
because it will not be by human means, but by heavenly power, which will be
far superior to every obstacle, that the Lord will gather his Church.^
Whereas Calvin emphasized both aspects of the church's life, Kill focuses
exclusively upon, its broken and scandalous condition. This may have resulted
from his aversion to anything eschatological, but it may just as well have
resulted from his desire to treat only what he thought was "practical." Hence
Hill amputates from his ecclesiology all but that which has to do with the
earthly form of the church as it presently exists in the world.
This controlling factor of practicability makes its presence felt in other
areas too. Hill lias nothing to say about the holiness of the church. Conmon
sense teaches that what exists really is - and a sinful church exists (Hill
always stresses this-') -■ therefore, a sinful church it must be. it would be the
height of impracticality to speak about the holiness of the church when the common
sense of man tells him that the church is filled with all sorts of unrighteous¬
ness. It is easy to see how Kill might arrive at this conclusion. Sinco the
time holiness of the church is derived from God through participation in Christ,
ana since Hill rejects any idea of incorporation into Christ, he is forced to
look outside of Christ for the church's holiness. The natural place to turn,
then, is to the church itself, and since its members are not holy and sinless,
the only reason Hill could give for the holiness of the church, he rejects this
as an attribute of the Bride of Christ. And to reject the holiness of the church
is to reject the unique place of the church in the world, for it is as holy that
1 T.F. Torrance notes that this distinction in Calvin "is concerned not
so much with a dialectical relation but with a time-lag in the course of fulfill¬
ment between Christ the Head and the Church as His Body." Kingdom and Church, p. 112.
2 Calvin, Commentary on Matthew, 24:50.
5 Hill, L. I.I)., Vol. Ill, pp. 487, 494, 496, 509. I" these references Hill
speaks of the church in its "present inperfect state," and calls attention to
those "false prophets" in the church who teach "a perversion of scripture," and
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the church is distinguished from all other communities, fellowships} and
social entities among the peoples of history. Therefore, to reject the holiness
of the church is to disavow its own unique ground and end in God, its own
essential life, its own essential form and order.^ It is no wonder then that,
in rejecting the holiness of the church on the basis of common sense, Hill
dismissed all these things as unimportant.
It was, however, this concern for1 the practical which caused Hill to
emphasize certain points. Since the church does, for whatever reasons, exist,
the practical questions are how and in what form is it to exist? How is it to
rule and govern its members? What kind and degree of power may it wield in a
world of many societies? The positive influence of Hill's philosophical back¬
ground may be seen in the direction he turned to find the answers to these
?
questions. Common sense and reason pointed him to natural, law and natural
order as the place to discover the pattern of the church's earthly existence.
He was further encouraged to look there for the solutions to the difficult
problems of church unity, the purpose of the church in society, and the relation¬
ship of church and state. It was also in nature that he found rational reasons
for the present condition of the church and so was emboldened to accept
to those things in the church which have produced "errors, contradictions,
and absurdities."
1 T.F. Torrance, Class Lectures on the Doctrine of the Church.
2 A.J. Campbell draws a sharp distinction between coranon sense and reason
and objects to them being drawn together in this way. He plainly states that
common sense involves "no rehabilitation of rationalism," and in fact sees in
this philosophy the foundations of Evangelical theology which "no longer depended
mainly on external 'evidence', but on internal and. spiritual truth." op.cit.,
p. 157. However true that may be, it is not correct to divorce so completely
common sense and reason. Although in the Inquiry Re id spoke as if there could
bo conflict between the two, in the Intellectual Powers, he explains the
difference as existing between common sense and misused reason. Reason has a
deductive and an intuitive function; and "common sense" is but the alternative
name for reason in its intuitive function. (Works, Vol. I, p. 425). In oppos¬
ing Campbell's interpretation, the present writer has followed that of 8.A. Grave
who states, "Reason and common sense go together in nature as they do in the
phrase....Indeed all the Common Sense philosophers...are sooner or later willing
or anxious to use on occasions 'common sense1 and 'reason' interchangeably."
op.cit. , p. 115. Thus Hill can consistently appeal to both Locke and Raid,
to Doth reason and common sense. Cf. L.I.D., Vol. I, p. 128.
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tho status quo without displaying an undignified enthusiasm to see the church
harmonized with New Testament standards.
Thus in tracing the progress of Hill's thought against the background of
his philosophical training, we have seen why he de-emphasized all else but the
external form and order of the church, and why, in emphasizing this, he turned
to reason as opposed to revelation.
B. Federal Theology
Because Hill was a federal theologian, he, in the tradition of that theology,
overemphasised the atonement at the expense of the incarnation; the substitutionary
death of Christ at the expense of incorporation into the new humanity of Christ.
This exclusive emphasis on the passive obedience of Christ only served to
strengthen Hill's depreciation of the church's union with its King and Head.
But more basic than its neglect of the incarnation (understanding it only as
the means by which Christ presented His sacrifice for sins) is federal
theology's two-fold covenant concept.
As noted in Chapter II, for Calvin there was but one covenant, representing
the gracious mil of Cod to commit Himself to His people, and to take them into
communion with Himself. It was through this one covenant that the church was
brought into being, as the divinely appointed sphere for the actualization of
this loving union.
In the beginning, antecedently to this Covenant, the condition of the
whole world was one and the same. But as soon as it was said, "I vd.ll
be a God to thee and to thy seed after thee," the Church was separated
from other nations.«».^
Thus Calvin saw the establishment of the covenant of grace in the corporate
election of Israel in the Old Testament, and its fulfillment in the corporate
election of the church in the New as the Body of Christ. This conception of
the relationship between the covenant and the church was accompanied by a
remarkably clear vision of the unity of the church. Just as there is but one
1 Calvin, Commentary on Genesis, 17;7.
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covenant, there is but one church. Therefore in Calvin's thinking, "to divide
A
the church is to lacerate ana dismember Christ."
This one church, however, exists in two forms, visible and invisible. The
term "visible church" designates "the whole multitude of men spread over the
earth who profess to worship one God and Christ." The term "invisible church"
refers to "those who are children of God by grace of adoption and true members
of Christ by sanctification of the Holy Spirit. Then, indeed, the church includes
not only saints presently living on earth but all the elect from the beginning
p
of the world.""- However, even though the two do not coincide precisely, even
though the invisible aspects are broader than the visible, and even though the
visible encompasses much of which is temporary in nature and cannot be x-egarded
as belonging to the church invisible, the church visible and the church invisible
cannot be separated. There are not two churches, but one, having in this world
an earthly and historical form, which is itself an object of faith, and an eternal
and heavenly form within the new world of God.
This concept of the church's unity is to be found in the theology of the
X
Scottish Reformation. Knox, like Calvin, had a horror of schism and division.-"
In spite of his zeal for reform, he had no intention of breaking -with "the true
fold," but only with the "false hirelings" who wrere responsible for leading the
flock astray.*1" Those who followed in Knox's succession thought of the church
as "no mere vague generality" but as the visible kingdom of God on earth. John
1 Calvin Treasury, p. xii. Cf. Institutes 4:1:1, "...there could not be
two or three churches unless Christ be torn asunder." See also J.S. Whale,
The Protestant Tradition, p. 1o2, Note 2, "Calvin's dread of schism springs
mainly from his mysticism. For him the Church is Christ...."
2 Calvin, Institutes, 4s 1s 7.
3 Baptism Commission Report, 1958, p. 11.
4 Alexander Martin, Church Union in Scotland, p. 7.
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Macpherson says that this idea of the church as "a great empire , the universal
visible Church of God on earth," dominated the theology of Scotland fox1 mors
O
than a century.
The development of federal theology, however, saw a radical change in the
concept of the church. The legal-rational distinction between the "covenant of
grace" and the "covenant of redemption" resulted in a dichotomy of the visible
church and the invisible church. There tended to be, not one, but two distinct
churches. The invisible church, grounded on the covenant of redemption ana
consisting of the elect, was wholly hidden; the visible church, grounded on the
covenant of grace and consisting of all who hear the Yford, was virtually
identified with the national society.-^
. There was also a second line of development within the federal framework,
which, worked to force the cleavage between the visible church and the kingdom, of
God. In the post-Westminster period the Covenanting preachers began more and
more to emphasize religious experience and a personal covenant. "You mast make
your covenant" became a stock exhortation. This teaching led to a doctrine of
ecclosiola in ecclesia, a belief in the existence of a separate dlite, a
spiritual church, consisting of elect individuals drawn from the ranks of the
church visible. The result was the rise of separatist ecclesiology.^
It should be noted, however, in all fairness to certain federal theologians ,5
that efforts were made to hold the visible and invisible church together. This
1 Cf» Walker, op.cit., pp. 95, 9b» "TT.in the idea of Scottish theologians
...the visible Church is not a genus, so to speak, with so many species under it.
It is thus you may think of the State; but the visible Cb.urch is a to turn
Integrals - it is an empire. The Churches of the various nationalities constitute
the provinces of this empire; and though they are so far independent of each
other, yet they are so one, that membership in one is membership in all, and
separation from one is separation from all."
2 J. Macpherson, The Doctrine of the Church in Scottish Theology, p. 93»
5 Baptism Commission Report, 1958, p. 50» 4 Ibid. , p. 50.
5 Samuel Rutherford, John Brown of Wamphray, James Fraser of Brea, and
Thomas Boston of Ettrick.
usually took the form of religio-political covenants. The most famous and the
most successful of these was the Solemn League and Covenant of 'i643* In that
covenant, the church, was clearly identified with the nation and was considered
-i
to be co-extensive with it. The covenant itself was drafted for tne express
purpose of providing "strict union and uniformity of religion." As long as
these two concepts, a covenanted nation (including all the people, the King
and God), and a uniform religion (including "doctrine, worship, discipline and
government"), remained paramount, then all divisions naturally fell into the
shadows. This is not to imply that a distinction was not made between the
visible and invisible aspects of the church,3 but it did oppose any tendency
to think in terms of more than one church. But when, in the Revolution
Settlement of 1690, this external covenant was pushed aside, the way was left-
open for the legitimate distinction between the visible and invisible aspects
of the church to degenerate into two separate theological entities, a visible
church and an invisible church.
Two immediate results of this corruption are obvious. First, since the
basis for uniting the visible church with the invisible has been destroyed by
the federal contractual!, system, the natural tendency is to stress one "church"
at the expense of the other. With his training in common sense philosophy and
rationalism, we are not surprised to find Hill placing all of his emphasis upon
the visible church. In fact, he does not even treat the invisible church at all
1 Cf. "Solemn League and Covenant", J.K. Hewison, The Covenanters (19137*
Appendix 2, p. 479. Robert Baillie speaks of the union of a "civil league"
and a "religious covenant" (Letters and Journals, Vol. II, p. 90)' - hence the
name, Solemn League and Covenant.
2 Robert Blair, cited by William Row, Life of Blair, p. 171.
3 Macpharson suggests that it was in fact this idea of a covenanted
nation which thrust forward the distinction between the visible and invisible
aspects of the church. Since the church was identified with the nation, yet
since many in the national church were obviously not genuine believers, some
distinction had to be made. "Rutherford and Scottish protestant theologians...
bring in the distinction of the visible and invisible church."
Macpherson, op.cit., pp. 62-63.
162
therefores when he uses the word "church." he means only the church as an
external society® Secondly, once the visible church is divorced from the
invisible, the visible church begins to divide. ' This fact comes to light as
early as 1652 in the fierce conflict between the Protestors and the
Resolutioners which Jamas Walker has called "one of the saddest ysi most
influential controversies in our ecclesiastical annals. It put ill blood
in our Church life which a century and a half did not expel."2 There we see
how the sharp distinction between the visible church and the invisible church
began to break up and disrupt the one church. If, however, the church was to
persist in its claim of adherence to the principles of New Testament ecclesiology,
at least some token mention had to be made concerning the oneness of the church.
This resulted, not in a complete denial of, but in a "laxer attitude" toward the
question of unity. "Thus it came to pass that, instead of the one Church for
which the older Presbyterians strove, a modified ideal of Church unity and
fellowship found a welcome," even from what claimed to be "the right wing of
Reformed orthodoxy.Indeed, the reformation ideal of "onlie one trew and
haly kirk" was so modified that one wonders if it retained any sense of unity at
all. Theologians not only rejected the idea that "schism is sin,"^ but actually
turned to the defense of schism as a good thing. It Is not difficult to under¬
stand why this not so subtle shift of emphasis occurred. As men looked about
them they saw only a shattered church, arid since they had no real basis upon
which to unite the pieces, they naturally began to defend the separation.
It is no wonder then that Hill has so little to say about the unity of the
church and that what he does say is founded solely upon rational grounds. In a
^ Baptism Commission Report, 19pB, p. 50.
2 Walker, op.ext., p. 10i+.
3 Macleod, op.cit. , p. 180.
4 A.J. Campbell, op.cit., p. 12y.
final analysis churches ere "cemented" together "not only by those affections
which their religion cherishes, but also by their joint acknowledgment of that
system of truth which it reveals®" Even then Hill is left at best with only
a hypothetical unity. "If," he says, "the whole Christian world could assemble
together for the purpose of observing the institutions of Christ, they would
2
form one visible society." But Hill goes on to add, not only that this hypo¬
thetical unity is sn impossibility, but that it "was not the intention of the
author of the Gospel that this visible unity of the Christian society should ba
long preserved...Pragmatically he concludes that the church is expected
only to retain "amidst this separation all the unity which is possible.
Besides this crucial blow to the unity of the church, federal theology
made its presence felt at other points in the development of Hill's ecclesias-
5
tical principle. Because of federalism1s desire for simplicity, there could
be no treatment of the various images used in the New Testament to manifest the
relationship of the church and Christ. As these could not be neatly categorized
and incorporated into the antecedent system, they were blatantly ignored. Hill
only mentions the Body-Head figure, and that in a political sense.^ The desire
for simplicity also steered Hill away from any depth treatment of the nature of
the sacraments, the church's responsibility to the heathen, and the final
consummation of the church. A discussion of these things might "introduce into
simple unlettered minds a degree of embarrassment and scepticism, which they had
never before experienced...it is very dangerous upon any point, whether moral,
~
THjmTL.i.d. . VoiTi'i'i," pT"~549T" 2 ibid., p. 350"
3 Ibid., p. 350. 4 Ibid., p. 373«
5 Locke also demanded that church doctrine ba quite simple and "lay
level with the commonest understanding."
6 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, pp. 478-479. Hill mentions this figure
elsewhere, but with no explanation. It siiaply indicates, along with the
idea that we are subjects of His kingdom, that there is a "connexion
between Christ and the persons for whom he died." Vol. II, p. 5'12.
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religious, or political, to unsettle the established opinions of those who
are,,»incapable of forming general views.For the sake of simplicity then,
Hill was content to condone ignorance rather then raise the difficult questions
of theology.
Because Hill was a federal theologian he was coamitted to the doctrine of
limited atonement, and was, therefore, concerned primarily with the elect
individuals for whom Christ had died. The church thus becomes, in the wards
of Professor Torrance, "the exclusive company of the privileged." Despite tho
world-affirming attitude of the Moderates and the denial of the church's
2
holiness, the church acquires a certain aloofness in Hill's theology. If it
is not even concerned with all men, but only with the elect, then certain!;/ it
will harbor no concern for creation as a whole. There is in Hill no concept of
the church as the sphere in which Christ draws together his now creation. This
outlook easily led to an ingrown attitude as is evidenced not only in Hill's
writings, but also in his activities as a churchman.-^ The doctrine of limited
atonement furthex* implies a limited mediatorial rcle for Christ. This in turn
confines Hill's understanding of the relationship of church and state to a
rational, practical frame of reference, conceived in terms of social contract.
But precisely because Hill was interested in this select society, he was
interested in how this society was to be organized and governed, and how it was
to perform the "rites and ceremonies" instituted by its founder. And because it
was a select society among many societies, he was interested in determining the
relationship between the one and the many. Once again the question is asked•
Where did federal theology suggest that he look for the answers to these questions?
V'Hill, Institutes, p. "349.
2 The dominance of the federal scueme of salvation not only depreciates
the whole concept of union with Christ, but at the same time exalts the church
as an ecclesiastical institution. Baptism Commission Report, 1952, p. 49.
3 Infra, p. 253. 4 Infra, p. 444.
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By now the answer is obvious. The scholasticism of federalism pointed Hill to
rationalism. Thus once again in tracing the development of Hill's thought
against the background of his theological training, we have seen why ha de-
emphasized all else but the external form and order of the church, and why, in
emphasizing this, he turned to natural theology.
C. Moderatism and the Moderate Fart,v
The Moderate tendency to minimize doctrine had its effect on the Moderate
theologian. Even Hill, who was far more interested in theology than his
colleagues, acquiesced in their depreciation of dogmatics when he came to treat
the church. Hence wa find in Kill no "doctrine of the church" in the usual sense
of the term. Unlike most "systematic theologies" consideration of such major
topics as the nature of the church, the attributes of the church, and the marks
-I
of the true church is conspicuously absent. And even those points of doctrine
which are salvaged, such as the church's mission and purpose in the world, are
restricted in Hill's thought by Moderate moralism, springing frcm rationalized
Calvinism.
As indicated in Chapter III, the above mentioned strands of philosophy
and theology flowed together in eighteenth century Moderatism. But whereas
these prior factors had primarily a negative influence upon the development of
Hill's ecclesiastical principle the greater effect of Hill's Moderate background
was essentially positive in nature. The reorientation of the enlightenment
threatened the central place of Christianity in secular culture, and forced
theologians to justify its existence to a rational age. Moderate churchmen
were compelled to defend Christianity's contribution to society, and to
evaluate the church itself in terms of moral ana social worth. The church's
boon to society was usually understood in terms of service rendered to the state.
1 See "Arrangement of the Course", L.I.D., Vol. i, pp. 445~45/; and
"Heads of Lectures", Institutes, pp. 121-135*.
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Great stress was laid upon those parts of the gospel which inculcate civil,
obedience, peace among citizens, and subjection to authority. The principle task
of the church was to exercise a moral influence so that worthy citizens might be
created. In that respect the ultimate ends of the church and the state coincided.
The alliance of the religious society with secular society at this juncture
sparked a revival of interest in the whole area of church-state relations. As
leader of the Moderate Party Hill was called upon to give an account of the
Moderate point of view. Consequently this matter lie cama a primary factor in his
ecclesiology. He not only expounds the social contract theory of union, but
defends the church against the accusations to which this union gave rise. Much
of what Hill has to say on the church stems from this pivotal point.
Moderatism made a further contribution to the development of Hill's Qcclesicl-
ogy in that it filled the void left by a denial of the oneness of the church.
Modoratism substituted concern for tolerance in place of concern fox- unity - and
the two are not the same. Although in Moderate thinking there was no inherent
unity of the church derived from her participation in Christ, there was essential
to the nature of the church on earth a character of love, open-mindedness, and
moderation. Therefore, despite the Moderates' practical denial of the unity
of the one church, they emphasized an attitude of tolerance among the many
churches, lock©, in fact, had called toleration "the chief characteristics!
mark of the true church.His use of the term "implied a protest against those
who in theological and other inquiries, demand absolute certainty in questions
2where balanced probability alone is vdthin the reach of human intelligence."
This understanding of tolerance, adopted by the Moderates, Hill included, not
only accounts for the broad comprehension within the established church, but
also moulded much of Hill's thinking on the nadire and function of the church's
1 Locke, Works, Vol. VI, p. 5«
2 A.C. Fraser, Locke, pp. 90-91.
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confessional statements. Creeds, if retained, had to be interpreted in the
light of tolerance, and the right of private judgment had to be maintained in
spite of stringent ecclesiastical discipline. At every point, church power
1
is to be "regulated" by "the liberties of Christ's disciples."
Also implied in this doctrine of toleration is the principle of voluntarism.
If one is to be consistently tolerant, then one must a,1low the reasonable men
to choose for himself the particular branch of the "great society" which he
would join. Intolerance and religious prejudices wore barriers which hindered
the progress of mankind and could not be tolerated by a church committed to the
cause of secular prosperity and well-being. Religious toleration then was not
only necessary for the spiritual health of the individual, but also for national
unity and strength.^ xt was mandatory, therefore, that any doctrine of church-
stats relations, any treatment of established religion, had to be expounded in
tolerant terms. This concern is so central that it colors practically all
that Hill has to say about the church as a society in society.
However, the greatest contribution of Hill's Moderate background to the
development of his ecclesiastical principle, was the Moderate concept of the
church as an external society. The analogy drawn from civil government in
support of this contention was not chosen arbitrarily. Many factors lay behind
the employment of this idea, not least of which was the contractual scheme of
3
federal theology. But more important than the causes which prompted its use
is the actual effect its use had upon Hill's theology. The extent of its
influence cannot be overemphasized for it is in this uncierstanding of the
church that Hill anchors his ecclesiolcgy. It is hore that he finds the solutions
'
1 HmrXTTDTrvoi. Ill7v£nF2. k85, 511. 536j"-"*—"""• ——
2 Norman Sykes, Church and State in England in the XVIII Century, pp. 325-327.
3 Federal theology used an analogy from secular government in Its
explanation of a covenant as a contract. No doubt the "success" of this
analogy encouraged similar ones at other points.
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to the problems we have raised throughout this chapter. It was this that gave
substance to the single point he emphasised time and again, namely, the
ordering of the Christian society.
A
If the followers of Jesus form a distinct society, and are bound to profess
their faith by the observance of certain institutions, there will probably
be found...some regulations as to the time and manner of observing them,
soma appointment of persons to administer them, some principles of order
and some provision of authority for guarding the honour and purity of the
Christian association.''
To say this was Hill's primary interest is not to deny the legitimacy of concern
for church government. Calvin insisted that "some form of organisation is
o
necessary" within the church. He further insisted, however, that "the lawful
form" of order "is the order which Christ interposes Himself that He may
gradually bring us to full communion with God,"-5 This fellowship with God was
broken, when the "ligitimate order which God originally established" was inverted,
and man, asserting his autonomy, usurped the power of God, and denied his
complete dependence upon God. The restoration of men to full communion with
God is a restoration to order through Christ: "cut of Christ all things were
disordered, and through Hira they have been restored to order."
Hill differed with Calvin at two significant points. First, whereas for
Calvin church government was "the scaffolding of the Church, by means of which
p
it is built up as the Body of Christ,"-5 it was for Hill the foremost point of
importance. Every other aspect of the church's life either vanishes or plays
second fiddle to the paramount issue of polity. All that Hill has to say about
the church is gathered up under these revealing headings: "Opinions Concerning
Church Government" in the Lectures and, "View of the Constitution of the Church
of Scotland" in the Institutes. Secondly, whereas Calvin looked to Christ to
1 HiliT L. I. D. TolT"[II, pp. 351-352. ~ ——
2 Calvin, Institutes, A;10;27. 3 Ibid., 2;15:15»
4 Calvin, Commentary on Bphesians, 1;10.
5 T.F. Torrance, Kingdom and Church, p. 138.
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find the pattern of ecclesiastical order so that even now the church might
1
reflect the image of God in her government. Hill looked outside of Christ
to the "sound and rational" grounds of nature which he found to be "agreeable
. 9
to the constitution of man,"" Here he sought for the principles upon which to
order and structure the "religious society."-^
.Thus we have seen how common sense philosophy and federal theology caused
■i
Hill to de-emphasize everything concerning the doctrine of the church except
the fact that it is a group of people same how joined together on earth for the
purpose of performing certain rites aryi ceremonies inaugurated by its Author.
We have seen how the Moderate Party offered Hill, the principle upon which to
unite these people and to establish the order necessary for the celebration of
their distinctive rites. We are now in a position to give the key which unlocks
the meaning behind all he has to say about the church. This then is Hill's
ecclesiastical principle; The church Is an external society, constituted b£
its Author for the purpose of performing certain rites.
The immediate reaction to this purely functional definition of the church
is to ask; Why study Hill's doctrine of the church at all? But to ask this
question is to ask; Why study historical theology? And the answer to both is
two-fold. In the first place, by an exposition and evaluation of Hill's
ecdesiology, we can learn from his mistakes. We can plainly see the pitfalls
of a certain theological system, and thus avoid those same errors in our own
theology. We may criticize Hill for what he deleted, but we cannot criticise
him for being inconsistent. We can see, therefore, where a certain line of
theology leads. We are given to see that if we accept certain points of the
1 Ibid., p. 138.
2 Kill, L.I.P.. Vol. Ill, pp. 359-360, 417, 453.
3 This does not mean, as we shall see, that Hill ignored the principles
of church government to be found in Scriptures, but he went to Scripture in
search of support for the principles he first perceived in natural theology
(for example, Lectures in Divinity. Vol. Ill, p. ~j>60)« This is but another
example of reason ruling revelation.
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federal system, then we are led to a certain doctrine of the church. Thus wo
are told a great deal by what Hill did not say. But secondly, we can learn much
from what he did say: and in what he does treat we are brought from the
eighteenth into the twentieth century. In his exposition of church power
and church polity we are confronted with today's burning questions on church-
state relations and the true basis for an ecumenical movement. As a consistent
federalist, and defender of the Westminster Confession Hill gives insight into
the prospects and the drawbacks of union tails from this perspective. And as
Westminster theology is still very much alive today, his contributions at this
point cannot be called into question. Thus having determined Hill's
ecclesiastical principle we turn expectantly to the exposition and evaluation
of his doctrine of the clrurch.
o
SECTION TWO
THE EXPOSITION AND EVALUATION OP
HILL'S SCCLESIOLOGY
"If the follcnvers of Jesus form a distinct
society, and are hound to profess their
faith by the observance of certain
institutions, there will probably be found
...some regulations as to the time and
manner of observing them, some appointment
of persons to administer them, some
principles of order and some provision of
authority for guarding the honour and
purity of the Christian association."
George Hill, Lectures in Divinity.
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THE NATURE OP THE CHRISTIAN SOCIETY
George Hill was primarily interested in the government and authority of the
church. A comprehensive discussion of those matters, however, necessitated at
-jleast an incidental mention of other aspects of ecclesiology. The purpose of
this chapter is to exrpound and evaluate those elements in the doctrine of the
church which for Hill were not central, but peripheral. The subjects of this
chapter were not, therefore, for the most part, given any separate and systematic
treatment; they appear only in passing references and in various contexts. The
apparent difficulty of elucidating Hill's own thought as copiously and fairly
as possible is amplified not only by his brevity on these issues, but also by
two further interrelated factors. The first is a fallacy in Hill's procedure.
O
He presupposes what he never attempts to prove. Often it is the case that these
subordinate elements are presented only by way of implication in his pre-logical
acceptance of them. Incomplete attention to these antecedent factors gives rise
to the second problem we face ~ Hill's circular reasoning. Because he never
isolates and consciously defines these prior concepts, he must appeal to them
repeatedly. The church has been established by its Author for the purpose of
performing certain rites and ceremonies. The proper enactment of these religious
ordinances indicates where a true church exists. At the same time the performance
of these rites becomes the means whereby all true churches are conjoined in a
common bond of purpose. Prom this confusion three components emerge about which
we may collect and organize Hill's thought - the necessity of the church, the
unity of the church, and the marks of the church. PLemercbering, however, that
all three are of secondary importance for Hill, the chapter is, understandably,
primarily critical in its content.
1 Por instance, in defending the power of the church to regulate the
performance of religious rites, Hill is obliged to comment upon the rites
themselves. L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, pp. 573f.
2 Infra, p. 199.
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A* The Necessity of the Chinch
A3 the prominent theologian of the Moderate persuasion, George Hill was
obliged to justify the existence of the church within the total complex of
human society*'' He discharged this duty in the customary manner by calling
attention to the church's support of civil government, its constraining moral
influence in the community,^ and its contribution to the creation of "good
citizens."^ But in spite of this defense of the church's role in a secular
world, there remained a more basic question: Is the church really necessary?
Granted one could justify its existence in society, is the church indispen3ible?
Could not the benefits rendered by its performance of duties be produced by a
well-trained, conscientious police force? So even if the church as it existed
could be justified, was it essential?^ Had Hill been no more interested in
theology than his typical Moderate compatriot, he may have shunned this question
as irrelevant, for the social justification of the church proved satisfactory
for the age; but because he was a churchman as well as a citizen; and more
particularly because he was a theologian, he addresses himself to the question
1 Supra, p."I3S-
2 'The Church of Christ, separated from the rest of the world...is not
set in opposition to human government. But the Gospel, without entering into
any discussion of the claims made by subjects and their rulers, enforces obedience
by the example of Jesus and of his apostles, and by various precepts such as
these, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesars." "Let every soul be
subject to the higher powers." "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of roan for
the Lord's sake."' L,I.D., Vol. I, p. 410.
3 When civil government and church government "conspire...they are of
considerable use in restraining enormity of transgression, and in preserving
that decency of outward conduct which is a great public benefit." L,I.D.,
Vol. Ill, p. 568. Cf. Institutes, pp. 135-136.
4 Ministers, "by their exhortations, and by the natural tendency of
discourses composed upon the true principles of Christianity,...diffuse a
general spirit of industry, sobxxlety, and order." L.I.D. , Vol. I, p. 410.
5 To ask this question is not to contradict the previous conclusion that
Hill was not interested in the origin of the church due to the influence of
common sense philosophy (Supra, p. 151 ). There is a difference in stating
that the church exists and asking why it exists; and inattention to the former
does not necessarily preclude attention to the latter.
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of the church's necessity. Interestingly Mill is compelled at this point
-j
to abandon his normal procedure, and to turn from the social worth of the
Christian society to the nature of that society itself. Since he is unable to
find the answer to this question apart from the church, he is forced to presuppose
the church in his arguments, thereby averting the real impact of the question.
Essentially, however, Hill's answer regarding the necessity of the church is
two-fold.
1. The church is the instrument of the Spirit in effecting
the salvation of the elect
The Holy Spirit, says Hill, operates in the lives of the elect to make
*
actual and concrete their predetermined salvation. In this divine operation,
however, the Spirit does not act immediately upon every individual elect
person, but rather conveys His influences through various means. These means
p
are to oe found in the church. That is to say, the church is in some way
the link or connection between the election of God and the salvation of
sinners. The question is: In what way does the church fulfill its instrumental
role in this regard? As Hill claims to be following Calvin in his exposition
z
of this doctrine, it is mandatory that we understand Calvin's position before
proceeding to examine Hill's.
In suggesting an instrumental role for the church, phraseology is employed
which is neither alien nor unacceptable to Calvin. Calvin speaks of "the Church
in whose bosom it is God's will that all his children should be collected";^
and indicates that the church is one "thing that God had appointed to be
1 Usually Hill, in answering any theological, question, looked first to
nature and reason and then to revelation. This fact, determined earlier
(Supra, p. 158), will be more firmly established as we move through the
present chapter.
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. I, pp. 5-406.
3 Ikia., Vol. Ill, pp. 45, 49, 51, 53, 57.
4 Calvin, Institutes, 4: "1:1.
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A
instrumental to our salvation." The primary issua in the concept before us,
however, is not the instrumental role of the church, but rather the meaning
assigns<3 to the election of God and the salvation of sinners. The church as the
connecting link can be understood only in the light of these fundamental doctrines.
For Calvin the doctrine of election is inseparably connected with the person
of J83us Christ. In the end of Book II of the Institutes, however, he indicates
that our election does not begin with the historical Jesus (though it is grounded
in Him), but goes back to eternity. Because Christ was eternally chosen on our
behalf, we sire chosen in Him. Calvin, therefore, speaks of Christ as the cause
of our election.-^ It follows for him that if Christ, the cause of election, is
the representative of the whole race, then election must be primarily corporate
and subsequently individual, in keeping with this corporate aspect Calvin is care¬
ful to note that God's will is that all men should be saved. But he points out that
1 Ibid. , 4:1:1. We must clearly indicate the context in which Calvin aneaks
of the instrumental role of the church. According to Calvin, we stand in a two¬
fold relation to Christ. There is (a) the fraternity of the flesh whereby we are
made one with Christ ontologically through the incarnation; and there is (b) the
fraternity of the Spirit whereby we are made one with Christ pneumatically
through faith (institutes, 2:13:2). As-Q.S. Hendry correctly notes (a) involves
Christ's incorporation into our humanity, and (b) involves our incorporation into
Christ (The Gospel of the Incarnation (1959), pp. 45> 61). By virtue of (a) our
salvation is clearly complete in Christ and we are already perfect in Him; yet
we must become in the world what we already are in Christ. Since the two elements
or two movements do not coincide, Calvin posits not only (a) but also (b) (the
concept is that of a "double metathesis," as J.K. Mozley called it, The Doctrine
of the Atonement (1915) , P. 105). It is in the context of relationship (b) that
Calvin speaks of the instrumental role of the church. The church is used by the
Spirit in effecting our incorporation into Christ, enabling us to live out in
space and time the life we fully possess in him. As we shall observe, Hill's
over-emphasis on the instrumental role of the church resulted in the loss of
(a) entirely, and the exposition of (b) in terms of preparation rather than
participation.
2 "The reason of this nystery may be learned from the first chapter of the
Epistle to the Sphesians, where Paul, having taught that W6 are chosen in Christ,
adds at the same time that we are accepted in him." Institutes, 2;17:2.
3 Calvin, Commentary on Ephesians, 1:5-8.
4 "...God, in offering the Gospel and Christ as Mediator to all men, shows
that He wishes all men to be saved." Commentary on I Timothy, Introductory
Theme. Cf. comment on I Tim. 2:4f.
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»..as long as Christ remains outside of us, and v/e are separated from
him, all that he has suffered and done for the salvation of the human race
remains useless and of no value to us. Therefore, to share with us what
he has received from the Father, he had to become ours and to dwell within
us...for as I have observed, whatever he possesses is nothing to us,
till we are united to him.
Salvation, or participation in the whole life of Christ, is the end of election, ^
and this end is accomplished through union with Christ. This union, moreover is
actualized and realized through faith. "In order, however, that we may participate
in the grace of Christ, ws must be ingrafted into Him by faith."By faith of
the gospel Christ becomes ours, and we become partakers of the salvation procurred
by him."But," says Calvin, "as our ignorance and slothfulness, and, I may add,
the vanity of our minds, require external aids, in order to the production of
faith in our hearts, and its increase and progressive advance even to its
5
completion, God has provided such aids in compassion to our infirmity."^ These
1 Calvin, Institutes, 3:1:1. By this statement Calvin does not mean that
we stand in no relationship to Christ until the Spirit creates faith within us,
as Hendry so interprets him (Gospel of the Incarnation, p. 69). Such an inter¬
pretation denies Calvin's clear teaching of Christ's consubstantiality with
all men in the incarnation (institutes, 2:12:1,3; 2:13:2, "But though it is
only to the faithful that the apostls-ffssigns the honor of being one with
Christ, yet it does not followr that unbelievers are not, according to the flesh
born of the same original." Supra,p. 179, note 1). In fact, rather than implying,
as Hendry suggests, that the personal relationship through faith rules out the
prior ontological relationship, Calvin implies just the opposite, ie«, that the
ontological relationship forms the foundation of the personal relationship:
"our common nature /Christ's and man's/ is a pledge of our fellowship with the
Son of God" (institutes 2:12:3).
2 Calvin makes a distinction between the "ultimate" end of election and
the "immediate" or "subordinate" end. "The glory of God is the highest end,"
but this does not exclude the salvation of sinners from being the subordinate
end. "There is no absurdity in supposing that one thing may have two objects."
Conroentary on Ephesians, 1:4.
3 Calvin, Commentary on Romans, 5:17.




aids or "treasures" God has "deposited with the Church." Therefore, since
union with Christ is necessary for the enjoyment of the benefits offered in the
2
gospel, since faith is the necessary bond of this union, and since the church
is essential in the creation of faith, Calvin does not hesitate to speak of the
church as "the mother of all who have him ( God ) for their Father."^ He adds:
Y/e may learn even from the title of mother, how useful and even how
necessary it is for us to know her; since there is no other way of
entrance into life, unless we are conceived by her, born of her,
nourished at her breast, and continually preserved under her care and
government till we are divested of this mortal flesh and "become
like angels."^
In using such language, however, Calvin would not have us to think that God
needs the church, nor that His sovereignty is impinged upon in any way. He
plainly states that "God could easily make his people perfect in a single
moment" without the instrumentality of the church; but he continues, "yet it
was not his will that they should grow to mature age, but under the education
of the church."5 s0 «v/e must continue under tier instruction and discipline
r
to the end of our lives."
Thus it is that the church plays its role in the working out of God's
election. It is through union with Christ that we are saved,"'' and it is
through union with the church that we are united with the Body of Christ. As
there is no forgiveness and no redemption apart from Christ, so out of the
O
"church's bosom there can be no hope of remission of sins or any salvation."
_
, 4:1:1. '
2 For an exposition of this aspect of Calvin's theology, see R.S. Ytellace,
Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian Life, pp. 21-23. Reviewed by J.K.3. Reid,
Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 13} 19&0, FP* 307-309.
3 Calvin, Institutes, 4:1:1. 4 Ibid. , 4:1:4*
5 Ibid., 4:1:5. 6 Ibid., 4:1:4.
7 The relation of union with Christ and eternal life is clearly stated by
T.F. Torrance, "Because in Christ human nature is everlastingly united to His
divine person we are assured of everlasting life and salvation through our
sharing in His human nature." Conflict and Agreement, Vol. II, p. 144.
8 C&lvin, Institutes, 4:1:4*
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Only through, union with the church ara we given to participate in the birth,
life, death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ.
It is the idea of the church as instrumental in salvation that Hill adopts
from Calvin, but his explanation of this role of the church differs drastically
from Calvin's and that for two reasons. In the first place, his starting point
is different. Hill's doctrine of election is based upon the concepts of limited
-1
atonement and divine foreknowledge. In supporting the limited range of the
atonement, he sets forth the classical arguments in its defense, a) That Christ
died for only certain persons appears 'to be -warranted by many expressions which
occur in the New Testament; such as the following, John x 11 ,15 "I lay down my
life for the sheep"; that is, as the expression is explained in the context,
for those who "hear and follow me." John xi 52.8) When certain texts
commonly urged in proof of universal redemption are examined, the context will
indicate that the.general expressions used were intended to mark the indiscriminate
extension of the blessings of the gospel to men of all nations.
Thus, because the benefit of the Jewish sacrifices was confined to that
nation, John the Baptist, when he saw Jesus coming to him, marked him out
to the people as "the Lamb of Cod, which taketh away the sin of the world";
that is, of all those in everyplace who are forgiven. - So John...
speaking as a Jew, says of Jesus, "he is the propitiation for our sins;
and not for ours only," that is, not for the sins of the Jews only, "but
also for the sins of the whole world." - So the apostle Paul says of
Jesus, he "gave himself a ransom for all, to be testified in due time."
But if wo attend to the scope of the discourse. ..it will be perceived
that the apostle's argument does not necessarily require any farther
meaning to be affixed to these words than this, - that Christ gave
himself a ransom not merely for that peculiar people, who are sometimes
celled in the Old Testament the "ransomed of the Lord," but for all in
every place who shall obtain redemption.3
1 Of great significance is the order and arrangement of Hill's theology.
Only after he has established, to his own satisfaction, the doctrine of limited
atonement and determined the nature of divine foreknowledge does he move "to
speak of the counsels of the Almighty" (L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 14; cf. pp. 29-42).
In Book IV, entitled "Opinions Concerning the Nature, the Extent and the
Application of the Remedy Brought by the Gospel," Chapter VI is headed
"Particular Redemption" and Chapter VII is headed "Predestination."
2 Hill, L.I.D. . Vol. Ill, p. 7.
3 IkiQ»> PP» 7-8.
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c) Those passages which speak of "the love of God to mankind" may be explained
by pointing to the blessings which appear in creation and providence. Although
salvation, peculiar to the elect, is "the greatest blessing purchased by the death
of Christ," there are other blessings which "the publication of the Gospel" has
imparted to the non-elect, such as, deliverance from idolatry and superstition,
restraints upon vice, and incentives to virtuous action. "These common benefits
of Christianity are sufficient to explain many expressions in the epistles
addressed to Christian societies, without our being obliged to suppose that all
the members of these societies were in the end to inherit eternal life." d)
The fourth argument is based upon the proposition that "the efficacy of the
2
remedy is inseparably connected with its being accepted." Therefore, those
passages which infer that Christ died intentionally for all men require a
limitation - the limitation of faith. "If faith in Christ be the condition upon
which men become partakers of the propitiation which he offered to God, it seems
to follow that all who have not the means of attaining this faith, are excluded
from the benefit of the propitiation."3 Hence the gospel cannot be, in the
intention of God, a universal remedy "since he has withheld the means of accepting
it from many of those for whom it is said to have been provided,"^ The words of
Paul, "God will have all men to be saved," must "receive from the event an
interpretation different from that which is the most obvious."5 "God wills all
men to be saved, upon condition that they repent and believe."^ e) Finally Hill
argues from the standpoint of human logic. If Christ died for all men, then all
men must be saved. Yet all men are not saved. If all are not saved, then either
Christ's death was in vain or else man, the creature, has the power to bring to
1 Ibid., p. 9.
3 Ibid. , p. 10.
5 Ibid. , p. 11.
2 Ibid. , p. 10.
4 Ibid., p. 11.
^ IkiL* > P* 53-
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naught the purpose of the Creator. "But," says Hill, "it seems when we hold
such a language, that we speak in a manner unbecoming our circumstances, and
inconsistent with those views of the Almighty which are suggested by reason,
•4
and are clearly taught in Scripture." We are thus led by reason to conclude that
since God never intended to save all men by the death of Christ, then Christ did
2
not die for all men, but only for 3ome men. At this point Hill rests his case.
1 Ibid., p. 12. Note Hill's double reference, first to natural revelation,
and then to special revelation. Supra, p.178, note 1.
2 A critical evaluation of the doctrine of limited atonement is not our
purpose, but a few remarks about Hill's arguments are in order. First, and by way
of commendation, Hill is in line with the teaching of Calvin by insisting upon
the necessity of faith in the realization of election. In fact he could hardly
have emphasized this fact more strongly than did Calvin. (See Calvin's Commentary
on Acts ,1b:31, "Believe on the Lord Jesus." He writes; "This is but a short
and apparently jejune but in fact a complete definition of salvation, that we are
to have faith in Christ. For Christ alone has all the parts of blessedness and
eternal life included in Him, which he offers us by the Gospel. And by faith we
receive them,") But beyond this basic agreement there is a great disagreement
on several important points. 1) Whereas Hill limits the scope of Christ'3 saving
activity to a specific number, Calvin is unwilling to do so. He does not hedge
the question by saying, as Hill does, that only the providential blessings of
God's kindness extend to all men, but rather states explicitly that "the benefit
of the sacrifice by which He has expiated for our sins, applied to all....Since
therefore He intends the benefit of His death -to be common to all, those who
hold a view that would exclude any from the tope of salvation do Him an injury."
(Commentary on I Timothy, 1:5) • 2) Hill, in his exposition of the fourth
argument, anticipates a doctrine of double predestination, regarding reprobation
on the same level as election. Calvin on the other hand expounds election and
reprobation differently. With regard to election we must emphasize the ultimate
cause, the will of God, and not the manifest cause, faith: "It is erroneous,
therefore, to suspend the efficacy of election upon the faith of the gospel...."
(institutes, 3:24:4)» With, regard to reprobation, however, we must emphasize
the manifest cause, unbelief, and not the ultimate cause, the secret counsel of
God; "Wherefore let vis rather contemplate the evident cause of condemnation,
which is nearer to us in the corrupt nature of irankind, than search after a
hidden and altogether incomprehensible one in the predestination of God."
(institutes, 3:23:8. Cf. Holmes Rolston, III, The Understanding of Sin and
Responsibility in the Teaching of John Calvin, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, New
College Library, where he deals with Calvin's concept of reprobation as an
"accidental" aspect of God's order, pp. I29f.). 3) Because Hill appeals to
reason, defined in terms of natural religion, as well as to revelation, he is
bound by a system of fallible human logic. His arguments are so presented as
to indicate that the "logical" defence of limited atonement is the most significant.
Calvin on the other hand chooses to be Biblical rather than logical; the mystery
is that "souls perish which were bought by the blood of Christ." (Sermon on
II Tim., 2;19, Sermons on the Epistle of St. Paul to Timothy and Titus, London:
G. Bishop, 1579.)
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Having satisfied his own mind as to the extent of the atonement, Hill moves to
discuss the second factor upon which his doctrine of election rests, that is,
divine foreknowledge. He begins thi3 discussion by stating categorically that
all things can be classified as either possible or impossible. There can be no
knowledge of things impossible, except that they are impossible; but "things that
p
are possible may be conceived." The more perfect the mind, the more complete
is the conception of all possibilities.
To the supreme mind, therefore, there are distinctly represented, not only
all the single objects which may be brought into existence, but also all
the possible combinations of single objects, their relations, and their
mutual influences on the systems of which they may compose a part.3
This divine knowledge of all possibilities Hill calls scientia simplicis
intelligentiae, or scientia indefinite,^ because it refers simply to the possibil-
ity of all objects without implying the actual existence of those objects. This
knowledge arises necessarily from the nature of God Himself and includes within
its scope "all those things, the reality of which would have been the same,
although no creature had ever been produced, such as the existence of God, His
attributes, and all those abstract propositions which are eternally and immutably
true."^
Out of all the possibilities which are present to the divine mind, God selects
those single objects and the combination of objects which he chooses to bring into
existence. This choice of those things which God determined to bring from possible
1 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, p. 50, cf. p. 32j "Of things wiiich may not be,
this only can be distinctly known, that they are impossible."
2 Ibid., p. 50. 3 Ibid., p. 30.
4 Hill doe3 not claim that the terms are original with him, but are common
to all theologians. Ibid., p. 30.
5 "From this proposition, a thing may be, this other proposition, it shall
be, does by no means follow." Ibid., p. 33.
^ Ibid, t P» 3"! • Hill notes in passing that we obtain the knowledge of
abstract propositions "by rising to them from the contemplation of particular
objects." But to "a perfect mind, the truth of such general propositions is
recognized before the objects are produced."
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existence into actual existence is called "the divine decree."'' This decree wa3
2
not determined in time at successive periods, but rather the whole plan of what
was to be produced wa3 forever present to God's mind. It is true that the plan
included series which arose in succession, but the fact that the series are
executed in time "does not make the smallest difference in the clearness, the
facility, and the certainty with which he knows them."-3 This is so because the
end and the means, regardless of how far removed from each other at the time of
actual existence, "were beheld in intimate connection with one another."
Events, therefore, are not to be considered as less ordained by God,
because they are dependent upon conditions, since the conditions are of
his appointment, and the manner in which the event depends upon the
conditions is known to him.4
This decree, determined in eternity and executed in time, "proceeded upon
reasons." Hill says we must suppose this because w9 must suppose that in forming
the decree a choice was exerted, "that the supreme Being was at liberty to resolve
either that ho would create, or that he would not create; that he would give his
work this form or that form." If we do not presuppose this choice, then we with¬
draw the universe from the direction of a "Supreme Intelligence" and subject all
things to blind fate. If, however, a choice was exercised in forming the decree,
it must have proceeded upon reasons "for a choice made by a wise being without
5
any ground of choice, is a contradiction in terms.The reason, upon which the
decree is based, must be found in God Himself:
...as nothing then existed but the Supreme Being, the only reason which
could determine him in chusing what he was to produce, was its appearing
to him fitter for accomplishing the end Yfhicn he proposed to himself,
1 "The divine decree is the determination of the divine will to produce
the universe...understanding by that word the whole combination of beings ana
causes, and effects, that were to come into existence." ibid., p. 34.
2 "It is not to be conceived that there was any...succession in the parts
of the choice." Ibid. , p. 35; cf. statement on p. 101, "And all these things
are known to him not merely as they arise. They originated in that plan which,
from the beginning, -was formed in the Divine Mind...."
3 Ibid., p. 101. 4 Ibid. , p. 47. 5 Ibid., p. 35.
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than any thing else which he might have produced.''
The knowledge which God, from eternity, had of all that He was actually to
produce, Hill calls scientia visionis, or scientia doflnita, "because the existence
of all objects of this knowledge, whether they be past, present, or future, is
determinate; in other words, it is not more certain that what is past has had an
existence, and that what is present now exists, than that what God forsees as
p
future, shall exist hereafter." Thus, whereas scientia indefinite has as its
object all things possible, scientia definita has as its object all things actual.
Hill notes two significant points which emerge from his distinction between
scientia indefinite and scientia definita. The first is the comprehensiveness of
this division. "If, therefore, scientia visionis be joined to scientia simplicis
intelligentiae, everything that can be known is comprehended; in other words, if
nothing can exist without the will of the First Cause, and if the First Cause,
who knows all things that are possible, knows also what things he wills to
produce, then he knows everything.Hill appeals to this concept of the know¬
ledge of God in his refutation of those Arminians who posit a third type of
knowledge between scientia inacfinlta and scientia definita, called scientia
media.^ Scientia media is defined as the knowledge of events that are to happen
1 Ibid. , p. 35.
^ Ibid. , p. 33. Although we say that after the execution of the decree
began, some objects of the scientia definita became past, others became present,
and others continued to be future, Hill notes a certain "impropriety" in using
such words to speak of God's knowledge: "It 'is only the narrowness of our
conceptions, and the poverty of our language, which compel us to apply such terms
to his clear, unvarying intuition of the whole series of objects which derive
their existence from his pleasure."
3 Ibid., p. 33.
4 "The term was first invented by Lfclina, a Spanish Jesuit, and a professor
of divinity in Portugal. It was the leading principle of a book which he published
in 1588 entitled, Liberi arbitrii concordia cum eratiae donis, divina praescientia,
providentia, predestintione, st reprobations." Ibid., p. 43• On kolina, cf.
Earth, Church Dogmatics, Il/1, pp. 5o9f•
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upon certain conditions. This concopt was born of the attempt to reconcile the
free agency of man with the foreknowledge of God. Although Hill understands the
purpose behind the use of this term, he does not see that it differs from the
categories he has established.
If it is meant by scientia media, that God knows every supposeable case...
and that he is well acquainted with what miqh t have happened in any given
circumstances as with what will happen: that is scientia simplicis intel-
ligentiae. If by scientia media...be meant that God sees what is to be, not
singly, but as depending upon something going before it, this is
scientia visionis. '
The things which may be, and the things which God hath willed to be couprehend
all the objects that can be known.
Secondly, Hill calls attention to the relationship of the divine decree and
scientia visionis. God foreknows because God has foreordained; "...everything
2
that is to exist is decreed by God...and it is foreseen because it is decreed."
Hill appeals to this order in his refutation of those Arminians who make God's
decree in someway dependent upon His foreknovd.edge. When scientia media is con-
joined with this reversed order, one is able to speak of God's knowledge of an
event that is to be although it did not enter into His decree. Hill exposes the
sophistry of this concept on the basis of throe interrelated principles.
1. Every future event derives its fruition from the decree of God. To say,
therefore, that God foresees an event before he has decreed that it 3hall be
is to say that he views as future an event which is merely possible; in
other words, that he views an event not as it is. But 2. could we suppose
that some events were future, which God had not decreed, his knowledge of
these events would be reduced to that kind of conjecture which we form
with regard to what shall be, from attending to all the previous circum¬
stances out of which it may be conceived to arise, instead of being that
clear, infallible, intuitive prescience of the whole series of causes and
effects, which seems essential to the perfection of the divine under¬
standing. And still farther, 3» supposing that, in some inconceivable
manner, future events, not decreed by him., were as certainly foreknown
as those which he had decreed, here would be a part of the universe
withdrawn from the government of the supreme Ruler.^
1 Ibid., p. 46.
2 Ibid. , p. 51• Cf. P. 3°i Everything "is known to him, because he
has decreed that it shall be."
3 Ibid., PP. 47-48.
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Finally Hill remarks that this concept of foreknowledge in no 'way implies
the destruction of the freedom of moral agents. The idea that it does derives
from the maxim of Aristotle, Do futuris contingentibus non datur determinata
Veritas. If it is true that certain foreknowledge of events destroys their
contingency, then it is impossible for contingent events to be certainly foreknown.
Hill, however, rejects this conclusion by rejecting the maxim. He substitutes
in its place this principle; "future events, which are in their own nature
A
contingent, may be certain, and consequently may be foreknown." He uses a
common oocurence to illustrate the truth of this principle.
Whether I am to write a letter to-morrow or not, is a matter purely
contingent. If no foreign cause interpose to take from me the power which
I now possess, I may write, or I may refrain from writing. Both events
are equally possible; but one of the events will certainly happen; and of
the two propositions, I will write to-morrow, I will not v/rite to-morrow,
one although I do not know which, is at this moment true. The truth
which now exists, whether it be perceived by any being or not, will be
known at the end of to-morrow to me, and to any person who attends to my
employments through the day; and if there is any being who possesses the
faculty of knowing the truth beforehand, the determination of my mind
is not in the least affected by his knowledge. ^
To give his contention more scholarly support Hill cites a passage from Clarke's
"Sermon on the Omniscience of God."
Foreknowledge has no influence at all upon the things foreknown; and it has
therefore no influence upon them, then because things would be just as they
were, and no otherwise, though there were no foreknowledge. It does not
cause things to be."-'
Y/e may correctly state, says Hill, that contingency is not inconsistent with the
certainty that of two events, either of which might happen, one is to happen.
Thus, contingent events may be certainly foreknown.
Having explained and defended his doctrine of limited atonement, and his
doctrine of foreknowledge, Hill sets forth his doctrine of election. This he
1 Ibid. , p. 25. 2 Ibid., p. 267
3 Samuel Clarke, Sermons, Vol. I, p. 261.
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does rather briefly in a number of propositions, which, as be admits, are but
paraphrases of the Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter III, and the
Seventeenth Article of the Church of England,
1, God chose out of the -whole body of mankind, whom he viewed in his eternal
decree as involved in guilt and misery, certain persons who are called the
elect, -whose names are known to him, and whose number, being unchangeably
fixed by his decree, can neither be increased nor diminished; so that the
whole extent of the remedy offered in the gospel is conceived to have been
determined beforehand by the divine decree,
2. As all the children of Adam were involved in the same guilt and misery,
the persons thus chosen had nothing in themselves to render them more worthy
of being elected than any others; and therefore the decree of election is
called in the Calvinistic system absolute,,.,
3« For the persons thus chosen, God, from the beginning, appointed the
means of their being delivered from corruption and .guilt; and by these
means, effectually applied in due season, he conducts them at length
to everlasting life."*
This last statement brings us to the second major distinction between Hill
and Calvin in their understanding of the instrumental role of the church. Not
only is the starting point, the doctrine of election, different, but the end
result, eternal life, is different. For Calvin eternal life meant union with
2
Christ and through this union, participation in the divine life. For Hill
eternal life involves only a legal relation with Christ. According to federal
theology, Christ as the representative of the elect (and only of the elect),
became man, mado under the law/-, that in keeping the law, He might earn righteous-
7.
ness for those whom He represented.-^ In harmony with the federal system, Hill
states that "Jesus was made under the law in two respects; in respect of the
sanction of the law, the curse due to transgressors which he endured, and








fulfilled." In His execution of the law in the two-fold regard, Christ earned
the reward of legal righteousness. But, "Jesus who was infinitely blessed and
glorious in himself, and who possessing all things from the beginning, was
incapable of receiving a personal reward...therefore all the merit arising out
of the execution of it is imputed or transferred to us, i.e., counted as ours,
2
so that we derive the benefit of it." Because the righteousness earned try Christ
is legally transferred to the account of the elect, they now have the right to
claim the reward of eternal life for themselves.
But there is a problem. Due to "the effect of Adam's transgression" his
posterity are not qualified to take possession of this reward. "The corruption
which they inherit from their ancestor, being an estrangement from the fountain
of life...is diametrically opposite to that intimate communion with God implied
in life eternal."3 Therefore, Christ must not only impute to the elect the
1 Hill, L.I.P., Vol. II, p. 306. In spite of this language Kill rejects
the distinction usually made by federal theologians between the active and
passive obedience of Christ. He correctly states that passive obedience normally
includes "all the staffering which he underwent for our sins"; and active
obedience, "all the piety, resignation, humility, and benevolence, which rendered
his life the most perfect pattern of righteousness." The former, being penal,
is considered as the satisfaction of divine justice; the latter, being a fulfill¬
ment of the lav/-, is considered as meritorious of a reward, We are, therefore,
thought to be saved from wrath by Christ's sufferings, and to acquire a right
to eternal life through His obedience. "But," says Hill, "in this an attempt
was made to distinguish things naturally indivisible. The passive and active
obedience of Christ cannot be disjoined. For in all that Jesus suffered,
there was obedience to God and gpod will to man, and the virtues of his
character were illustrated and enhanced by the situation in which he displayed
them." Hill prefers to speak of the "merit of Christ" or "the righteousness
arising out of all his actions and all his -sufferings taken in one complex view."
The influence of federal theology is not nullified completely, however, for Hill
minimized the incarnation by concluding that we may correctly ascribe our redemp¬
tion only to the blood of Christ, "because his death was the most illustrious act
of obedience." L. I.D., Vol. II, pp. 502k-506; Institutes, p. Q<+. One wonders,
tha^ if Hill did not reject the two-fold distinction in order to do away with the
"active" aspect altogether. Later discussions strengthen this suspicion. Infra, p.193.
^ > £.• 506. Hill explains further what he means by "imputation": "In
his ^/""christ's^J/ sufferings and in his actions lie did the will of his Father; and
this obedience, being yielded in the human nature which he assumed to accomplish
our deliverance, is considered as yielded in our stead and for our sakes; the
merit of it is counted to those whom the remedy of the Gospel is applied...."
3 I£id. > P. 507.
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righteousness on the basis of which they may lay claim to eternal life, "his
religion must also confer upon his followers those qualifications and dispositions
4
by which they may be meet for entering into that life." Hill is explicit as to
what these qualifications are - faith and good works.^ "God having, from all
eternity, chosen a certain number of persons, did in time, give his son to be
their Savior; bestows upon them, through him, that grace which effectually deter¬
mines them to repent and believe, and so effectually conducts them, by faith and
good works to everlasting life.""1 Although Hill points out that these qualifica¬
tions are not dependent upon man,^ they are, nonetheless, so prominent in his
theology that he describes eternal life in terms of the removal of those things
which hinder the production of faith and good works. Ultimately he is more
interested in the qualifications themselves than in that for which they qualify,
more concerned with preparation than with participation.
Hill's emphasis is understandable when we note two pertinent factors. The
first is Hill's definition of eternal life. Stated negatively, eternal life is
"a complete redemption from the evils of sin.It has "for its ultimate design
the removal of those evils which sin had introduced.Even the righteousness
imputed to us does no more than enable us to escape the tragic end of wickedness.
Eternal life seems to be a return to-the supralapsarian life of Adam, and implies
nothing more than the "good" condition of his original created nature. At best,
1 Ibid,. , p. 507. Cf.' Institutes, p.' 84. "The Gospel, by delivering men
from spiritual death, qualifies them for Eternal life."
2 Ibid., p. 59. Gf. Vol. I, p. 5^0 where Hill states that faith and good
works describe "the character with which a participation of the blessings of the
Gospel is always connected in Scripture." For the relationship of faith and
works see pp. 3^1f.
3 Ibid. , Vol. Ill, pp. 51-52. Faith and good works "constitute...the
capacity of enjoying supreme felicity hereafter."
4 Ibid. , p. 362.
5 Hill, Institutes, p. 85. L.I.D., Vol. II, p. ^16,
6 L.I.D. . Vol. I, p. 365.
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eternal life means sane sort of moral neutrality, the absence of something rather
than the presence of something. At worst the concept is completely void of
content and substance. Evident here is the result of dwelling exclusively on
the death of Christ, which Hill, in the federalist tradition, does. If the
saving activity of Christ is limited to His death,'' then Hill can only talk about
redemption 'from'. If he failed to do this he would be hard put to give any
meaning at all to the term 'salvation'.
The reason for this negative concept of eternal life is more clearly revealed
when we draw attention to the second significant factor in Hill's discussion, that
is, "the connection between the hope of eternal life, and the interposition of
Christ.That connection is explained concisely: eternal life "was purchased
for us by him; the power of conferring it resides in him; he prepares us for it,
and h3 v/ill at length bestow it."3 Immediately notice is taken of the complete
separation of eternal life from the Person of Christ. Eternal life stands over
against Christ as an entity in and of itself, as something to be sliced into pieces
and distributed to those who have been prepared to receive it. No attempt is made
to understand eternal life as participation in the whole life of Christ from the
incarnation through the ascension. Hill, therefore, concentrated on preparation
rather than participation because there was nothing to participate inJ This
exclusive emphasis on preparation to receive eternal life accounts for the fact
that Hill preached moralism rather than the gospel.
Having examined Hill's doctrine of election and his doctrine of eternal
life, we are now able to see the necessity of the church from his point of view.
We have already determined that those individuals elected for eternal life must
1 We have already noted Hill's general depreciation of the incarnation,
but mention here his depreciation of the resurrection. It is treated only in
a 3ingle paragraph, and for this reason: "The resurrection of Jesus may be
mentioned as the first branch of the confirmation of that right acquired for
us by his death." L, I.D., Vol. II, pp. 509-510. Even this doctrine is
tainted by the forensic nature of federal theology.
2 Ibid. , p. 515. 3 Ibid*» P* 515,
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be prepared to receive it. This preparation or change of character may have been
brought about by many things, such as "the moral influence of doctrine, precept
and example," but Scripture indicates that God, in His wisdom chose to use "the
efficacious influence of the Spirit." Christians are, therefore, 'represented
as one great society 'united...by the guidance of the same Spirit in following
"after holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord;" and "after the things -
A
wherewith one may edify another."' In the production of this holiness, however,
2
the Spirit uses various means. "The Spirit may act as he will, but there is no
warrant to expect that the conversion of any individual will be brought about
in a sudden sensible manner."-^ On the contrary, "the exercise of a pious
education, the habits of virtuous youth, the impressions fixed upon the mind by
the continued instruction and conversation of the wise" may gradually dispose a
person for receiving eternal life.*1" That means, then, that the Spirit prepares
the elect through the instrumentality of men. We are warranted to speak of
this "co-operation in accomplishing the great design of the Gospel" because in
Scripture 'we are commanded to "work out our own salvation", and we are required
5
to help our brethern in the good ways of the Lord.' It follows for Hill that
"if the heavenly gift...is to be dispensed by the instrumentality of men, the
c
establishment of what'we call a church is necessary." Why is it necessary - it
is 'necessary for "the perfecting of the saints."'^ The church is the instrument
of the Spirit in effecting the salvation of the elect by preparing them to receive
eternal life.
We see how both Oalvin and Hill can speak of the church a3 the instrument
of the Spirit in effecting the salvation of the elect; but in spite of the fact
1 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 36b. ' ™ ~
2 "The Scriptures mention various means, which the Spirit of God employs,
in producing that faith which is the principle of the Christian character, and
these good works which flow from this principle." Ibid., p. 3^7.
3 Ibid. , p. 367. 4 Ibid., p. 367. 5 Ibid. , p. 366.
6 Ibid., p. 368. 7 > P* 368»
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that they use the same language, they mean something quite different, and that
is because they mean something quite different when they speak of election and
eternal life. Therefore, though Hill adopts the idea of instrumentality from
Calvin, he cannot possibly mean by that what Calvin does simply because the church
is not the connecting link between the same things. Calvin sees the church as
the connecting link between God's election in Christ and the believer's ingrafting
into Christ; Hill sees the church as the connecting link between an abstract
decree of election and the believers own life of faith and obedience.
Several observations should be made at this point, a) Hill'3 position admits
no vital union between the church and Christ. The church is detached from the
Person of Christ and is determined only by the work of Christ. It is united, not
with Christ Himself, but with what He earned. Salvation is based upon the forensic
imputation of Christ's legal righteousness. Granted some doctrine of imputation
-1
is necessary to avoid the heretical doctrine of identity, the detachment of the
Person and work of Christ implied in Hill's position cannot be made on the basis
of Scripture. The church's divorce from the Person of Christ means that there
can be no connection between God's election in Christ and the church, except a
secondary one. Scripture, however, speaks not only of Jesus Christ as the
"foundation" (i Cor. 5:1) and "chief cornerstone" (Eph. 2:20), but also of election
as the ultimate ground of the church (Eph. 1:4-5)* Calvin writes of the church
2
whose very foundation is God's election. In Hill's teaching the church itself
is not elected, but is understood to be only a group of elected individuals
whose primary basis of gathering is the common worship of one God. His doctrine
of the church's necessity is developed, therefore, without any reference to the
church's union with Christ or its election in Him. The relationship of these
factors, the church's necessity and union and election in Christ, is correctly
1 T.F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement, Vol. I, p. 55.
2 Calvin, Institutes, 4:1:2.
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set forth by Hooker, vhom Hill follows at other points, but fails to
appreciate here.
Our being in Christ by eternal foreknowledge saveth vis not without our
actual and real adoption into the fellowship of his saints in this present
word. For in him we actually are by our actual incorporation into that
society which hath him for their Head, and doth make together with him one
Body, for which cause, by virtue of his mystical conjunction, we are of him
and in him, even as though our very flesh and bones should be made
continuate with his.
b) Hill's position on the necessity of the church admits no vital- connection
with the Holy Spirit. Calvin understood the necessity of the church in terms of
its role in actualizing the mystical union between Christ and His people, and he
understood the role of the Spirit as the bond of this union. In paraphrasing
Calvin, R.S. Wallace writes, "It is the Holy Spirit alone who can bring into real
being 1hat wonderful relation of mystery between Christ's heavenly body and His
Church on earth...."^ This means that the Spirit Himself must indwell the church.J
"It was not enough," writes C.H. Dodd, "to say that Christ, being exalted to the
right hand of God, had 'poured forth' the Spirit."^ Y/e must insist upon the "real
presence" of the Spirit within the church.^ That this is essential becomes evident
when v® reviewr Hill's teaching on the necessity of the church. In his thinking,
the Spirit stands outside the church and manipulates it, almost in a mechanical
way, to produce a desired effect, the creation of faith and good works. This is
1 Hooker, Ecclesiastical Polity, 5s56:7»""
2 R.S. Wallace, Calvin's Doctrine of the. Christian Life (Edinburgh, 1959), p. 20.
3 T.F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, "The Foundation of the Church:
Union with Christ through the Spirit", p. 193* "...Jesus Christ through the Spirit
dv/ells in the midst of the Church on earth making it his own Body or his earthly
and historical form of existence...."
4 C.H. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching and Its Developments (London, 1936),
p. 62.
5 The mystery of the trinity must be remembered here, for in virtue of
the unity of the divine nature, the presence of the Spirit is included in the
presence of- the Father ana the Son. "If we go on to ask whether there is any
difference between having God's presence with us, having Christ dwell in us,
and being filled with the Holy Spirit, we are bound to answer that the New
Testament makes no clear distinction...the God vrfio was incarnate in Christ
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not to deny the ethical influence of the Spirit, but it is to say that more
is involved than the external detached relation which the Spirit holds with the
church in Hill's view. In fact Barth notes that the church cannot ever produce
-S
this desired effect unless Christ comes to the church daily in the Holy Spirit.
Hill's rational doctrine of the church as the instrument of the spirit appears
poverty-striken in view of the Hew Testament's teaching on the place of the
Spirit in the life of the church.
c) There is in Hill's treatment of the necessity of the church a subtle
shift of emphasis from God's action to man's reaction, from God's election to
man's decision, from God's grace to the diligent effort of man as he strives
for holiness. The church is consequently seen as a society whose existence hangs
on the faith and good works of its members rather than as a company founded upon
the gracious call of God. But as Richard Field put it, "It is the work of grace,
and of heavenly call that give being to the church, and make it a different
society from all other companies of men in the world.More to the point of our
discussion about the necessity of the church Barth says that "the church can
justify her existence only in so far as she understands that she i3 fo\xnded on
a call."3 However, with Hill'3 shift of emphasis from God's faithfulness to
man's faith and good works as the visible manifestation of faith, with his
emphasis upon the human and earthly means by which "the influences of the Spirit
dwells in us through the Holy Spirit...." D.M. Baillie, God 7/as in Christ
(London, 19^3) , pp. 153-154. Nevertheless, we are correct in insisting upon
the indwelling presence of the Spirit in the church, a fact which Hill belittles.
1 Karl Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God (London, 1938),
pp. 122f. * — "
2 Richard Field, Of the Church (first published in Oxford, 1635; in use,
Cambridge edition, 1847J7 Vol. II, p. 2-5.
3 Karl Barth, Prayer and Preaching, p. 81, Cf. Knowledge of God, p. 153»
where he states that the church possesses "her true nature" in the "calling"
of the Holy Spirit.
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are ordinarily conveyed," we can understand why he stated that "the Scriptures
represent the earliest Christians, and speak of Christians in all succeeding
2
ages, as a society distinguished by certain regulations and outward ordinances."
2. The Church is the place of performance for certain
rites and ceremonies
Hill's last sentence brings us to the second.answer he gives to the question
concerning the necessity of the church: the church is necessary as the place
for performing the religious rites instituted by Christ. He reasons as follows:
Although the Scriptures represent the blessings there revealed as acquired
by the interposition of the Son of G-od, and the character necessary in
order to a participation of them as originating from the influence of the
Spirit, yet they uniformally address us in a style which supposes that
there is something for us to do.
This follows from the first reason for the church's necessity. If the Spirit
uses the instrumentality of men, then men must do something for the Spirit to
use. In one word the "something" which men do is "to confess Christ before
men."^" The followers of Jesus discharge this duty by attending to certain
ordinances instituted by Him and by giving a public testimony "that they entertain
the sentiments, which are supposed common to all his disciples.In other words,
the disciples of Christ are bound to join in the public worship of God. This
obligation is given Hill's characteristic two-fold support, first from reason,
then from revelation. The public worship of God, "who is known by the light
of nature, forms one of the duties of natural religion."^ But further, the
conxnand of Christ makes mandatory for His people the public worship of God.
"He whom they acknowledge as. their Master has judged it proper to appoint. ..that
they shall statedly join in different acts of worship presented to the Father
in his name.
1 Hill, L.'l.D. , Vol. I, p. 3687 2 Ibid., p. 368.
3 Ibid., p. 366. 4 Ibid., Vol. Ill, pp. 350, 451.
5 Ibid., p. 350. 6 Ibid., p. 350.
7 Ibid., p. 350.
o 19?
The necessity of the church "flows by natural consequence from the general
idea of an obligation upon Christians to assemble together for the purpose of
professing their faith by the observance of certain rites.If the followers
of Christ are to join together in this manner for this purpose, then the church
is necessary as the place for them to congregate and perform these rites. This
idea of the church13 necessity is supported by the nature of religion itself.
"If religion is merely a personal concern, and all the intercourse of a Christian
2
with his Saviour and his God may be carried on in secret," then the church is
not necessary; but just because religion is corporate, the necessity of the church
as the place where Christians may gather is established. In fact Hill goes so
far as to say that the church is actually "founded in the duty which Jesus
requires of his disciples...to unite for the purpose of performing certain rites.
If the necessity of the church is explicit in this obligation to unite for
worship, then it is implicit in the command of Christ to unite with the Christian
society.^ Hill indicates that the church is no "voluntary association."5 It is
voluntary only in the sense that one may chose which branch he will join, but
this voluntaryism does not present one with an option as to whether he will join
or not. The church is "that society constituted by Jesus Christ, into which it
is the duty of his disciples to enter.Hill reasons that if it is the duty of
Christ's followers to join that society established for the purpose of performing
certain rites which He has ordained, then that society of necessity must exist.
1 Ibid. , p. 352. ""2 Ibid., p. 352. 3 Ibid. , p. 451.
4 Here we are confronted with Hill's circular reasoning. He posits the
necessity of the church before proving it. However, he felt his inference here
was a valid one.
5 Ibid. , p. 536. Cf. p. 451. The "Christian society" was not "merely a
voluntary association, into which men entered without being obliged to...."
Cf. John Potter, A Discourse of Church Government (1707), p. 5- "The Christian
church is not a mere voluntary society, but one whereof men are obliged to be
members."
6 Ibid., p. 536.
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Consideration is drawn to two observations about this treatment of the
church's necessity. The first is the far-reaching consequences of federal theology
in the doctrine of the church. The essential difference between Calvin and Hill
concerning the relation of the believer to Christ cannot be overemphasized. For
Calvin this relationship involved mystical union with Christ, participation in
His whole life ofobedience. For Hill this relationship is based solely on a
legal contract. Therefore, though both Calvin and Hill speak of the absolute
necessity of joining the visible church, they cannot possibly mean the same thing
by this exhortation. Calvin says that "it is always fatally dangerous to be
separated from the church."'' Why? Because such "is the effect of union with the
church, that it retains us in the fellowship of God.''^ Hill also say's that we
are "required" to join "the Christian Church." But when we ask him why, we
receive an entirely different answer - Because believers "are bound to maintain
a certain character."3 They are "to aspire after perfection...endeavor to excel
their virtues...fill up their lives with various exertions of active, diffusive,
disinterested benevolence^. .^£~and_/r to guard against the emotions of vanity. "5
This "progress in virtue" is always associated with the society of Jesus's
followers, and one is to join that society that he too might "be distinguished
by the zeal and constancy with which they abound in the work of the Lord."
It is absolutely essential to be so distinguished by "the good works which they
perform," called "spiritual sacrifices," because the "Almighty lifts the light
of his countenance upon those who offer this sacrifice and admits them into his
family.'" Whereas Calvin says it is necessary to join the church that union
2 Ibid., 4:1:3.
4 Supra p. 112.
^ ibid. , p. 3&3»
1 Calvin, Institutes, 4s 1:4*
3 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 451.
5 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. I, p. 364.
7 Ibid., p. 361,
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with. Christ might be actualized, Hill says it is necessary to join the church
that the federal relation with Christ might be verified.
The second fact which comes to light in this discussion is Hill's tendency
to identify and limit the church to the institutional, organized society of
Christ's disciples. We have already indicated his exclusive emphasis on the
visible church, and this section merely underscores that fact. Hill is saved
from being accused of actually identifying the church with a place, a building
and a particular congregation, only by later comments. Nonetheless, the
necessity of uniting with the church is understood only in terms of the nature
of the church as an external society existing solely for the purpose of perform¬
ing religious rites.
B. The Unity of the Church
It is natural to move from Hill's discussion of the necessity of the church
to his discussion of the unity of the church for two reasons. In the first place
Hill has been speaking, as we indicated, about local congregations and the
necessity of uniting with thorn; but now he must indicate how these numerous
societies are initiated into the great society, the universal church. In the
second place, it is natural to move from necessity to unity for the basis of
unity is to be found in the necessity for which the church exists. Since for
Hill the church is an external society constituted by its Author for the perform¬
ance of certain rites, we expect Hill to posit visible bonds of union for this
visible society, and are not surprised to find' him locating these bonds in the
very ordinances which the society is obligated to perform. In the few places%vhere
Hill has anything at all to say about the unity of the church, this is the idoa
sounded every time - the church is an external society united by external bonds.
1 Hill treats the unity of the church only as it arises in his treatment
of church government. It is relegated to a secondary place and given no
systematic nor comprehensive treatment.
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1. The bonds of unity
Those things which unite the followers of Jesu3 may be placed into one of
three categories. The first category includes those actions expressive of the
fraternal love elicited by the religion of Jesus from those who would be His
disciples.^
The followers of Jesus are united by the mutual consideration, the tenderness
in bearing with the infirmities of others, the solicitude to avoid giving
offence, the care to make their light to shine before men, so as to draw
them to the practice of virtue, and the brotherly zeal in admonishing them
of their duty, and in reproving their faults which flow from the native
spirit of the gospel, which form the subject of many particular precepts,
and by means of which Christians are said to "edify one another.""
This bond of union, though basic,^ is not in itself cohesive enough to sustain a
visible, distinct society;^ and therefore, HiU mentions a second bond of union -
the profession of faith in the same system of truth.^ Christians' "union is
produced and cemented, not only by those affections which their religion cherishes,
but also by their joint acknowledgment of that system of truth which it reveals."0
1 "But amongst all of them there is a bond of union formed, by...that spirit
of love which ought to pervade all the churches of Christ, that brotherly
correspondence by which they may often promote the comfort and edification of
one another." Institutes, p. 268.
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 349. Note how Hill brings together in a
single sentence the necessity of the church for the production of these virtues
which prepare one for the reception of the gospel, and the unity of the church
based upon this effort in mutual preparation.
3 Elsewhere he calls "the excitements of love and mutual forebearance" one
of "the chief bonds of union." Ibid., p. 385.
4 Ibid., p. 352. Cf. John Potter, A Discourse of Church Government (1707).
P. 2.
5 This appeal does not contradict the Moderate aversion to 'systems'
(Supra, p. 107) as shall be indicated later (infra, p. 223) By 'system', as used
here, Hill means the most basic elements of truth.
6 L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p„ 349. Cf. p. 451. Cf. G.W. Bromiley, The Unity
and Disunity of the Church (Grand Rapids, 1958), p. 76, where he says that
confession of the same system has its place, but that it does not create unity.
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Once again, though basic, this bond does not correspond to the nature of the
Christian society. As the church is an external society, there must be some visible
manifestation of this mutual love and faith: "The followers of Jesus...are bound
2
to profess their faith by the observance of certain institutions...." The third
category, then, includes those external rites by which the disciples of Christ
"declare the reverence and gratitude with which they receive the characteristical
doctrine of his religion."3 Christians are, at the same time, visibly "distinguished
from the rest of mankind, and united amongst themselves, by employing the same
external rites as expressions of their holding the same truth.
In only two phrases does Hill even suggest that Christ Himself might be the
basis of the church's unity. He speaks of the obligation of Christians to
"acknowledge him as their head and master,"5 and mentions in passing, "attachment
to one Saviour."^ However, because of Hill's clear rejection of any mystical
union with Christ,^ we are led to believe that this "attachment" is, at best, a
mediated one. We are "attached" to Christ by obeying His command to love one
another as we love ourselves; we are "attached" to Christ by professing acceptance
of that doctrinal system which He expounded; we are "attached" to Christ by
performing those rites which He established. In a final analysis, the "great
society" is united in the exercise of brotherly love, the acceptance of
propositional truth, and the performance of religious rites, the latter one being
8
an expression of the former two. Hill warns that "attempts to establish a stricter
1 "The avowal of their belief of that system of truth which may be learned
from the revelation received by them as divine, is not left optional to
Christians." Ibid., p. 350.
2 Ibid., p. 351. 3 Ibid., P. 350 4 Ibid., p. 350.
5 Ibid. , Vol. I, pp. 370, J>66. Institutes, p. 268.
6 Ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 385. 7 Ibid., p. 271. 8 Ibid. , p. 451.
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uniformity than what results from these principles, may be attended with greater
evils, and may be more repugnant to the spirit of the Gospel, than those breaches
of unity" which these principles allow. ^
2. The tension between unity and disunity
Although Hill's concept of unity rests on non-biblical foundations, he is
nonetheless intent to preserve what unity he has established. He mentions,
therefore, innumerable times, "the Christian Church,"the Church of Christ,"3
4 5
"the Christian society," "the catholic or universal church,"-^ "the great society
of the followers of the Lord Jesus.He condemns soundly those who would destroy
the unity of the church altogether. In fact, he rejects the independent form of
church government simply because of "the disunion of the Christian society which
it implies.It is precisely because of what he has to say about church government
in general that he is so desirous to preserve some sense of the church's oneness.
It is at this point that we understand the tension in Hill's concept of unity.
Aware that this idea is essential, he strives to establish it; but the unity which
he has established is not strong enough to meet the challenging reality of a
divided church. This tension is heightened when he turns to Scripture, for these
O
he finds but "one body."0 He is painfully aware of Christ's high priestly prayer
"that they may all be one even as I and the father are ono."^ Thus, on the basis
of Scripture Hill is forced to admit that "Jesus often expressed a desire that
his church should be one," and that "an endeavour to maintain unity is earnestly
10
recommended to his disciples." But on the basis of reason and common sense Hill
is forced to conclude that "it does not follow that they were to have that kind
1 Ibid"., p. 3B5. 2 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 570, 571.
3 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 571, 455.
4 Ibid., Vol. I, P. 455; Vol. Ill, pp. 550, 5^9, 570, 575.
5 Ibid., Vol. Ill, pp. 551, 575, 374.
6 Ibid., Vol. Ill, p. 551. 7 Ibid., p. 572.
8 Ibid., PP. 349 , 375. 9 Ibid., p. 585.
10 Ibid., p. 584.
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of unity."'' In v/hat appears to be an open contradiction, Hill writes, "It wa3
not the intention of the author of the gospel that this visible unity of the
O
Christian society should long be preserved." Hill was searching for external
visible unity, but none existed in the Scotland of his day.
The tension in Hill's concept of unity is the tension between what the church
ought to be and what the church actually is. Calvin felt this tension, but he
was able to resolve it in his understanding of the two conditions of the church,
what it is in Christ, and what it is in itself.-^ Hill, however, who is suspicious
of anything eschatological, and who, on the basis of comnon sense, is prone to
/
emphasize what actually exists, is denied this means of resolving the tension he
obviously feels. But as some solution is necessary, he attempts another. He
simply focuses on the necessity of being disunited in one sense and united in
another. Since he is concerned with the visible situation, he notes the disunity
first, and calls attention to the most practical reason for the division of the
external society. "From the earliest times, different assemblies of Christians
have, of necessity, met in separate places." But separation of place "which the
propagation of Christianity renders unavoidable" has conspired with other causes
to widen the breach of unity in the catholic church. Different interpretations
of Scripture, different opinions as to the mode of worship, different practices
in observing religious rites all "have led to an opposition amongst Christians."^"
Although these "circumstances, which rendered it necessary for this whole to be
divided, are a matter only of secondary consideration," the division of the whole
5
xs nonetheless real.
1 Compare the logic here with the logic in Hill's argument for limited
atonement. There he said that if Christ died for all men and yet all. were not
saved, then the power of Christ would be nullified. Here in a clear contradiction
of that line of reasoning he says that Christ, in the power of G-od, prayed for the
oneness of the church, but that does not necessarily mean that the church shall
be one.
2 Hill, L.I.D. . Vol. Ill, p. 350. 3 Supra, p. 135.
h Hill, L.I.D. . Vol. Ill, p. 351. 5 Ibid. , p. 374.
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Having begun with this understanding of the church's disunity, when Hill
comes to treat unity, he is compelled to substitute practical unity for essential
unity, or created unity for given unity. Churches (plural) are called on to
produce and manifest all the unity they possibly can in spite of their disunity.
The best expression of this unity would be the assembly of all churches in one
2
place, if they could so gather, but since they cannot and this exhibition of
external unity is denied, the problem of how to express the church's oneness
still remains. To solve this problem Hill sets forth a "branch" theory of church
unity. According to this view the one church of Christ is a tree having different
/
branches, which though distinct, are still part of the tree. Thus Hill notes: "the
different meetings of Christians are branches of one society, united as parts of
a whole.'All the assemblies of Christians in every quarter of the globe,
professing to hold "the truth as it is in Jesus," and to worship God according to
the appointment of Christ, are to be regarded as branches of what has been sig¬
nificantly called the catholic church.'^" This concept of the church's unity is
5not original with Hill, but is adopted by him in defense of all denominational
divisions.
The task of those who accept this branch theory, however, is not to show the
distinctiveness of each branch (this is obvious), but rather to show how the parts
are related to the whole. In other words, what, specifically, unites the divisions?
1 Ibid., p. 373- 2 Ibid. , p. 350.
3 Ibid., pp. 373-374. 4 Ibid., p. 351.
5 Cf. The figure employed by Hooker: "...as the main body of the sea
being one, yet within divers precincts hath divers names; so the Catholic Church
is in like sort divided into a number of distinct Societies, every one of
which is termed a church within itself." Ecclesiastical Polity, 3:1:14.
K.A. Bell, Christian Unity, p. 16, says that this statement is "the root of
Hooker's whole Church aoctrine." This gives us a clue as to the importance
of the branch theory for Hill. Macpherson notes that some cf the earlier
Scottish federalists made use of the branch theory. Doctrine of the Church
in Scottish Theology, p. 97.
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A common procedure is to posit a spiritual, invisible unity that transcends
the physical, visible disunity. The "unity of spirit" which God wills for
the church is the common foundation beneath all the walls of discord. A modern
disciple of this theory writes:
It makes no difference to this Oneness that as a fact of history members
of the Sacred Society have come to be grouped in separate organizations.
It makes no difference that these different organizations severally
emphasize different aspects of Christian truth or that they are organized
under different forms of government. Below all such distinctions there
remains the "unity created by the Spirit."1 That is a unity which is not
even threatened by such divisions any more than the unity of the king's
army is threatened by the fact that it is divided into regiments.^
This idea, however, could not be used by Hill, for it implies the notion of an
invisible church and the concept of union with Christ through the Holy Spirit,
both of which have no place in his theology.
Some of the earlier Scottish federalists, who appealed to the branch theory,
sought to mite the branches in the "preaching of the word."^ It was believed
that this was the only indispensible mark of the church, and that as long as
any individual church "preached the word," it was to be counted as a branch of
the true church, "even though the proclamation might be very defective, and
though it might be accompanied with many additions of doctrine that have no
scriptural warrant and with ceremonies which could only be regarded as idolatrous."^
1 For Calvin's interpretation of this phrase, cf. R.3. Wallace,
Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament, p. 152f.
2 C.A.A. Scott, The Church; Its Worship and Sacraments (London, 1927),
p. 18. According to W.A. Visser 't Hooft this concept of union is not reformed
theology. "The Reformers do not teach the disembodied unity of a church in the
clouds, which some people persist in regarding as a typically protestant notion."
The Wretchedness and Greatness of the Church, p. 57.
3 Kacpherson, op.cit., pp. 108-109. "Our sixteenth and seventeenth
century theologians clearly perceived that it is the preaching of the word, the
announcement of salvation...that forms the essential principle of the church."
4 Ibid. , p. 108. Cf. Geddes KacGreggor, Corpus Christi (London, 1959),
p. 12. Conmenting on the branch theory he writes, "Neither impurity of doctrine
nor laxity of practice are fatal to the life of any branch of the church."
209
On the basis of this principle, the true church was found to exist even within
the Church of Rome.'' Although llill in theory might have allowed this basis of
unity,^ in practice he does not. Since he acquiesced in the Moderate depreciation
of preaching, he yrould hardly have turned to preaching in any sense as the
foundation of Christian unity.
Instead, Hill, in harmony with his ecclesiastical principle, sought to
relate the parts to the whole in terms of external religious rites. If a church
participates in the performance of "the rites which the great body of Christians
agree in celebrating," then that church is a branch of "the church of Christ...
a member of the great society."-^ Any church, then, may consider itself a branch
of the true church if it meets for the purpose of performing the ordinances for
which the true church was founded.^ For Hill the basis and bonds of unity are
one and the same thing. If it is the performance of external rites that holds
all churches together, then it must be in the performance of these rites that
any one part is joined to the whole.
Hill has succeeded in reconciling the unity and disunity of the church
without excluding either. No doubt he was pleased with this solution. It
allowed some sense of unity v/hich Scripture demanded, and it allowed the disunity
which his common sense background5 and Moderate persuasion^ demanded. It takes
account of the obvious divided condition of the church (common sense demands this),
1 Ibid., p. 97. "Our Scottish theologians were so generous in their
conception of what constitutes a true church of Christ that, keen as their
antagonism to Rome of necessity was, they did not seek to unchurch her."
2 Hill states that preaching of the Abrd is a mark of the church.
Infra, p. 233.
3 Hill, L.I.D.. Vol. Ill, p. 373.
4 Compare this statement with that of Alfred Loisy, "Christian unity
is not merely a unity of purpose, and a unity of means employed to effect this
purpose." Quoted by E.C. Hoskyns, The Fourth Gospel, p. 505.
5 Supra, p. 156. 6 Supra, p. 166.
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and it is tolerant of denominational differences (moderation demands this). In




Hill's solution is cleverly stated, and is even described by those who
oppose it as "logical,but the question remains, is it correct? Is it based
on the teaching of Scripture about the unity of the church? For the sake of
clarity we shall evaluate first Hill's concept of unity in general, and then his
branch theory in particular.
a. The evaluation of Hill's concept of the unity of the church may be best
presented under several points. (1). Throughout this discussion Hill has confused
"unity" with "uniformity,"5 and the two are not the same. As Gustaf Aulen asserts.
Considering the conditions and manifestations of unity according to the
New Testament, we must emphasize that unity is not uniformity - neither
uniformity of doctrine, nor uniformity of organization ana orders, nor
uniformity of life and religious experience.^-
Confusion at this point accounts, at least in part, for the fact that Hill, has
little concern for the unity of the church. Since he construes unity to mean
c*
uniformity, and since uniformity of doctrine or practice no where exists,^ he
could not treat this subject very seriously. In fact unity defined broadly in
terms of uniformity would not even come within the realm of possibility; so he
is led to speak of unity only in limited term3 of the observance of external rites
(specifically baptism and the Lord's Supper) in which all participate. Although
1 W.A. Visser 't Hooft, The Church and Its Function in Society
(London, 1937), p. 92.
2 J.R. Nelson, The Realm of Redemption (London, 1956), p. 193*
3 Supra, p. 204.
4 G-* Auldn, The Universal Church in Cod's Design (London, 1948) , p. 28.
5 The Christian society "supposes a consent in the great articles of the
Christian faith; but it does not imply, either a perfect agreement as to every
disputable point of doctrine, or an uniformity of...ceremonies." Institutes, p. 269.
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the participants in no way agree as to the interpretation, significance, nor
administration of these rites, so long as they perform them in an acceptable
manner, the requirement of unity is satisfied at least for Hill. But further,
Hill has confused unity and uniformity to the extent that any serious effort for
unity could be understood as opposed to Scripture! Y/hy? - because such effort
could be interpreted as an attempt to destroy the diversity of the Body of
Christ which Scripture allows (I Cor. 12; 14). In making diversity synonymous
with disunity, a logical consequence of confusing unity and uniformity, we are
able to see why Hill thinks he has Biblical support for the Moderate idea of
beauty in division. But Hill's equations are not Biblical, and diversity is not
opposed to unity. Although diversities may be sanctioned by Scripture, they
provide no justification for the divided state of the church on earth. As
T.F. Torrance aptly put it, "The problem is not our God-given diversity, but
p
the scandal of our sinful division."
If there is ever to be any movement toward real unity within the church, a
distinction must be maintained between unity and uniformity. If this distinction
is not made, unity will be looked upon, not only as a thing impossible, but as
a thing undesirable. Rather than confusing unity and uniformity, we must, as
Gloege suggests, seek unity within multiplicity.^
T~ Tv.ro dangers of this Moderate position should be noted. Tj The danger
of this position is that it is easily perverted from a defense against
theological stagnation (supra, p. 133 ) to a pragmatic rationalization of
divisions. Beauty in diversity becomes beauty' in disunity. 2) The danger of
this position is that it places emphasis on the "diversities" - those things
which divide rather than unite. Defense of diversity becomes defense of
schism.
2 T.F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement (London, 1959), Vol. I, p. 276.
3 G-erhard Gloege, Reich Gottes und Kirche im Neuan Testament (Guterslok,




(2). Hill confuses "unity" and "catholicity" with the result that much of
what is involved in the latter concept is lost. To be sure the two concepts are
inter-related,'' but ecclesiology is weakened by not affirming catholicity itself
as one of the essential properties of the church. In Hill's thinking catholicity
means primarily the universality of the church or the extension of the church
2 ^5
throughout the world. Certainly this is one aspect of the church's catholicity,
but it does not exhaust the meaning of that term. The catholicity of the church
denotes the -wholeness of the Christian faith.^ As noted above uniformity of
doctrine is not necessary to the church's catholicity, but the faithful
proclamation of the one gospel is. This does not mean the proclamation of "the
sum-total of beliefs held by all Christians everywhere and always," which contains
contradictions, but the proclamation of the "truth as it is in Jesus Christ."5
"Thus," writes T.F. Torrance, "catholic is the designation of the Church as true
1 "The two concepts are mutually complementary. Both have their common
point of reference in Jesus Christ." Nelson, op.cit., pp. 205-206.
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, pp. 350-351, where he indicates that "catholic"
means "universal church" or "world-wide church," the church "throughout the world."
3 Through this section reference is made to the definition of Catholicity
laid down by Cyril of Jerusalem in 347: The church "is called Catholic because
it is throughout the world, from one end of the earth to the other; and because
it teaches universally and completely one and all the doctrines which ought
to come to men's knowledge, concerning things both visible and invisible,
heavenly and earthly; ana because it subjugates in order to godliness every
class of men, governors and governed, learned and unlearned; and because it
universally treats and heals every sort of sins, which are committed by soul
or body, and possesses in itself every form of virtue which is named, both
in deeds and words, and in every kind of spiritual gifts." Catechetical
Lectures, 18:23. (London, 1872). A.G-. Hebert, The Form of the Church,
pp. 91-97, follows this meaning of catholicity, as does F.J. Taylor,
The Church of Cod, pp. 114-26.
4 Cyril, op.cit., 18:23.
5 A.G-. Hebert, op.cit., p. 92.
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over against a false and so-called church....Against heretical sects and apostate
communities, the catholicity of the Church refers to its cohesion in the Truth...."
The catholicity of the church refers also to its universal mission to all
2
sorts and conditions of men. According to Professor Torrance this was in fact
the earliest use of the term, referring to the faith of the church in the
universal redemption of Christ for all men alike, as opposed to the esoteric
"gnosis" for a few Spirituals. Hence the word catholic "described the traditional
apostolic church as opposed to the heretical sects who limited the atonement and
it3 universal range."3 In the words of Paul, "There is neither Jew nor Greek,
there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are
all one in Christ Jesus.The church stands before God on behalf of the whole
of mankind, and not just for its own members. In fact O.C. Quick observes that
the church "exists primarily for the sake of those who do not yet belong to it."5
It is, therefore, this property of catholicity which makes it absolutely necessary
r
for the church to be a missionary church under all circumstances.
The catholicity of the church refers to the continuity of the church
throughout all the world and throughout all ag6s.
The one holy Church has an essential character in virtue of which it is
everywhere the same and is everywhere to be acknowledged in this sameness.
Jesus Christ, the Head of the Church, is the same, yesterday, today, and
1 T.P. Torrance, Class Notes, p. 15.
2 Cyril, op.cit., 18;23.
3 T.F. Torrance, Class Notes, p. 15^ Cf. Nelson, op.cit., p. 206,
"The Church is called 'catholic'...because it is the projection of Christ to
the entire human race."
A Galatians, 3:27. Cf. Stig Hanson, The Unity of the Church in the New
Testament (Uppsala, 191-6) pp. 79-82; since the Greek elo' is masculine, it is
plausible and clarifying to render the last clause, "you are all one man in
Christ," as the representative of the New Humanity.
5 O.C. Quick, The Christian Sacraments (London, 1932), p. 126.
6 T.P. Torrance, Class Notes, p. 15, "The Church is catholic also in
that it is incorporated in the universal mission of redemption and is
essentially missionary."
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forever. The Church which is His Body participates in His sameness.
Because the Church is the same in all ages, in all peoples, and in all
forms, it is catholic.^
It is not only obvious from this brief exposition of catholicity that in
confusing unity and catholicity certain aspects of the church's nature will be
slighted, but it is also obvious that Hill probably consciously avoided these
aspects. The concepts expressed in the catholicity of the church simply do not
fit into his system of theology. They do not square with his doctrine of limited
atonement, his legalistic understanding of the relation of the church to Christ,
his external basis of the church's unity. In confusing unity and catholicity
Hill avoided these embarrassing issues, but his ecclesiology is the poorer for it.
It should be noted at this point, however, that until the meaning of the
church's catholicity is recovered, there can be no serious movement toward
reunion. According to Hebert, "the Church's catholicity is the carrying into
effect of its unity.
Therefore wherever Christians live in a state of separation from one another;
wherever one denomination, be it ever so large, claims full sufficiency of
itself;... the catholicity of the church is being overtly denied ana the
unity in Christ is rendered ineffective.-*'
(3)« A third point of confusion in Kill is a confusion between the expression
of unity and the creation of unity. He noted above that in thinking out his
doctrine of unity Hill substituted the practical unity of the church for its given
unity. The last phrase needs clarification at this point. By given unity is
meant that unity of the church given or created by God in the very act of
constituting the Body of Christ. It is a unity that is given to the church by
1 Ibid. , p. 15.
2 Hebert, op.cit., p. 98.
3 Nelson, op.cit., p. 209.
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the Father, that is supernaturally created within it by the Holy Spirit, that
is begotten with Jesus Christ. That means, then, that the church represents
1
on earth the unity existing between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. That
this is the divine intention of the church's unity is understood from the prayer
of Jesus for the church to this end,"...that they may all be one; even as thou,
Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be in us..." (John 17:3)•
It is because the unity of the church has such a supersensible basis in the
divine nature that we must speak of it as being given by God. And to say this
unity of the church is given by God is to deny that it is constructed out of the
visible organisation of the church and that its source of unity lies in some
tangible principle to be manipulated by men. "We do not have to create unity,"
writes F.J. Taylor, "but to remove the barriers to its expression which have
2
been erected by human sin in the course of history."
It is at this point that Hill's confusion arises. He understands unity as
something to be created - his own word is "produced".^ And those very things by
which Hill would have the church create unity are in fact to be expressions of
the unity that already exists by the grace of God. They are not the tools and
materials by which and from which unity is made. To be correct, therefore, we
must never speak of "unifying the churches" - "reunion" is the proper word.
1 Cf. A. Loisy: "Christian unity is...a vital organic union, not only
similar to, but veritably identical with the union of the Father and the
incarnate Son." Quoted by E.C. Hoskyns, The Fourth Gospel, p. 505.
2 F.J. Taylor, or.ext., p. 106. Cf. T.F. Torrance, Theology in
Reconstruction, p. 192; and W.A. Visser 't Hooft, The Church and its Function
in Society (Lo'ndon, 1937), p. 95» "Our present impasse is a sign that unity
cannot be made by men, but can only be acknowledged and received when God
actually gives it. It is with unity as with all the gifts of God: we can
prepare for it, we can pray for it, we can watch for it, but we cannot bring
it into being. Unity is not achieved; but it happens when men listen
together to God...."
3 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 349.
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To affirm so strongly the giveness of the church's unity, however is not
to deny the believers' responsibility for that unity. Theirs is the very great
-t
task of expressing that unity. Although the unity of the church is not built
up from the flesh and is not made with hands it is, nonetheless, a unity that
involves bodily and visible oneness. If the church is the earthly counterpart
of the living unity of the triune God, then it must live out that unity in its
flesh and blood existence. It must act in space and time in such a way that the
unity of its physical life is in worthy agreement with the gospel by which it
lives.^ Disunited the church betrays the gospel which it preaches. Only when
it is united can the church proclaim to all men reconciliation through the blood
of Christ without giving a lie to it by sinful divisions. Ironically, it was
this visible unity of the church which Hill set out to establish, but because
he grounded it upon a false foundation, he was unable to sustain it. In the
end he abandons the idea of visible unity and defends the visible disunity. ^
But the very existence of the church is grounded in the overcoming of division;
"for the people of God to live in disunity, for the church to allow the divisions
of the world to penetrate back into its life, is to live in disagreement with its
own existence."^ It is absolutely essential, then, that the church express in a
visible way its God-given unity. J.R. Nelson writes, "Unless there lies deeply
embedded in the faith of Christians this conception of unity as a fundamental
gift of God to be expressed and used, rather than as a goal to be attained,
the prospects for a Ghux-ch which maintains 'the unity of the Spirit in the bond
of peace' are most discouraging."5
1 Nathaniel Micklem, 7,rhat Is the Faith? (London, 1~9j6)V P»' 211.
2 T.F. Torrance, Class Notes, p. 12.
3 Infra, p. 230.
4 T.F. Torrance, Class Notes, p. 12.
5 Nelson, op.cit., p. 205.
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(4). Finally Hill confused "organization" and "organism," thus obscuring
the true nature of the church's unity as an organic union with Christ. This
organic union between Christ and the church is a familiar theme in the New
Testament, vividly expressed in various figures of speech, lie need only recall
the figure of the Vine, the Temple, the Building, the Bride of Christ, to
indicate how positively this concept is emphasized throughout; but perhaps the
clearest figure is that of the Body of Christ. If this phrase be taken
literally as the name of a supernatural entity, possessing both human and divine
nature, then the church is understood to be a "living organism" in the real
§ense of the word.^ It signifies the corporeality of the continuing presence
of Christ in the world. This does not mean that the church is an extension of
the incarnation^ or the prolongation of Christ in the world; but it does mean
that Christ has identified Himself with the church and assumed it into unity with
Himself "as his earthly and historical form of existence."^ To speak of the
church as an organism does not mean that we have to indulge in attempts to find
1 This is but one of two legitimate ways of using this term according to
the New Testament. On the one hand it is used in a comprehensive sense to
speak of the whole Christ who includes the church within is His own fulness.
On the other hand, it is used to distinguish the church as the Body of which
Christ is the Head. (T.F. Torrance, "Catholicity", S.J.T. , 2, 1949, p. 88.)
The maintenance of this distinction between the Lord and the church is,
according to Hoskyns, the root distinction between the meaning of faith in
John and the esoteric mysticism of gnostic thought, in which the identifica¬
tion of the church with its Lord is complete (The Fourth Go3pel. p. 50o).
2 Karl Barth, Prayer and Preaching (London, 1964), P* 77: "the Church
is a physical and historical organism, a real and visible body...."
L.S. Thornton, The Common Life in the Body of.Christ (London, 1942), p. 94:
"the Body is a living unity created and sustained by the one Spirit."
George Florovsky, "The Church: Her Nature and Task," The Universal Church
in God's Design, p. 49: "The Church is a body indeed, an organism...perhaps
an 'organism' is the best modern rendering of the term to soma, as used
by St. Paul."
3 Cf. MacGreggor, op.cit., p. 146 where he cites a number of leading
theologians who refute the idea that the church is an extension of the
incarnation.
4 T.F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction, p. 193. Cf. Barth,
Church Dogmatics, 11/1, p. Gbtj>;'j.l/2} p. "614.
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in the various groups within the church counterparts to the different organs of
the human body, but it does moan that the church is conceived to be a living
thing, realizing its life in space and time.
It is this idea of the basic nature of the church as an organism which
determines the Scriptural idea of the unity of the church. If the church is truly
a living organism, then it cannot possibly be severed into sections and live.
It is no more conceivable that the Body of Christ on earth can be divided and
live than that any human body can be divided and live. But still more signifi¬
cant is the fact that a divided church, the Body of Christ, reaches back behind
the church to Christ Himself. Is Christ divided? As there is only one Christ,
so there can be only one Body of Christ. Thus Barth writes, "The Church is one
as certainly as G-od is only one. It is the Body of Christ on earth of which
there can be but one."
It follows that if the church as the Body is one, then we are made one with
Christ the Head, not individually, but as a whole body. Accordingly we cannot
"think of At-one-ment as something wrhich transpires between God and an infinite
number of selves, forgetting that it is the corporate union of the People with
O
the Presence." This corporate participation in a living organism remains forever
a mystery. "It happens to us in a mystical order...Our incorporation into Christ
identifies us with the history of the new organism to which we now belong."^ But
the fact that we cannot comprehend how it is that the church is a single organic
whole should not keep us from affirming that it is nonetheless.
1 Barth, Theology and Church, p. 275.
2 W.J. Phythian-Adams, The People and the Presence , p. 263.
3 L.S. Thornton, "The Body of Christ in the New Testament," The Apostolic
Ministry (London, 1946), p. 77.
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It is only after we conceive of the church as an organism that we can rightly
appreciate the organization of the church. The church lives in a world of sin,
and is, in fact, in a state of sin itself. Sin, by its nature, implies confusion
and disorder; and these things breed death. As any organism living in the midst
of chaos must order and structure its life to exist, so the church as a living
organism must establish a well-regulated order. Calvin writes,
We see the necessity of some polity...if we would make a proper provision
for the safety of the church, we ought to pay the strictest attention to
the injunction of Paul, that "all things be done decently and in order"...
the laws, therefore, which promote this end, we are so far from condemning,
that, we contend, their abolition would be followed by a disruption of the
bonds of union and the total disorganization and dispersion of the churches.
In this light the organization of the church is not seen as unimportant nor
unnecessary, but as essential.
It is within the framework of the organic Body of Christ, that we understand
2the necessity of an "entire surrender of our individual selves" in establishing
g
the organization of the church. The eye cannot claim to be the whole body. It
is an awareness of the organic nature of the church which curtails the sectarian
spirit, that monopolizing tendency of any part of the Body of Christ to exercise
by itself and for itself those functions which belong to the unity of the whole
body«A This awareness will prevent us from exclusive emphasis upon "our" form of
organization, "our" order. Quite the contrary, it will enable us to crucify our
own form of order that sinful divisions may be healed and that we may live with
Christ as one whole man. In realizing the organic nature of the church, we are
encouraged, not to usurp the Lordship of Christ, but rather to look to Him as the
1 Calvin, Institutes, 4:27:10.
2 Vf.J. Phythian-Adams, op.cit. , p. 265.
3 I Cor. 12:17.
4 C.C. Morrison, What is Christianity (Chicago, 1940), p. 208.
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Head of the Body for the organization of the Body. "He only is the Head, under
whose sovereign government we are all united to each other, according to that
oi'der and form of polity which He himself has prescribed."
It is the church's organic nature, which enables us to see not only the
relation of the whole Body to the Head, but also the unified and organized
relationship of all members. If the eye cannot claim to be the whole body,
p
neither can it say to the hand, "I have no need of thee." The church is no
spastic organism to be plagued by independent and uncontrolable muscular spasms;
therefore, no member is allowed to act on its own, but must act in harmony and
co-ordination with the other members of the same Body in service and obedience
to the same Head. Once again emphasis is placed upon the Head who controls and
co-ordinates all members so that they do not work at cross purposes, but strive
to realize the same end. In this respect Christ is seen to be not only the
vertical, but also the horizontal bond of unity.3
In maintaining this distinction between the church as an organism and the
church as an organization, we conclude with Kelson that "the church's unity is
not that of an organization, but of an organism."^ Hill, however, implies just
the opposite. In his though^ the unity of the church is precisely and necessarily
the unity of an organization. Since it i3 in the New Testament figures of speech
that the "mystery" of the church's organic nature is most clearly expressed, and
5since Hill fails to take seriously this Biblical language, he misses this central
truth. Denied the knowledge of so basic a concept, he rejects the idea of the
church as the literal, living Body of Christ on earth. At best the church is a
1 Calvin, Institutes, 4:6:9.
2 I Cor. 12:21.
3 Stig Hanson, op.cit. , p. 119.
h Nelson, op.cit., p. 203.
5 Supra, p. 163.
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more or less effective human organization. This means that the church possesses
no principle of life, only a principle of order. It means that the church does
not grow up into the fulness of Christ, but only changes its external appearance
as its form of organization changes. Hill, in fact, speaks of the history of
-I
the church only in terms of the history of church government. Therefore, when
he come3 to consider the unity of the church, he is forced to consider the unity
of an organization. And because his starting point is false, all his conclusions
are false. 'He see this, for instance, in his understanding of the bonds of union.
Beginning with the unity of an organization, he is led necessarily to posit
/
external bonds, and only external bonds of unity. Or again, presupposing the
unity of an organization, he is led to defend the hard and fast divisions
within the church. Those things which would destroy the unity of an organism do
no real harm to the loose unity of an organization. Insistance upon the unity
of an organization results in a pragmatic understanding of order in the church.
Calvin, who began with the unity of an organism, understood order as a means of
maintaining that organic unity. Hill, on the other hand, beginning with the unity
of an organization understood order simply as a means of maintaining a more
efficient organization, pushed to its logical conclusion, Hill's position would
be this: the more organized the church, the more unified the church.
It is mandatory that Hill's confusion between organism and organization be
corrected, if the church is ever to express its G-od-given unity. In the first
place, this confusion places all the emphasis on externals, and with reference
to church union this means that the primary thing will bo the plan or scheme of
union. This is not to disparage the emense importance of the practical planning
needed to make the church's unity more manifest; but to place these practical
matters in the right perspective, we must recover the essential organic nature
of the church. This cannot be done as long as the confusion between organism and
1 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. I, p. 455.
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organization exists. In the second place, this confusion results in the incessant
demand that churches meet together. Once again, this is not to minimize the
necessity for consultation, but meeting for the sake of meeting will accomplish
precious little. Regardless of how much they "get together,churches never
visualize their unity until they understand its basis to be their corporate
organic union with Christ. This will never be realized as long as the confusion
remains. And in the third place, this confusion, whether consciously or not,
lends itself to sectarianism and denominationalism. The result is always sinful
self-assertion whereby the sole Lordship of Christ over the church is denied.
The only way toward reunion, however, is to seek earnestly the absolute Lordship
p
of Christ, and to do this we must understand that churches are members of the
Body of Christ of which He is the Head. That fact can never be acknowledged as
long as this confusion persists.
b* Having examined Hill's concept of unity in general, let us evaluate his
branch theory in particular. (1). According to W.A. Visser 't Hooft this theory's
"weakness is that it isolates the question of unity from the question of truth." 3
It may appear at first that this criticism is unjustified, at least for Hill, for
on several occasions he speaks of churches everywhere accepting the same "system
of truth.We must, however, interpret this phrase in the light of Hill's
5Moderate background. The Moderates,'it is remembered, were more concerned with
tolerance than with unity, with latitude of belief than with strictness of
doctrine. To make the canopy of the church large enough to include a great






H.R. Mackintosh, op.cit., p. AOo. .
W.A. Visser 't Hooft, The Kingship of Christ (London, 1948), p. 77.
W.A. Visser 't Hooft, The Church and its Function in society, p. 92.
Hill> » Vol. Ill, pp. 349, 385.
Supra, p. 166.
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content, of truth.. When they spoke of a system of truth they meant only the
absolutely most essential elements of Christian doctrine as they interpreted it.
The system of truth referred to those things the absence of which would leave
the church open to atheists as well as Christians. The tolerance of the Moderates,
moreover, allowed latitude even within these basic elements of truth by allowing
different attitudes of approach to them. In fact, this diversity "amongst those
■\
who hold the same great doctrines, illustrates and confirms the unity of faith."
So it was that the Moderates could retain both Haddow and the Marrow Men in the
same church in spite of the fact that they held contradictory points of view.
Elevated from intra-church to interchurch relations, this meant that regardless
of the amount of error in a church, as long as there was some glimmer of truth
it was a branch of the true church. Thus we are led to believe that when Hill
speaks of 'truth', he has in mind only a fragmentary concept of truth; and with
reference to the branch theory, this means that unity is brought about by
synthesizing the fragments. Understood in this light, Visser 't Hooft's criticism
is justified, because "it is difficult to escape the conclusion that this 3ort of
synthesis which has to do with fragments of truth...fails to recognise that in
the most basic 3ense of the Incarnation, Christ Himself is the Truth, Truth in
3
the form of personal Being. There can be no synthesis of fragments...."
If real unity in Christ is unity without any sacrifice of truth or principle,
then contrary to the branch theory, churches may seek unity only when they are
in doctrinal agreement. Barth rightly asks,
Yrtiat is our standing ground if we take the familiar line of ascribing to
the Roman, the Greek, the Lutheran, the Reformed, the Anglican and other
churches their special attributes and functions within an imagined organic.
1 Hill, Institutes, p. 269.
2 Hill, Institutes, p. 349: "it is impossible for one man to know all the
links by which different truths are connected in the mind of another man...."
3 T.P. Torrance, S.J.T. , 2, 1949, PP. 92-93*
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totality? However well this may sound, it is not theology, it is mere
sociology or philosophy of history...it is utterly and forever impossible
to take the Virgin of Einsiedeln and Luther's Wittenberg or Calvin'3
Geneva, the Roman Lass and the Evangelical Communion, the Orthodox
inconostasis and the evangelical pulpit...as branches of one and the
self same tree, comparing and estimating them as belonging to one
category,^
The church's unity, however, must be justified, not on the basis of sociology,
but on the basis of theology, and "the theological understanding of the unity
2
of the church does not seem to allow for the claims of the 'branch theory'."
The significance of the branch theory within the ecumenical movement is
obvious when two statements are made. As long as the branch theory prevails,
there can be no respect for the truth. As long as thei-e is no respect for the
truth, there can be no honest movement toward reunion. "Ecumenical conversation,"
says K.E. Skydsgaard, "consists not merely of a two-sided exchange where attention
is fastened on one's own position, but a much deeper exchange where both parties^
together have their views directed toward the third party of this conversation -
the truth itself. Without the presence of this 'third' the conversation becomes
as salt which has lost its savor.So long as the branch theory fosters
indifference towards the truth, agreement can be sought only in some ethereal
stratum beyond the objective demand of the truth. Consultation will deteriorate
into consideration of practical co-operation. Unity will become a cheap compromise
in which each church gives up that which most offends the others. At best, the
synthetic approach of the branch theory can only offer what T.F. Torrance call3
"a patchwork remedy.Unity at the expense of truth can not reflect the unity
it is supposed to reflect.
1 Karl Barth, The Church and the Churches (London, 1937), 'pp. 2*7-257"
2 Nelson, op.cit., p. 194.
3 Skydsgaard is speaking about 1-rotestants and Roman Catholics, but the
principle is the same regardless of the number involved.
4 K.E. Skydsgaard, One in Christ (philadexphia, 1957), p. 49.
5 T.F. Torrance, S. J.T. , 2, 1949> p. 93«
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(2) We noted earlier how the Moderates looked upon the divisions of the
church as being justifiable, if not inherent in the church's nature. Hill, in
propounding the "branch theory," concurs with the idea that schism is indeed a
4
fact, but not a sin. Churches are united on the basis of observing certain rites
and ceremonies. Therefore, to create as much unity as possible, churches should
O
strive for "simplicity of external observances," because the fewer the regulations
concerning the performance of these rites, the larger the number of churches
able to unite. However, "it is impossible to frame regulations of such natters
v/hich will meet the prejudices and opinions of all."-^ Therefore, separation is
/
unavoidable; in fact it is unlawful not to separate under certain conditions.
If the ordinances of any church "lead Christians to act in contradiction to the
light of their conscience," then "separation from her is a duty v/hich they owe
to their Master in heaven."^ Schism, then, may be called evil only when it is
"reserved for gratifying the passions of ambition, avarice, resentment and envy."^
This raises the whole question of how to deal with dissenting bodies. It
v/as because they held so firmly to the essential unity of the church that the idea
of schism in any sense of the term posed so grave a problem for the early Scottish
federalists such as Rutherford, Gillespie, and Durham. Macpherson says that "in
no case could they tolerate the idea of breaking av/ay from the communion of the
Catholic Church. They had a v/ay of distinguishing between separation in and
separation from the church."^ This distinction was retained by the seceders who,
in spite of their secession, claimed a horror of schism;
- " ' ~
2 Hill, Institutes, pp. 261, 267. Such action is not only 'dictated by th.8
luminous principle v/hich the Apostle Paul hath delivered; "The Kingdom of God
is not meat and drink, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost"'
(261): but is also demanded by "the true nature of that .great society v,hich is
constituted by the follov/ers of Jesus" (p. 269).
3 Ibid. , p. 266. 4 Ibid. , p. 264. 5 Ibid., p. 264.
6 Macpherson, on. cit., p. 9^- Cf. James Durham's v/ork, The Dying Han's
Testament to the Church of Scotland: or A_ Treatise Concerning Scandal (first
It is one thing to depart from the communion of a church, and another
thing to depart from communion with a party in that church...the seceding
Ministers are neither afraid nor ashamed to own that they have made a seces¬
sion from the present judicatories of this National Church; but they refuse
that they have ever seceded from the Communion of the Church of Scotland
or that they have made any kind of separation from her.
Hill's concept of unity, however, does not require this distinction. He speaks
of the right of the individual to do just what the Reformers dreaded - the
right to break from the communion of the church. His "remedy" to the problem
of dissenting bodies is simply the formation of separate churches, and by separate
phe means complete "emancipation" from the communion of the mother church. Since
Hill relies upon the branch theory, such a break is not an intolerable offense
against the nature of the church. The unity of the church is not harmed in the
least by the fact that a new branch has budded and begun to grow. Hill concludes,
therefore, that we must refrain from "holding, in the language of former times,
that separation is of itself a deadly sin."^
In recent years, however, Hill's point of view has been challenged by those
who are inclined to equate Christian disunity with unqualified sinfulness. Karl
Earth, for one, observes that "we have no right to explain the multiplicity of
the Churches at aLl. We have to deal with it as we deal with sin."^ The error
of the branch theory may be clearly understood if it is stated conversely: the
published 1659), in which he distinguishes between schism and division. "Schism...
is a breaking of the Union of the Church, and that Communion which ought to be
amongst the Members thereof" (p. 245). "Division" applies to such "dissentions
in the church as are consistent with Communion" (p. 250).
1 William Wilson (one of the Pour Fathers of the Secession), A Defense of
the Reformation Principles of the Church of Scotland (Glasgow, 1769")", p. 65f.
2 Hill, Institutes, p. 264.
5 Ibid., p. 165.
4 Barth, The Church and the Churches, p. 29. Cf. Benara Deeming, The
Churches and the Church (London, i960), p. 22. "Christ willed us to be one
and our sins make us not one."
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lack of division, not division itself, thv/arts the purpose of Christ for His
•i
Body. Unless schism is the consequence of sin, we must assume the correctness
of the branch theory, namely, that divisions are actually intended by God for
the church. On the basis of Scripture, however, this alternative cannot be
admitted. "A divided Church in the New Testament sense of the word Church is
something illogical and incomprehensible - as illogical and incomprehensible as
p
human sin."
Obviously, this branch theory which Hill propounds is a formidable obstacle
which must be surmounted if reunion is to be realised. It must be acknowledged
that the whole church is in a state of schism,"^ and, therefore, in a state of sin/1"
before reunion can be taken seriously; for as T.F. Torrance observes, reunion
"must be pursued with a deep sense of sin and shame, and with sincere contrition
and forgiveness.Only when we confess that vie are all unprofitable servants,
whatever our church or ecclesiastical allegiance, will we be ready for that
renewal by the living Christ in whom alone reunion is possible.
(3). Because ho confused the creation of unity with the expression of unity,
Hill understood unity as a goal to be attained. In terms of the branch theory,
however, this goal is set so low that it has already been reached. The church
now evidences, not only all the unity it is capable of expressing, but all the
unity it is supposed to express. Hence, it i3 not necessarily incumbent upon
1 The exponents of the branch theory appear to understand the richness
and variety of the church only in terms of separate denominations.
2 J.E.L. Newbigin, The Reunion of the Church (London, i960), pc 24.
3 This idea is developed by A.C. Headlam, The Doctrine of the Church and
Christian Reunion (London, 1920), p. 223. Of. O.C. Quick, The Christian
Sacraments. p. 147, "We conclude then that, the 'visible' church being
manifestly divided, all bodies professing Christianity belong to it
imperfectly and in varying degrees."
4 A.S.J. Rawlinson, who also adopts the view that schism is within the
church indicates that the effect of this position is to include the whole
church under sin. problems of Reunion (London, 1950), p. viii.
5 T.F. Torrance, 3,J.T., 4, 1951, P. 427.
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ministers to exercise the ministry of reconciliation to remove the barriers
which separate Christian people. The church is _de facto divided and one must
simply accept this fact.
At first 3ight, it might appear that the branch theory as set forth by Hill
is the ecumenical theory. Due to his Moderate tolerance, he is led to accept
1
all sects and divisions and separations under the one term church; but in a
final analysis this theory is actually a great stumbling block to the ecumenical
movement as we know it today, for it says that such a movement is not only
unnecessary, but unproductive. All the unity that can exist, does exist. Hill
makes this point explicitly. Concerning the Synod of Dort he writes:
The result of this synod is a lesson to Protestants that in the present
situation of Christendom ^/i. e. , divided situation/', it is chimerical to
think of obtaining any greater uniformity of doctrine than already
subsists amongst those who have left the communion of the church of Rome.
Thus wo find Hill tolerantly accepting the Anglican communion, but making no
effort to realize a visible union with that Church. Rather than seeking to
heal the divisive vrounds within the church, the branch theory is content to stand
with the status quo. Therefore, if the visible unity of the church is ever to
be actualized, the branch theory of unity must be repudiated.
A. Conclusion
By way of summary attention is drawn to two strong points and two weaknesses
in Hill's doctrine of unity. To his credit, Hill does not accept the appearance
of the church as an accident of history, but as a result of divine intention.
"I...consider the church of Christ as a society founded by its Author."'' Unfor¬
tunately however, Hill nowhere gives his reasons for holding this view nor does
1 The Moderates regarded themselves "as the advanced spirits of their age,
seeking that comprehension of all creeds and classes in an established Church
which was the ecclesiastical ideal." W.M. Taylor, The Scottish Pulpit, p. 139.
2 Hill, Institutes, p. 342.
3 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. I, p. 455.
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he reconcile it with the idea that the church had its roots in anciont Israeli
He simply posits the fact that Christ consciously formed a definite, coherent
society, i.e. , he rejects the thought that the church originated as an
extraneous consequence of Christ's ministry.
It is also to Hill's credit that he has a concern for the visible unity of
the church. Although this concern, weak as it is, may not have grown out of the
proper motives, it is present in his theology nonetheless. The church is a
visible society in which all Christians are to manifest visibly the greatest
possible unity. Precisely because the church is a visible society, all unity
1 G.D. Henderson states that the "older Scottish authorities do not say
that Christ 'founded' the church...the characteristic treatment is to carry the
idea of the Church back into the Old Testament times" ("The Church of Scotland",
The Nature of the Church (ed. H.N. Flew), pp. 97-98). Some have argued that
to say that Christ "founded" the church is to say that He instituted it as
something entirely new and unprecedented, thus denying the church's ties with
ancient Israel (cf.^FiC* Craig, "The Church of the New Testament", The Universal
Church in God' s Designy p. 33; H.L. Goudge, The Church of England and Reunion,
p. W- Surely it cannot be allowed that the Israel of the Old Covenant was
in no way the people of God; but neither can it be allowed that Jesus had
nothing to do with the development of the New Testament church. A middle course
must be steered between thes6 extremes; either Jesus instituted the church and
it had no connections with Israel, or else the church grew out of ancient
Israel and Jesus had no connection with it. C.I. Craig suggests that Christ
neither founded the church, nor ignored the church, but "redeemed" the already
existing church (op.cit., p. 33). Consenting on the same idea, T.F. Torrance
writes, "The Christian Church is Isreal gathered up in Jesus Christ, who
recapitulates in Himself the historic-redemptive service of Isreal and,
after fulfilling and transcending all its hopes, launches it out again in
its servant-mission laden with the Word of Reconciliation for all mankind"
(Conflict and Agreement, Vol. II, p. 126. Cf. F.V. Filson, Gospel According
to St. Matthew, p. 1H7.) No doubt, this solution solves the problem, but to
discuss Hill's phraseology in terms of these issues is to read into Hill a
problem with which he was not concerned, lie was .not interested theologically
in the continuity existing between Israel and the church, but interested only
in the external, organized, structured form of the New Testament church;
and it is in that context that he speaks of Christ "founding" or
"constituting" the church. It is in this sense that A.M. Stibbs (God's
Church, 1959, chapter 2».) and R.N. Flew (Jesus and His Church, 1938> chapter 3)
discuss in detail the reasons for asserting that Jesus did intend to "form"
the church. We should not, therefore, allow later semantic distinctions to
blind us to the good point Hill makes, namely, the integral relationship
between Christ and the church.
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is not to be sought in the mystical and the unseen. Hill would part company
with many who hold to the branch theory in his assertion that the unity of the
church is not merely spiritual. He may not have been so bold as William Temple
-j
who said, "Christianity is the most materialistic of the world's great religions"?
but he does stress that the material and the institutional are not peripheral
or secondary, but a vital part of what is involved in church unity.
Ironically, however, Hill is forced to deny the one thing he affirms. He
desires to actualize the visible union of the church, but this is the very thing
that he cannot do, and so in the end he abandons, for all practical purposes, the
goal he longs to realise. The reasons behind this regretful action are basically
two-fold. Both reasons have been implied throughout this discussion, but should
be stated forthrightly. The first is Hill's failure to relate the unity of the
church to union with Christ. Hill wants to establish the visible unity of the
church, but due to the federal system, he is forced to look outside of Christ
for the basis of this unity, and thus never finds the true source of the church's
oneness. The far-reaching consequences of this failure to relate the unity of
the church to union with Christ become obvious in the light of the following:
The Church includes an infinite multitude of people in all ages and
comprises a diversity as wide as creation itself, yet it is essentially
one in Jesus Christ who is the only Mediator between God and man and who
reconciles and gathers up all things in Himself. He alone constitutes and
organises the many members of the Church into unity, giving it in its
many members to participate in His one and unique relation to the Bather
through the Holy Spirit, and maintaining it and securing it in that unity
by including it within the one Body of which He is the Head."
The second reason Hill is forced to abandon the realization of the visible
oneness of the church is due to his failure to see this concept in terms of
eschatology. He desired the unity of the church; but he saw only the division
of the church; therefore, he gave up all hops of earthly union and acquiesced in
the superficial solution of the branch theory. Had Hill been able to see the
1 Quoted by Newbigin, The Reunion of the Church, p. 26.
2 T.P. Torrance, Class Notes, pp. 11-12.
2yi
unity of the church in terras of eschatology he could have substituted hope for
despair. If he had realized that the unity of the church is yet hid with Christ
in God, he would not have been limited to expressing the church's unity in terras
of its earthly manifestations. He could have seen that the real unity of the
church is not bound to the here and now, but has an ultimate point of reference
which is transcendent and eschatological. He could have understood how the church
lives in a state of crisis and tension between the time of promise and the time of
final consumation. It is in this way that Calvin deals with what T.F. Torrance
2
has called "the mystery of iniquity." He saw the divided condition of the
church, but also saw the ultimate perfection of Christian unity.
For though the Church is now tormented by the malice of men, and even broken
by the violence of the billows, and miserably torn in pieces, so as to have
no stability in the world, yet we ought always to cherish confident hope,
because it will not be by any human means, but by heavenly power, which will
be far superior to every obstacle, that the Lord will gather His Church.J
If Hill had treated the problem of the visible unity of the church eschatologically,
then he could have maintained the visible oneness of the church in spite of the
manifest division. He could have allowed the church "to become what it is, to live
on the level of the promise.Rather than abandoning the hope of visible oneness,
he could have rejoiced in the confidence that this hope shall one day be realized.
To that end he could have been encouraged to labor without ceasing to find the
means of recovering and expressing the unity which God gave to the church when
He created it through Jesus Christ.
1 "If the given unity of the Church is essentially eschatological then the
validity of all that she does is conditioned by the Parousia and cannot be made
to repose upon any primitive structure of unity already complete in the naturally
historical realm or upon any continuity in the fallen world out of which we are
redeemed." T.F. Torrance, "Concerning Amsterdam", S.J,T., 2, 1949, p. 244.
2 "...while the Body of Christ cannot be divided, the impossible seems to have
happened. That the impossible seems to have happened means that we are faced here
with the same dark and terrible enigma of sin, the irrational mystery of iniquity...
the ultimate reason for our division is rooted in the irrational and awful mystery
of iniquity...." T.F. Torrance, Conflict ana Agreement, Vol. I, pp. 275-276.
Cf. II Thess. 2:7.
3 Calvin, Commentary on Matthew, 24:30.
4 W.A. Visser 't Hooft, The Wretchedness and Greatness of the Church, p. 17.
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C* The Maries of the Church
1. The marks in general
Those aspects of ecclesiology which describe the essential properties of the
church are usually called the notes of the church. These notes are affirmations
of the nature of the church as it participates in Jesus Christ. They are first
of all attributes of Christ Himself, and consequently attributes of the church as
it shares the life of Christ. The notes of the church are, strictly speaking,
only discernible through faith. The marks of the church designate the external
characteristics of the church. They indicate where the true church is to be
found. They do not define the church, but simply point to it.
Hill rejects this distinction between the notes and the marks of the church.
Because he is concerned primarily with the external appearance of the church he
excludes the idea of the notes completely. All the particulars which the two-fold
distinction maintains are incorporated under the one concept of marks. That Hill
affects this conjunction is not so insignificant as might first appear. It means
that Hill defines the church on earth in terms of its marks, that is to say, the
church is defined functionally in terms of its activities rather than in terras
of its essence as the Body of Christ. Although this definitive action is a
necessary function of the marks due to the absence of the distinctive idea of
notes, when Hill employs the former concept, he usually has in mind its primary
function - the designation of the true church. Thus he speaks of the marks as
those things "by which the author of the Gospel meant that the society which he
-1
was to found should be distinguished from every other."
Hill follows Calvin in his general understanding of the purpose of the marks -
2
they are to distinguish the church in the world; but 'unlike Calvin he never says
why it is necessary for the marks to render this service. Calvin says that if
1 Hill, L.I.P., Vol. Ill, p. 371.
2 Calvin, Institutes, 4:1:9; Hill, L.I.D., Vol. I, pp. 371, 455.
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Christians are required to unite with the Body of Christ, there must be some
indication as to where it is to be found; "...we are conrnanded to honor, and
to maintain communion with it. As far, therefore, as was important for us to
A
know it, the Lord has described it by certain marks and characters." Although
Hill simply says that the marks distinguish and never says why, we are led to
believe that he would agree with Calvin, and that for several reasons. In the
first place he does speak of the necessity of believers to join the Christian
2
society; and in the second place he indicates that there are false churches
3
alongside the true church. It seems just to conclude, therefore, that for Hill
the task of the marks is so obvious it needs no mention; they point to true
churches with which it is the duty of Christians to unite.
Aware of Hill's understanding of the nature and purpose of the marks, we
are not surprised to find him turning to the external rites of the church as he
enumerates them. If the church is a society founded for the purpose of performing
certain rites, if the performance of these rites unites the various branches into
one tree, then these rites must be the marks of.the true church. So it is that
the external ordinances which have played so dominant a role in Hill's ecclesiology
have yet another function to perform. They not only define the church, and unite
the church, but also distinguish the church in the world. The "churches of Christ"
(note plural) must teach
no other doctrine than that form of sound doctrine, which is to be gathered
from the writings of his apostles. They must maintain that spiritual worship
which he hath substituted in place of the idolatrjr of the heathen, and the
ceremonies of the Hosaic dispensation; and they must observe, according to
his institution, the ordinances which he hath established in his church....
Upon this account, we rank the right-administration of Baptism and of the
Lord's Supper, the preaching of "the faith once delivered to the saints,"
and the maintenance of spiritual worship, as the marks of a Christian church.^
1 Calvin, Institutes, 4:1:7-8". 2 Supra, p. 199.
3 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, P. 351f. 4 Ibid., pp. 370-371.
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When Hill corae3 to establish the fact that these are indeed the marks
of the church, he makes his usual two-fold appeal, first to reason, then to
revelation: "We gather all three marks from the nature of such a society, and
from several places of Scripture." "The notion of a society implies the use of
certain external observances, which are necessary to distinguish it from other
P 7
societies." Since those marks do just that,-' then it follows that they are the
true marks of the true church.
This would be proof enough to establish the validity of these marks, but
they are further sanctioned by Scripture, and in particular by a passage in the
Book of Acts where "we find the three brought into one view";'4' "then they that
gladly received his word were baptized. And they continued stedfastly in the
apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and in breaking of bread, and in prayers."5
Let us now examine and evaluate Hill's exposition of the marks of the church.
2. The preaching of the Word^
It is sad, but not surprising,to find Hill giving this mark of the church
1 Ibid., "p." '371". 2 Ibid.', Vol. I, p. 433. ~~
3 Ibid. , p. 3^8; cf. p. 371, "Baptism and the Lord's supper are the external
badges of the Christian profession, the rites by which the author of the Gospel
meant that the society which he was to found should be distinguished from every
other."
4 Ibid., p. 371. ' 5 Acts 2: VI-42.
6 G.W. Sprott notes that during the covenanting period in Scotland a
distinction was made between "lecturing" and "preaching." A person "lectured''
when he delivered a short exposition of a long-portion of Scripture (a chapter
or two); he "preached" when he delivered a long exposition of a short portion of
Scripture (a verse or two). In 1o52 the Church of Scotland recommended the use
of both in the sexwice of public worship, the lecture followed by the sermon.
Sprott notes, however, that the Moderates of the next century disdained the use
of the lecture, primarily because it forced them to treat "all the essential
truths of the Gospel" v/hich they sought "to steer clear of" (The 'Worship of
the Church of Scotland During the Covenanting Period, 1638-1661, pp. 28f, 49).
Accordingly, Hill the Moderate acknowledges the recommendation, but considers
it unnecessary "to adhere precisely to" it (institutes, p. 330). He does not,
however, press for the abolition of lecturing altogether. In his Institutes,
he has chapters on both "lecturing" and "preaching" and he published a book
of Lectures upon Portions of the Ola Testament. But when Hill speaks of
"preaching" as a mark of the church he is not thinking of "preaching" as
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very little attention - not surprising because we have already noted Hill's
acquiescence in the Moderates' depreciation of the task; yet nonetheless sad
for it serves only to strengthen the opinion we have begun to form, that Hill
had a very low view of the church. It should be stated at the outset of this
discussion that Hill in no way approaches anything which may be called a "theology
of preaching." In fact, he never even treats the task of preaching theologically
at all. The sum of what he has to say on the subject is to be found in a few
sections of the Institutes where he deals in a practical manner, with this "duty
p
of the pastoral office." Yr'e are thus limited to these incidental remarks
and to an evaluation of Hill's own sermons in determining what he considered to
be th6 nature and task of preaching.
a. The nature of preaching. Although preaching is a duty of the pastoral
office, and, therefore, an aspect of the church's life, it is nonetheless an
incidental element. This concept of the nature of preaching comes to light in
Hill's attempt to answer the question as to why it is that ministers preach
at all. Rather than searching for the Biblical answer to this question, Hill
simply points to tradition. His authority at this point is "King on the
Primitive Church.He paraphrases a section of this vrork^ which indicates
that preaching was an excepted part of early Christian worship.
opposed to "lecturing." He has in mind the public exposition of Scripture which
includes both. That this is so is evidenced by the fact that he speaks of both
lectures and sermons as "discourses" (institutes, pp. 330, 337, 350, 355, 357,
361, etc.) - a discourse being the public exposition of Scripture (institutes,
p. 332.) the minister is expected to give every Sunday, be it single (a sermon), dual
(a lecture on a chapter and a sermon), or triple (a lecture on Old Testament chapter,
a lecture on a New Testament chapter, and a sermon) (institutes, 337). Since we
are more concerned with what lectures and sermons have in conmon than in the
differences betv/een them, we shall not maintain any hard and fast distinction in our
exposition of Hill, especially since this seems fair to his own position; but since
part of what he has to say about the public exposition of Scripture is included
under lecturing and part under preaching we shall allow what he says about each to
contribute to our overall understanding of what he calls "discoursing" and we call
"preaching."
1 Supra, p., 146. 2 Hill, Institutes, p. 327. 3 Ibid. , p. 3^7.
4 Peter King, An_ Enquiry into the Constitution, Discipline, Unity, and
Yforship of the Primitive Church, part 2, Chapter 1, p. 4f.
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In the Christian assemblies, r/hich from the beginning were held upon the
Lord's day, the Y/ri tings of the Apostles were joined with those of the
Prophets, and reading the Scriptures formed a principle part of the public
service....After the reader had finished, the Bishop or minister addressed
to the people an exhortation, generally founded upon what had been read, ^
calling thern to the imitation of the excellent things v/hich they had heard.
Although the Directory of Worship of the Church of Scotland "leaves to the discretion
of the minister who readeth, to judge whether it is necessary to expound...any part
»
p
of what had been read," Hill adds that it is alv/ays "competent for the minister of
a parish to resume at any time, as much of the primitive practice as he judges
expedient."-' Thus "there has arisen, by general consent, with the sanction of
ecclesiastical authority, our present mode of lecturing, in v/hich,...either a
whole chapter or part of a chapter, is read by the minister, and then expounded
in a discourse.
If asked why it is that preaching is a part of Christian worship, Hill's
most profound answer could only be that it always has been. He did not go beyond
tradition and human motivation: the minister preaches because "discourses are
still expected every Lord's day,"-' and because he subjectively chooses to preach.
In a final analysis, preaching is but an incidental aspect of the church's life.
It is difficult to accept Hill's incidental role for preaching, particularly
in the light of Scripture. Jesus Himself appeared very early in the gospel
record as a preacher, following His fervently preaching forerunner, John the
Baptist. No sooner had the disciples received the Holy Spirit at Pentecost than
they began to preach. Hov/ else but by preaching can a man come to faith, asked
Paul, for faith comes from hearing, and hearing from preaching. "Woe is me if
I preach not the gospel," he exclaimed. To draw the inference from the early
1 Hill, Institutes, pp. 327-328.
3 Ibid. , p. 330.
5 Ibid., p. 337.
2 Ibid., p. 329.
b Ibid., p. 33O.
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church that preaching was simply an incidental aspect of the church's life is to
misrepresent the early church. "Nothing seems more apparent," writes Nelson,
"than that the entire history of the Church has exhibited the central role of...
proclamation, whether by ordained preachers or laymen, whether in prepared
sermons or personal testimonies and eloquent actions."^
The centrality of preaching was certainly recognised by the reformers.
O
Calvin said, "God does not wish to be heard but by the voice of His ministers."
With more particular reference to the church, Karl Earth has suggested that
preaching is bound up with the church's existence: "the event of real proclamation
3
is the life-function of the Church...." In the same vein T.F. Torrance says that
"the church lives by its proclamation."^'
In another relevant comment Barth says that to find the motivo for preaching
in human initiative as Hill does is to "lose all insight into the need for
5
proclamation." The true motive for preaching is to be found in the coinnand,
authority, and direction of Christ.^ That is to say preaching is an essential,
not an incidental, aspect of the church'3 life.
If it is difficult to accept Hill's incidental role for preaching, it is
even more difficult to follow his reasoning from this concept of preaching to the
idea that preaching is a mark of the church. It is true that where the Word is
preached, the church exists; but according to Hill's view, it is also true that
the church exists where the Word is not preached. This last proposition cannot
be allowed if preaching is indeed the "life-function" of the church. If the Word
1 Nelson, op.clt., p. 100.
2 Calvin, Commentary on Isaiah, 50:10.
3 Barth, The Doctrine of the Yford of God, p. 98.
4 T.F. Torrance, Class Lecture. Cf. Kingdom and Church, p. 55.
5 Barth, Word of God, p. 100.
6 Wallace, Word and Sacrament, p. 84.
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is not preached, there is no living Body of Christ. It is only when preaching
is understood to be an essential, not an incidental aspect of the church's life
that preaching can be properly called a mark of the church.
We are given a second insight into Hill's concept of the'nature of preaching
through his description of preaching as lecturing. Beginning with the presupposition
1 2
that sermons are lectures, he exhorts' his students to choose a "topic" or idea
suggested by some passage of Scripture, bearing in mind that a topic must be
chosen which can be thoroughly canvassed in the allotted time. Having settled
rather arbitrarily upon the idea one is to present, one should then begin "to
collect all the information connected with the passage." One should read "the
best commentaries" in order "to attain an accurate acquaintance with any events
that are mentioned, with the situation and character of the principal actors,
with the geography of the country which is the scene of the transaction, with the
local customs to which any reference is made."3 After "due pains" in this activity,
one must "employ his own knowledge" to the topic,^ and satisfy his own mind as to
(T C.
the most "natural"-^ point of view. Having thus settled upon an opinion, one must
present that opinion in a coherent, organized lecture.7 To this end one must
strive for "excellence in the art of preaching,"® that is to say, one must achieve
a masterly style of composition, avoiding the repetition of thoughts and words,
but above all one must be "rational."9 Such a catalogue of advice suggests
that preaching is essentially the interesting lecture of an informed man. In
preaching the minister presents for the "satisfaction" of his hearers, his own
enlightened ideas about a passage of Scripture.
1 "The earliest Christian sermons were very much what we call lectures."
Institutes, p. 328.
2 Ibid., p. 337. 3 Ibid., p. 332.
4 Ibid., p. 332. 5 Ibid., pp. 338, 33°.
6 "Avoid the affectation of surprising your hearers, but let your discourse
turn upon those topics which the words of the text suggest to every man...."
Ibid., p. 337.
7 I8id., p. 358. 8 Ibid., p. 365. 9 Ibid. , p. 333.
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Certainly Hill justifies W.M. Taylor's criticism that the Moderates turned
4
the sermon into "a mere literary product," but more significant than this is the
complete failure on the part of Hill to treat preaching as the Word of God. It
is for him human speech, and only human speech. No one would question the fact
that in preaching we have to deal with human language, but many theologians
question Hill's implication that preaching is only human language and nothing
more. Calvin says, "Among the many noble endowments with wrhich God has ordained
the human race, one of the most remarkable is that He deigns to consecrate the
mouths and tongues of man to His service, making His own voice to be heard in
them.Commenting on Haggai, he makes even more explicit his view that preaching
is the very Ward of God. "The 'Word of God is not distinguished from the words
of the Prophet."^ This idea of preaching as the Word of God, lost after the
reformation, has been sounded again in our time by Karl Barth: "The Word of God
preached means...man's language about God in which and through which God himself
speaks about Himself.
No doubt this exalted concept of preaching presents us with certain problems.
There is the difficult problem of deciding -which language is the 'Word of God, and
5
which is simply the word of man. There is the problem of determining the
relationship between the Word of God and the word of man.^ There are the
1 Taylor, op.cit. , p. 142. 2 Calvin, Institutes, 4:1:5."
3 Calvin, Commentary on Haggai, 1:12. K Barth, V/oi-d of God, p. 106.
5. Calvin met this problem in the freedom-and power of the Spirit. He admits
the fact that preaching may- fail to be the ?/ord of Sod; "the act may remain on a
merely human level throughout, in which case the preacher with all his eloquence
and skill and fervour will accomplish nothing" '('Wallace, VYord and sacrament, p. 90).
It is only in the power of the Spirit that the word of man becomes the Y/ord of God;
"we may know that the external word is of no avail by itself, unless antimated
by the power of the Spirit 11 (Commentary on Bzekiel, 2;2).
6 Calvin met this problem by demanding that a sharp distinction be maintained
between God and man: "...we must set the Lord on one side and the minister on the
other. Vie must view the minister as one that is a servant, not a master - an
instrument, not the hand" (Commentary on I Cor., 3s7); "God himself who is the
author is conjoined with the~Instrument..7" "(Ibid. , 9:1). In a similar vein
Barth says, "God and the human element are not two factors operating side by side
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temptations and dangers of ultimate humility and ultimate pride. Yet difficult
as this doctrine may be, we must hold it if preaching is to be a mark of the
church. If God does not speak in preaching, then man must be the only speaker;
and the mere language of man cannot designate the true Body of Christ. If man
alone is the speaker, there can be no confidence in the voice of the church, no
assurance that the message it proclaims is trustworthy. Such speech that is
filled with doubt and uncertainty can hardly mark the Body of Him who is the very
ground of Christian certainty. If, however, in preaching God speaks, man can
accept the promises of the gospel without reservation: "nothing that has come
out of God's mouth can fail in its effect.If man alone is the speaker, there
is no reason for expecting anything to happen when preaching occurs. Obviously
Hill did not expect much to be accomplished by preaching as is evidenced by his
suggested stock-pile of sermons. One simply repeats old sermons, because he is
expected to lecture, not because he expects the power of God to be displayed.
Yet language that is dead, at best stale, can hardly mark the body of the Living
Lord. But if in preaching God speaks, then "preaching moves in an atmosphere
of expectation,for God's »bra cannot be divorced from God's action. "The
voice of God is,-.living and conjoined with effect."^ That is why Barth says
that real proclamation is an "event.
and together" (Word of God, p. 105); "Preaching is not...a joint-action by two
collaborators. It is the exercise of sovereign power on the part of God and
obedience on the part of man." (prayer and Preaching, p. 70).
1 Both temptations are met in remembering that preaching is a divine act
of grace. If one tends to concentrate on his own sinfulness, he should remember
that preaching is of grace. Thus "he will not allow himself to be paralysed
by his weakness....He knows that the divine will, will clothe his feebleness
and his wretchedness ana will endue his action with a quality which he himself
cannot give it" (prayer and Preaching, p. 85). If one tends to concentrate on
his own self-importance, he should remember that preaching is a divine act.
"It is God who speaks, not man" (ibid., p. 92).
2 Calvin, Commentary on Isaiah, 34:16.
3 Barth, Prayer and Preaching, p. 72.
4 Calvin, Commentary on I.Thoss., 1:4. 5 Barth, '/ford of God, p. 106.
If Christ, tha Head of the Body, speaks with authority and with power through
the proclamation of the church, then it is understandable that the true Body of
Christ exists where the voice of the Head is heard. If, however, the Word of
Christ is not heard in the preaching of the church, there is no reason to say
that preaching is a mark of the church. Once again it is difficult to see how
Hill moves from his concept of preaching as the interesting lecture of an informed
man to the idea of preaching as a mark of the church. Such a concept reflects
not only a low view of preaching, but a low view of the church as well. If
Hill's position is allowed, the church is nothing more than a group of individuals
who assemble to listen, with more or less interest, to the personal convictions
of a particular man, providing he chooses to articulate his convictions.
b. The task of preaching. In keeping with the incidental nature of preaching,
Hill assigns to preaching an insignificant task. The purpose of preaching is to
convince men that the information collected from Scripture by the preacher, and
conveyed by him, is true. Within this single task there are three subordinate
tasks. The purpose of preaching is to impart information, to interpret the Word,
and to influence opinion.
"The great purpose of Lecturing," says Hill, is the communication of
1
"information to your hearers"; and it is only as preaching conveys such information
that it is both useful and acceptable. In a sense, the preacher is a hired
information gatherer. Hill reminds his student's that most of their parishioners
have little access to books, little leisure for study, little capacity for
collecting literary information,"...and you cannot make them a more acceptable
present, than by imparting the fruit of your studies. "3
If the minister takes seriously his task of gathering information, he shall
in time collect more than he can diffuse. The question therefore arises as to
1
. Hill, Institutes, p. 33^•
2 Ibid» » P- 355. 3 Ibid., p. 333.
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what information one should impart to his hearers. Hill gives three criteria
to aid in this selection. In the first place the minister is "to comnunicate
only what is useful."'' Hill does not tell us what he means by useful, but
whatever is meant, a limitation is implied. Rather than preaching the whole
counsel of God, the minister in his own wisdom chooses what he y/ould have his
people to hear, and the rest is presumably discarded as useless. Secondly the
minister is to impart only what is understandable to the common man - "let your
discourse turn upon those topics which the word of the text suggest to every man
who understands them."2 Finally the minister is to "dwell upon points in the
discussion of which you run no risk of encountering established opinion."3
Having chosen the information which meets these prerequisites, the preacher
must then impart that information to his hearers. However, "in the present refined
state of the public ear," the minister "cannot expect to command attention and
admiration without...correct taste. Hence the instruction to diffuse "around
religions and moral instruction a captivating charm. "5 Thus Hill concludes that
"both judgment and taste are required in the execution of discourses" if they are
to "arrest the attention of the listeners";^ - judgment in deciding what informa¬
tion is to be presented, taste in making that information acceptable. This task,
so executed, "affords the preacher a pleasing exercise of his talents, in
collecting particular and accurate information, in polishing the several parts,
and giving the whole that degree of interest of which it is susceptible,"^
Hill's theory of the task of preaching is- seen to be false when examined
in the light of the true nature of preaching. If preaching is but the interesting
lecture of an informed man, then the task of preaching might well be the imparting
1 Ibid., p. 333. " " ~[bid. , p. 3571
3 X"b±c3. , p. 349. 4 Ibid. , p. 366.
5 Ibid*> P» 3^7. 6 Ibid., p. 366.
7 Ibid. , p. 356.
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of information. But if preaching is the Word of God, its task can in no way be
conceived as the regurgitation of religious knowledge, not even as the comnunica-
tion of truth about God. In the words of Brunner, 'God wills to do more than
"say something" to us, or even to "communicate something" to us: the content of
His conmunication is Himself.'2 jf preaching is the Y/ord of God, then the preacher
has no right to chose what he will or will not say. To follow the criterion of
Hill is to impinge upon the sovereignty of God. Therefore Barth says that when
a preacher has chosen a text, he must "follow the special trend of his text,
and keep to it wherever it may lead him."3 It is a dangerous and presumptuous
/
undertaking fox1 the minister to delete at will. If preaching is the 'Word of God,
there will be no need for the artistry and studied eloquence, which Hill suggests.**
As long as it is faithful to the Bible, preaching cannot be tedious. "Scripture
is in fact so interesting, it has so many new and startling things to tell us,
that those who listen cannot possibly be overcome with sleep."5 Finally, if
preaching is the Yford of God, then man has no cause for self glorification.
Hill said that "discourses...are one of the most likely means of raising a
clergyman to all the reputation and success to which our profession admits";^ and
this may well be the case, for Hill's "discourses" can hardly be called "real
proclamation." But if the preacher realizes that God is speaking through him,
then, far from boasting in this event, he is made painfully aware of his own
feebleness and imperfection. He can only glory in "that it has pleased God to
1 Barth, Prayer and Preaching, p. S77
2 Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason (London, 1947), p. 109.
3 Barth, prayer and Preaching, p. 69.
4 Ibid., p. 67. Y.'e are not "required to display the truth of God in an
artistic form by the use of vain images or by presenting Jesus Christ in outpourings
of sentimental eloquence, when Paul told the Galatians, that he had portrayed
before their eyes Jesus Christ crucified, he was not referring to speeches in
which he had used every device of artistry to capture the imagination of his hearers.
For him to portray Christ was to show him forth in plain truth without embellishments."
5 Ibid. , p. 93. 6 Hill, Institutes, p. 3^6.
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intervene on the human plane by means of a man, in spite of the inherent -weakness
of human nature."'1
The second function of preaching follows from the first. If the preacher
is to impart information, from whence does this information come? It comes from
Scripture. Preachers, therefore, serve the followers of Jesus "by acting as the
interpreters of his word."^ To interpret the Word is to lay hold of that
proposition which appears to be the leading idea of the Biblical writer, to
incorporate one's own opinion with his, and to present the sum in an orderly
fashion. Though it is permissible to impress upon the text one's own views,
one should not allow his views to thwart the purpose of conveying information
on the topic under review. "Ply counsel, therefore," says Hill, "is, not that
you should endeavor to prevent the leading features of your mind from appearing,
and predominating through your composition, but that you should not allow them
to defeat the end of your discourse, and to exclude many kinds of excellence which
it ought to profess."3 Hill further suggests that to give one's own "ideas equal
weight with those of the Biblical writer, one should present them as determined
by Scripture as well; "endeavor always to derive to your whole discourse the
venerable and edifying support of appearing to be dictated by the words of
Scripture.
Giving Hill the benefit of the doubt, his approach to the interpretation of
Scripture is nevertheless called into question by this observation from Sarth:
"If the preacher sets himself to expound a particular idea, in some form or
another - even if the idea is derived from a serious and well-informed exegesis -
then the Scripture is not allowed to speak for itself; the preacher is discoursing
on it."5 Ultimately, the basis of preaching is not interpretation, but revelation.
1 Barth, Prayer and Breaching, p. 85. Supra, p.240, note 1.
2 Hill, Institutes, p. 3^4. 3 Ibid., p. 378.
^ j P» 355. 5 Barth, Prayer and Preaching, p. 69.
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The fixed point from which all preaching starts is the fact that God has revealed
A
Himself. This starting point indicates both negative and positive functions for
preaching. Negatively, this means that preaching has nothing to do with any idea
or notion which the preacher has thought out in his own mind. James Stewart says
that "preaching exists not for the propagation of views, opinions and ideals, but
O
for the proclamation of the mighty acts of God.Positively, this means that
the preacher "does not have to invent but to repeat something."3 That is to say,
in proclamation everything has already been given to the preacher. All that
is necessary is to recount again what concerns the prior event of revelation.
/
"The task of the preacher can therefore be suimied up thus: to reproduce in
thought that one unique event, the gift of God's grace.
The third function of preaching for Hill brings us to the crux of the matter.
The preacher must lead his hearers to accept what he says as true. He must
convert them to his own position, or, in the words of Hill, "you must-carry your
hearers along with you.But the preacher is not to influence opinion as an
end in itself; he is to influence opinion as a means of influencing conduct. It
does little good to "win the approval of your hearers" unless you "deduce moral
observations and lessons of conduct,"^ Therefore, the preacher must not "neglect
that winning impressive manner of preaching morality which is to be learnt in
the school of Christ.He must remember "that the preaching of the Yr'ord is one
of the means which the Spirit of God employs to render the instructions and motives
of the Gospel effectual in producing that character, without which men cannot be
saved.He concludes that "the most useful, and the most acceptable kind of
1 Ibid. , p. 70.
2 James Stewart, Heralds of God (London, 1949), p. 5.
3 Barth, Prayer and Preaching, p. 69.
4 Ibid. , p. 73• 5 Hill, Institutes, p. 335.
6 Ibid., p. 356. 7 Ibid., p. 352. 8 Ibid., p. 352.
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preaching is that in which.. .morality is grounded upon faith";'' and that "the
great object" of preaching is the application of "the doctrine of religion to
regulate the conduct of a mixed audience."^
This function of preaching, set forth by Hill, is said by Earth to be a false
function of preaching, false on two counts. In the first place, the function of
preaching is not the conversion of others to the position of the preacher. It is
true that preaching "works toward a decision,"^ but it is a decision in favor of
God's truth, not man's opinion. In the second place, Hill's "great object" is
false. If preaching has one unique starting point, the revelation of God, then
it has "one unique end: the fulfillment of the Revelation, the redemption which
awaits us.Thus Calvin writes, "The Gospel is not preached that it may only
5
be heard by us, but that it may be as a seed of immortal life"; and "as often
then as God's fatherly love towards us is preached, let us know that tuere is
given to us ground for true joy, that with peacable consciences we may be
certain of our salvation."^ But Calvin's assessment of the function of preaching
does not stop here, preaching is the means whereby God comes to us; "He
approaches by the preaching of the Word...."' It is also the means whereby the
gifts of Christ are conveyed to us: "God has ordained His word as the instrument
by which Jesus Christ, with all His graces, is dispensed to us."® preaching is
also the instrument by means of which Christ establishes His rule in the hearts
1 Ibid., pp. 352-353'
^ r°:Lc3. , p. 377. Cf. Thomas Dick, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 378.
"One of the great objects of preaching ought undoubtedly to be, to investigate
the numerous and minute ramifications of human conduct; to explore every avenue
of corruption; to endeavour to draw forth from its hiding-place every immoral
principle and action, which exerts its pernicious influence in Christian or in
general society."
3 Barth, Prayer and Preaching, p. 68. 4 Ibid. , p. 71.
5 Calvin, Commentary on I Peter, 1:23. 6 Calvin, Commentary on John, 15:11.
7 Calvin, Commentary on Isaiah, 50:2.
8 Calvin's Opera Selecta (ed. P. Barth), Vol. I, p. 505, "...Comme instrument,
par lequel lesus Christ, avec toutes ses graces, nous soit dispense." Translation
by R.S. Wallace.
247
of His people, "Christ does not otherwise rule among us than by the doctrine
•1
of the Gospel"; and Ilis Lordship over the world,"Christ reign3 whenever He
O
subdues the world to Himself by the preaching of the Gospel.It is no wonder
that Calvin speaks in exalted terras of preaching as a prize and treasure.^
Hill's statement on the function of preaching is not only false, but ecliptic.
It obscures the true function of preaching as the means whereby Christ designates
His own Body on earth. Once more we conclude that Hill's paltry treatment of the
function of preaching reflects not only a low view of preaching, but a low view
of the church of which it is the mark. If Hill's position is allowed, the church
can be no more than a group of men who crave to know and disseminate bits of
knowledge imminent in the existence of men and things.
c. The relation of preaching to dogmas. Hill's discussion of the nature
and function of preaching raises the question of the relation of preaching to
dogmas. The purpose of preaching is the communication of information, and this
information is composed, in part, of one's own ideas about a Scriptural topic.
No doubt, the topic itself is valid, but how is one to know if his thoughts about
it are "sound." Hence there arises the need of a system of doctrine against -which
to check the orthodoxy of one's teaching. To sho?/ that such a system is legitimate,
and that it does not encroach upon the rights of private judgment, Hill makes his
usual two-fold appeal. In this case he appeals first to the ancient "practice
of the States of Greece," and then to the "Apostolic sanction...revealed in the
15th and 16th chapters of the book of Acts."^ ■ To this testimony he adds the
tradition of the "Protestant Churches" in establishing their confessions, symbols,
1 Calvin, Cormientary on Micah, 4:3- -
2 Calvin, Commentary on Acts, 1:8.
3 Calvin, Conine n tary on James, 1:21.
4 Hill, Institutes, p. 340.
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formularies, and catechisms, all of which "declare what the great body of the
disciples of Christ believe to be true."'' Hill argues then that churches have
the right to publish "a declaration of the truths that they believe to be
contained in Scripture;...and consequently they are entitled to require, that
every person to whom they afterwards convey the power of ordination...shall at
his admission subscribe their confession, or, in some other way, testify his
acquiescence in the opinions which it declares."^ Hill correctly states that the
formulation of such a system is the work of the church, not the work of any
individual; but in terms of the branch theory, he means the local or national
church, not the one universal church:
...in every independent kingdom or state, the' Christian teachers with the
concurrence of civil authority, are fully competent, without waiting for
the judgment of Christians in other countries, to prepare such a general
declaration of the Christian faith, and such occasional preservatives
against error, as may answer the purposes for which the Church of Christ
was appointed by its Founder to watch ever purity of doctrine.-5
Once Hill has established the necessity of dogmas, he turns to their functions,
which are dual. First, they limit the scope of preaching. Hill says that "the
love of liberty is natural to man; He aspires after independence in his opinions,
as well as in his actions."^- As long as a man remains a "private Christian" he
may "enjoy the liberty of publishing any opinions which do not disturb the
public tranquility";^ but "every person who professes to become a minister of
this Established Church should be aware of the restraints to which he will then
subject himself...by subscribing the Confession of Faith at his admission, he gives
a solemn pledge to the State and to the Church, that he concurs with the community
of teachers in the general views upon which that Confession was compiled and
published."0 A wide range of topics is available, however, for the "general
views upon which, the Confession was compiled" included a two-layer system of
1 Ibid. , p. 341.
4 Ibid., p. 347.
2 Ibid., pp. 340,343.
5 > p. 345.
3 Ibid., p. 342.
6 , p. 345.
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theology - on the bottom was natural religion and built upon that was a system
-]
of revealed theology. W.1/4 Taylor says that among those who adhered to this
system there "developed a tendency to dwell rather on those things which are
common to...natural religion than on such things as are and always have been
stumbling blocks.Y/hether this sweeping generalization is true or not, the
system did acknowledge Hill's moralistic topics as legitimate.
Although the scope is broad, it is not unlimited. Not only are topics
outside this system unfit for preaching, some topics even within the system should
be avoided. Hill warns his students against introducing "the discussions of the
college into their discourses from the pulpit."3 Even when guided by what appears
to be "the pure dictates of reason and benevolence," one may be far from reconcil¬
ing his "peculiar opinions with the established system.Hill, therefore,
suggests that his students dwell on those issues within the system which shall
cause no controversy, and keep the debatable issues for private study. "If you
do, in this way, make a sacrifice, by being debarred from subjects upon which
your heart inclines to speak, comfort yourselves with the reflection, that there
is still open to you a large field in which you may find numberless subjects of
useful, interesting, and practical discourse.
If the system of dogmas is to perform this function of determining the valid
topics of preaching, then it is necessary to know the entire system. "You will
speak superficially and inaccurately of any particular branch of theology, unless
you have formed a dear apprehension of the whole system."^
This last statement indicates that, for Kill, dogmas perform a second function.
They not only determine the scope of preaching, but in a final analysis become
the subject matter of preaching.
1 Supra, p. 59, note 1.
3 Hill, Institutes, p. 347.
5 Ibid., pp. 349-350.
2 Taylor, op.cit., p. 143*
4 ibid., pp. 347-348.
6 Ibid., p. 3^1 •
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It is very dangerous, upon any point, whether moral, religious, or
political, to unsettle' the established opinions of those who are
unaccustomed to speculation, and incapable of forming general views;
and upon this account, it is the duty of those who speak: from the
pulpit, to hold forth at all times, clear and unembarrassed views
of the great doctrines of religion.''
In another context Hill makes the same point. Ministers are "to consider it as
the object of their ambition, that the established...teaching which the state
hath provided shall never cease to be reconmended to the attention and the good
opinion of the people.The minister is one who propagates the existing dogmas
of "his church," and his preaching is understood to be "the legal specimen of
his proficiency in the study of theology." If the system performs this
function, namely, supplying the subject matter for preaching, then-preaching
can easily become nothing more than a defense of the system. No doubt, Hill is
guilty of this error. He says in fact that the minister is placed in the pulpit
"to defend the present truth."3 Elsewhere he writes,
we are led to consider the succession of Christian teachers as intended to
be the guardians of that truth which may be learned from Scripture; and
the church, the great society composed of those teachers, is presented to
our view under the idea of the keepers of the sacred deposit, over which
they are appointed to watch. ^
Although preaching is not merely human language, it is human language
nonetheless. As such, it is impure and imperfect, and needs to be constantly
corrected and revised. To that end Barth agrees with Hill that dogmas are
necessary to 'test the "orthodoxy"'5 of the church's proclamation. He also
concurs with Hill in stating that dogmas limit the scope of preaching. One must
"have as the purpose and limit of one's message the confession of one's church."^
In spite of their agreement as to the necessity of dogmas and this function
of dogmas, Hill and Barth disagree drasticly as to the nature of dogmas. Hill
1 Ibid. , p. 549. 2 Ibid., p. 164. 3 Ibid. , p. 346.
4 Hill, L. I.D., Vol. Ill, pp. 493-494. 5 Barth, Word of God, p. 92.
6 Barth, Prayer and preaching, p. 81.
believed dogmas constituted a closed "system of truth,"'' and one that was
"unchangeable" in the same sense that Christ is unchangeable. Earth on the
other hand suggests that dogmas "cannot...have in view a system of Christian
truth";3 "they are not the truth of revelation."^ Neither are they settled
once for all - "dogmas...aim at being on the way to the truth of revelation."5
Therefore Barth cannot accept Hill's position that dogmas are the subject natter
of proclamation. "It is a well-known and perhaps unavoidable beginner's
mistake in students and licentiates when preaching, to imagine that they must
and may confidently take the matter of their preaching from some once treasured
college notebook or textbook on dogmatics."^ Whereas Hill suggests that dogmas
are the raw material of proclamation, Earth suggests just the opposite.
d. The relation of preaching to the mission of "the church. We have
discussed Hill's concept of preaching in detail for a specific reason. Hill
nowhere treats the mission of the church, but his understanding of the concept
of preaching reflects his understanding of the church's task. Prom the above
discussion two functions for the church emerge. The first is that the church is
to be an educational institution. If the church is to continue its existence in
the world , it must see to it that the system of truth upon which it is founded
is passed along from generation to generation. "That system may be learnt by
searching the Scriptures";^ but Christ has "provided, in the constitution of his
religion, a standing method of instruction."8 Rather than each individual
determining this system on his own, all individuals are to look to the church
1 Hill, Institutes, p. 338* 2 Ibid., p. 339.
3 Barth, Word of Cod, p. 88. 4 Ibid. , p. 307.
5 Ibid., p. 308. 6 Ibid., p. 88.
7 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 494.
8 Ibid-» F» ^92.
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for it. Thus one office of the church is "to afford the disciples of Christ
that assistance in learning the truth.11'' The task of the church, like the task
of preaching, is the propagation of that system of truth to which it adheres.
Secondly Hill's concept of preaching indicates that a principle function of
the church is the exercise of moral influence in the world. The church is
primarily a society of Christians acting as an ethical leaven within society
p
as a whole. As a moral watch-dog, the church ha3 to conquer the evil passions
of men, enforce the performance of duties, and co-operate with hurnan laws in
preserving the peace and order of the community. 3
This two-fold function of the church is summed up in this single statement
which declares "the purposes for which the Christian society was instituted."^
The church,
being founded in opposition, not to human violence, but to the influence
of an evil spirit, was established for the purpose of delivering men from
this spiritual thraldom, by imparting to them the knowledge of that truth
which Christ reveaLs, by cherishing those graces which his Spirit forms,
and by leading them, in the obedience of his precepts, and the imitation
of his example, to that future happiness of which his mediation encourages
them to entertain the hope...it gives notice that wrong will be done; it
teaches how wrong ought to be borne; and it represents reproach, and
injury, and persecution, as forming part of that discipline, by which its
subjects are prepared for a higher state of being, where their sufferings
are to cease, and their patience is to be rev/arded.^
In a resolute denial of Hill's position Barth says clearly that it is not
"the church's ta3k to educate humanity and make human beings into real men....The
Church is not an institution to keep the world on the right path nor is it
r
dedicated to the service of progress." These-comments strike a death blow to
"1 Ibid., p. 495.
2 Hill, Institutes, p. 502, "...the propagation of the Christian religion
/~is_J7 the best method of promoting the virtue and happiness of the human race."
Cf. Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History (Hew York, 193^)> P. 220, where
he defines the church "as that sociological reality in which the holy is
supposed to be presented."
5 > P*
5 Ibid., p. 457.
4 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, p. 456.
6 Barth, Prayer and Preaching, p. 79.
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Hill's concept of the mission of the church. Earth adds that these things "rALay
a part" in the mission of the church, but that they can never become primary.
"The moment he makes them his chief object, the preacher ceases to have any
justification for preaching.The truth of this last statement is verified
by Hill's own action. He became so enamoured with the church's role as a moral
adviser that he lost sight of the church's true mission - a mission grounded in
God's love for the world in Christ.
The extent to which Hill lost sight of this mission of the church is indicated
by his statements in the foreign mission debate before the General Assembly in
1796. The Synod of Fife, of which Hill was a member, presented to the assembly
an overture in which it urged the Assembly to consider the most effective methods
by which the Church of Scotland might contribute to the spread of the gospel over
the world. "Principal Hill made a long speech in which he strenuously labored
O
to defeat the missionary cause."
In it3 present form the Assembly may take it i/~overture_yr up or not, just
as they think proper. It is clothed in egressions so general and vague, -
it recommends an object so truly Christian and warranted by Scripture
prophesy, yet so great and comprehensive in its aspect, involving so many
perplexing considerations, and promising such uncertain consequences, -
that I am inclined to think the Assembly are not called on to consider it,
but might simply dismiss it at once.4
This was not the first time that Hill had thwarted the missionary interest in
the church of Scotland. In a sermon preached at the opening of the General Assembly
in 1790 he poured much cold water on the flames of evangelistic zeal. He pointed
out that enthusiasm for the lost might actually be opposed to the purposes of
the Almighty God who is said to operate in a "gradual" way.
1 Ibid. , p. 79. 2 II. -Miller, op.cit. , p. 164.
3 'Hill's speech before the General Assembly, cited by Joseph Grant, Account
of the Proceedings and Debate in the General Assembly of the Church of Septland,
27th Hay, 179b, p. 44.
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I observe that as, in natural productions, there is a time of maturity,
to which all the preparation had tended, so the season destined for the
appearance of the Gospel...was produced by a preparation of four thousand
years; during which some measure of religious knowledge was gradually
diffused throughout the world...we profit very much by marking the slow
advances of nature to its end: and we are not warranted by the analogy
of any part of Divine Providence, to expect, in the communication of
religious instruction, that haste, which to our imaginations may appear
desirable.^
Hill, therefore, urges the church to "display the attraction of virtue,"^ to
"prescribe that rational devotion which is the most delightful, the most ennobling,
the most natural, exercise of the human powers,"3 and to make provision "far
restoring the virtue and happiness of the human race."4 in so doing, "there is
J
a preparation, not perhaps intended by us, yet such as the nature of the case
requires, for the knowledge of the true God and his son Jesus Christ being
communicated to the ends of the world."5 s0 far from understanding the mission
of the church to be the mission of reconciliation in which it lives out in its
own life the reconciling love of God,1^ Hill understands the mission of the church
to be simply the exercise of moral influence within society.
3. The right administration of the sacraments
Hill says that the second mark of the true church is the right administration
of the sacraments. The correct administration, however, depends upon a proper
1 Hill, Sermons, p. 352. Cf. The statement by Hamilton of Gladsmuir, who
spoke with Hill against the cause of missions in 1796. "To spread abroad the
knowledge of the gospel among barbarous and heathen nations seerns to me highly
preposterous, in as far as it anticipates, nay, as it even reverses, the order
of nature. Men must be polished and refined in manners before they can be
properly enlightened in religious truths." J. Grant, on.pit., pp. 17-16.
2 Ibid., p. 364. 3 Ibid. , p. 341.
4 Ibid., p. 362. 5 ibid., p. 357.
6 "In Jesus Christ the form that the Love of God took was the form of a
Servant who poured out His life for mankind... .The Church i3 sent by Him to live
out its divinely given life among men and by love to bring men into the fellowship
of healing and peace with God....In order to fulfill that mission the Church must
be in itself a conmunion of love, a fellowship of reconciliation - it must live
out in its own life the reconciling love of God which brought it into existence
and determines its innermost being." T.F. Torrance, Class Notes, p. 8.
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understanding of the doctrine of the sacraments themselves: "those who understand
it thoroughly have received the best preparation for discharging this part of
their public duty."'' Let us examine, then, Hill's doctrine of the sacraments.
a. The sacraments in general. Hill's first concern is to establish the
necessity of the sacraments. Their indispensibility arises from human weakness -
the weakness of faith to accept the grace of God as a sure thing. God, aware
of this weakness, condescendingly gave to His people "those helps which he saw
to be necessary" for the increase of their faith, and their acceptance of His
2
promise as reliable.
It is usual for covenants amongst men to be confirmed by certain solemnities.
In the simplicity of ancient time, the solemnities were monuments or large
stones erected as a witness of the transaction....In more advanced periods
of society, the solemnities have become deeds written in a formal style,
sealed, delivered, and exchanged between the parties at the time of the
contract, and remaining, till they are cancelled, as vouchers of the
original transaction. As circumcision was ordained as the token and seal
of the covenant v/ith Abraham, we are led to expect that, when the Almighty
published the covenant of grace by his Son,...he would, with the same
condescension to human weakness, grant some confirmation of the grace
therein manifested, some sensible sign which might establish a reliance
upon his promise, and constitute the ground of a federal act between
him and his creatures.3
This confirmation of grace is called a sacrament, a name which nowhere
appears in Scripture." Sacramenturn, being a word of Latin extraction, could not
be introduced into theology by the original language, in which the books of the
New Testament were written; it was introduced in the Vulgate, or old Latin trans¬
lation of the Bible, where it is put for the Greek word pucrarjpiov . Hill
appeals to Campbell's discussion of the relationship of sacramentum and puorripiov ?
and states, "he has clearly shown that puovriptov always means either a secret,
1 Hill, Institutes, p. 3^9. 2 Ibid. , p. 3*18.
3 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, pp. 291-2.92. h Ibid. , p. 292.
5 George Campbell, Preliminary Dissertation to a_ New Translation of the
Gospels.
256
something unknown till it was revealed; or a latent spiritual meaning of some
fable, emblem, or type."^ He continues, "in both these senses pixrroptov
is rendered in the Vulgate sacramentum, although when we attend to the etymology
of the two words they do not appear to correspond. . Meya Ixru pucrrnptov e-'ul^siac,
magnum est sacramentum pietatis: xo pucrrriptov xcov ev.xa dcmrepov,
O
sacramentum septem stellarum." Hill's point is that etymologically Scripture
does not warrant the translation of the Greek puoxTjptov by the Latin
sacramentum.3 He adds, however, that such a translation "has the sanction of
very ancient practice.
As some of the most sacred and retired parts of the ancient he athan.worship
were called mysteries, there is reason to think that the word pao'Trip 1 a
was early applied to the Lord's Supper, which, from the beginning Christians
regarded with much reverence, which in times of persecution, they wore
obliged to celebrate in private, and from which they were accustomed to
exclude both those who had been guilty of notorious sins, and those who
had not attained sufficient knowledge. The Latin word sacramentum
followed this application of the Greek word.3
Hill concludes that the word "sacrament," in the sense in which it is now used,
"is an ecclesiastical, not a Scriptural word," and that the nature of a sacrament
cannot be determined by "the original meaning of the word," but rather by "the
practice of those with whom it occurs."0
Hill therewith proceeds to examine briefly the nature of the sacraments from
the Roman, Socinian, and Reformed point of view, setting forth his own views by
way of criticism.
Sacraments are conceived in the church of Rome to consist of matter,
deriving, from the action of the priest.in pronouncing certain words, a
divine virtue, by which grace is conveyed to the soul of every person who
1 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 292. 2 Ibid. , p. 292.
3 "For from the etymology nothing more can be deduced than that a sacrament
is something, either a word, or an action connected with what is sacred."
Ibid. , p. 293.
> Ibid. , p. 293.
5 Ibid. , p. 293. Cf. Calvin, Institutes, 4:14:13> "•••it is evident that the
ancient fathers, who gave our signs the name of sacraments, were not at all guided
by the previous use of this word in Latin writers; but that they gave it a new
sense for their own convenience...."
6 Ibid. , p. 293.
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received them....On the part of those who receive the sacrament, it is
required that they be free from any of those sins called in the church
of Rome mortal; but it is not required of them to exercise any good
disposition, to possess faith, or to resolve that they shall amend
their lives.^
By way of refutation, Hill says of this doctrine,
It represents the sacraments as a mere charm, the use of which, being
totally disjoined from every mental exercise, cannot be regarded as a
reasonable service. It gives men the hope of receiving, by the use of
a charm, the full participation of the grace of God, although they
continue to indulge that very large class of sins, to which the accom¬
modating morality of the church of Rome extends the name of venial; and
yet it makes this high privilege entirely dependent upon the intention
of another, who, although ho performs all the outward acts which belong ,
to the sacrament, may, if he chooses, withhold the communication of that
physical virtue, without which the sacrament is of none avail.
According to Hill, the Socinian doctrine
conceived that the sacraments are not essentially distinct from any other
rites or ceremonies; that as they consist of symbolical action, in which
something external and material is employed to represent what is
spiritual and invisible, they may by this address to the senses be of
use in reviving the remembrance of past events, and in cherishing pious
sentiments; but that their affect is purely moral.J
Only mildly critical of this view, Hill writes,
this doctrine is infinitely more rational than the Popish, more friendly
to the interest of morality, and consequently more honorable to the
religion of Christ. But like all the other parts of the Socinian system,
it represents that religion in the simple view of being a lesson in
righteousness, and loses sight of that character of the Gospel, which is
meant to be implied in calling it a covenant of grace.'4'
In setting forth what he conceived to be the Reformed doctrine of the nature
of the sacraments, Hill admits that every point of the Socinian doctrine is true,
true as far as it goes, but that it is incomplete. The sacraments are not only
signs, but also seals of the covenant of grace. They not only "represent an
inward invisible grace," but are "pledges that that grace will be conveyed to all
1 Ibid., p. 294.
3 Ibid., p. 295.
2 Ibid. , pp. 294-295.
4 Ibid., p. 296.
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in whom the proper moral effect is produced."'' In Hill's opinion, then, sacraments
"constitute federal acts, in which the persons who receive .them with proper
dispositions, solemnly engage to fulfil their part of the covenant, and G-od
o
confirms his promise to them in a sensible manner." For any act to be classified
as a sacrament Hill says that three prerequisites must be met: there must be
external matter which resembles the thing signified; there must be Christ's
command, or His words of institution; there mist be a promise which connects the
matter with the grace conveyed.On the basis of these requirements Hill
maintains, against the Socinians, a distinction between rites and ceremonies.
Ceremonies "are in their nature arbitrary," but rites are "ordained by God.
It is also on this account that he rejects five of the seven sacraments of Rome,
"because in some of the five we do not find any matter,...and in others we do
not find any promise connecting the matter used with the grace said to be thereby
signified."8 Hill concludes that only baptism and the Lord's Supper fulfil
all the requirements.
In Baptism and the Lord's Supper, to which the name of sacraments is,
according to our definition, limited, we find all which that definition
requires. In each there is matter, an external visible substance; and
there is also a positive institution authorizing that substance to be
used with certain words in a religious rite. And we think that...the two
are not barely signs of invisible grace, but were intended by him-who
appointed them to be pledges of that grace, and seals of the covenant
by which it is conveyed."
The consequences of Kill's federalistic concept of the nature of the sacraments
will become more evident when we examine his exposition of the doctrines of baptism
and the Lord's Supper, but several remarks are in order concerning his view of the
sacraments in general. First, Hill manifests a tendency to treat the sacraments
t Ibid., p. 296. 2 Ibid., p. 297.
3 Ibid., p. 257. Cf. Calvin, Institutes, 4:19:1.
4 Ibid. , p. 297. 5 Ibid. , pp. 297-298. 6 Ibid., p. 298.
259
as independent entities, devoid of integral association with the Word of God.
In the Reformed tradition, however, which Hill claims to expound, the Word and
the sacraments are always considered in the closest possible connection. "Despite
the wide range of opinion as to the exact nature of the Sacraments, the spiritual
descendents of Luther, Calvin, and the evangelical reformers have generally
followed the belief of Augustine that the true Sacrament is the verbuin visible,
•i
the Word in visible form and action." Why Hill failed to hold the Word and
sacraments in the closest proximation is a matter of conjecture, but why he
should have done so is a matter of great significance. According to Calvin,
the sacraments, apart from the Word, are ineffectual; they are "nothing in
O
themselves." In fact Calvin calls the sacraments separated from the Word "idle
and unmeaning shadows."3 Thus signs become sacraments then only when the Word
is added. But if, on the one hand, the sacraments are ineffectual without the
Word, on the other hand, the Word cannot have its full effect without the
sacraments. The sacraments confirm the Word^ by making it more visible and
concrete to our senses, something which our carnal nature demands.
Because man who is carnal will have God with him according to the capacity
of the flesh, this is the cause why men are so bold in all ages to make
idols. And God indeed so far applies Himself to our rudeness that He shows
Himself visible, after a manner, under figures, for there were many signs
under the law to testify His presence. And He comes down to us, even at
this day, by Baptism and the Lord's Supper.-5
The sacraments then are the true visible representation of the Word. In failing
1 Nelson, op.cit. , p. 122. Cf. R.S. Wallace, Calvin's Doctrine of Word
and Sacrament, p. 140, where he notes that Calvin "quotes with approval a saying
of Augustine to the effect that the sacrament is the 'visible word'."
Cf. Institutes, 4:14:1.
2 Calvin, Institutes, 4:14:4.
3 Calvin, Institutes, 4:14:4. Cf. H. Hermelink, "The Ministry and
Sacraments in the Evangelical Churches of Germany today", The i.'dnistry and the
Sacraments (London, 1937), p. 153> "The Sacrament is verbuin visible, which has
no special meaning of its own, nor one apart from the Word of God."
4 "A sacrament...accompanies and confirms preaching." Barth, Word of God,
P# ^1.
5 Calvin, Commentary on Acts, 7:40.
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to relate the sacraments to the Word, Hill has denied the sacraments their true
nature as dependent upon the Word, and their true function as confirmation of
the Word.
In the second place, Kill separates the sacraments from living union with
the Person of Christ. No doubt this is a direct influence of federal theology.
"Union" with Christ in certain presentations of that system is thought of simply
in forensic and legal terms; therefore, the sacraments as signs and seals of that
contractual relation are naturally thought of in those same terms. So it is that
Hill defines sacraments as "federal acts," but he would have been more correct in
following the direction of the Larger Catechism, which, though cast in the federal
framework, speaks of the spiritual part of both sacraments as "Christ and His
A
Benefits."' The implication is that the substance and reality of the sacraments,
so far from being merely a legal relation to Christ, is rather the whole Christ
Himself together with all His grace. It is in this vein that Paul Minear writes
that sacraments may be defined in part "as whatever means the Spirit adopts for
communicating participation in the death and resurrection of Christ."^ In inter¬
preting the sacraments apart from union with the living person of Christ Hill
k®s a priori denied all grounds for understanding the sacraments as the means of
ingrafting believers into Christ and of nourishing that mystical union.
In the third place, Hill's emphasis falls, not on God's promise, but on man's
faith, on what Durham called "the inward answer of conscience."^ No doubt once
again we witness the direct influence of federal theology. In Hill's understanding
of that system the covenant had become a contract, and as such it demanded a
contractual response. Hill, therefore, stresses the necessity of man to keep
1 The Larger Catechism, No. 176.
2 P.S. Linear in the Piles of Conrrdssion I, World Council of Churches,
quoted by Nelson, op.cit. , p. 121.
3 James Durham, Heaven upon Earth (Edinburgh, i685)> P. 103•
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his part of the bargain if he is to have an interest in Christ. The sacraments,
as signs of that agreement become signs of man's intention to believe in Christ
and to follow His commands. This is not to deny that faith is a necessary
condition of the sacraments, but it is a misconception so to emphasize the
necessity of faith that the value of the sacraments is made to depend entirely
upon the recipient.'' Calvin, who acknowledges the necessity of faith, refuses
to let this become primary. Against those who insisted upon referring to the
sacraments as pledges of human loyalty to God, he writes, "We approve not, that
that which is a secondary thing in the sacraments is by them made the first
and indeed the only thing. The first object of them is to assist our faith
2
towards. God; the second, to attest our confession before men." For both Calvin
and Hill, the question of faith is a question of emphasis, not a question of
exclusion; but whereas Calvin emphasized God's grace, Hill emphasized man's faith.
By making that which is primary secondary, and vice versa, Hill has reversed the
movement within the sacraments from God's promise coming down to man in grace to
man's pledge of allegiance going up to God in faith. In fact, says Hill, there
3
is a proper analogy between the sacraments "and the military oath of fidelity."
Consequently he is led to speak of the sacraments as "the external badges of the
Christian profession."^
b. Baptism. To introduce his doctrine of baptism, Hill establishes the
origin of this sacrament. The practice of baptism, which in one way or another
signifies -washing and cleansing, "arose probably from a consciousness of impurity,
1 "Report of the Theological Commission appointed by the Continuation
Committee of the Faith and Order Movement under the Chairmanship of the Right
Rev. A.C. Headlam", The Ministry and the Sacraments, p. 27.
2 Calvin, Institutes, 4:1 A:13.
3 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, p. 293. Cf. Calvin, Institutes, 4:14:13, where
he refutes this analogy.
4 Ibid. , Vol. I, p. 371; Vol. Ill, p. 298.
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A
and an opinion that innocence was acceptable to the gods." In all religions,
pagan and heathen alike, baptism i3 understood as the profession of those who
undergo this rite to abstain from all forms of pollutions, all errors and defile-
ments. It was in this sense that the ancient Jews adopted the rite. "When any
inhabitants of the countries adjoining to Judah turned from the worship of idols,
and, professing their faith in the God of Israel, desired to be numbered as his
servants among the proselytes to the law of Hoses, they were baptised."^ It was
in accommodation to this general practice that Jesus employed his apostles to
baptize those who came to him. Christ, "having condescended in this respect, to
the usage of the times...introduced baptism into the last commission which he gave
his apostles."3 However, in order to distinguish this rite from similar ones in
the pagan world, Christ added these words, "in the name of the Father, and the
Son, and the Holy Spirit."4
If this is the origin of Christian baptism, what is its nature? In answer
to this question Hill claims to set forth "the rational doctrine common to all
the reformed churches with regard to the effect of this sacrament."5 Wishing,
therefore, to avoid the Socinian error regarding baptism,® as well as "the more
dangerous and more irrational" error of Rome,^ he takes up a position which he
holds to be a mean between the two. Baptism is essentially "the initiatory
rite of Christianity, the solemn profession of the Christian faith,"® but it
has something more to it than that, and it is the something more that saves it
1 Ibid. 7*Vol» III, p. 299. 2 Ibid., p. 299.
3 Ibid., p. 300. 4 Ibid., p. 300. 5 Ibid. , p. 311.
6 "For it appears to them that what was intended merely for the purpose
of being a discriminating rite, ceases of course, in circumstances where there
is no need for- discrimination; and that the observance of it is of real
importance only in those cases...when persons who had been educated in another
religion are converted to Christianity." Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, pp. 302-303.
7 "The Church of Rome considers baptism...as of itself applying the merits
of Christ to the person baptised....Hence they deduce the absolute necessity of
baptism in order to salvation." Ibid. , p. 309.
® Ibid., p. 306. Christ "introduced baptism into the last commission which
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from the Socinian error. That something else is described by Hill as "a federal
act, in which those who sponsion with sincerity on their part, receive a pledge
and security that the blessings exhibited shall be conveyed to their souls.""'
By "federal act" Hill means that "mutual stipulations" are confirmed in such a
way that an intimate connection is established between the rite itself and the
two characteristic blessings of the covenant, the forgiveness of sins, and the
communication of inward grace.^ Hill explains baptism's connection with each
blessing in this way. Baptism does not convey "the annihilation of past sins,"
but only the promise of forgiveness for those sins of 'which believers repent.
"\'{e mate no distinction," says Hill, "as to the efficacy of Baptism between sins
committed before, and sins committed after the administration of it."3 Baptism
implies "the remission of every sin that is repented of."^" The mutual stipulations
are thus set forth - if believers repent, then Christ will forgive, and baptism
is the seal of this contractual agreement, the guarantee that each party will
fulfill his end of the bargain. To describe the connection between baptism
and inward grace, Hill uses the language of Romans 6 in a striking v/ay.
The Apostle Paul, Rorn. vi. 4, 5> 6, illustrates this connection by an allusion
drawn from the ancient method of administering baptism. The immersion in
wrater of the bodies of those who were baptized is jan emblem of that death
unto sin, by which the conversion of Christians is generally expressed;
the rising out of the water, the breathing the air again after having been
for seme time in another element, is _an emblem of that new life which
Christians by their profession are bound, and by the power of their
religion are enabled to lead. The time during which they remained under
the water is a kind of temporary death, after the image of the death of
Christ, during which they deposited under the stream the sins of which
the old man was composed: when they emerged from the water, they rose,
after the image of his resurrection, to a life of righteousness here,
and a life of glory hereafter. Hero is a significant representation both
of what the baptized persons engaged to do, and also of the grace and
strength communicated to their souls.3
he gave his apostles in a manner which seems to intimate that he intended it to
be the initiatory rite of his universal religion." p. 300» Cf. Institutes, p. 3^0«
1 Ibid., p. 312. 2 Ibid, , p. 307. 3 Ibid., p. 312.
4 Ibid. , p. 312. 5 Ibid. , p. 307. Underlining is mine.
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Emphasis hero is clearly upon rational symbolism, and this caused Hill to make
several negative statements concerning baptism. He renounced the idea that there
is an "immediate effect of baptism," and that "a renovation of the mind accompanies
the act of baptism."'' Likewise, he rejects the idea that baptism implies the
"infusion of a new character," and that it is "the physical instrument of...
justification."^ It is only the seal of a federal act, "vouchsafed to us by God."5
It is precisely because baptism is a federal act that Hill has great difficulty
in accepting the baptism of infants. If baptism were "merely a discriminating
badge," as the Socinians say, then there would be no problem. If baptism "were
a charm communicating virtue," as Rome says, then still there is no problem,
for virtue "might be received by a child as well as a man."^1" "But if baptism be
a federal act, there seems to be the strongest reason for its being delayed till
the party, upon whose sponsion its efficacy with regard to himself entirely depends,
shall understand the nature of the sponsion."5 Nevertheless, Hill supports the
practice of infant baptism. In justifying his position he selects certain of
Calvin's arguments about the relation of baptism to circumcision,^ and about
the reception of children into the kingdom by Jesus."'' He also refers to "the
1 Ibid., p. 312. 2 Ibid., p. 307. 3 Ibid., p. 312.
4 Ibid., p. 3I4.
5 Ibid. , p. 3*1 b- Cf. Institutes, p. 312, "The practice of infant baptism
appears to be inconsistent with the idea of a federal act."
6 Calvin said that God expressly pronounced "that the circumcision of a little
infant should serve as a seal for the confirmation of the covenant. But if the
covenant remains firm and unmoved, it belongs to the children of Christians now,
as much as it did to the infants of Jev;s under the Old Testament." Institutes,
4:16:5. Hill said, if the covenant of grace be the same in substance with the
Abrahamic covenant, and if baptism comes in place of circumcision, the presumption
is...that baptism also should be administered to infants." L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 315*
7 Calvin said that "it is not to be passed over as a thing of little
importance, that Christ commanded infants to be brought to him, and added, as
a reason for this command, 'For of such is the kingdom of heaven;'....If it be
reasonable for infants to be brought to Christ, why is it not allowable to admit
them to baptism, the symbol of our communion and fellowship with Christ? If of
them is the kingdom of heaven, why shall they be denied the sign, which opens,
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authority of Scripture" and to "the general usage of the Christian church."''
Ultimately Hill's concern for infant baptism is two-fold. First, he regards
"the baptism of infants as a provision for perpetuating the church of Christ,
p
and transmitting his religion to the latest generations." Secondly, he emphasizes
the necessity of confirming the vows undertaken at the baptism of an infant.
Three things are involved here; the vow taken on behalf of the child by the
parents, the placing of the parents under a solemn vow to teach their child, and
the confirmation of the vow of profession of faith when the child comes of age.
"It can not be supposed by any reasonable person, that infants, at the time of
their baptism are brought under an obligation by an act which they do not
understand."-^ But Kill claims that in allowing the parent to act on behalf of
the child, the Reformed Church follows what is normal in society and in family
responsibility. "Christian parents being accustomed to engage for them in many
civil transactions, were accustomed also in this solemn action to mate those
declarations which it was supposed the children would have made had they been
possessed of understanding."^- Kill notes, however, that in this action "the
parents do not make any promise for the child, but they promise for themselves
that nothing shall be wanting on their part to engage the child to undertake, at
some future time, that obligation which he cannot then understand."5 The parents,
as it were, an entrance into the Church?" Institutes, 4:16:/. Hill said, "When
Jesus says to his disciples, who were rebuking those that brought young children
to him, 'suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not; for
of such is the kingdom of God,' his expression is calculated to mislead, if the
dispensation of the gospel was, in this respect, to be distinguished from the
Mosaic, that it was not to comprehend little children." L,I.D., Vol. Ill,
pp. 315-316.
1 Hill, Institutes, pp. 312-313. Cf. L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 316, "7/e have
reason to think that infant baptism was practised in very early ages of the Christian
Church; and,...the principles upon which it rests are so universally acknowledged
by Christians, that, with the exception of the different branches of Anabaptists,
it has been uniformly observed."
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, P. 317. 3 Ibid. , p. 316.
^ Ibid. , p. 317. 5 Ibid., p. 317.
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not godparents because of the "dictate of nature," undertake these vows for the
instruction of the child in order that it may not be "left merely to discretion
or natural affection."^ The real crux of the matter, however, is the child's
own confirmation of the vow made in.his behalf. "In whatever manner infant-
baptism has been administered, it rests with the children, after having enjoyed
the advantages which flow from the practice, to confirm this early dedication.1,2
The manner in which confirmation is made has varied throughout the ages, but
whatever the practice, opportunity must be afforded children for publicly
professing their faith.^
We believe that, as they have enjoyed the advantages of infant baptism,
and are thereby prepared for making "the answer of a good conscience towards
God," all the inward grace which that sacrament exhibits will be conveyed to
their souls, when they partake worthily of the other /Lord's Sucperj7; for
then the covenant with God is upon their part confirmed; and as certainly
as they know that they fulfill what he requires of them, so certainly may
they be assured that he will fulfill what he has promised.^
Thus Hill sti.3.1 affirms that it is only in the rational and moral consciousness
of the baptised that the sacrament of baptism is effective; and so he has only
hedged the question of infant baptism.
It is because Hill's teaching about baptism is thought out within the
formal scheme of federal theology that many of his problems arise. By interpreting
1 "ibid., p. 318. " "
2 Ibid., p. 318.
3 Hill warns against the danger of confirmation becoming a sacrament,
yet notes nonetheless that "Calvin expresses .a•wish that it were restored."
L, I.D. , Vol. Ill, p. 319. No doubt he has reference to the Institutes, 4:19:13?
"How I wish that we might have kept the custom which,-as I have said, existed
among the ancient Christians before this misborn wraith of a sacrament came
to birth. Not that it would be a confirmation such as they fancy, which cannot
be named without doing injustice to baptism; but a catechizing, in which
children or those near adolescence would give an account of their faith before
the church." Hill is "very far from condemning confirmation as practiced in
the church of England," but finds the practice of the Church of Scotland more
agreeable: "When young persons partake, for the first time, of the Lord's
Supper, we are careful to...lead them to consider themselves as than making that
declaration of faith...which would have accompanied their baptism had it been
delayed to their riper years." L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 320*
4 Hill, L.I.D. . Vol. Ill, p. 320.
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the covenant in contractual terms, he is forced to present baptism in terms of
equal parties and mutual conditions. The result is that baptism is a sacrament
■l
v/hich is partially God's act and partially man's act. This contradicts the New
Testament teaching that baptism is the sacrament of what has already been done
for us and on our behalf in Christ.^ Once again Y/e note that the sacrament has
two sides, but the principal thing is what God does, and the secondary thing is
what man does. Thus vrhereas Calvin speaks primarily of baptism as something to
be received "from the hand of God,"-5 Kill speaks primarily of a rite to be
performed, of the human action in baptism,^ and of those "who perfoi'm their part
of this federal act."5 Consequently, he, unlike the New Testament, is far more
interested in the rite itself than the event which lies behind this rite, the
baptism of Christ.6
This brings into focus a second damaging influence of federal theology, the
failure to relate baptism to the Person of Christ.^ Federal theology, in divorcing
the person and work of Christ, placed all the emphasis upon the death and resur¬
rection of Christ. It is in this light that Hill interprets the passage in Romans
6. From the standpoint of the federal scheme the language is applied to baptism
with reference only to the cross and the tomb. Certainly these are involved, but
v/e are guilty of false abstraction if we thus limit this language and fail to see
1 Cf. P.T. Forsyth, The Church and the Sacraments' (London, 1917) , p. 194,
"Baptism is something that happens to the man (or child) at the Church's hand...
the baptismal act in which he enters the Church, like the birth whereby he
enters the world, is something done rather on him than by him."
2 T.F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement, Vol. II, p. 123.
3 Calvin, Institutes, 4:15;15» 4 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 307e
5 Ibid., p. 313.
6 T.F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement, Vol. II, p. 110-111. This idea
that the New Testament is not primarily interested in the rite "is reinforced by
the fact that nov/here does the New Testament offer us a description of the rite
of Baptism....It is not of course that the New Testament regards the rite
itself with indifference, but that the rite is to be used like a v/indow through
which we look to something beyond it altogether."
7 Supra, p. 260.
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also a reference to Christ's incarnation and ascension. The language used in
Romans 6 of descent and ascent applies fundamentally to the descent of the Son
of God into our humanity and to His ascension to the right hand of the Father.
What binds these two concepts together is the oft-neglected fact that our
incorporation into Christ is grounded entirely and primarily upon His
incorporation into us. Ultimately the sacrament of baptism is grounded in the
incarnation in which the Son immersed Himself in our mortal human life and
assumed us into oneness with Himself that He might heal us and through the whole
course of His obedience reconcile us to the Father. Thus rather than having
exclusive reference to the crucifixion and resurrection, baptism has essential
reference to the whole incarnational event. Rather than being cast in forensic
terms, it is cast in terms of personal union with Christ. Rather than holding
that it involves simply a symbolic representation, it must be held that baptism
p
involves "an actual reality.11
Further, it was because Hill expounded baptism within the federal framework
that he had problems with infant baptism. If baptism i3 the sacrament of a
contract between two voluntary parties, then both parties must be rationally
aware of the conditions for the sacrament to be effective as a seal of the
bargain. In terms of infant baptism this means that for the covenant to be
operative the child must be aware of his stipulation, his own faith and
faithfulness.-^ Since the child cannot be aware of any such conditions, Hill
^ T.F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement, Vol. II, p. 119.
2 Hanson, op.cit., p. 83. This is not to deny that baptism contains a
figurative element, but to make baptism purely figurative is to deny "the fact
that our Baptism in the Name of Christ is a covenanted consociation with Him."
Representation and reality must both be affirmed, but each in its proper place.
Cf. T.F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement, Vol. II, p. 113.
3 Such reasoning suggests that God is indifferent toward little children




wants to delay baptism until the child understands. If, however, baptism, is
the sacrament of what Christ has already done for us, then it is the sacrament
of our sharing in His own faith and obedience. Baptism clearly teaches that we
do not rely upon our own faith and faithfulness but that, through union with
Christ, we rely solely upon His faith and faithfulness. Baptism then is the
sacrament, not of our faithfulness, but of Christ's faithfulness; and it is in
that faithfulness, not their own, that we baptize infants.
It is when we keep this biblical perspective and refuse to let go as the
very essence of the Gospel the fact that God has bound Himself to us and
bound us to Himself before we ever bind ourselves to Him, that we have no
difficulty about infant-baptism, for infant-baptism is then seen to be
the clearest form of the proclamation of the .Gospel and of a Gospel which
covenants us to a life ofobedience to the Father. But whether baptism
is administered to children or adults it is administered with the same
doctrine and with the same form, for it is only as little children that
we enter into this inheritance of the Kingdom freely bestowed upon us
in the new covenant; and we enter into it relying not upon ourselves in
any way but solely upon Him who has already laid hold of us by His grace,
and who wills to have fellowship with us on that basis that we may be
free to love and trust Him all our days.-^
Finally, it was Hill's federalism which forced him to expound baptism in a
manner consistent with the doctrine of limited-atonement. The qualified scope
1 The fact that Hill does not delay baptism "can hardly be regarded as
anything short of scandalous." (Brunner, Truth as Encounter (London, 19bA),
p. 275.) This is not to refute the practice of infant baptism, but to deny the
flagrantly irresponsible misuse of the sacrament. The fact that Hill ana others
like him continue to baptize infants in spite of the discrepancy with federal
theology has no doubt contributed to the degeneration of infant baptism into
the perfunctory rite of christening.
2 Of. G. Auldn, The ministry and the Sacraments, p. 157f., where he suggests
that the baptism of infants is an even more striking expression of divine grace
than adult baptism since the element of faith on the part of the infant is
unthinkable. Of. also Aulen, "The Church in the Light of the New Testament",
The Universal Church in God's Design, p. 25; "For the baptism of infants shows
us how our membership in the Church has its basis not in our own endeavours
and efforts, but solely in the divine love and grace."
3 T.F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement, Vol. II, p. 125.
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of Christ's saving activity lies beneath the surface of all that he has to say,
and it is this factor which creates the big "if" in the sacrament. Since Christ
did not die for all, baptism is efficacious only if the person baptized evidences
his election by proper moral behavior. Baptism, consequently, loses its
character as an evangelical ordinance proclaiming God's free pardon, and becomes
instead the sacrament of a conditional offer of salvation.
Unless, therefore, baptism is conceived to be the sacrament of God's grace
whereby we are ingrafted into the whole life of Christ, the Representative of the
race, then doubt is cast upon its trustworthiness as the sacrament of the gospel
offered to all men, faith is made the sole condition of baptism, the rite becomes
simply the confirmation of human experience, the declaratory act of faith.
Rather than serving as a mark of the church, it is more likely to fall into
desuetude. Obviously these problems with Hill's doctrine of baptism are but
reflections of his larger problem with the nature of the church. If the church
is primarily an external society, founded for the purpose of performing ritual
practices such as baptism, then naturally baptism is to be stripped of its
sacramental reality and lowered to the level of an initiatory rite. In this
regard Hill is far more Socinian than he would admit.
c. The Lord's Supper. Unlike the nebulous origins of baptism, the provenance
of the Lord's Supper is quite definite. It has its source in the passover feast
of the Old Testament. Hill reaches this conclusion through a comparison of the
two rites.
There is a striking correspondence between this view of the Lord's Supper...
and the circumstances attending the institution of the feast of the passover.
Like the Jews, we have the original sacrifice; "Christ our passover is
sacrificed for us";....Like the Jews, -we have a feast in which that sacrifice,
and the deliverance purchased by it, are remembered....To Christians as to
Jews, there "is a night to be much observed unto the Lord," in all generations.
To both, it is accompanied with thanksgiving. And thus, as different expres¬
sions led us formerly to conclude, that the initiatory rite of Christianity
comes in the place of the initiatory rite of the Abrahamic covenant, we now
find that the other sacrament of the New Testament also has its counterpart
under the Old.'
1 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, p. 323.
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Once again Hill claims to expound the "rational doctrine" of the nature of
the Lord's Supper; and in so doing, he explains three things, the purpose of the
sacrament, the presence of Christ in the sacrament and the believer's participation
in the sacrament. Actually the purpose of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper
is manifold. Its primary function is to "exhibit by a significant action, the
characteristical doctrine of the Christian faith,...the death of its author."1
Christ's own words of institution indicate that He intended it to serve this
function. In fact Christ Himself appears to have no other purpose in mind save
the symbolic representation of His death: "the command of Jesus seems to present
'
2
the Lord's Supper in no other light than as a remembrance of his death." If this
purpose of the sacrament is directed towards the world in general,-5 the subsequent
purposes of the sacrament are to give believers the opportunity to profess
publicly their allegiance to their crucified Lord. In partaking of the Lord's
Supper "they declare that, far from being ashamed of the sufferings of iheir master,
they glory in his cross." The purpose of the sacrament is also to impress upon
the disciples of Jesus their duty to follow Him. "They cannot remember the death
of Christ, the circumstances which rendered that event necessary, the disinterested
love, and the exalted virtues of their deliverer, without feeling their obligations
to him.Unless the vilest hypocrisy accompany this rite, believers will be
constrained "to fulfill the purposes of his death, by 'living unto him who died
for them'.
It is this last purpose of the sacrament which forces Hill to treat the
presence of Christ in the sacrament, a concept he would rather leave untreated.^
1 Ibid., p. 323. 2 Hill, Institutes, p. 319.
3 "By partaking of this rite, his disciples publish an event most interest¬
ing to all the kingdoms of the earth." Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, p. 324.
4 Ibid., p. 324. 5 Ibid. , p. 324.
6 "This is the pleasing picture of the Lord's Supper which we wish always
to present: and happy had it been for the Christian world, if this were all that
required to be said upon the subject." Ibid., pp. 324-325.
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Since, however, it is the presence of Christ in the sacrament which establishes
the "connection" between the rite and the blessings which it conveys, this subject
-t
must receive attention. Having disclaimed the "monstrous error" of Rome, and
O
the"unphilosophical" error of the Lutherans, Hill deals with the Zwinglian and
Calvinistic doctrines.
According to Zwingli, the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is but a memorial
to the death of Christ, the sacrifice once offered on the cross. The bread and
wine, signs of what is absent, are used to excite the remembrance of it.-^ No
doubt, simple "devout recollection...has a tendency to minister to one's
improvement," and no doubt, in the mind of Zwingli, the sacrament "was intended
to produce a moral effect. "4 But the actual power to produce such an effect is
absent in this view. If the purpose of the sacrament is to foster the believer's
"moral improvement," then the sacrament must communicate the strength necessary
for such improvement". For the sacrament to have this efficacy, something more
is required than simple "remembrance of the death of Christ."5 This something
more is the spiritual presence of Christ in the sacrament. By spiritual presence
c
Hill means that Christ is "present to the mind." Moral effect is not produced
by .just remembering the death of Christ, but by feeding upon the body and blood
of Christ, that is, by contemplating the body and blood of Christ, brought to the
mind through the elements. This action conveys the same nourishment to the soul,
1 There are "three great practical errors of the church of Rome":
1) the doctrine of transubstantiation; 2) the idea that the sacrament is a
sacrifice; 3) "the adoration of the elements. Hill, L. I.D. , Vol. Ill, p. 334.
2 The Lutherans "employ a multitude of words, which I profess I do not
understand, to reconcile the limited extension which enters into our conceptions
of body with that omnipresence of the body of Christ, which appears to them to
flow from the inseparable union between the divine and human natures....This
opinion...appears to us to labor under so many palpable difficulties, that we are
disposed to wonder at its being held by men of a philosophical mind." Hill,
L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 333.
3 Ibid. , p. 336. 4 Ibid., pp. 338-339.
5 Ibid., p. 325. 6 Ibid., p. 339.
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the same quickening to the spiritual life, as the eating of bread and the
A
drinking of wine convey to physical life. Thus the spiritual presence of
Christ is necessary to ensure that the rite produces its desired effect. "For
while all who eat the bread and drink the wine may be said to show the Lord's
death," and all who remember hi3 death "receive some devout impression,"
"they only to whom Jesus is spiritually present share in that spiritual
O
nourishment" which enables them to maintain acceptable moral behavior.
This good conduct is of primary importance when Hill comes to speak of the
believer's participation in the sacrament. Because he is still bound to the forensic
scheme of federal theology, he is once again concerned about the conditions of the
covenant of which this sacrament is the seal. He, therefore, urges that "Christians
renew their covenant with God," and that "they fulfill their part of the covenant,"-^
in order that the sacrament might fulfill the purposes for which it was established.
In terms of the Lord's Supper this means that if believers exhibit "the great
event which is characteristical of their religion," if they make "public
profession of Christianity," and if "they are quickened in well doing, and
prepared for the discharge of every duty,"^- then "grace and strength" vail be
"conveyed to their souls."5 jf nian first expresses a willingness to obey Christ,
then God will grant to him the necessary strength. Both these conditions are
brought together in the sacrament of'the Lord's Supper. It is in partaking of
the supper that the believer professes his intention of following Christ, and at
the same time, as he partakes, he receives from God the grace which enables him
to follow. The sacrament, therefore, is the perfect seal of this contractual
agreement bet-ween God and man.
Hill's exposition of the Lord's Supper is marked by its extreme brevity, and
1 Ibid. , p. 339.
4 Ibid., p. 340.
2 Ibid., p. '340.
5 Ibid. , p. 344*
3 Ibid., p. 344.
A/> doctrine is necessarily weakened by the omission of several vital concepts.
■ft,is criticism is justified by Hill's treatment of the origin of the sacrament.
M> doubt the origin of the Lord's Supper lies, as Hill suggests, in the passover
rtie<31/' but there are other elements, such as the parables, the miracles of feeding
+/,«. multitudes and Christ's meals with "sinners," which have to be taken into
account if we are to arrive at a full understanding of the nature of Holy
Communion.^ Calvin warns against constructing a doctrine of this sacrament on
a_ few "obscure passages" and encourages a study of the subject in the light of
the whole teaching of Scriptures.^ "Brevity is obscure," he says, "the sense is
j
gfuoidated by a fuller statement."^- Hill's neglect of these other factors probably
belongs to his "general failure to give the whole historical life and ministry
o-f Christ its proper place in His saving work.
Moreover Hill nowhere speaks of Christ's presence at the supper in terns of
the unseen host, the one who graciously invites sinners to His table. He deals
with the question as if a doctrine of the sacrament were possible without any
reference to the presence of Christ at all, and although he is forced to treat it,
he does so abstractly. Even then his chief concern seems to be that "the notion
©f communion with Christ in this particular ordinance,..may foster a spirit of
fanaticism."6 Hill's position serves only to emphasise how desperately we need
to recover the Biblical truth that "it is Christ Who speaks, Who blesses, Who
breaks, Who gives" in the sacrament.
Due to his fear of fanaticism, Hill quite naturally avoids the element of
1 A.J.3. Higgins, The Lord's Supper in the New Testament (London, i960),
chapter two. Here Higgins defines the problem and amasses the evidence to
support the fact that the Last Supper was a passover meal. Cf. Joachim Jeremias,
The Bnoharistic Words of Jesus (London, -\f)66) , chapter one.
2 T.F, Torrance, Conflict and Agreement, Vol. II, p. 135.
3 Calvin, Institutes, 4:17:19. 4 Ibid. , 4:17:20.
5 T.F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement, Vol. II, p. 135.
6 Kill, L.I.D. , Volo III, p. 341.
7 P.O. Simpson, Church Principles (London, 1923) > F-« 107.
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mystery in the Lord's Supper. If it enters into his thinking at all, it is
because he explains it av/ay with his "rational" and "philosophical" approach.
Calvin, on the other hand, adamantly guarded the mystery of the sacramental
-t
relation, and refused to formulate his doctrine of the subject on the grounds
of comnon sense and human philosophy.
Is it common sense that tells us to seek the immortal life of the soul
from human flesh? It is natural reason which declares that the living
virtue of Christ's flesh penetrates from heaven to earth and is in a
wondrous manner infused in our souls? Is it in accordance with philoso¬
phical speculation, that a lifeless earthly element should be the
effectual organ of the Holy Spirit? Is it from natural principles we
learn that whatever the minister pronounces with his lips according to
the word of God, and figures by a sign, Christ inwardly performs?
Certainly did we not regard the holy Supper, as a heavenly mystery,
we should not attribute to it effects so distinguished and incredible
to carnal reason.^
Because Hill rejects the element of mystery, the sacrament cannot have the
meaning, the wonder, the "sublimity" that it has for Calvin, nor can it elicit
the same response; "all that remains is to break forth in admiration of the
mystery."3
As mentioned above, Hill evidences a failure to relate the sacrament to
the total activity of Christ. Exclusive attention is paid to the death of Christ,
without the slightest mention of the resurrection. Yet as T.F. Torrance notes,
"The Supper...has to do both with the death and the resurrection of Christ; it
is both a memorial in thanksgiving of His sacrifice once and for all accomplished,
and an eucharistic memorial before God in which we lift our hearts in responsive
obedience to His ascension and are made to sit with Christ in heavenly places."^1"
Failure to acknowledge this truth means that the Lord's Supper fails to present
1 Calvin, Institutes, 4:17:7. Cf. Wilhelm Stahlin, The Fystery of God
(London,1937) , p. 7H7 "But, together with Christology, the Sacraments are the
...place where Reformation theology developed a doctrine that should guard and
defend this true mystery."
2 Calvin, Corpus Reforruatorum, Vol. 9, p. 94. Quoted by R.S. "Wallace,
Calvin's Doctrine of v/ord ana Sacrament, p. 220.
3 Calvin, Institutes, 4:17:7.
4 T.F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement, Vol. II, p. 148.
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Christ as He is to be presented, as the triumphant and ascended Mediator and
Advocate.
Apparently Hill is unaware of the element of judgment involved in the Lord's
Supper. He seems oblivious to the fact that every time we partake of the body
and the blood of Christ, we partake of the judgment inherent in the death of
Christ, judgment against 3in which caused that death. Failure to acknowledge
thi3 element of judgment means that we cannot fully appreciate the divine grace
promised in the sacrament.
A
Because of his commitment to common sense principles, Hill denies the
eschatological nature of the sacrament; the Lord's Supper does not point to the
future, but only to the past. But the true, nature of the sacrament incorporates
both past and future. "It reaches into the past, to the death of Christ, and sets
it in the present as a reality operative here and now in the Church. On the other
hand, the Eucharist reaches out beyond the present into the future, and becomes
the means whereby the cburc-h in the present is brought under the power of the
advent of Christ."^ Through the Lord's Supper the church becomes, so to speak,
the great arch that spans history, supported by only two pillars, the cross which
stands on this side of time ana the coming of Christ in power which stands at the
end of history.3
This last statement indicates yet another factor overlooked by Hill in his
abbreviated treatment of the Lord's Supper, that is, the sacrament's relation to
the nature of the church, a significant point for our study. Hill is not aware
that any relationship exists between the Lord's Supper and the nature of the
church; yet in the most conceivable dissimilar position, T.F. Torrance says,
"The Church really becomes the Church in the Eucharist."^ In the incarnation
1 Supra, p. 155.
2 T.F. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement, Vol. II, pp. 170-171.
3 Ibid., p. 171. 4 Ibid. , pp. 197, 189.
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Christ became bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, and in the Lord's Supper
we become bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh. If in the Lord's Supper the
Christian conmunity passes beyond a merely human institution to become the
Body of Christ, then the sacrament is understood to be not only the divinely
•i
given means of uniting the Head with the Body, but of uniting the Body itself.
It is in the Lord's Supper that the church realizes its true nature as one -
"we being many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread."2 This point
Hill not merely ignores, but refutes: "it has so happened, that an ordinance,
which is the natural expression of love to the common master of Christians, and
which seems to constitute a bond of union amongst them has proved the source of
corruptions, the most dishonourable to their religion, and of mutual contentions
the most bitter and the most disgraceful."3 However true that may be, Hill fails
to grasp the fact that the sacrament was given with the intention of unifying
the church under just such divided conditions.
The very place of the Eucharist...in the very midst of history with all
its divisions and heart rending failures, means that it is designed to be
such a means of unity within diversity that in spite of diversity and
division that unity is continually recreated in conditions of time until
its full reality is disclosed in the Kingdom to come...we have been given
the Holy Eucharist as the sacrament of unity in diversity to tell us that
our oneness with the Lord does not depend upon our success or failure
in loyalty to Him, but on His Will to be one with us and to make us all
one in Him. ^
Since Hill designs to treat these concepts of the doctrine of the Lord's
Supper, and since what he does treat is cast within the framework of federal
theology, he has for all practical purposes stripped the sacrament of its nature
1 G.W. Bromiley, op.cit., p. 831".
2 I Gor. 10:17. Hill can maintain that this sacrament is a bond of unity
only by making it an independent focus of unity, and pointing to the fact that
most churches observe it.
3 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 325.
4 T.P. Torrance, Conflict and Agreement, Vol. II, pp. 200-201.
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and worth. His emphasis upon the conditions of the covenant caused hirn to view
the sacrament, not as the pledge of God's grace to nourish and sustain the living
union with Christ, but rather as a sign of the believers response, an expression
of his own experience;
the action has appeared so natural, so pleasing, so salutary an expression
of all that a Christian feels, that, with the exception only of the Quakers
...it has been observed in the Christian church, from the earliest timesA '
to the present day.1
It may be said in Hill's defense that he insists upon the presence of Christ in
the sacrament, yet this emphasis is not of itself so praiseworthy. The crucial
2
question is not whether Christ is present, but how and why. Although Hill
manifests a desire to follow Calvin's explanation of how Christ is present,
his own ansv/er as to why He is present has been determined by the legalism and
moralism inherent in the federal system.
d. The administration of the sacraments. As noted above, Hill states that
the administration of the sacraments is determined by their nature. In the light
of the foregoing discussion, we conclude that Hill was consistent in maintaining
that the administration of the sacraments must conform to their "great end of
cherishing good impressions, and promoting practical godliness."3 His advice,
therefore, is to "dwell upon those affecting views of these ordinances by which
they are fitted at once to exhibit the peculiar doctrines of Christianity and to
imprint the obligations of virtue."^" Along with the great purpose, the primary
principles to be kept in view are those of "order" and "prudence." As these
principles may be "unhinged" by rigid adherence to any particular form or mode
1 Hill, L.I. P., Vol. Ill, p. 324. " " *
2 "Anyone who would deny the Real presence of Christ in the Sacrament,"
writes C.A.A. Scott, "would place himself in the curious position of saying that
Christ is present with His people in all places ana in all circumstances except
in the Sacrament." The Church: Its Worship and Sacraments (London, 1927)} p. 102.
3 Hill, Institutes, p. 309.
^ I^id., pp. 325-326.
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of administration, Hill warns against an "attempt to produce an uniformity...
throughout the Reformed Church....They act more wisely and more conformably
to the true spirit of the Gospel, by adhering to the mode of administering the
Sacraments which prevails in their neighborhood.Thus the right administration
of the sacraments is a mark of the church, not because the sacraments themselves
reflect the nature and mission of the church as it is united with Christ in
baptism and nourished by Christ in the Lord's Supper, but because in administering
the sacraments, the church performs those external rites it has been instituted
to perform.
4. The maintenance of spiritual vjorship
The third and final mark of the church is the "maintenance of spiritual
worship." Two things are involved here; first the actual acts of worship, and
secondly, the order necessary for the proper performance of these acts. At
this point Hill is more concerned with the orderliness of Christian worship than
with "the peculiarities of that worship.Inherent £6 the nature of this mark
then is the concept of church discipline upon which the maintenance of order in
the church is based. This discipline, moreover, rests upon the power invested
in the church. Since, as we have indicated,^ the power of the church is one of
the two chief aspects of ecclesiology for Hill, we shall give this mark fullest
attention when we treat that subject. It is there that Hill himself gives the
most complete exposition of discipline, and it is best to understand it in the
context in which he places it. For now we shail note only the spirit in which
discipline is to be administered, and the objects against which it is to be
exercised.
1 Ibid. , pp. 30^309.
3 Supra, p. 176.
2 Hill, L.I. 13., Vol. I, p. 4567
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"That power of making enactments, by its own authority, in matters of order,
and in circumstances respecting the conduct of divine worship, which is conveyed
to the church by the practice and the directions of the Apostles, ought always
to be exercised in a manner conformable to the character of the Christian
religion."'' The spirit of that manner Hill describes in Scriptural terms; "Let
if
us follow after the things which make for peace and things wherewith one may edify
another.Translated into non-biblical language, this means "the temperate
exercise of discipline."3 This spirit causes Hill to posit a distinction between
greater and lesser excommunication. Greater excommunication is a public sentence
declaring that the sinner is cut off completely from the communion of the church.
Lesser excommunication is a private suspension from the privileges of the church,
particularly from participation in the Lord's Supper.^" Hill defends this
distinction by noting its practical usefulness - "more good arises from the
dread of public rebuke than from the rebuke itself; and there is always want of
wisdom in defeating the end of church censuses, by requiring what we knov^ will
not be complied with."5 If this distinction is maintained, then offenders can
still be disciplined, but with a view to reinstating them in the fellowship of
the church rather than casting them from it. In describing the spirit in which
discipline is to be administered, Hill has combined two chief elements from his
own background, tolerance^ and simplicity.^ We may see how these two precepts
determine the exercise of discipline if we look at the objects of discipline.
In determining the proper objects of church discipline, Hill is guided by
the principle of order. Those things are objects of church discipline which
destroy the order of the church thereby destroying the possibility of spiritual
1 Hill, Institutes, p. '2&1. 2 Ibid. , p. 256.
3 Ibid. , p. 254. 4 Ibid., p. 255.
5 Ibid., p. 256. 6 Supra, p. 166.
7 Supra, p. 163.
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worship. The first object of discipline is "gross immorality." The adjective
is more important than the noun. The church is never to "intermeddle" nor "to
engage in the investigation of secret wickedness.The discipline of the church
is reserved for "flagrant transgression of the laws of Christ";3 "for those
scandalous sins which bring reproach upon religion."^ These sins are to be
censored, not only because they give offence to the Christian society, but
because they disturb the faith and practice of its members. Yet even then, *
"it becomes the office-bearers of the Church to allow full time for the operation
of all lenient methods of reclaiming offenders, before they proceed to that
5
extremity which circumstances may sometimes render indispensible."
The second legitimate object of church discipline respects fundamental errors
of doctrine. Cnce again the qualifying adjective receives the stress. In
framing the creed against which heresy is judged the church must strive for that
"divine simplicity with which the truths characteristical of the Gospel are
there proposed.
We think that it is possible to state, in no great compass, the errors
which are fundamental, and the truths in which all who hold one faith
ought to be united; and we are unwilling to charge with heresy those who
readily subscribe to the great doctrines which are plainly taught in
Scripture, although they do not admit the justness of all the
explications, distinctions, and reasonings which have been employed
in the statement of those doctrines.
Heretics are liable to church discipline, not only because they may lead others
into error, but because they "excite those animosities and altercations" which
destroy the tranquility of the church. Yet even then, respect is "due to the
diversities of understanding and of education;...even to the wanderings of a
speculative mind."9
1 Hill, Institutes, p. 2p1. 2 Ibid., p. 254.
4 Ibid., p. 254. 5 Ibid., pp. 256-257.
7 Ibid., p. 260. 8 Ibid. , p. 260.
3 Ibid., p. 251.
6 Ibid., p. 259.
9 Ibid., p. 260.
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Finally, "those -who refuse compliance with Ecclesiastical regulations"
expose themselves to church discipline."^ Absent here is any qualifying
phrase, but "simplicity of external observances" is urged nonetheless, along
with a spirit of tolerance. Hill commends a "readiness to grant every indulgence
and concession not inconsistent with order.However, once this simplicity has
been achieved and this tolerance has been exercised, those who persist in revil¬
ing the regulations enacted by the church must receive the highest censure.
The reason is clear - such action strikes at the very being of the church.
If the church is an external society founded for the performance of certain
rites, and if the performance of these rites are hindered in any way, then the
very existence of the church is threatened. Those guilty of disreputing the
ordinances essential to spiritual worship are to be "cast out of the church,"
and they have no ground of complaint "if the Church employs her censures in
counteracting the disorder...which they wish to propagate."5
This brief recital of Hill's position on discipline evidences a strange
mixture of Calvin's thought and Knox's thought-on the subject. On hie spirit
in which discipline is to be exercised, Hill followed Calvin as opposed to Knox.
Knox was influenced by the purifying zeal of the English reformers/1" and Calvin
did not approve of his rigor and strictness in administering discipline.5 For
overzealous reformers Calvin recommended a "middle course which does not give
r
too great offense to the weak, and yet is adapted to cure their diseases."0
On the importance of discipline, however, Kill followed Knox as opposed to
Calvin. J.T. McNeill has traced the original concern for discipline to
1 Ibid. , p. 2&3~, 2 Ibid. ,""p. 261. 5 Ibid. , p. 2of.
4 Peter Lorimer, John Knox and the Church of England (London, 1375), p. 6.
5 John Knox, Works (ed. by David Laing), Vol. VI, p. 124. Letter from
Calvin to Knox, dated April 23, 1561. "I trust your strictness...will be
regulated by discretion."
6 Calvin, Commentary on Matthew 18;15- Cf. Institutes, 4:1:29.
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Oecolampadius of Easel, but suggests that Martin Bucer gave rise to the thought
of discipline as a nark of the church. As early as 1524 Bucer wrote, "Where
there is no discipline or excommunication there is no Christian community."'
Following this Knox wrote in the Confession of Faith drawn up for the English
church in Geneva:
...that church which is visible, and sene to the eye, hath three tokens,
or markes, whereby it may be discerned. First, the Worde of God conteyned
in the Olde and Newe Testament...the second is the holy Sacraments, to wilt,
of Baptisms and the Lordes Supper....The third mark of this Church is
Ecclesiastical Discipline, which standet'n in admonition and correction
of fautes.2
In the Book of Discipline, these simple substantives are joined with verbs;
"the trew preaching of the word of God,...the rycht administration of the
sacraments...Ecclesticall Discipline uprychtlie ministered."3 The significance
of these statements is that they indicate that discipline was an absolutely
essential mark of the church. This position is accentuated by the fact that for
Calvin discipline was a mark, but not a necessary mark of the visible church.
"We have stated that the marks by which the Church is to be distinguished, ar6,
the preaching of the word and the administx'ation of the sacraments."^ Discipline
on the other hand "does not belong to the nature of the Gospel, but is accidental"^-
"an appendage to doctrine."^ J.W. Prugh suggests that Calvin adopted this line
of thinking because he was afraid that discipline might disiiLace rather than
support the Word and sacraments."'' If this were indeed the cause of Calvin's
anxiety, then Hill would have confirmed his fear. In Hill's theology discipline
has become not only a necessary mark of the church, but in essence the primary
"
^ ^u°ted by J.T.' McNeill, The History and Character of Calvinism
(New York, 1954), PP» 80-81.
2 Knox, Works, Vol. IV, pp. 172-173*
3 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 110. 4 Calvin, Institutes, 4:1:10.
5 Calvin, Commentary on Matthew, 16:19. 6 Ibid., 18;18.
7 J.W. Prugh, The Theorv and Practice of Discipline in the Scottish
Reformation (unpublished thesis, New College Library, 1959), p. 256.
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mark of the church. It represents the most human and external aspects of the
church's life, and thus appeals to his rational approach. Its inherent power
captures his attention and accounts for his paltry treatment of the Word and
sacraments. Though preaching and baptism and the Lord's Supper are important,
they cannot be maintained without discipline. Discipline, therefore, as an
external aid to worship, is given more importance than the acts of worship
themselves.
Finally Hill followed Knox as opposed to Calvin in determining the scope
of discipline. Calvin limited discipline to censures defined as corrective
A y
means. Knox on the other hand defined discipline as censures plus polity.
This interpretation is supported by the fact that the Book of Discipline
included a plan for church government. That Hill is more in line with Knox
than with Calvin is verified by the objects which he deems proper for discip-
p
linary action. However, due to the Moderate influence upon Hill, the third
object is lifted out of this broad theory and allowed to become paramount.
Discipline, therefore, is defined in terms of ecclesiastical government. The
distinction he intimates in elevating the third object above the other two,
which is not so clear in his own thinking, has been clarified and defined in
the Constitution of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America.3 The distinction is between judicial and administrative discipline.
Judicial discipline is "the special and orderly exercise of that authority
which Jesus Christ has vested in his church for the prevention and correction
of offenses." Administrative discipline is "the preservation of the whole
government of the Church by...the proper exercise of its authority, and by
1 Calvin's chapter on discipline is entitled, "The discipline of the
Church: Its principle use in Censures and Excommunication", Institutes, 4: "12.
2 Supra, p. 126.
3 The Constitution (published by the office of the Cenaral Assembly
of the U.P.C.U.S.A., Philadelphia, 195S), p. 177.
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the protection of the rights of its members, officers, congregations, and
judicatories." Though these categories were unknown to Hill, they serve
to place the strength of his emphasis - Hill stressed administrative
discipline as over against judicial discipline.
This last section, and in fact the whole chapter, serves to verify our
contention that Hill v/as interested in the church only as an external society.
He establishes the necessity of the church, but it is a necessity grounded in
the external actions of man. He condescendingly acknowledges the unity of the
church, but it is a unity determined and governed by the visible disunity of
/
the church. He treats the marks of the church, but essentially as external
badges of human experience. So we conclude as we began by stating that Hill
bothers to deal with these subjects only because of their reference to the
external form and order of the church. We turn now, however, from that which
is secondary and insignificant to that which is primary in Hill's ecclesiology -
the polity and power of the Christian society.
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of Apostles
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(b). The Examples of Paul's Transmission of Extraordinary
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Power on the Part of Ministers
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Hill's Concluding Statement ....... p. 345
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for the Institution of One Form of Government to
the Exclusion of All Others
(i) This Position does Not Allow the Form of Government
to Become a Matter Essential to Salvation
(ii) This Position does Not Allow the Form of Government
to Become a Barrier to Church Union
(iii) This Position does Allow for the Continued
Development of Form
(b). The Fact that the New Testament does Not Present
Conclusive Evidence does Not Mean:
(il That Form is a Matter of Indifference
(ii) That Scriptural Data is Insufficient
(iii) That it is Inconsistent to affirm Presbyterian
Form as Lawful, Based upon Scripture
(2) Weak Points
(a). Hill Treats Form Primarily in Terms of Unfettered
Reason - to the Exclusion of the Spirit's Guidance
(b). Hill Treats Form primarily in Terms of Circumstances
and Civil Patterns - to the Exclusion of Patterns
Presented in Christ's Death and Resurrection
(c). Hill Treats Form Primarily in Terms of Organizational
Utility - to the Exclusion of its Service to the
Ministry of Word and Sacraments
b. Hill's Doctrine of the Apostolate
(1). The Uniqueness of the Apostles
(a). Strong Point: Hill Affirms the Uniqueness and
Unrepeatable Character of the Apostles
(b). Weak Point: Hill Defines this Uniqueness Primarily
in Terms of Oversight
(i) He Cannot Adequately Defend Against the Continuation
of the Apostolate
(ii) He is Unable to See the Importance of Several Basic
Issues
(iii) He Cannot Appreciate the True Function of the
Apostolate
(iv) He has No Grounds for Asserting the Apostles'
Place in the Church Today
(2). The Successors of the Apostles
(a). Strong Point: Hill posits a Doctrine of Apostolic
Succession
(i) The Succession of Apostolic Teaching
(ii) The Succession of Apostolic Function
(b). Weak Point: Hill Overemphasizes the Succession of
Function to the Detriment of the Succession of
Te aching
C. The Formation of Church Government ...... p. 3^5
1. The Ordination of Office Bearers ■ . . . . „ p. 366
a. The Nature of Ordination
1). "Appointment of Jesus Christ...."
2). "Appointment of Jesus Christ, Conveying a Character...."
3). "Appointment of Jesus Christ, Conveying a Character,
By the Instrumentality of the Office Bearers."




c. The Procedure of Ordination
(1). For the Minister
fa). The Trial of Qualification
(b). The Solemn Deed of Presbytery
(2). For the Elder
d. The Results of Ordination
(1). For the 2.iinister
(a). Reception of Power and Authority
(b). Initiation into Ministry of Church Universal
(2). For the Elder
The Election of Office Bearers • • • • • • P» 374
a. The Nature of Election
1). A Human Act
2). Subsequent to Ordination
b. The Procedure of Election
(1). For the Minister
fa). The Principle
(b). The Presentation of the Patron
(c). The Participation of the people
(2). For the Elder
The Organization of Office Bearers ..... p. 381
a. The Establishment of Ecclesiastical Courts Composed of Ministers
and Elders















b. The Subordination of Ecclesiastical Courts
(1). The Principle of Subordination
(a). The Rights of Superior Courts
(b). The Rights of Inferior Courts
(2). The Pattern of Subordination
c. The Practice of Appeal in Ecclesiastical Business
(1). The Principle of Appeal
(2). The Practice of Appeal .
fa). The Formal Appeal
(b). The Formal Complaint-
Evaluation • • • • •» • » P« 388
a. Hill's Doctrine of Ordination
(1). Hill Correctly States that Ordination is an Act of Jesus
Christ, BUT does this not Rule Out the Instrumentality of
Men?
(2). Hill Correctly Asserts the Instrumentality of Men in
Ordination, BUT does this not Mean:
(a). That Christ in the Divine Act is Dependent Upon
the Human Act?
(b). That the Human Act can Force the Divine Act?
(3). Hill Correctly States that Ordination Conveys Something
to the Person Ordained, BUT does that not Imply:
(a). That Ordination Cannot also Recognize the Person
as One who has Previously Received Gifts?
(b). That Ordination Alone Conveys All Gifts at Once?
(U). Hill Correctly States that Ordination is a Judicial Act,
BUT is it not also a Spiritual Act? -
(5). Hill Correctly Calls for Judicial Authorization Before
the performance of Ministerial Functions, BUT does this
not Imply that the Ministry of 'Word and Sacrament is
Contingent upon Ordination?
(6). Hill Correctly States that the VThole Presbytery is the
Proper Instrument for Ordering Ordination, BUT is this
not Inconsistent with the Fact that Only Preaching
Presbyters Actually Ordain?
(7). Hill Cox-rectly Asserts that by Ordination a Person
Becomes a Minister of the Universal Church, BUT is this
not Inconsistent with the Fact that an Ordained person
is authorized to Perform Ministerial Functions only
v/ithin the Particular Church through which He has Received
Ordination?
b. Hill's Doctrine of Election
(1). Errors in Kill's Historical Survey of the Law of Patronage
(a). Presents Patronage as the Original Practice and the
Popular Call as the Innovation
(b). Traces the Provenance of the Popular Call Only to
the Revolution Settlement
(2). Basis of Hill's Defense of Law of patronage
(a). Patronage is an Ecclesiastical Law
(i). Patronage Becomes a Principle of Presbyterian
Government
(ii). Patronage Rules Out the Voice of the People
(b). Patronage is a Civil Layx
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THE POLITY OF THE CHRISTIAN SOCIETY
Confident that sufficient material has been analysed to verify the contention
that George Hill was interested primarily in the government of the Christian
society, we now turn to an exposition^ and evaluation of his lectures on that
subject. To guide our discussion, we invoke the assistance of several pertinent
questions. Is, in fact, the Christian society to be governed? If so, who i3
to govern? Is government a function of the whole society or of a particular
segment of that society? If the authority to rule the whole is committed to
a part to which part is it committed? How is this special group to be determined,
defined, and invested with that authority? In what manner is this class to be
perpetuated, i.e., how is the power to rule to be transmitted from ono person
to another; how are successors to be elevated to this position of leadership?
How are the several spheres of activity to be marked out, and how are the numerous
leaders, providing they are numerous, to be related individually and collectively?
These are questions which necessarily arise when one concerns oneself with the
doctrine of church polity. We shall arrange Hill's answers to these queries
under three headings; the foundation of church government, the form of church
government, and the formation of church government.
1 In the exposition of these lectures, an attempt shall be made, by way
of footnotes, to give the possible source of some of Hill's unoriginal ideas.
Since Hill made little use of direct documentation, it can not be claimed that
these suggestions are either correct or complete. Hill's son, who edited the
lectures, made the same admission, and for the same reason. "It was the wish
of the Editor to subjoin a note of reference to every quotation made by the
Author. But in the manuscript it frequently happened that there was nothing
to lead him particularly to the passage or authority cited." (preface,
L. I. D., Vol. I, p.v.) Hill does, however, annex a list of books to certain
chapters. According to the editor these wore "books which the author was
accustomed to recommend to his students" for further reading; but might not
they also represent the primary sources from which he drew his material?
When it appears that Hill did draw from these works, reference has been made
to the suspected volume.
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A. The Foundation of Church Government
In his chapter which bears the title of this heading, Hill is concerned
with the question as to whether there is a continuing ministerial order in the
Christian church. Attempting to establish the facts, first, that the church
does possess a principle of order, and secondly, that the preservation of this
A
order is committed to a special class of men, he makes his usual two-fold appeal -
to reason and to revelation. He opens with reference to the common sense prin-
o
ciple of universal opinion.
The consent of the great body of Christians may encourage us to assume
in the beginning of this discussion, a3 an established point, that the
general idea of church government, and the existence of a particular
description of men invested with that kind of rule 7/hieh church
government implies, are agreeable to Scripture.3
Continuing in the vein of common sense he posits that this idea, that the govern¬
ment of the church is the responsibility of a special group, is "sound and rational
and agreeable to the constitution of man.
Although these common sense principles afford strong reasons for affirming
the place of a standing ministry, Hill considers his logical argument an even
stronger reason for asserting the legitimacy of a special group responsible for
church government. His starting point is simply this: a standing ministry is
necessary for religious rites are necessary. Or to state it another way, if
religious rites are necessary, then a ministerial class is necessary.^ Hill
takes as his protagonists the Quakers who reject both "the positive rites of
Christianity,"6 and consequently, "the office of the ministry"? - thinking the
1 Without making a sharp distinction between the two, Hill's attention
is directed more toward the latter than the former. If the second fact can be
substantiated, then the first must be received as an obvious and necessary
presupposition.
2 Supra, p. 33. 3 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, p. 364.
4 Ibid., pp. 359-360.
5 Cf. Hooker, Ecclesiastical Polity, 7:6:8.
6 Hill, L.I.D.. Vol. Ill, p. 355. 7 Ibid. , p. 356.
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la-cter to be both "useless and unlawful."*' Hill meets this Quaker position
with a dual rebuttal. In the first place, he points out that the extreme
practice of the Quaker principle simply did not work. In the course of their
history they were forced to modify their anarchical views, and came to allow
"two or three of the gravest and most respectable men" in any particular
meeting to be "invested with a degree of authority," to "claim a kind of
subjection from the brethren," to "admonish or reprove," and even to "address
a word of exhortation to those meetings, in which none of the brethren found
himself moved to speak. These regulations had to be adopted claims Hill,
"as a counterbalance to the disunion and disorder" which resulted from a
complete disavowal of ministerial orders.3 Thus the Quakers learned by
experience the necessity of "that subordination, without which it is impossible
for a society to subsist.
In the second place, Hill attacks the Quaker's rejection of the intermin¬
able nature of Christian rites: "the ordinances of religion //ar£7 perpetual
institutions to be observed by all Christians, according to the directions of
their master."5 Par from the Quaker teaching that these ordinances are super¬
ceded by the grace given to an individual, the New Testament teaches that this
grace only enables that individual, 'in the diligent use of the positive rites
of religion to attain the "end of his faith, even the salvation of his soul."'^
1 Ibid. , p. 35o. Quakers' consider a standing ministry "useless"
because public worship is to be directed by the Spirit; and "unlawful" because
the ministry actually impedes the operation of the Spirit.
^ Ibid. , pp. 357-358. Cf. Robert Barclay's, Apology for the True Christian
Divinity, As the same is Held Forth, and -Preached by the people, called in Scorn,
Quakers, Proposition X ^Concerning the Ministry", pp. 2"/1f. Hill says that
Barclay was willing to accommodate the Quaker "principle to the spirit of the
times," and thus his Apology became "the ostensible creed of the Quakers."
3 Ibid., p. 359.
^ Ibid.> P» 556. Cf. Edward Stillingfleet, Irenicum, p. 203.
5 Ibid., P. 359. 6 ibid., p. 359.
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Hill al3o argues that to reject the rites of Christ as unimportant is to deny
his pre-established point^ that "the operation of the Spirit is conveyed to the
p
soul by the use of means." To reject the ordinances of Christ is to deny
"that operation of the Spirit £whichj^ is essentially necessary for the
conversion and final salvation of a sinner.
Having established the perpetuity of the Christian rites, Hill argues ftrom
this for the necessity of the ministry. "It ^~perpetuity_/^ implies that there
is an orderly method of administering the rites of Christianity; and as the
method cannot continue orderly unless there are certain persons to -whom this
office is committed, the existence of such a description of persons is a conse¬
quence which seems fairly to result from the opinion.He concludes: "We are
warranted...to lay the foundation of church-government, in its being the duty
of Christians to assemble together for the observance of these rites.
Hill turns from reason to Scripture. "If the followers of Jesus...are
bound to profess their faith by the observance of certain institutions, there
Trill probably be found in the Gospel.. .some appointment of persons to administer
g
th9m, some principles of order, and some provision of authority." It should
be noted that Hill's appeal to revelation is not primarily to establish the
legitimacy of a standing ministry, but to "confirm" v/hat he has already estab¬
lished by way of common sense and logic,^ and to show that such a ministry is
not "merely a human invention.To accomplish this two-fold aim, Hill notes
negatively that the "annihilation of church-government" is nowhere
1 Supra, p. 194.
3 Ibid., p. 359•
5 lbid»> P. 352.
7 Ibid., p. 360.
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 359.
4 Ibid., p. 36O.
6 Ibid., p. 351.
8 Ibid., p. 359.
"countenanced by Scripture";'' and positively that his reasoning everywhere
evidences a "conformity with Scripture.To avoid a lengthy discussion of
y/hat he considers obvious to any man "in the full possession of reason,"^ he
only lists "the heads of argument which the members of the Church of Rome,
and of the Episcopal and Presbyterian churches agree in opposing the presump¬
tuous conclusion vfhich.. .would represent the offices of a standing ministry
as useless."^- First there is the example of Christ. In choosing the twelve
apostles and sending them forth to make disciples, Christ intimated that He
was to employ, in the conversion of sinners, "the ministration of men holding
and exercising an office." Secondly, Hill argues that it cannot be said that
the office of a standing ministry, first invested in the apostles, was meant
to expire v/ith them, because they committed "the form of sound words" which
they taught "to faithful men able to teach others also." Thirdly he appeals
to precedent. If ministers were required in the earliest age of Christianity
when the Spirit was visibly operative through His extraordinary gifts, then "it
should seem that they will be more necessary in all succeeding ages, when His
extraordinary gifts are v/ithdrawn." Fourthly Hill refers to the fact that
office-bearers of different churches are mentioned in Scripture. The Epistle
to the Philippians is addressed "to all the saints at Philippi with the bishops
and deacons." Peter exhorts "the elders" to feed the flock. The writer to
the Hebrews coranands Christians to "obey them that have rule over them." The
letters to the seven churches in the Book of'Revelation are addressed, "not
to the churches, although they contain much general exhortation, but to the
angels or ministers of the churches; which is a proof that in every church there
was a person distinguished from the rest and qualified by his station to distri-
T ibid. , p. 359. 2 ibid. , p. 360. Ci'. p. 352.
3 Ibid., p. 36O. 4 Ibid., p. 364. See pp. 36O-364.
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bute the exhortations with effect." Finally Hill calls attention to Paul's
references to a ministerial order. In I Corinthians 14:32-33 ("And tho spirits
of the prophets are subject to the prophets. For God is not the author of
confusion, but of peace"), Paul delivers a "general rule...a rule which when
taken in conjunction with the occasion upon which it was delivered, and the
reason upon which it is grounded, seems intended to furnish a perpetual
preservative against that very confusion, which Quakers experience as soon
as they presume to disregard it, by exalting the exercise of the supposed gifts
of individuals above the ox*dinary performances of a standing ministry." In
the Epistle to the Thessolonians, Paul exhorts Christians "to esteem them that
are over them in the Lord." In letters to Timothy and Titus he mentions office¬
bearers of different rank in the Christian Society invested with special power.
He further charges Titus to ordain elders in every city. The "idea of the
perpetuity of the office of the ministry is expressed by Paul in a remarkable
passage, Ephesians 4:11-13*" There Paul lists, among others, the gift of the
ministry which is to remain "till we all come in the unity of the faith" - "an
end which the dispensations of providence and grace are carrying forward, but
which, in the nature of things, cannot be accomplished during this state....
From the apostle then, we learn, that till the end of the world, the work of
the ministry is to continue."
In evaluating Hill's position, the question arises: what sort of
ministry is Hill striving to substantiate as a perpetual ministry? As we might
expect from the conclusions reached in the previous chapter, Hill has no doctrine
of the ministry. He is only concerned with the external office of the minister
and the role the minister plays in the government of the Christian society.
Consequently he thinks primarily of the ministry, not in terms of service, but
in terms of control. The ministry Hill wishes to establish as perpetual is
simply the ministry of oversight. This is not the place to enter into a full
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discussion of all that the ministry does involve;'' it is enough to say thatfiar
more is entailed in that office than the authority to rule the church. Several
unfortunate results immediately spring from Kill's suggestion that the ministry
can be defined only in terms of ecclesiastical structure. First, the value of
the ministry will always be measured in terras of its functional utility. We
find Hill slipping into that error at several points.2 Yot W.H. Vanstone says,
"We are led by the New Testament to discuss the problem of structure in terms
neither of validity nor of utility, but of meaning."3 And T.F. Torrance says
that the true meaning of order and structure is to be found in the Lord's
Supper.^ This being so the ministerial ordex* must be appreciated for its
service to the real form and nature of the church in love, not for its pragmatic
usefulness.^ Secondly, because Hill arbitrarily describes the ministry in
judicial terms, he has no concept of the ministry of the whole church. Such
a concept would be inconsistent with the idea of a ministry defined only in
terms of government; if only some rule, then all cannot rule. Kill, therefore,
has no doctrine of the relationship of the special ministry to the common
ministry, the institutional ministry to the corporate ministry.^
1 Cf. J.T. McNeill, "The Ministry in the Light of the Historical Situation",
Consultation on Church Union Digest, Vol. Ill (Princeton, New Jersey, 1964) >
pp. 51-52, where he gives a bibliography covering the various aspects of the
Christian ministry.
2 Infra,pp. 314, 321, 344.
3 W.H. Vanstone, "The Ministry in the New Testament", The Historic
Episcopate (ed. by K.M. Carey), p. 40.
4 T.F. Torrance, Royal Priesthood, (S.J,T., Occasional paper No. 3> 1955)
p. 65 "...order of the Church is given in and through the Lord's Supper...."
5 Ibid., p. 66.
6 For a discussion of this relationship see J.R. Nelson, "Some Aspects
of the Christian Ministry in the Light of New Testament Study", Consultation
on Church Union Digest, Vol. Ill, p. 56, where he paraphrases Olof Linton's
four possible relationships. Cf. also Nelson, The Realm of Redemption, pp. I44f;
Leon Morris, Ministers of G-od, pp. 31f; J.A.T. Robinson, "Kingdom, Church and
Ministry", Historic Episcopate, p. 14; T.F. Torrance, Royal Priesthood, p. 35.
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It was not Hill's intention, however, to discuss the nature of the ministry.
His chief desire was to evince the fact that the ministry, simply as he precon¬
ceived it in terms of government, should continue to exist in the Christian
society. This he does in the manner outlined above. The evidence he brings
forward calls for several comments. Apparently unaware of any New Testament
distinction between "the twelve" and "the apostles," he interprets those
passages which speak of Jesus sending forth the twelve as the institution
of the apostolic office. Prom these incidents he draws the conclusion that
ministerial offices for order were established by Christ. This assertion has
2
been called into question by competent New Testament scholars. Leon Morris,
for instance, questions Hill's use of these passages as evidence of the fact
that Christ established a ministerial order. "There is no evidence that Jesus
instituted a ministry."3 Morris suggests that Hill might possibly infer from
passages that Jesus established a ministerial order, but they in no way present
the positive evidence for this fact which Hill interprets them as presenting.
Also Edward Schweizer calls into question Hill's implications that the choice
Torrance suggests that in failing to see this relationship, Hill has denied
himself one of the strongest points of evidence for substantiating the very
thing he is out to prove - the perpetuity of the ministry. Torrance says
that in the two-fold priesthood of the Old Testament, the royal priesthood
of the whole body and the institutional priesthood in the tribe of Levi,
we have the Biblical and theological basis for the institutional ministry of
the church.
1 J.K.S. Reid, The Biblical Doctrine of the Ministry (3.J.T. , Occasional
Paper No. 4, 1955), p. 18. VI.H. Vanstone, op.cit. , p. 29.
2 This is not to imply that contemporary New Testament scholars direct
their comments to Hill personally, but they do question the implications of
the general position which Hill expounded. Since this is true, and since it
is desirable to avoid involved phrases with the impersonal pronoun, a certain
anachronic licence is exercised. In other words, the contemporary scholars
are presented as though their remarks are directed to Hill personally, not
just to any who happen to hold the general position.
3 Morris, Ministers of God, p. 23.
301
of the twelve in any way established an 'office'. K.E. Kirk says in fact
p
that it does not refer to an office at all, but to a function. John Kriox extends
the question beyond the passages dealing vrlth the apostles, and asks it of those
references which Hill cites from Pauline literature to show that office-bearers
were in the early church.
For Paul there were teachers and prophets, but hardly the offices of
teacher and prophet. More obviously the healers, speakers in tongues,
miracle workers were not 'officials' of the church. Even the 'bishops'
and 'deacons' of Phil. 1:1 are not to be thought of as officials.3
But even if an office is implied, does this, asks J.K.S. Reid, "imply govern¬
mental functions?"^ Hill's argument presupposes an affirmative answer to this
question, yet Reid calls attention to "the absence of explicit mention" of
such functions.5
Hill himself did not defend his position against these questions.^
Yfithout reason, yet without hesitation, he simply made his assertion. However,
the position has been defended nonetheless. Commenting on Jesus' appointment
1 Edward Schweizer, Church Order in the New Testament (London, 196if,
pp. 28f. Cf. Arnold Ehrhardt, The Apostolic i.Iinistry""(s". j7*T, , Occasional
Paper No. 7, 1958), pp. 1-2.
2 K.E. Kirk (ed.), The Apostolic Ministry (London, 1946), p. vii.
3 John Knox "The Ministry in the Primitive Church", The Ministry in
Historical Perspectives (eds., H.R. Niebuhr and D.D. Williams, New York,
"1956), PP. '18-19.
4 Reid, Biblical Doctrine of the Ministry, p. 14.
5 Ibid. , p. 14. '
6 This is understandable. The idea that Jesus did not institute a
ministry i3 post-Hill, after Harnack-Sohm and the rise of the idea of the
charismatic origin of the ministry. The remark in the text, therefore, is
not intended as a criticism, but as a clarifying statement of fact.
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of the twelve Harold Riesenfeld asserts, "There is no doubt that an office or
1
ministry is in question here." And J.K.S. Reid rejecting a hard and fast
2
distinction between function and office says that both are involved. He also
states that one necessarily assumes that governmental authority "lies implicit"
in the passages in question. 3ut Reid concurs with the judgment of Morris in
contending that this issue is not settled on the basis of a few isolated
references, but from the other titles given the apostles, from the eschato-
logical place assigned to them, and from the evidence of their practice.-^
But even if the critics of Hill's assertion had proved right, it wouxd
have caused him no great alarm, for it is remembered that he considered his
strongest proof for ministerial orders, not the testimony of Scripture, but the
logic of his own argument.*1' The church was founded for the performance of
religious rites, and because the church must exist in an orderly state for
the observance of these rites, the ministerial office must have been present,
or how else would this essential and necessary order have been preserved?
Actually Hill's reasoning is not without merit. Leon Morris says, "We may
infer that an organization cannot exist without officers, and that therefore
some officers must have been provided." "But," he adds, "in inferring this we
should be quite clear what we are doing. We are reasoning about what seems
right to us."5 And Calvin suggests that what seems right to us might not be
the case. He agrees that order is necessary for the well-being of the church,^
1 Harold Riesenfeld, "The Ministry in the New Testament," The Root of
the Vina (ed. by A. Fridrichsen, 1953) > F* 112.
2 "It is an office into which the twelve are ordained. This means that
the concept of office has a place that is secure in the apostolate. If it
be also granted that function (as the case of the title apostle indicates) is
present too, then it follows that we have two complementary concepts with which
to work." Reid, Biblical Doctrine of the Ministry, p. 11.
3 Ibid., pp. 8-10. 4 Supra, pp. 294, 296.
5 Morris, Ministers of God , p. 23. Cf. O.C. Quick, The Christian Sacraments,
p. 15; J.T. McNeill, Consultation on Church Union Digest, Vol. Ill, p.
6 Supra, p. 219.
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but unlike Hill he says that "God might indeed of Himself, without the agency
-1
of men, preserve order." For Calvin, it is too facile an argument to reason
2
from the necessity of order to the establishment of a ministry. The ministry
exists only because God in his freedom "takes men for His Ministers and makes
use of their hands.
Perhaps the greatest weakness of Hill's argument, however, is the relation¬
ship which it suggests between Christ, the church, and the ministry. Christ
constituted the church for the performance of certain religious rites. The
church, realizing the need for order in observing these rites, inaugurated the
ministry. The ministry, therefore, evolved from the exigency of a human






This relationship, adopted by Protestants of various traditions,^ has been used
as a defence against priestly and hierarchical doctrines of the ministry. Indeed
it does prevent the minister from becoming the essential mediator between God
and man,5 but its liabilities far outweigh its assets. The interesting thing
is that Hill himself would reject such a relationship on the grounds of its
obvious "independent" principles.^ In fact, this pattern repudiates one of the
1 Calvin, Conroentary on Matthew, 21:33.
2 This is not to imply that Calvin did not accept the ministerial
office - he did, but for a different reason.
3 Calvin, Connientary on Matthew, 21:33.
U Nelson, Consultation on Church Union Digest, Vol. Ill, p. 61.
5 J.C. Ryle, Principles for Churchmen (London, 1884) , p. 156.
6 Infra, p. 3"l3*
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things Hill wants to prove - that the ministry was of divine, not human origin.'®
Apparently Hill was not aware that his logical argument implied such a relation¬
ship. The reason for this oversight no doubt is due to the fact that he used
this argument primarily to establish the perpetuation of the ministerial
office, not the ministerial office itself.
This brings us to an entirely different matter. Granting Hill everything
that he thought he had established by the use of logical argument and Scripture
texts, i.e., that Christ instituted ministerial offices of order, he has yet
p
to prove that ministerial offices are valid today. Appealing primarily to the
position of the apostles, he asserts that Christ instituted the apostolic
office; but does this necessarily mean that the office of apostle is authorized
today? Even for Hill the answer is negative. In the next section we find Hill
himself arguing that the apostles do not represent a permanent element in the
life of the church, but rather were suited to its infancy.^ Having made this
1 Realizing the converse in Hill's relationship, A.T. Hanson suggests'
another: "The pattern is Christ - the ministry - the Church." The pioneer
Ministry (London, 19^1), p. 72. But if Hill's suggested pattern makes the
ministry the creation of the church, Hanson's pattern makes the church the
creation of the ministry. At this point one becomes involved in what R.N. Hew
and R.E. Dayies call the problem of "temporal sequence." The Catholicity of
Frotestanism (London, 1950), p. 22. Seeking to avoid this problem of priorities,




Christ maintains both a direct and indirect relationship with the ministry and
the church; and neither the ministry nor the church can exist without the
other. The Church's Ministry (London, 1948), p. 50.
2 "Valid" is used here in the sense of being "grounded in the authority of
God," not in the sense of being "guaranteed" or "legitimate." Such usage follows
the example of Robinson and other writers in the Historic Episcopate. See p. 14,
note 3. Cf. T.P. Torrance, "Consecration and Ordination", S.J.T., Vol. II,
1958, p. 244.
3 Infra, p. 324.
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admission, Hill is hard put to refute the Quaker position that not only the
apostolic office, but all ministerial offices were only for the early church,,
Aware of the difficulty, created in part by his own position regarding the
apostles, he counters the Quaker assertion that all ministerial offices ceased
Y/ith apostolic age by noting that the apostles passed on "sound words.This,
however, is a lame answer for it avoids completely the question. The issue at
stake is not the apostles' doctrine or teaching but their unique authority to
rule, their superior power of jurisdiction; and it is this very power which
Hill himself proves to be nontransferable.^ This reference then to the trans¬
mission of "sound words" is quite irrelevant to the Quaker's attack on Hill's
position. In a final analysis his only defense is to press his logical argument
a bit further. It goes something like this. Christ constituted the church to
perform certain rites. In the performance of these rites, order v/as necessary;
and for order to prevail, the ministry was necessary. Since the rites are
perpetual, the ministry must be perpetual.3
There are those v/ho accept Hill's conclusion, that a standing ministry in
the church is valid, but reject his reasons for reaching this conclusion. They
reject his argument from proof-texts in favor of an argument from the context.
The Biblical basis for a continuing ministry, says J.K.S. Reid, "is found not
by analysis of what the Bible at individual points has to say, but rather from
a consideration of what the Bible as a whole is. The evidence will be drawn
not from individual texts, but from the nature of the Bible as such....We are
~
1 Supra, p"~297I *~~~ * "2 Infra', p.' 3^1.
3 In attempting to refute the continuation of the apostolate while at
the same time seeking to establish a standing ministry, Hill could have made
good use of Thomas Ayton's argument concerning these interrelated points which
is much stronger than his own. Cf. The Original Constitution of the Christian
Church (1730) > FP« A5-48* It appears, however, that Hill was not aware of this
v/ork. Cf. T.F. Torrance, "Thomas Ayton's Original Constitution of the Christian
Church", Reformation and Revolution (ed. Duncan Shaw), pp. 273^»
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to take our stand on the rim of the Bible and see whether we may be told seme-
thing about the ministry that i3 recorded in its pages.""* Just as decisively,
others reject Hill's logical argument in favor of a theological argument. The
most striking feature of Hill's approach is its complete failure to relate the
ministry of men to the ministry of Christ. Yet "all discussion about the
ministry," declares Paul Minear, "must begin with. ..His ministry."^ Y/hy must
this be the case? Because, says J.A.T., Robinson, "The Christian ministry is
none other than the ministry of Christ Himself."3 Even though Hill drastically
limited the Christian ministry in terms of order, he should have discussed this
single concept, no less than the whole, in relation to Christ. It is only as
one understands the ministry of men in terms of Christ's ministry that he is
given to see the validity ox a standing human ministry. Order and the ministry
of order continue in the church because Christ Himself continually rules and
governs His church, and the ministry of men is but a "participation in the whole
ministry of Christ."^ There will always be a ruling class in the church because
1 Raid, The Biblical Doctrine of the Ministry, p. 12.
2 Quoted by J.R. Nelson, Consultation on Church Union Digest, Vol. Ill,
p. 58.
3 Robinson, Historic Episcopate, p. 13. Cf. Morris, Ministers of God,
p. 25; "The really essential thing about the New Testament view of the ministry
is that the one basic ministry is that of Christ Himself." Cf. Reid, Biblical
Doctrine of the Ministry, p. 1; "The prototype for the ministry is our Lord
Himself; the pattern for all the New Testament has to say about the ministry
is what our Lord has to say about His ministry." Cf. T.VT. Manson, The Church's
Ministry, p. 22; "There is one 'essential1 ministry....That is the ministry which
the Lord Jesus Christ opened in Galilee after John the Baptish had been put in
prison."
1 T.P. Torrance, Royal Priesthood, p. 36. Cf. Geddes MaoGregor, Corpus
Christ!, p. 156; "According to the Reformed tradition, there are strictly speaking,
no individual ministers, but, rather, individuals within the Church whose unique
privilege it is to participate in the corporate ministry of Christ, the only
Head of the Church." Torrance says that it is not easy to state precisely the
relationship between the ministry of Christ and the ministry of man, but at
least two. things are quite clear. "On the one hand, there can be no relation
of identity in part or in whole between the ministry of the Church and the
ministry of Christ....On the other hand, the ministry of the Church is not
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Christ has chosen to exercise His Lordship over His church mediately, not
iranediately. "Christ by His ascension took away His visible presence from us,
and yet He ascended that He might fill all things; now, therefore, He is
present in the Church, and always will be. When Paul would show the way in
which He exhibits Himself, he calls our attention to the ministerial offices
which He employs."'' We may posit a standing ministry in the church because the
ministry is the special gift of Christ to the church for the fulfillment of its
mission between Pentecost and the 'Parousia'. ^ It is the "scaffolding"^ for
the lip-building of the church until Christ's return. Indeed, it, like the
/
gifts of baptism and the Lord's Supper, will pass away when with the coming
of Christ the essential order of the church is revealed. However, until that
time, the gift of ministerial orders, as well a3 the gifts of Word and sacrament,
"are absolutely necessary.To argue in this manner for the authorization of
a standing ministry is to argue theologically, and this approach does not allow
even the remotest possibility of refuting the continual presence of the ministry
of men in the earthly life of the church. When the church of Christ rightly
asserts the validity of an order of men entrusted -with the government of the
church, it does so not necessarily because it deems such an order expedient,5
another ministry different from the ministry of Christ, or separable from it."
p. 3/. Leon Morris uses the example of Paul to illustrate this relationship.
"The outside observer might feel that Paul was engaged in some work of
ministry. And in a way he was. But to the apostle the essential thing was that
Christ was doing the work of the ministry. In the particular instances of which
he speaks Christ, not Paul, was the real minister, though it is true that He
was choosing to work through Paul....There is but one essential ministry, the
ministry of Christ. All valid human ministry is a reflection of that."
Ministers of Cod, p. 25.
1 Calvin, Institutes, in6:10.
2 T.F. Torrance, Royal Priesthood, p. 97.
3 Ibid., p. 81. Torrance borrows this term from M. Schmaus,
Katholische Dogmatik, 4/1, p. 572.
4 T.'F. Torrance, Kingdom and Church, p. 138.
5 O.C. Quick calls this the "it-seemed-good-to-us" approach.
Christian Sacraments, p. 143.
308
but because such an order has been determined by Christ Himself - His ministry,
His Lordship, Hi3 gift.
Tke Fo™ of Church Government
Having established the fact that the Christian society is to have a
ministerial order, Hill moves to determine the form v/hich that order should take.
He chooses to discuss the form of church government in terms of "the persons
in v/hom church-government is vested.""1 Four opinions as to the description of
such persons are examined and critisized; the opinions of the Independents,
the Church of Rome, the Episcopalians, and the Presbyterians.
/
1. Independents
Hill understands the Independent form of church government to be no more
than a modification of the extreme "no-government" position of the Quakers.
John Robinson, the "author" of Independency, was educated in the Quaker
tradition, but expediency caused him to modify that position and to adopt one
which, unlikB the Quakers', allowed for certain persons in every congregation
to be given the authority to govern, but which, like the Quakers', allowed no
vital connection between one congregation and another. Robinson's leading
idea was expressed in these vrords; "Every particular society of visible
professors, agreeing to walk together in the faith and order of the Gospel,
is a complete church, and has full power 'within itself to elect and ordain all
church officers, to exclude all offenders, and to do all other acts relating
1 Hill, L.I.D., Yo~III, pp. 39"2, 354, 384, 37&~.
2 Ibid. , p. 364. Hill follows Daniel Neale, Tho History of the Puritans,
Vol. I, p. 437: "Mr. Robinson was the father of the IKDEPENDENT3." However,
Ronald Osborn in "Ministry or Ministries", Consultation on Church Union,
1965, p. 175, follows V/illiston Walker, The Creeds and Platforms of
Congregationalism (Boston, 1893)» P« 17, in saying that "Robert Browne must
be accounted the father of modern Congregationalism." Walker suggests that
Robinson v/as the author of a type of separatism representing the further
development of a form of government based upon the principles first
propounded by Browne. Ibid., p. 84.
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to the edification and well-being of the church."'' According to this fundamental
principle "the persons in whom church government is vested" are those whom "the
whole body ^congregation^ sets apart with religious solemnity. ..under the
name of pastors, teachers, or elders, who derive their title to act in that
capacity solely from the nomination of the society, and who, in virtue of that
nomination are the only persons entitled to perform within that society the
2
acts connected with their character."
The key issue in this theory, however, is not the appointment of those
who are to rule, but the independency of the separate congregations. It is
argued that if the independency of congregations is established, then it will
naturally follow that the persons who govern are such as have been described.
Therefore, desiring to prove that their description of the persons in whom
church government resides is Scriptural and that their correlative form of
government is lawfully binding upon the church to the exclusion of all other
forms,3 the Independents attempt to show that all the churches mentioned in
the New Testament were single congregations which mat in one place. Hill,
however, consigns to failure both the effort to defend independency as Scriptural
and the effort to make it mandatory today. Kegarding the first he reasons that
the success of the apostles' labors, the multitude of believers, and the number
of teachers such multitudes required are presented in the Book of Acts
^ Ibid.', p. 365. Cf. D. Neale, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 50uT Hill says
that it is obvious to see why "those who adopted this scheme were originally
called Independents; but as that name came to be employed in a political sense,
and was applied, during the commotions of the seventeenth century, to many
who entertained principles hostile to civil government, those who wished to
hold themselves forth as peaceable subjects of the powers that were, and as
distinguished from other Christians, merely by their peculiar notions of
church government, chose rather to take the name of Congregational Brethern"
(p. 3^6). Hill nevertheless refers to them as Independents throu^aout his
discussion.
2 Ibid. , pp. 365-366. Cf. Neale, op.cit. , Vol. II, p. 508.
3 Neale, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 508.
310
in such terms as render it impossible for us to suppose, that all the
Christians in any one of the four cities*' could assemble together;
more especially when we consider that the Christians were not at that
time in possession of any public places of worship, and that they
would be solicitous to avoid any ostentation of their number, because
their meetings, instead of being authorized by the lay/s of the state,
were obnoxious to the magistrate.^
Yet, says Hill, the different congregations which obviously existed in these
large cities are always called "one church." The plural may be applied to
churches in different provinces, i.e., "the churches throughout all Judea,
and Galilee, and Samaria" (Acts 9:31)> but the plural is never applied to the
churches in one city. We read only of the church y/hich was in Jerusalem, the
church at Corinth, the church at Antioch, the church at Sphesus. Hill concludes
that "whatever was the bond of union among the different congregations in one
city, the apostles seem to have considered them as constituting one church."3
But even if the Independents were successful in their first efforts, they would
still fail in their second.
But even although we should allow the Independents the proposition which
they attempt to prove, it does not appear that they would gain much. If,
in the times of which the Book of Act3 gives the history, all the Christians
of every city might conveniently assemble for worship in one place, such
regulations as suited this scanty number could not be a proper pattern for
after-times, when Christians multiplied beyond the possibility of meeting
together: and if in the one congregation which was formed at first, many
individuals and many families were united by their common faith under one
government, this early union, which y/as all that the circumstances of the
case required, is very far from implying any condemnation of that future
union of different congregations, which their vicinity might prompt.^
Hill admits that this evidence serves only to refute any claim of a divine
right for the Independent form of government,' not that form of government itself.
1 Jerusalem, Corinth, Antioch, Ephesus.
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 367.
3 Ibid., pp. 367-368.
A Ibid., p. 368.
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Although the state of the congregations described in the New Testament dees not
furnish "Scripture-authority" for the Independent form, it is a fact of history
nonetheless. Therefore, Hill determines to evaluate it as such. Since the "plea
for authority" has been set aside, this form of church government must be tried
by "general maxims," maxims which are founded, as one might expect, "in reason
A
and Scripture."'
In appreciating the merits of the Independent form of church government,
there are several concessions Hill readily makes. It does imply the perpetual
obligation of the rites of Christianity. It provides for the appointment of a
particular order of men to insure the regular administration of these rites.
It proposes an ecclesiastical society which possesses and exercises certain
powers, considered as necessary for its own preservation. It guards against
"the aggrandizement of any order of men," and manifests a concern "for the
edification of the people." And Hill is even willing to admit that in certain
circumstances the independent form may be allov/ed.
If a body of Christians were by any calamity, placed for a length of time
in such a situation, that it was impossible for them to obtain the minis¬
trations of a person regularly invested with the pastoral character, -
placed in an island without a pastor, and separated from all other Christians,
it would still continue to be their duty to join in the worship of God, and
to celebrate the rites of Christianity: but that these services might bo
performed in a manner the most orderly, and the most agreeable to the institu¬
tion of Christ which circumstances permitted, it -would also be their duty
to call from among themselves the persons whom they thought best qualified
to preside in the public worship and to administer the rites; and it i3
not to be doubted that the blessing of God would supply the unavoidable
defect.2
1 Ibid., p. 368.
2 Ibid. , pp. 369-370. Samuel Rutherford makes an interesting comment at
this point. "In an Island where the Gospell is, if all the Pastors should
dye, the people might chuse Pastors to themselves, but they could not then
make them pastors, God onely without the ministry of other Pastors in that
case should make Pastors." Peaceable Plea for Paul's Presbytorie in Scotland,
pp. 266-267.
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But once these concessions have been made, Hill contends that "the
Independent form of government remains liable to strong objections."^ His first
objection is the disunion of the Christian society which it implies. "It considers
the follov/ers of Jesus as constituting so many separate assemblies, every one of
■which cares for itself, is complete within itself, and has only a casual connexion
with others.This idea, he continues, is diametrically opposed to the Scriptural
idea of a Christian society, separated indeed by the necessity of circumstances
into various associations, but retaining even in separation some essential
"connexion." It is in his explanation of that "connexion" that Hill sets forth
his "branch theory" of church unity. We have already presented and evaluated
this theory, but should note in this context wiry Hill is concerned to establish
some kind of"connexion." He mentions three reasons in particular. In the first
place, if there is no connection between congregations, there is no legal
procedure for correcting the errors committed by small, unrelated judicatories.
"If in the exorcise of the separate authority, of any congregation, wrong be
done to an individual, he is left, while he remains a member of that congregation,
without the possibility of redress."3 In the second place, if there is no
connection, there is no constitutional means of settling the controversies which
arise among separate associations. "If neighbouring associations quarrel, which,
considering the caprice and violence of human passions, is perhaps not much less
likely than that they will live in peace, no method is provided for terminating
their dissessions, or for preserving, amidst these dissensions, the continuance
of their agreement in any common principles."^" In the third place, separate
associations tend to appropriate as their own exclusive rites the ordinances of
Christianity; yet, "the rites which the great body of Christians agree in cele-
1 Ibid., p. 370.
3 Ibid. , pp. 372, 377.
2 Ibid., p. 372.
^ Ibid.» PP» 372-373-
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bi-ating, ore the rites not of this or that association, but of the church of
Christ."1
Hill's second objection to the Independent form of government respects "the
mode of appointment to the office of the ministry which it enacts."^ According
to the Independent method, both the ministerial office and the power which that
office implies are conveyed to a person by an act of the people. But according
to Hill, this is an improper method for conveying either the office or the power;
and the claim that it is a proper one is based on false equations at both points.
In the first place, "ordination is confounded with election.More shall be
said about this matter later, but suffice it to note here that Hill, dn the
basis of Scripture, makes a distinction between ordination whereby the office
of minister is conveyed to a person by an act of Christ, and the election of that
person to a position of service in the church by an act of men. Indeed, the
people may act in assigning a minister to his particular place of service, but
they may so act only after the minister has been qualified for that service by
the divine act of ordination. In the second place, "the source from which church
power flows is confounded with the purpose for which it is conferred.
Independents argue that since church power is exercised over the people, then
that power must reside originally with the people to be delegated by them to
5their officers. Hill contends that such reasoning is incorrect for it fails to
take account of the headship of Christ over the church. He argues that the power
implied in the ministerial office, though exercised over the people, need not,
and in fact, does not derive from the people, but from Christ who alone is the
g
King and Head of the Christian society.
1 Ibid., p. J573-
3 Ikl-d*, p. 377.
5 Ibid. , p. 369.
2 Ibid., p. 370.
4 Ibid., p. 369.
6 Ibid., p. 378.
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Thus, because the Independent form of church government tends to oppose
church unity, and because it implies a doctrine of ordination which is contrary
to both Scripture and reason, Hill rejects it as the best form of polity for the
Christian society.
2. Church of Rome
Hill states that when we come to discuss the polity of the Church of Rome
in terms of "the persons in whom church-government is vested," we must acknowledge
a distinction between those whom he calls Papists and those whom he calls Romanists.
The Papists hold that the bishop of Rome, commonly known by the name of the Pope,
has, as the successor of the apostle Peter, a primacy over the great society of
Christians; that he is the vicar of Christ on earth, the visible head of the
universal church, whose power extends over all its members; that he may in himself
enact laws binding upon the Y/hole church, determine all controversies by his own
infallible authority, and either inflict censures or grant absolution according
to his own pleasure; but that he himself is not obliged to give account to any.
In short, the Papists believe that all church-government is vested in one person,
th.6 Pope, who possesses infallible, sovereign, and uncontrollable power."® The
Romanists, on the other hand, maintain that the bishop of Rome, as the successor
of Peter, is the most dignified member of the universal church; that he holds a
place of primacy and superiority; and that he is due a certain respect. But,
unlike the Papists, they do not allow the personal infallibility of the Pope;
they consider that the head, no less than the members, is subject to the decrees
of the church universal; that it is competent, should the Pope err, for a general
council to correct his maladministration, to insure the liberties of the whole
body, to defend the truth which he abandons, and even to depose him should the
safety or reformation of the church require it. In short the Romanists believe
p
that all church government is vested in the Papa cum concilio. Hill, not
1 Ibid. , p. 379. 2 Ibid., pp. 3»0-3b1.
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wishing to minimize these differences between the papists and Romanists,^
nevertheless concludes that for our purpose we may deal with them together.
Both groups assert the authority and power of the Pope; one simply limits this
whereas the other does not.
The assertion that church government, be it total or partial, rest in the
person of the Pope is founded on three propositions: "that our Lord gave to
Peter a primacy over all the other apostles - that Peter wa3 Bishop of Rome -
and that it was the intention of Christ, that the powers possessed by Peter should
be transmitted to the Bishops of Rome, in all succeeding ages."^ Hill contends
that if the Papists^ are to defend the divine right of papacy, they must prove
every one of these propositions, for "if they fail in the proof of any one...the
primacy of the Pope becomes a human invention, which may be wise or unwise but
which cannot be regarded as the institution of Christ."^"
To support the primacy of Peter the Papists note that the New Testament
presents him as the one more ready to speak and to act than the other apostles,
as the one peculiarly addressed by Christ and as the one who answers in the name
of the rest. They also call attention to the fact that his name heads every
complete enumeration of the apostles, and that Matthew even calls him "the first."
Their strongest support, however, is to be found in Christ's remarkable words to
Peter recorded in Matthew 16;18; "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build
my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." As for the
second proposition, the Papists argue partly from the testimony of ancient writers
that Peter lived for some time in Rome, that he along with Paul founded the church
1 Hill notes that in the 15th and 16th centuries these differences were
the cause of violent controversies between the ecclesiastical leaders of Italy
and France.
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 589.
3 Hill uses this term for both groups.
4 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, pp. 389-390.
there, and that he died there; and partly from the expression at the end of his
first epistle, "the church at Babylon saluteth. you." It is said that Babylon,
in the Book of Revelation, is the symbolic name for Rome, and that Fetor by
using this name in his epistle meant to indicate that Rome was the place of his
residence. The Papists are forced to admit that the third proposition finds no
support at all in Scripture and that tradition alone vouches for its credibility.
They note in particular the respect which they say was in all ages paid to the
bishop of Rome, the names given to him by ancient writers, and the probability
that Peter's successors would be distinguished above those of the other apostles.1
In refuting these arguments, Hill claims to give only "a specimen of the
answers that are made to them.As for the primacy of Peter, Hill admits that
in every body of men there are some individuals who appear to take the lead, and
that Peter's own character and personality constituted him such a person. But
he adds that this in no v,ray implies any superiority of office. More damaging
to the Papist position is the fact that Christ, immediately before His ascension,
gave all his apostles the same commission and invested them with the same powers.
Hill further suggests that the primacy of Peter is difficult to reconcile with
the fact that, though present, he did not preside at the Jerusalem Council, that
he is sent by the others to Samaria, that he is openly reprimanded by Paul. When
he comes to examine "the strength of what the Papists account their impregnable
fortress, the words addressed to Peter in Matthew Hill finds a
reasonable interpretation other than that of the Papists. He states that the
phrase, "I will give thee the keys of the Kingdom of heaven" is immediately
explained by the following phrase, "whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall
^ Ibid. , p. 390. ' Of. George Campbell, Ecclesiastical History (London,
1840, first published 1771), pp. 330f.
2 Ibid., pp. 391f.
3 Ibid. , p. 392. Cf. John Potter, A Discourse on Church Government
(London, 1839, first published 1707), pp. 51f. Of. Hans Kung, Structures of the
Church, pp. 201f.
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be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, shall be loosed
in heaven." This last phrase, notes Hill, is soon repeated by Llatthew (18; 18) and
is then addressed to all the apostles. These words then cannot convey to Peter
any power but such as all the apostles enjoyed. To the argument that tho personal
words, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I shall build my church," assign to
Peter a dignity and importance that cannot be common to him and the other
apostles, Hill gives two answers. The first is simply that the expression does
not necessarily imply that the church was to be built upon Peter. A possible
interpretation is that Peter's confession, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the
living God," is the foundation of the church, and that Christ, wishing to stress
the stability of the church upon this foundation, alludes to the import of the
name which He had given Simon when called as a disciple.1 Hill suggests this
paraphrase: "The gates of hell shall not prevail against my church for it is
founded upon that confession now made by thee, which as the name given thee
imports, is immoveable."2 in defence of "this interpretation, Hill notes:
He does not say, "Upon thee mil I build my church." He does not even
say, toj TOTpw. But crv el n^rpoe, xat etu raotr) rrf 7ceirpa ofc xo6opf)ato
pom "cr\v ev.xhiaxcvj , changing the substantive noun, it would seem, in
order to indicate that he meant only an allusion to the name, and not
the person to whom the name belonged.3
If, however, the reference is to the person of Peter as well as to his name then
Hill gives a second answrer: the sense of the statement must be figurative, "for
the only person who can be truly regarded as the foundation of "the Christian
church is the divine author of it."^ If, to refute this, the Papists cite
Ephesians 2:20, "Ye are built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets,
Jesus Christ himself being the chief cornerstone," Kill still insists upon a
figurative interpretation, but notes further that this statement itself denies
1 Ibid., p. 394.
3 Ibid., p. 394.
2 Ibid., p. 394.
4 Ibid., p. 395.
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the uniqueness claimed for Peter since all the apostles are mentioned as
foundations. Thus "by one or the other of these rational interpretations...
Protestants think they are able to remove the countenance which this singular
expression may appear to give to the high claims of a primacy in Peter over the
other apostles."^
According to Hill's reasoning, it is not necessary to disprove the other
two interrelated propositions of the Papist position since the first ha3 proven
to be untrue, but ha presents brief arguments against them nevertheless. "When
you examine the evidence that Peter died bishop of Rome, you will find it
p
extremely doubtful whether he was ever in that city." Paxil makes no mention of
Peter in his Epistle to the Romans; Peter himself never speaks of being in Rome;
and there is no reason to suppose that the name of Babylon should be taken to
mean anything other than the ancient capital of the Assyrian empire. And if
Peter was not the bishop of Rome, then the popes are not his successors. The
collapse of the papist proof is complete.
But, as with his critique of the Independent proofs, Hill is quick to admit
that his own arguments have only proven that papacy cannot be regarded as divinely
instituted; they have not, nor was it their intention, to disprove papacy as a
point of fact. On the contrary ho acknowledges "Popery as one of the most-
interesting portions of ecclesiastical history,"3 and quite apart from the
arguments of the Papists, gives his own account of the rise and development of
this form of chxxrch government.^ Having once divorced papacy from its claims
of divine institution, Hill considers its plausibility as a humanly contrived
means of ruling and governing the Christian society.
—Ibid> ^ 396<
2 Ibid., p. 393. Cf. Campbell, op.cit., p. 212, "It has been questioned
whether Peter ever was at Rome."
3 Ibid., p. 382. 4 Ibid., p. 398f.
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The great merit of the papal form of government lies in the unity which
it claims to give to the universal church. While the Independent form breaks
the one society into many unconnected parts, the sovereignty of the pope forms
a common centor of unity for the various associations into which Christians,
of necessity, must be divided.
If there is one visible head whom all of them acknowledge, his authority,
pervading the great society, controlling and regulating all ecclesiastical
jurisdiction, is fitted to preserve that consent in articles of faith,
and that uniformity in worship and rites which, however agreeable to the
nature of the Christian society, the wide extent of it seems to render
impractical without such a paramount authority.
In his Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church, Bossuet makes this
claim in these words;
The Son of God being desirous his Church should be one, and solidly built
upon Unity, hath established and instituted the Primacy of St. Peter
to maintain and cement it. Upon which account, we acknowledge this
Primacy in the Successors of the Prince of the Apostles., .-which is the
common Center of all Catholic Unity.
Although Hill desires some expression of oneness, he is not willing to
recommend "that kind of unity which arises from subjection to one head."-5 His
refusal to do so is based upon several reasons. In the first place, the Catholic
position, if it does not claim it, certainly implies that Christ needs a visible
head to maintain the unity of the Christian society. This, says Hill, impinges
upon the freedom of Christ as the Lord of the church. "As this Lord shall
continue till the end of the world to rule in his kingdom, he may employ
other means besides the government of a visible head to preserve unity."^ In
the second place, Hill states that for the papal form to work, perfect wisdom
and perfect goodness must be united in the person of the pope, otherwise his
1 Ibid. , p. 3&i|i
2 Ibid. , p. 384. Cf. J.B. Bossuet, An Exposition of the Doctrine of the
Catholic Church in matters of Controversie"~("l663), pp. 200-201.
3 Ibid., p. 384.
4 Ibid. , p. 385. Cf. Yfilliam Wake, A Continuation of the present State of
the Controversy Between the Church of England ana the Church of Rome (1688), p. 27.
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tremendous power will not be exerted for the best purposes of the church
4
and its members. Yet such a character is not to be found on earth, and
certainly not in the successions of popes as is indicated by the fact that they
p
have contradicted one another. In the third place, Christ explicitly warned
against both the exercise of power implied in the office of the pope (Matthew 20;
25-26), and the subjection of thought and judgment implied on the part of the
people (Matthew 23; 8-9). Hill hastens to add that such warnings, -when compared
with other passages of Scripture, do not condemn church government in general;
but he believes that they do modify the authority that is to be exercised,
and the subjection that is to be yielded.
Therefore they ^Christ* s warnings^ imply a condemnation of a form of
church government, which, by committing Christians in all places of the
world to the inspection and the absolute government of one man, exalts
him to a station, and intrusts him with an office, to which the natural
powers of the wisest and the best of the sons of men are wholly inadequate.3
In the fourth place, the papal form of church government has evidenced through¬
out history an inherent antipathy towards civil government. It has interrupted
the orderly proceedings of foreign states, weakened the authority of magistrates,
created interests in opposition to the public good, and afforded various
pretexts for superinducing dangerous civil claims. These things cannot be.
Any person who recollects the submission which our Lord and his apostles
uniformly yielded to the civil power, the many exhortations to obedience
v/hich the epistles contain, and the quiet accommodating spirit in all
things not sinful, which the Gospel forms, will not readily believe that
the method which Christ adopted for preserving the unity of his church,
was a method so hostile to the peace of society.
And finally, it must be noted that the papal form of church government has not
accomplished its great aim. What might have been a center of uniry has, in
fact, become a point of discord and a perpetual source of contention. The papal
1 Ibid., p. 385.
3 Ibid. , p. 386.
2 Ibid., p. 387.
h Ibid., pp. 388-389.
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form of government has "produced altercation, mutual hatred, and persecution."
Hill, therefore, concludes that the "great merit" of the papal form of govern¬
ment, the unity it claims to give to the universal church, proves to be
specious.^ Thus having shov/n that it is not of divine institution, and that,
as a human invention, it is a failure, he rejects the papal form as a proper
means of governing the Christian society.
3. Episcopalians^
According to the Episcopal form of government, "the personsin whom church-
government is vested" are of two classes.
There is in the church a superior order of office bearers, the successors
of the apostles, who possess in their own persons the right of jurisdiction
...and who are called stuctxotoh (bishops), as being the overseers not only
of the people, but also of the clergy; and an inferior order of ministers
called presbyters, the literal translation of the word Kpeai3uT:epoi , which
is rendered in our English Bibles elders, persons who receive...power to
preach and to administer the sacraments, who are set over the people, but
are themselves under the government of the bishops.^
The key principle in this form of government is the distinction it maintains
between the two classes of clergymen to whom the government of the church is
committed and the inspection and authority the superior group exercises over
the inferior. Episcopalians state that whatever degree of subordination exists
between members of the superior class is simply "a matter of civil regulation,
depending upon mutual agreement, or upon national establishment."5
Those who would substantiate the claim that episcopacy finds the model
upon vdiich it is formed in the days of the apostles, and that it is incumbent
upon us being recommended by apostolic authority, are faced Y/ith a two-fold
1 -Ibid. , p. 387. "2 Ibid., p. 363.
3 Hill treats the Episcopal and Presbyterian forms of government simul¬
taneously, and for these reasons; they both claim to be grounded in the same
model; they are both found in the same kingdom; they agree in certain points;
and the refutation of the one lays the foundation for the other. For the sake
of clarity and organization, hov;ever, we shall treat his discussion of them
separately.
4 Hill, L, I.D. . Vol. Ill, pp. 421-2^2.
5 Ibid. , p. 422.
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task. They must first prove that the apostles were commissioned to their
special position by Jesus and that they did in fact exercise their superior
authority ov6r the inferior ministerial orders of their day; and secondly they
must prove that the superior office of apostle, together with its accompanying
powers, was transmitted to the successors of the apostles and has continued in
such transmission unto the present day.
Episcopalians feel that they have an easy task in proving that the
apostles were given superior positions of government in the order of the New
Testament church. They state that anyone who reads the New Testament with an
unbiased mind will always reach the conclusion that Christ gave to them specific
descriptions of the office which they were to hold, that He qualified them for
the execution of that office, and that He invested them with the authority which
the discharge of the duties of that office implies. It is just as evident, they
maintain, that immediately after the ascension of Christ the apostles began to
execute their commission as rulers of the Christian society which was gathered
by their preaching. To manifest the fact that they exercised this authority
over lesser office-bearers in the church, the Episcopalians note in particular
the passage in Acts 6 which clearly indicates the apostles' authority over the
deacons. More especially do they call attention to the several activities of
the Apostle Paul in this regard. He is found to have ordained elders, teachers,
pastors, and overseers of the churches in the places where he preached. The
important thing in this case, however, is not his ordination of these officers,
but the jurisdiction which h.6 exercised over those to whom he had conveyed some
ministerial order. Such jurisdiction is undoubtedly implied in Paul's summoning
of the elders of Ephesus, and in his letters to Timothy and Titus, written in
the style of a superior. It is concluded, therefore, that the apostles were
o
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given a superior office in the church of Christ, and that after His earthly
departure, they exercised the authority and power of this office over the
inferior office-bearers in the church.
The next point which must be established is the fact that the apostles
transmitted this superior office with its superior authority to successors, and
that these men in turn passed it on to others, and so on to the present day.
To verify this process of apostolic succession, the Episcopalians appeal once
again to the practice of Paul. They find in the Scriptural record of his
activity two examples of a delegation of his apostolic authority. The first
is the incident in which Paul empowers Timothy to set apart men for the work
of th6 ministry, and specifically notes that both the bishops and the deacons
in Ephesus are under his inspection. In the second incident, similar to the
first, Paul gives to Titus the right to judge the qualifications of bishops
in Crete, and imparts to him authority over all orders of Christians there.
Here, then, is that apostle, with whose actions we are best acquainted,
seemingly aware that there would be continued occasion in the Christian
church for the exercise of that authority over pastors and teachers,
which the apostles had derived from the Lord Jesus; and by these two
examples of a delegation given during his lifetime, preparing the world
for beholding that authority exercised by the successors of the
apostles in all ages.^
This, though the earliest, is not the only evidence. The post-Biblical writers
cite the apostles as "giving orders, that upon their death, other approved men
should succeed in their ministry.Fortunately, ecclesiastical history not
only testifies to the fact that these orders were obeyed, but actually records
the succession of bishops during the first three critical centuries. Finally,
in support of apostolic succession, the Episcopalians note the universal continua¬
tion of this practice. "'We find episcopacy in all corners of the church of Christ.
1 Ibid. , pp. 419-420. 2 Ibid., p. 420.
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Until the time of the Reformation there were in every Christian state persons
-t
with the name, the rank, and the authority of bishops."
After having set forth the most prominent arguments in favor of episcopacy,
Itill sets about to evaluate each in turn. He readily admits, with the
Episcopalians, that the apostles were commissioned by Christ to a special position
of authority in the church; but he believes that a distinction must be made
between the extraordinary powers implied in their special position, and the
2
ordinary functions implied in their office as teachers. Connected with the
office of apostle were two powers of an extraordinary nature, both of which
were exercised under the infallible guidance of the Holy Spirit. The first was
the power of superior jurisdiction which exalted the apostles above all other
office-bearers. This power was indicated and verified by the performance of
miracles, and it directed and encouraged the early Christians "to submit
r— "7 7)
implicitly to their [_ apostles'_/ injunctions and directions."^ The second was
the power of inspiration which placed the apostles' words "upon a footing with
the words of their Master." This power, likewise confirmed by the working of
miracles in the name of Jesus, "warrants the Christian world, An all ages, to
receive with entire confidence that system of faith and morality, which they wore
authorized to deliver in his name."^ Now, reasons Hill, if the second power
passed with the death of the apostles, what justification is there for retaining
the first, especially since the confirmation of both (the working of miracles')
has passed and the guarantee of the correct execution of both (the infallible
guidance of the Spirit) has passed.
As all Protestants hold that this system /""of faith and morality__/ was
completed when the canon of Scripture was closed, and that neither individuals,
nor any body of men, have authority to add any new articles of faith, it is
admitted by them that a great part of the apostolical powers ceased with those
1 Ibid., p. 421.
2 Ibid., p. 427. Cf. Campbell, Ecclesiastical History, p. 82.
3 Ibid., p. 427. 4 Ibid., p. 427.
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to •whom Jesus first coirmitted them; and, therefore, the Presbyterians
cannot appear to contradict the analogy of faith, when they rank amongst
the extraordinary powers which were to cease after the days of the
apostles, that supreme right of inspection and government over Christian
pastors, which...in their hands was not liable to abuse.
But not all were extraordinary powers; some were ordinary. The ordinary functions
which belonged to the apostles, as teachers, were preaching the Word, dispensing
the sacraments, and exerting that general rule which is implied in the idea of a
church as a society. Such functions "are in all ages necessary," and, therefore,
"were to remain in the Christian church. Hill concludes then that the apostles
did indeed transmit certain prerogatives to those •whom they appointed as rulers
in the church, but that it was only "the right of exercising all these
ordinary functions which was conveyed by the apostles to the "Jipeo^utspot, ."3
Having made this point, however, Hill is aware that he must explain the
two incidents which appear to contradict it, the apostolic delegation of extra¬
ordinary power in the cases of Timothy and Titus. His plan is to prove that
these two incidents were special cases and as such give no warrant for the
perpetual successive delegations of this extraordinary power of superior juris¬
diction. Hill's premise is that both Timothy and Titus were extraordinary office¬
bearers, called evangelists, who were suited to the infant state of the church.^-
The office of evangelist was described by Eusibius in these words:
They, laying only the foundation of the faith in places which had not heard
the Gospel, and appointing other pastors to whom they delivered the cultiva¬
tion of these new plants, passed on themselves to other countries and nations.-3
"The proof that Timothy and Titus were of the order of evangelists is of this
kind.Timothy is mentioned in the Acts and the Epistles as Paul's attendant on
several journeys. In I Timothy 1:3 Paul orders him to abide at Sphesus, which
1 Ibid., pp. 427-428'." ibid.",' p.' 4^7. 3 Ibid., p. 428.
4 Ibid. , p. 423. Cf. Campbell, Ecclesiastical History, pp. 86f.
Cf. Westminster Form of Fresbyterial Church Government, p. 511.
5 Ibid. , p. 423. No reference.
6 Ibid., pp. 423f. Cf. Campbell, Ecclesiastical History, pp. 86f.
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implies that this was not his fixed abode, but a place where the prospects of
performing some special service rendered a temporary stay expedient. Timothy
is called an evangelist (II Timothy 9:5). In II Timothy 4:9, 21, Paul requests him
to come to Rome and to come before winter which implies that he was not soon to
return to Ephesus. From these facts Hill thinks it probable that Timothy was not
a stated office-bearer in the church at Ephesus, but rather a person whom Paul
sent there at a specific time to do a specific task. This view is rendered even
more probable by the circumstances which made it advisable to send such a person
as Timothy to Sphesus. In Paul's address to the Ephesian elders at Miletus he
gave this warning: "For I know that after my departure shall grievous wolves
enter in among you, not sparing the flock. Also of yourselves shall men arise,
speaking perverse things, to draw away disciples after them." (Acts 20; 29-3O).
The Epistle to the Ephesians indicates that-Paul's prophecy proved true, and that
the false teachers displayed such a flair for learning and such a perversion of
Christian doctrine that only an able and skilful apologist could refute them.
Such a man was Timothy; and for this reason he is left at Ephesus - "to oppose
1
Judaizing teachers."
There are two reasons for believing that Titus, like Timothy, was an
evangelist, and not bishop of the church of Crete, nor even a stated office-
2
bearer in that church. The first is the account given of Titus being left on
Crete. "For this cause I left thee in Crete, that thou shouldest set in order
the things that are wanting, and ordain elders in every city" (Titus 1:5), which
according to Susibius is the very work of an evangelist. The second is a specific
direction given to him by Paul. "When I shall send Artemas unto thee, or Tychicus,
be diligent to come unto me to Nicopolis: for I have determined there to winter"
(Titus 3:12). Kioopdis was a town in Macedonia, or in Epirus. Whichever of the
1 Ibid., pp. 424-425. 2 Ibid., p. 425»
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two we understand it to be, Titus had to sail from Crete the whole length of the
Aegean Sea before he could reach Paul. This request, therefore, seems to imply
that the work assigned him in the first chapter was temporary, and that when
finished he was to rejoin the apostle that he might be sent elsewhere. In
II Timothy, one of Paul's last epistles, and presumably written after Titus
had left Crete, we read, "Titus is departed unto Dalmatia."
If these are arguments sufficient to prove that Timothy and Titus were
extraordinary office-bearers, suited to the infant state of the Christian
church, then these two instances, of a delegation of the apostolical
powers of inspection and government, are no proof that such delegations
to single persons ought to be continued, or that the apostles intended it
should remain in the Christian church. And, if the support which the
episcopal form of government derives from the pov/ers committed to
Timothy and Titus be withdrawn, the Presbyterians contend, that the
Scriptures furnish no unequivocal instance of inspection over pastors
being exercised by any office-bearer inferior to an apostle. '
But even if Timothy and Titus were not extraordinary office-bearers,
we have no reason to presume, as do the Episcopalians, that all the apostles
followed the example of Paul in ordaining others to such an office. It is true
that since much of the New Testament deals with the activitiy of the apostle
Paul, "we are enabled to form a conception of the form of government which he
established in sane churches...but it is a conclusion which the premises by no
means warrant, that what was done by one apestie in planting some churches,
was done by every other apostle in planting all churches.Hill contends that
since we have only partial knowledge of the practice of only one apostle the
Episcopalians have no reason to claim that "in all the places where the apostles
preached, they observed one fixed course of settling church government.
Though Hill thinks all other arguments matters of "secondary consideration,"^
he nevertheless addresses himself to the evidence which the Episcopalians derive
n Ibid>> 126.
2 Ibid., p. 435. Cf. Hill, Institutes, p. 182. Cf. also Leon Morris,
Ministry of God, p. 55.
3 Ibid., pp. 434-435. Cf. p. 438. 4 Ibid., p. 426.
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from the alleged records of the succession of bishops since the days of the
apostles. He says basically two things against this evidence. First, "there
is no authentic catalogue of the names of those who were bishops for many of the
ages immediately following the days of the apostles."'' This is quite under¬
standable. The persecution to which early Christians were exposed, and the
secret with which they were obliged to hold their meetings, did not contribute
to records being kept. Of the succession in many churches, particularly the
smaller ones, we know nothing; and even with regard to the churches planted in
important cities, "there is the greatest intricacy, and contradiction, and doubt-
2
ful conjecture in the attempts to ascertain the succession of their teachers."
Hill cites the testimony of Eusibius who, with all his solicitude to discover
the truth and with all the sources of information at his disposal, begins his
catalogue by declaring that "it is not easy to say who were the disciples of
the apostles, that were appointed to feed the churches which they planted except
only those v/hom we may learn from the writing of Paul."3 The theory of apostolic
succession, therefore, is weakest at what ought to be its strongest point, namely,
the connection between the apostles and their immediate successors.
It is manifest, that an argument founded upon the uninterrupted succession
from the days of the apostles is very much weakened, when, upon tracing
back this succession, we find an unavoidable and an acknowledged
uncertainty, at the very time when it is of utmost importance to the
argument to know exactly what was done.4
Secondly, Hill contends that the deficiency of names cannot be compensated
1 Ibid. , p. 432. Of. A. Ehrhardt, Apostolic Succession, "The Early
Succession Lists", p. 35f.
2 Ijbid., P. 433.
3 Ibid. , p. ii-33* Cf. Eusibius, Church History, 3:4:3* (See Nicene and
Post Hicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. I; ed. by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace;
trans, by A.C. McGiffert.)
4 Ibid. , p. 433* Cf. D.L. Edwards, Not Angels but Anglicans, (London, 1959),
p. 25, where he speaks of this lack of evidence as "the fatal defect in the
apostolic succession theory."
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for by an account of what the apostles ana their successors did. It has been
argued by some Episcopalians that, although the names have been lost, a descrip¬
tion of the power of the different offices has been preserved, and that this is
really the important issue anyway. Hill's point, however, is that the same
ambiguity and uncertainty which surrounds the lists of names, also enshrouds
the description of the early offices in the church. He quotes Clement of Rome
as saying that "the Apostles preached through cities and countries, appointing
their first disciples, after having proved them by the Spirit, and left them
directions that, after their death, other approved men should succeed in their
Ministry.Hill concurs with Peter King in thinking that this passage gives
evidence of a succession of teachers, but that it gives no evidence that any one
of these teachers possessed the powers of the apostles who appointed them. In
the context Clement is not concerned with powers at all, but with a succession
p
of teaching. Hill concludes that this passage and others likB it in the early
writers, which are supposed to describe offices,"are found, upon a critical
attention to their words, to mean nothing more than the succession of apostolical
doctrine conveyed through the men, whom the apostles appointed to teach it."3
But granted that Scripture gives no conclusive support for the establishment
of episcopacy, and granted that a period of darkness prevails in the centur3r after
the apostles in which there is no record of a succession of persons having the
extraordinary powers of the apostles, the fact remains that the history of the
church entails the rise and development of the episcopal form of government.
Although evidence is lacking in Scripture and the writings of the first-century
1 Ibid., p. 434. This is not a direct quotation from Clement as Hill
makes it appear, but rather is a paraphrase of two passages in Clement's First
Epistle to the Corinthians, Chapter 42 and Chapter 44. (See The Apostolic
Fathers, Vol. I; ed. by A. Roberts and J. Donaldson; trans, by A. Roberts,
J. Donaldson and F. Crcmbie.)
^ Ibid. , p. 434. Cf. King, Primitive Church, p. 140.
3 * F# 434.
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fathers, it is possible to substantiate the fact that as early as the second
century the name bishop was appropriated to an order of men who had a priority
in rank above other Christian teachers,'' and that from the second century to the
reformation "it is inquestionable that this order of men continued to exist in
almost all parts of the Christian world, was acknowledged to possess the right
of exercising peculiar powers, and was looked up to with respect, and a degree
of submission, by both clergy and laity."^ Because of his own common sense
philosophy,^ Hill is forced to admit that "this general consent of the Christian
church seems to afford convincing evidence" that episcopacy, "if not founded in
Scripture or apostolical appointment, was a continuation of that establishment
which the apostles began, and probably the consequences of directions which
they gave in planting churches."^ At least it imposes upon those who have departed
from this early and universal practice the task of giving some other account,
equally rational and probable, of the manner in which it was introduced. Since
this "challenge is undoubtedly a fair one," Hill determines to give his own
theory of the rise of episcopacy.5
The apostles during their own lifetime witnessed the rapid growth of the
infant church and, consequently, realized quite early the need for a large number
of Christian teachers. While still alive and able to exercise the gift of
"discerning spirits," they chose to provide for the future increase of believers
in different areas by setting apart, "for the work of the ministry," those whom
they found in these districts worthy of this position. This group, forming a
coetus presbyterorum attended to all the spiritual concerns of the Christians
in its respective city and surrounding area. Such a body would naturally hold
1 Hill, Institutes, p. l7T£
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 437. Cf. Institutes, p. 167. Cf.
F.Y/. Dillistone, The Ministry of the Church (1947), p. 67. "It is highly
questionable whether Anglican order can claim...a strict continuity of theory
or of practice from primitive times."
3 Supra, p. 33. 4 Hill, L.I.D.. Vol. Ill, p. 437.
5 Ibid.. pp. 438f.
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frequent meetings to hear reports on the work, and to debate about the most
prudent and efficient methods of promoting their objective. In these meetings
some person would preside for the sake of order; and whether this precedency was
determined by seniority or by rotation, or whether a permanent office was
conferred by election, it implies a degree of control over the other members
of the coetus and a title of respect. The title most often used was that of
kwJW7.oQ (bishop ) , an appropriate title, for while it did not imply that the
person who held it possessed any power different from the other presbyters, it
did intimate his being invested, by office, with a certain inspection. The
spread of Christianity from the urban centers to the surrounding countryside gave
occasion for the extension of this inspection. The smaller congregations in
outlying areas would feel a connection with the mother church from which they had
received their pastors. Pastors, likewise, would desire to maintain fellowship
with the coetus from which they had been sent. Thus the care of all Christians
in both city and country would be considered as belonging to the coetus. Thi3
increase in the sheer number of Christians would multiply the occasions upon
which the person who presided over the coetus appeared in his character as
president, and would afford him various opportunities for extending his claims
and enlarging his powers; and so
with no greater degree of sagacity and attention to the succession of
events than is commonly displayed in the conduct of human affairs, the
president of the coetus presbyterorum might establish himself in such a
pre-eminence over the individual members, as corresponds to the
description given in the second and third centuries of the dignity of
a bishop. 1
Because the Episcopalians are forced to plead the deficiency of early
ecclesiastical records in failing to produce authentic catalogues of -that
succession of bishops which they believe to have existed, Hill makes no apology
1 Ibid. , pp. WD-441.
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for pleading the same deficiency in failing to produce particular evidence to
substantiate the process by which he accounts for the introduction of episcopacy.
But Hill does not rest his case at this point. Although specific evidence to
support his theory is lacking, there are two points which have direct bearing
on the process he outlines. The first is the early imparity among bishops which
arose by human institution; although every bishop claims to be a successor of
the apostles, and although in theory the bishop of the poorest city has the
same power as the bishop of the richest, and although in the case of his own
diocese the bishop is subject to none but Christ, it is nonetheless an
irrefutable fact of history that by the end of four centuries there had developed
a gradation of patriarchs, metropolitans, archbishops, and bishops - a gradation
not only in respect of rank, but also in respect of privileges and powers.
Hill reasons that
if this limitation of the powers of bishops, and this subjection of many of
them to those with' v/hom they v/ere originally equal, had become so general
during the first three centuries, as to obtain, in 325, ^ the highest
ecclesiastical sanction, we have no reason to be surprised, if, in the
same time, a bishop should be exalted from being the first among equals
chosen by their suffrage, to be accounted an office-bearer of a higher
order than presbyters.
The second point Hill notes is the support ancient writers give to his account
of the origin of episcopacy. "Jerome, who lived about the end ©f the fourth
century, gives in different parts of his works, precisely the same account of the
origin of Episcopacy as we do."^ Hill cites Jerome as saying that for some time
the early churches were governed communi consllio presbyterorum but that it
became the universal practice, founded upon expediency, for one of the presbyters
1 Ibid., p. 442. "The council of Nice, which met so early as A.D. 325,
recognized the prerogatives claimed by the bishops of Rome, Antioch, and
Alexandria."
2 Ibid., pp. 442-443.
3 Ibid., p. 444. Hill gives no reference.
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to be elected by the rest to preside and for the government of the church to be
committed to him.'' "Let presbyters, therefore, know that they are subject by
custom of the church, to him who provides over them; and let bishops know that
they are greater than presbyters, rather by custom than by the appointment of
the Lord.The testimony o'f Jerome is not without parallel. Augustine,
writing to Jerome said, "Secundum honorum vocabula quae jam ecclesiae usus
obtinuit, episcopatu3 presbyterio major est."^ Hill adds to this the statement
of the Second Council of Seville, "Quamvis cum episcopisplurium presbyteris
ministeriorum communis sit dispensatio, quaedam novellis et ecclesiasticis
regulis sibi prohibits noverint."^ Hill concludes that such ancient authority
elevates his theory for the origin of episcopacy from the level of mere ground¬
less speculation to that of possibility, if not certain probability. At this
point Hill does rest his case. He has, to his own satisfaction, disproved the
claim that episcopacy was established by divine institution; and yet, at the
same time, he has accounted for its early origin and continued existence. But
since he does not consider antiquity and universality of practice as adequate
grounds for constraining the church to accept episcopacy, Hill is free to examine
yet another form of church government.
4» Presbyterians
According to Presbyterians, "the persons in whom chin*ch-government is vested"
are described as "ministers of the Gospel, equal in rank and power and "lay
1 Ib'i'ci. , p. 444. Cf. 'Stillingfleet, Irenicum, p. 4I5.
2 Ibid., p. 444. Cf. Stillingfleet, op.cit. , p. 416. Cf. also Calvin,
Institutes, 4:4:2, when he cites the same passage as corning from Jerome's
commentary on the Epistle to Titus.
3 Ibid. , p. 445. Here Hill does give a reference, Augustine's Epistle
No. 29, but it is a wrong one. In the pre-Benedictine order of Augustine's
epistles, which Hill used, letter No. 29 is to Jerome, but this phrase does
not occur anywhere.
4 Ibid., p. 445. Cf. Stillingfleet, op.cit., p. 416.
5 Ibid., p. 446.
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elders.. .•who form an office inferior in rank and power to that of pastors."
At first sight it might appear that this form of government is identical with
the episcopal, but this appearance proves to be deceptive upon an examination
of the two offices here described. Presupposing the distinction bet-ween the
ordinary and extraordinary functions of the apostles Y/hich he established in
his evaluation of episcopacy, Hill reiterates his contention that the ordinary
functions, but only the ordinary functions, of the apostles, the preaching of
the TCord, the administration of the sacraments, the exercise of ecclesiastical
2
jurisdiction, belong to the office of a Christian teacher in all ages. Every
person ordained to this office of teacher, or "Preaching Presbyter" as Hill
calls it,3 has the right to perform all these functions, and, therefore, may
be considered to be a successor of the apostles, "as much a successor of th6
Apostles as any Christian teacher can be."4 This being the case, all Preaching
Presbyters are equal in rank and power. This essential equality, however, is
not inconsistent with an "official preference...which is constituted by voluntary
1 Hill, Institutes, p. 171. The editor of Hill's Lectures notes that
since Hill had already printed his thoughts on the eldership in his Institutes,
he will not reprint that section in the Lectures. Therefore, the fact that
the reference to ministers is in the Lectures and the reference to the elders
is in the Institutes does not imply that Hill treated them separately. On the
contrary, he dealt with the office of minister and the office of elder as twin
principles of presbyterian polity.
2 Ibid., pp. 165-166.
3 Ibid. , p. 172. Cf. J.H.S. Burleigh, S. J.T. , Vol. II, 1949, P. 307,
"The expression preaching Presbyter is certainly curious and may be reminiscent
of the discussions concerning the two kinds of presbyters. One may feel that
the emphasis is on the adjective rather than on the noun. I suspect that we
owe the expression to the majority of the Divines who had of course been
ordained presbyters by bishops, and were under necessity to defend the validity
of their ordination against the Independents who regarded it as null...Perhaps
it is vrorth noting that those ordained in Scotland, or in any other Reformed
Church, are said to have been ordained minister, not presbyter."
Cf. J.M. Ross, Vhat Is An Elder?, p. 11.
4 Ibid. , p. 166.
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agreement for the sake of order." YYhen ministers are associated together,
it is necessary for the orderly conduct of their deliberations that some one
should preside at these meetings in the capacity of president. There are several
ways of determining this presidency. One may "succeed to the office by seniority,
or one may be elected for life, or a new president may be chosen at stated times."
The Church of Scotland, "from a jealousy lest prelacy be introduced," prefers
the frequent election of a new president or moderator. Although this moderator
is the executive officer of the society over which he presides, and although he
acts in the name of the society and appears as its head, he has no other
superiority than that which is necessarily implied in the office of president,
and no claim to any power or privileges uncommon to all; and vhen his term as
moderator has expired, he "returns to a perfect equality with his brethern."^
In preaching or teaching and in dispensing the sacraments the minister acts
according to his own discretion,^ but in everything which pertains to the exercise
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the minister is assisted by lay-elders. They
are laymen in that they have no right to teach or dispense the sacraments,5 and
on this account their office is inferior in both rank and power to that of the
minister. These lay office-bearers generally discharge the duties which
~
1 ifi.ll, L.I.P.. Vol. Ill, pp. 146-417.
2 Although Hill has not yet set forth his own theory as to how ministers
are to be associated, he has established the fact, in his rejection of
Independency, that they ar6 to be associated in some way. At this point, this
is all that needs to be assumed.
3 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 147.
4- Hill, Institutes, p. 170.
5 Cf. John Knox, Book of Common Order; "They differ from the Minister
in that they preach not the Y/ord nor minister the Sacraments" (Works, Vol. Ill,
p. 176). Cf. Second Book of Discipline, 8;1; "Such as we commonly call
elders...labor not in word and doctrine."
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originally belonged to the deacons,^ that is, attendance to the interests of the
poor; but their peculiar business is expressed by the name of "Ruling Presbyter."
In every question of jurisdiction within a parish, they form the spiritual court
p
of which the minister is the moderator.
Hill is aware -that this description of the persons in whom church government
is vested implies a distinction which is nowhere explicitly expressed in
x
Scriptural terms. However, he considers it to be "agreeable" to Scriptural views.
Besides it is not a concept peculiar to the presbyterian form of government.
Independents, the Church of Rome, Episcopalians, - all make a distinction between
the clergy and the laity. The unique feature of presbyterianism then is not this
distinction, nor the corrolary belief that certain powers are committed
exclusively to a ministerial class, nor the contention that members of the
ministerial class are to be orderly associated, but rather the quality implied
1 It wa3 precisely because the functions of the deacon were included
in those of the elder that the deacon tended to disappear from the church in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Yfotherspoon and Kirkpatrick, op.cit.,
p. 102. Cf. Walter Steuart, Collections, p. 32, "...the office of a deacon
is included in the office of a ruling elder...." Cf. J.M. Ross, What Is An
Elder?, p. 26, note 30, "By the end of the 17th century the deacon had become
practically extinct in Scotland." Hill does not treat the office of deacon
at all.
2 Hill, Institutes, p. 171.
3 Hill, L.I.D., Yol. Ill, p. 377. C.H. Dodd questions this position.
He interprets Paul as recognizing no distinction between clergy and laity, but
only between the talents for service, which Christians receive from the Spirit,
The Epistle of' Paul to the Romans (1§32), p. 195- Cf. Barth, Universal Church
in God's Design, p. 73» 'for practical reasons some may have to take
precedence of others, but in principle there are no "higher" or "lower"
forms of service. Such service can be shared among the members only on the
basis of a recognition of the different gifts bestowed by the One Holy Spirit,
Who is promised to all.'
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among all members of the ministerial class and the fact that laymen have a part
in the government of the church. If Hill is to substantiate his claim that
"the pfesbyterian form of church government...finds, in the times of the
apostles, the model upon -which it is framed,'"1 then he must prove that in the
days of the apostles these two things existed, the parity of ministers, and the
participation of laymen in church government.
To establish the parity of the ministry in the New Testament, Hill determines
to show that all New Testament ministers, excluding the apostles, were equal in rank
and equal in power, the two matters thrust up by his own description of the
ministerial office. In defending his first proposition, Hill contends that "the
two names k%C<JXov.oi and •rcpecrSu'cepoi are used by the apostles
promiscuously."5 He reasons that if these New Testament terms, which form the
only basis for maintaining a higher and lower rank within the ministry, are proved
to be synonymous, then "this inference seems clearly to follow," that all New
Testament ministers were equal in rank. ^ Hill brings forward several texts to
1 Cf. John Dall, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. X, p. 264.
A.J. Carlyle states that the participation of laymen in the government of the
church is not now unique to the presbyterian system, nor vras it unique to that
system in Hill's day. He notes that at the time when the Church of England
broke with the Church of Rome, "a far-reaching change of method was introduced;
that is, all the proceedings of the new settlement were also sanctioned by
Acts of Parliament....If, therefore, we attempt to define the constitutional
position of the Church of England since the Reformation, we must say that is
governed first by the bishops and clergy in their Convocations, but secondly
by the laity of England in their Parliament." "The Historic Episcopate",
Towards Reunion (1919)? p. 129. This however does not contradict Hill's
statement for he is speaking about the form of government within the church
itself.
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 422.
3 Ibid. , p. 428. Although Hill gives no reference to the source of his
argument in the Lectures, he does, in the Institutes (p. 166), direct the reader
to Campbell's Ecclesiastical History. He gives no specific reference, but the
arguments he uses are, without doubt, lifted from Lecture IV, pp. 72f. The
arguments presented there are repeated by Hill in the same order - even to the
use of the same words. "The terms 7CpecrPwt£pot and IftCcrxoTiot are sometimes
used promiscuously in the New Testament" (p. 72).
4 Ibid., p. 428.
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verify his contention that the names were used interchangably. The first
respects Paul's conference with the Ephesian elders, when Paul sent for these
elders to meet him in Miletus, he called thera touc xpecrpuxepouc hxxkrp'CaQ.
(Acts 20:17); but when he actually addressed them he said, Tipo&exexe eavxotc
xal xavxl xw TOtpvta), ev co to aytov eQexo eTuaxoxous, xoipaCvet, v xqv
kxxkrfrCav toU GeotJ (Acts 20;28). Here vtpeapGxepot, and enCctxotot are used
indiscriminately to denote the same persons. A similar passage is found in
Titus 1:5 where Paul says to Titus, "I left thee in Crete tva xaxcurzrySQQ xaxa
xoAtv xpeopuxepoue Paul then mentions some qualifications which ought to
be required in them, and adds as a reason for requiring such qualifications
bet yap toy eracrxoxov &vsyxXt)xov etvat (1:7). Once again Paul is "intimating
that the two names were convertible."^ Hill also notes that the Epistle to the
Philippians is addressed moxy xo~c ayiotc ew XpioTtp 'iqcrou xoiq ouoav ev
noic auv IfticncoTCH c 5iax6voi<; (Phil. 1:1); and reasons that "as there is
no mention of xpeopGxspot in the address, the same persons whom the writers
of the New Testament, in speaking of other churches call xpecpGxepot, , are
A
here termed eTcCostoxoi ." ffi.ll comments in passing that he is not alone
1 Ibid., p. 429.
2 Ibid., p. 429. Although Hill is correct in stating that both
"presbyter" and "bishop" are names applied to Hie same order (the ministry of
Word and sacrament), he is wrong in stating that there is an absolute identity
between them, for a difference of application existed from the start, "presbyter"
was the name given to ministers in Jewish-Christian churches and is found in the
churches Paul established on his first missionary journey in accordance with
the Jerusalem tradition. "Bishop" was the name given to ministers in Gentile
churches and is found in churches Paul established on subsequent missionary
journeys. The Pastoral letters appear to represent a stage when these two
traditions were being brought together. For instance, the account given in
Acts 20, to which Hill refers, uses both "presbyter" and "bishop" for the
ministers at Ephesus. But it must be noted that this is one of' the "We"
passages in Acts. "Presbyter" is the word used by the narrator and "bishop"
is used by Paul. In the final stage, however, while neither term was used to
describe a formal rank or a technical office, it seems that "presbyter" came
to denote status and was used as the general title of the office; whereas
"bishop" came to denote function and was descriptive of a particular ministry.
For instance, a "presbyter," while enjoying that status, might also exercise
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in his interpretation of these passages. Jerome specifically quotes all
the passages in which ftpecrpVTepoi, and enCcrxoxoi appear to be synonymous
and Clement of Rome, "by the omission of xpecrpurepoi in his early enumeration
of office-bearers, seems to consider erdcry.0%01 and •Kpeo^uTepot as
A
equivalent." On the basis of these ancient authorities Hill presents his
proposition, that -xpecrputepoi, and exfcrxoran are New Testament synonyms,
as "incontrovertible."; and on the basis of this "incontrovertible proposition"
he concludes that all Hew Testament ministers bearing these titles were equal
O
in rank.
Next Hill moves to prove his second proposition, that Hew Testament
ministers were equal in power. He posits that equality of power is expressed
indirectly by Peter's statement in his first Epistle 5:1: npsafSuTepoue ouv
kv upuv xapaxaAto o cruiiTtpecrputepot; ml p&pruc; twv xov Xpiotou m6T]|-ivdTa)v, o ml
Trie i-ieWowrric; amxaAuxreaBai, 86gy<; xotvcovoc. "The apostle, by calling himself
crupxpecrpuvepoc, , seems to intimate that they (KpeofiuTepot, ) possessed all
the authority in the Christian church, which was to remain after the death
of the apostles."-5 If this inference is correct, then no special power is
reserved for some presupposed higher order of ^tcnco-xoi . But whether
or not the inference is correct, i.e., that all power is given to the
■xpecrpCvspo!, , Hill notes that the power of government, the specific power
in question, is definitely committed to them.^ If, however, these considerations
a particular function such as "oversight1''. Thus, while all "bishops" were
"presbyters," not all "presbyters" were "bishops." The two terms, therefore,
are not, as Hill suggests, entirely synonymous. A. Ehrhardt, S.J.T., Occasional
Paper, No. 7, p. 12. T.M. Lindsay, Church and Ministry in the Early Centuries,
p. 118. Donald Macleod, Ministry and Sacraments in the Church of Scotland,
pp. 92f. G.W.H. Lampe, Some Aspects of the New Testament ^inisury, p. 17.
J. Arrnitage Robinson, "The Christian Ministry in the Apostolic and sub-
Apostolic periods", Essays on the Early History of the Church and the Ministry
(ed. H.B. Swete), pp. 83-84.
1 Ibid., p. 434. Cf. King, Primitive Church, p. 140.
2 Ibid., p. 428. 3 Ibid., p. 1£9. 4 Ibid., p. 429.
340
lend only indirect support to the equality of power among New Testament irdnisters,
the concept receives direct support ftrom the fact that the one power, the power
of ordination, which forms the basis for asserting an inequality of power
between the TipecrpCTepot, and the Itucdcotoi, , that power presumably being
reserved for the £%tcnco%oi is specifically attributed to the ^peo^vTepcu,^
In I Timothy 4i14 Paul speaks of the xapfopa o £560r] cot 5t,a TtpocprpreCae; peta em-
0ecea>G twv xetP®v ^pea^u'repf oo. This statement clearly teaches "that
TtpecrpCtepot v/ere not excluded from the right of ordination," and should ihus
be understood to prove that all ministers in the days of the apostles were equal
in power, 3
Hill, therefore, is not willing to accept a position of Biblical neutrality
concerning this first principle of presbyterian polity, the parity of ministers.
In other words, he will not simply say, there is no Biblical reason for asserting
a higher class of ministers with special powers but neither is there any Biblical
reason for denying it. On the contrary, he concludes that Scripture positively
indicates that all New Testament ministers were equal in both rank and power.
The second fact Hill must prove, if he is to substantiate his claim that
the presbyterian form of government finds its model in the days of the apostles,
is that during New Testament times laymen participated in the government of
the church. He draws support for this thesis from several texts. "There are
three texts commonly adduced to prove that, in the days of the Apostles, there
were Ruling Presbyters distinct from Preaching Presbyters." Hill gives these
texts without comment.
Having then gifts differing according to the grace that is given to us,
whether prophecy, let us prophesy; on ministry let us wait on our ministry;
or he that teacheth on teaching; or he that exhorteth on exhortation; he
1 Ibid. , p. 421. 2 Ibid., p. 430. Cf. King, Primitive Church, p. 120f.
3 i FF« 430-431.
4 Hill, Institutes, pp. 171-172.
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that giveth with simplicity, he that ruleth, with diligence (Romans 12:
6-8). And God hath set some in the church, first apostles, secondarily
prophets, thirdly teachers, and after that miracles, then gifts of
healings, helps, governments, diversities of tongues (II Corinthians
12j 28). Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double
honour, especially they who labour in the word and doctrine
(I Timothy 5:17).
Hill admits that when considered by themselves these texts "afford but a slender
or doubtful foundation" for asserting that laymen participated in the government
of the church during the days of the apostles, but that when considered in
conjunction with two other factors they form "the most respectable authority"
2
for making this assertion. The first factor is the relationship existing between
the early Christian congregations and their contemporary Jewish counterparts.
We know that the first Christian congregations were, in respect of the
mode of worship, formed upon the plan of the Jewish Synagogues; and by a
direction contained in one of the Epistles of Paul,J we are led to believe,
that in respect of government also they followed the same pattern.4
1 For the Scriptural justification of the office of lay elder, Calvin
referred to the same three texts (institutes, 4:11:1). John Knox's Book of
Conraon Order referred to Romans 12, I Cor. 12, Bph. 4> James 5, and I Peter 5
(Works, Vol. IV, p. 176).
2 Hill, Institutes, p. 172.
3 The reference is to I Corinthians 6;1, 5, which upbraids Christians for
carrying their cases before unbelieving judges. Cf. A. Schlatter, The Church
in the New Testament Period (1955), p. 75.
4 Hill, Institutes, p. 172. Though he does not acknowledge it, Hill is,
perhaps indebted to Stillingfleet for this line of argument. Cf. Irenicum,
pp. 528-346. Stillingfleet first describes the form of government employed in
the synagogue, and then seeks to prove that "the Apostles did observe this
model" (335). His general arguments are these - the order of public worship
in the church resembled that of the synagogue; the office-bearers in both have
similar names; the apostles did form churches out of synagogues; the government
of the synagogue was suitable to the state of the early church. Stillingfleet
stops at this point, however, and it is Hill who presses this line of argument
to support, in specific, the presence of lay-elders in the first Christian
congregations. (Cf. Calvin, Institutes, 4:11:6, when he quotes Ambrose as
saying, "The ancient synagogue, and afterwards the Church, had elders,
without whose advice nothing was done." Cf. also David King, The Ruling
Eldership in the Christian Church (1844)> P» 217; Samuel Miller, The Warrant,
Nature ana Duties of the Office of Ruling Elder in the Presbyterian Church, (182^2) ,
p. 33). It appears that in so doing, he is guilty of the same mistake he
castigates in others, namely the mistake of reading back from the known (lay
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Among the Jews in any particular place, there were several persons called
Rulers of the Synagogue. One of these had the name of Minister, implying that
the others were laymen. Although the Minister alone presided in the public
worship of the Synagogue, the rest of the Rulers joined withhim in the government
of that body. Since the first Christian congregations apparently patterned their
form of government after this synagogal form, it is reasonable to assume that
A
they allowed laymen to participate in the government of the church. The second
factor Hill brings to bear on these texts is the testimony of early Christian
writers respecting the participation of the laity in church government. Hill
himself gives no references, but directs the reader to Peter King's Primitive
Church, Chapter Seven. There King cites relevant passages from the works of
three men. Clement of Rome wrote, "Who will say, according to the example of
Moses, if seditions, contentions and schisms are happened because of me, I will
depart, I will go wheresoever you please, and I will do what are enjoined me by
p
the people, so the Church of Christ be in peace." Origen stated that a
r 3
particular criminal appeared . And
Cyprian contended that offenders should "plead their cause before the clergy,
and before all the people."*1"
elders do definitely appear at the end of the second century) to the unknown.
Gregory Dix approves of this procedure (Apostolic Ministry, p. 19"1)5 but Edward
Schweizer does not. Although he acknowledges the positive influence which the
synagogue had upon the early church, he says, "The method of simply arguing
back from the sources of about the year 200 to New Testament times is...
inadmissible, even if pre-Christian Jewish examples can be quoted" (Church Order
in the New Testament, p. 17). A balanced position on this point has been given
by J.M. Ross: "Seventeenth century writers used to find in the Jewish synagogue
organization the entire counterpart of a modern Christian congregation, complete
with minister, elders, and deacons. This is probably more than the facts will
allow, but we need not go to the other extreme and adopt the view, fashionable
at the end of the nineteenth century, that early Church organization owed
little or nothing to the synagogue." What Is An Elder?, p. 3.
1 Ibid., p. 172. 2 King, Primitive Church, pp. 219-220.
3 Ibid., p. 220.
4 Ibid., p. 222. Once again Hill appears to be guilty of reading later
evidence back into the New Testament. According to King, neither Clement, nor
343
Hill contends that the Scripture passages, though weak in themselves,
together with these other factors, substantiate his claim that laymen participated
in the government of New Testament churches. He notes that the reformers,
persuaded by "the sanction of these early authorities," revived the office of
lay-elder, not as "a novel invention," but as a return to the "primitive
4
Scriptural model." Hill also calls attention to the fact that ever since
the reformation, that office has remained as a fundamental principle of the
presbyterian form of government.
At this point Hill is forced to consider the same question which he himself
has asked of the other forms of church government. Granted that the participation
of laymen in the government of the church is a primitive practice and even a
Origen, nor Cyprian said that laymen participated in the .New Testament church.
They only indicate (and some would question this) that in their day, laymen
had a part in church government.
1 Hill, Institutes, p. 174. Cf. L.I.D., Vol. Ill, pp. 438» 446. There
are some Presbyterians, however, who think that Scripture, even when read in
the light of these other factors, still fails to present direct authority for
the office of lay-elder; yet they believe, nevertheless, that the office of
lay-elder can be justified on Scriptural grounds. Stuart Louden, for instance,
says "It is admittedly difficult today wholly to endorse the supposed scriptural
basis and authority for the eider's office....At the same time the office of
the eldership is agreeable to the Word of God, because it incorporates in its
functions the essential diaconate of the Apostolic Church, and because it
ensures, as the Biblical understanding of the people of God demands, the
government of the Church being exercised in a conciliar manner by the whole
Body under Christ the Head" (True Face of the Kiik, p. 42). Although the
Westminster Confession of Faith gives no proof text for the office of
elder, it claims that the office is justified on the ground of the Church's
God-given right "to set down rules and directions for the better ordering
of the government of the Church" (Confession of Faith, 3*1:3) • See also
in this regard, John McKerrow, The Office of Ruling Elder in the Christian
Church (1846), pp. 108f.; P.C. Campbell, The Theory of Ruling Eldership
(1866), pp. 20f.; G.D. Henderson, The Scottish Ruling Elder (1935), pp. 11f.J
J.M. Ross, What Is An Blder? (1955"), pp. 16, 19f« Whatever be the grounds
of justification alleged for this office, it is presented as being in
keeping with the general principles laid down in Scripture for the ordering
of the Christian church.
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Scriptural practice, is it a practical practice today? Were Calvin and the
other reformers wise in breaking with the tradition of centuries in allowing
O
lay-elders a voice in church courts? This practice certainly cannot claim an
unbroken history of continual use since the days of the apostles. Therefore,
it must have been judged useless at some time in the past. Is there any
reason then to think that it should have been revived at the time of the
reformation, and that it should be continued as a means of governing the
contemporary church? Hill believes that an affirmative answer will be given
to both questions when it is remembered why the reformers first reintroduced the
practice. The reformers, in their efforts to restore the purity of the church,
rejected, as the product of human ambition, the power by which bishops ruled
over presbyters; and they resolved to guard against its reoccurrance. For
this reason they revived the practice of allowing laymen to participate in the
government of the church, and it proved to be "an effectual method of preventing
the return of inordinate power in a superior order of clergy."3 Hill states that
1 VT.M. Macphail contends that expediency is a valid test of any form of
church government (The Presbyterian Church, London, 1908, p. 135), but T.F.
Torrance implies that even if this text is passed the argument of expediency is
a rather lame argument for adopting that form (S,J.T. , Vol. I, 1948, p. 200).
2 Hill, Institutes, p. 172. Hill notes that in 1542 Calvin admitted lay-
elders into church courts. For Calvin's own description of this office see
"Draft Ecclesiastical Ordinances" (1541), Theological Treatises (Library of
Christian Classics, Vol. XXII, Philadelphia, 1954), p. 63J.L. Ross, in Y,rhat
Is An Elder?, not only questions Hill's presupposed identification of the
Scottish elder with Calvin's elder (p. 11), but also questions the truth of the
statement that Calvin allowed elders into church courts. "Calvin, on his
return to Geneva in 1541, insisted on the appointment of elders to administer
discipline...but...they did not attend the Presbytery" (p. 10). That is to
say they -were not admitted to the church court proper, the Presbyterlum.
Only if Calvin's "senate," corresponding to the Scottish kirk session, be
called a court, can it be said that elders were admitted to courts. "The
common and customary order was for the jurisdiction of the church to be
exercised through the senate of the presbyters, of whom (as I have said)
there were two kinds." Institutes, L.;11;6. The reference is to 4:4:1 and
4:11:1 where he has distinguished between teaching and ruling presbyters.
3 Ibid., p. 174.
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the eldership is still an effective corrective for that love of power to which
clergymen are still susceptible.
If we should at any time discover a desire to act as judges or dividers,
and to employ, for the gratification of our own ambition, avarice, or
resentment, the spiritual pov/ers with which we are invested for "the jpod
of others, a firm union of lay-members in the church-courts would
effectually defeat every scheme of ecclesiastical tyranny. "1
Hill states further that the office of lay-elder has not only this practical
benefit to its credit, but that "it has been productive of other very important
2
advantages." ' '
To the readiness with which the elders undertake the office of deacons,
Scotland is indebted for the easy maintenance of her poor....The presence
of a respectable eldership in the parochial consistory has a tendency
to vindicate the exercise of ecclesiastical discipline from the charge
of partiality, and to render it an instrument of general edification,
by procuring a ready submission to every sentence.5
Hill has established from Scripture that ministers are to be equal in rank
and power and that lay-elders, though inferior in rank and power to ministers,
are to participate in the government of the church. Assuming the practicality
of ministers, he has established the practicality of elders. His concluding
word of judgment upon the presbyterian form of polity which unites these two
offices in the government of the church is as follows:
No kind of church-government is better calculated to conciliate the respect
and goodwill of the people, to restrain their vices, and to minister to
their improvement, than that in which a faithful and diligent pastor, who
maintains the dignity and independence of his own office, is supported by
the co-operation of a body of ruling elders in those matters which belong
jointly to his office and theirs.^"
5. Hill's Concluding Statement
The evidence he produced and examined led Hill to formulate the following
conclusions. Neither the Independents nor the Church of Rome can claim Scriptural
1 Ibid., p. 175.
3 Ibid. , pp. 174-175.
2 Ibid., p. 174.
4 Ibit3«, p. 176.
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support for their respective forms of government. At best they can only point
to the history of the church in their defense. On the other hand, both
Episcopalians and Presbyterians can claim for their respective forms of
government, not only support derived Mfrom the practice of antiquity," but also
support derived "from the V/ord of God." It is easy to understand how Hill can
consistently maintain that both episcopal and presbyterian forms, together with
independent and papal forms, receive the support of tradition and ecclesiastical
practice; but how can he consistently maintain that both episcopal and presbyterian
forms of government receive the support of Scripture, especially since he himself
admits that their "general systems...are, in many respects, opposed to one
another"?^ Hill can maintain that both derive support from Scripture because ho
rejects the idea that either is of divine i*ight, that is, he rejects that either
form of government is divinely appointed by God, that either is so delineated
and prescribed in Scripture as to exclude the other (and all others for that
matter) as unlawful, and that either is consequently binding upon all Christians
until the end of the world.? Unlike the advocates of jure divino ministry, Hill
believes that, although God has ordained order in the Christian society, He has
not ordained a fixed form of polity. He adopts as his own the now famous
principle of Bishop Stiilingfleet. He paraphrases:
Although church-government is of divine appointment, that is, although
the powers which it implies were not created by the state, but are
conveyed from the Lord Jesus through those v/hom he ordained; yet the Hew
Testament does not prescribe any one particular form of church-government
in such a manner as to render another form unlawful.^
The "presumption"^ is that rather than settling one form of church government,
the apostles accommodated the government of the early churches to their peculiar
situations, and intentionally left many things to be determined as future
1 Hill, L.I.P. , Vol. I, P. 455. 2 Ibid., Vol. Ill, p.41"
3 Hill, Institutes, p. 179.
4 Ibid., p. 181. Cf. L.I.D.. Vol. Ill, p. 523.
5 Ibid., p. 182. cf. L.I.D.. Vol. Ill, pp. 434, 438.
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circumstances changed. Hill notes that "Epiphanius, a bishop of the fourth
century, gives precisely this account of the matter.But even if, as the
propounders of divine right theories suggest, the apostles did establish a
particular form of government, there is no reason to think that such a form
would be binding on the church today in entirely different circumstances."^
However, although the apostles did not establish a certain form, they did lay
down, by precept and example, certain general rules regarding the qualification
of ministers, the conduct of office-bearers, the power of various offices, and
the exercise of discipline.4 j^ny form of government which adheres to these
general rules laid down in Scripture can thereby claim to be "founded in
Scripture"; and it is because both episcopal and presbyterian forms do just that,
adhere to these general rules, that they can both make such a claim. "The
directions in the New Testament concerning the qualifications of ministers, and
the right discharge of their office, are equally applicable to the episcopal
and presbyterian forms."5 The Episcopalians see in the appointment of Timothy
and Titus an example of that inspection which bishops exercise over presbyters.
Clearly the inference is that such inspection was, in the particular circum¬
stances of those churches, expedient, and not in itself sinful. Hill, therefore,
is willing to admit that in the cases of Timothy and Titus we have an example
of what may be done today.^
That superiority of a Bishop above Presbyters, called Prelacy...may be
adopted for the sake of convenience: We do not consider it as any part of
our duty to Christ, the Head of the Church, to endeavour the extirpation
1 Ibid. , p. 182. Cf7"L.I.D. , Vol. Ill7 P. 438. — —
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 436. Cf. Stillingfleet, Irenicum, p. 440.
3 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 369.
4 Ibid. , p. 369; Vol. Ill, p. 523; Institutes, p. 183. Cf. Calvin,
Institutes, 4:10;2, "We must have recourse to general rules, therefore, which He
has given, employing them to test whatever the necessity of the Church may
require to be enjoined for order and decency."
5 Hill, Institutes, p. 183. 6 Ibid., pp. 182-183.
3^
of Prelacy: We do not think ourselves called upon to exaggerate the
defects which we observe in the English Episcopacy, or to depreciate
the advantages which may be derived from it; and we are sensible, that,
in a country such as England, a change from Episcopacy to Presbytery
may be highly inexpedient. x
Nevertheless, Hill is not willing to say that all churches must adopt episcopacy,
or that churches without the office of bishop are incomplete.^ Presbyterians,
on the other hand, find the parity of New Testament ministers and the participa¬
tion of laymen in the New Testament church reason to believe that their form
of government is "not only lawful, but founded in the Word of God, and conformable
x
to the model exhibited in the primitive times of Christianity." But even so,
Hill is not willing to use the "contemptuous language" of divine right "with
regard to the Presbyterian church."^
Hill's openness with regard to the form of church government extends beyond
the presbyterian and episcopal forms. Since we do have a description of the form
of government which Paxil employed at least sometimes, "it is natural for all
Christian churches to endeavour to show that their ecclesiastical institutions
do not depart far from it." But because "it is nowhere said that this ought to
be the form of the church universal," and because "there are expressions...which
imply that Christians are allowed to use a prudent accommodation to circumstances
in matters of external order," Hill contends that "these societies, whose
institutions approach nearest to the apostolical practice, have no warrant to
condemn their brethem, who have been led by a different progress of society to
establishments farther removed from it."5 He is willing, therefore, to allow any
"difference in matters of order, which the Scriptures do not condemn."^
Hill states that this "liberty," with regard to the form of church government
1 IbidT7~P» Cf. Isaac Madox, A Vindication of the Government,
Doctrine, and Worship, of the Church of En^Eand (1733)» p. 53«
2 Ibid., p. 183. 3 Ibid., p. 186.
4 Ibid. , p. 180. 5 Hill,L. I.D., Vol. I, p. 3^9.
6 Ibid., p. 370.
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is warranted by our limited knowledge. Concerning the matter of apostolic
procedure he notes that "Scripture gives little information, and ancient writers
speak very generally and uncertainly."2 This "liberty" is also essential to
the character of Christianity as a universal religion. Unlike Moses who could
deliver to one nation a code of ecclesiastical regulations, the apostles were
sent to gather converts from many nations. It was not feasible, therefore, to
adopt any one form, for no one form was equally applicable to all. "Any
attempt to bind upon Christians a particular form of church-government...proved
an obstacle to the propagation of Christianity amongst all the nations who found
that plan incompatible with their civil constitution."3 Finally, Hill notes
that this "liberty" with regard to church government is agreeable to the "genius"
of Christianity. "The Gospel, preserves upon this subject the same just and
delicate attention to the nature of a reasonable being...which pervades the
whole system."^
But if "110 particular form of church government is so precisely marked dov/n
in Scripture as to render any other unlawful,"5 how does one go about choosing
one form from the many lawful forms? Hill implies that the choice is to be made
on the basis of two interrelated principles, both of which he finds embedded
deep within the history of the church. The first principle i3 that of expediency.
The form of government chosen should be the one which contributes the most to the
"edification of Christians," that is, the one which best promotes their "spiritual
c 7and temporal good." This principle Hill traces back to the writing of Jerome.'
The second principle which needs to be considered in determining the form of
1 Hill, Institutes, p. 183. Cf. Calvin, Commentary on I Cor., 11;3.
"We know that every Church has liberty to frame for itself a form of government
that is suitable and profitable for it because the Lord has not prescribed
anything definite."
2 Ibid. , p. 181. 3 Ibid. , pp. 183-184. 4 Ibid. , p. 189.
5 Hill, L.I.D. . Vol. Ill, p. 523. 6 Hill, Institutes, pp. 182, 184.
7 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 444.
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church government is that of political accommodation. Scripture "leaves every
nation which embraces the Gospel, to proceed under the influence of the true
spirit of that religion, in accommodating their form of church-government to their
political constitution.Only as the church makes such accommodation is it
"qualified to receive the countenance and protection of...civil government."
Only then may church and state "conspire in preserving the public tranquillity."5
Hill points out that this principle was employed even before Constantine proclaimed
Christianity to be the state religion. "Various circumstances led the Christians,
even before their religion had the benefit of a public establishment, to
accommodate the government of the church to the government of the state.
It was on the basis of these two principles, expediency and political accommo¬
dation, not on the principle of divine right, that presbyterian government
was established in Scotland at the Revolution Settlement of 1690.5
6. Evaluation
As we turn to an evaluation of Hill's discussion of the forms of church
government it would be useless for vis to conduct a critical analysis in terms of
the various points of evidence he produced and the various arguments he employed
for and against each form. Hill admits that neither the evidence nor the arguments
i
are original, and we have already noted their probable sources in many cases.
Besides, most, if not all, of these matters have been debated since Hill's time,
and in greater detail than the scope of this work allows. It appears to be more
beneficial for our study to evaluate Hill's whole approach to the form of church
government in terms of its strong points and its weaknesses.
Surely it is to Hill's credit that he, for the most part, refuses to read
into Biblical and patristic literature more meaning than these sources contain.
1 Hill, Institutes, p. 184.
3 Hill, Institutes, p. 184.
5 Hill, Institutes, p. 185.
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 523.
4 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 442.
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In spite of his excessive interest in the form of church government, he remains
sensitive to the fact that the knowledge these documents supply is at best vague
and general, and that on many points they provide no knowledge at all. Hill,
therefore, refrains from acknowledging any particular form of government as the
New Testament form. He would be in complete agreement with those modern scholars
who, even after more detailed research than he applied, still speak of the
"ambiguity,"'' the "inconclusiveness,"^ the "fragmentary"^ nature of New Testament
evidence; the "flexibility,"^" the "fluidity,the "tremendous variety"^
of New Testament practices; "the sheer lack of evidence"^ or "gaps in the
O
extant evidence." Because this is also Hill's position, he will not posit the
divine right of any form of government, including the presbyterian. Admittedly,
this stance on his part may have resulted from his close historical proximity
to the mutual persecutions between Episcopalians and Iresbyterians in Britain
which he abhorred as a "horrid practice";^ but it is more likely that he adopted
this position because of his honest approach to the evidence. It is true, as
he admits, that Hill is not the originator of the idea that the New Testament
presents no conclusive evidence for the establishment of one form of church
government to the exclusion of all others, but it is nonetheless commendable
that he adopted it as his own - commendable for several reasons.
1 T.F. Torrance, S.J.T., Occasional Paper No. 3> p.~3^T J.K.S. Re id",
S. J.T. , Occasional paper No. 4, p. 29.
2 J.R. Nelson, Consultation on Church Union,19p. 71.
3 Stephen Neill, "The Historic Episcopate", Bishops (1961, ed. 0. Simon),
P . 4-1»
4- J.R. Nelson, Consultation on Church Union, p. 71.
5 A. Ehrhardt, S.J.T., Occasional paper No. 7, p. 36.
6 Leon Morris, Ministers of God, p. 69.
7 J.K.S. Reid, S.J.T., Occasional Paper No. 4, p. 37.
8 Oregory Dix, Apostolic Ministry, p. 191-
9 Hill, Institutes, p. 180.
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In the first place, this position does not allow the form of government to
4
become a matter of faith, i.e., essential to salvation. If it is to be connected
with redemption, then "we need something," says Bishop Newbigin, "as sure as the
Cross and the empty tomb...probability is not enough.Since, however, probabil¬
ity is all he had, Hill was not willing to make the acceptance of a form of
government a prerequisite to eternal life. "The Spirit of Christianity calls
our attention to things infintely more important than the varieties of church
government. The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness, and
peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost."^
In the second place, Hill's position does not allow the form of government
to become a barrier to church union. Although Hill himself was not interested
in union or reunion, it was not his concept of polity which was responsible for
his lack of interest. He followed in the tradition of both Calvin^" and Knox^
by declining to condemn the office of bishop as such.^ Because of his branch
theory of unity, however, it is possible to interpret some of his statements as
expressing nothing more than a tolerant acceptance of bishops in some other
branch of the church; but it is also plausible to interpret these statements
as meaning that he would not object to the office of bishop in the Church of
Scotland, given certain circumstances. Unfortunately, this question cannot be
1 Cf. Calvin, Institutes", 4:ioT"2". Christ" aid not deliver ,rahy express
command on church government, "because things of this nature are not necessary
to salvation."
2 Lesslie Newbigin, The Reunion of the Church, p. 157.
3 Hill, L.I.D. . Vol. I, p. 369.
4 Calvin, Institutes, 4:4:2; 4:8;1.
5 John Knox, Letter to the General Assembly, August 5, 1572, Yforks,
Vol. VI, pp. 620-621. Cf. Gordon Donaldson, "The Polity of the Scottish Church,
1560-1600", Records of the Scottish Church History Society, Vol. 1J., p. 221.
6 Supra, p. 347.
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determined on the basis of the information -which Hill has left us, but his
treatment of the office of moderator and his indication that episcopal functions
are to be found in the Church of Scotland seem to suggest the latter of the two
-1
interpretations. Two things, however, are clear. One, as long as the Treaty of
Union (1707), which had declared presbyterianism "to be unalterable government
of Christ's Church in this part of the United Kingdom," retained the force of
civil law, then Hill would have opposed the institution of the office of bishop
o
in Scotland. Two, if the office of bishop were presented as belonging to the
'esse' of the church, as some have presented it,^ then he v/ould have rejected
4 5
it, and rightly so. Only if the office of bishop were presented as valuable
1 "In the Church of England, persons presented to a benefice, are tried,
ordained, admitted, and inducted, by authority of the Bishop: In the Church of
Scotland, this office of a superior order of clergy devolves upon a College of
equals, acting by their Moderator." (institutes, p. 187. Cf. Louden,
True Face of the Kirk, p. 46; "The ecclesiastical oversight and quasi-episcopal
function of the Fresbytery are most apparent in the Presbytery's acts of ordina¬
tion.") To this statement should also be added the fact that Kill, while living
in London, seriously entertained the possibility of ordination in the Church
of England. Before he had decided the issue, however, his English patron died.
(Cook, Life of Hill, p. 30; Hugh Miller, Headship of Christ, p. 137).
2 Hill, Institutes, p. 187.
3 A.G. Hebert, The Form of the Church, p. 113: "That which is of the 'esse'
of the Church is the essential core of the Ministry, namely the Apostolic
Commission, which the Bishop alone holds in its fullness, and is empowered to
hand on." K.B. Kirk, Apostolic Ministry, p. 40: "If then we follow the teaching
of Scripture and the tradition of the Church, we are bound to say that a valid
ministry is one which...proceeds in due succession from the apostles by laying
on of hands of the Essential Ministry; and that should such a ministry fail,
the apostolic Church...would disappear with it." (cf. E.L. Mascall,
Corpus Christi (1953)j UP* 12f., and The Recovery of Unity (1958), p. 158;
Charles Gore, The Church and the Ministry "(1938) , p. 392.) Although
H. Burn-Murdoch agrees that the office of bishop belongs to the 'esse' of
the church, he does not believe that it represents the whole 'esse', so
that a Church without it is inconceivable, as Kirk suggests. Church, Continuity,
and Unity (1945) > p. 109.
4 Supra, p. 348.
5 Lesslie Newbigin, Reunion of the Churches, p. 167.
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for the 'bene esse' of the Church of Scotland would he have considered it. It
should also be remembered in this connection that Hill was not totally opposed to
the congregational principle, and admitted that under certain circumstances it
2
was not only permissible but advisable. It is not altogether inconceivable,
therefore, that, had Hill ever become interested in the reunion of churches,
he would have accepted some plan of union which incorporated elements of all
three forms of government.^ Indeed, the acceptance of such a plan is not only
warranted by the position which Hill adopts as a result of his own study, but
appears to be the only hope for the reunion of churches today, This being the
case, -we are obliged to commend Hill to the extent to which, he, in his own
way, expounded this truth.
In the third place, the position which. Hill adopted does allcw for the
continual development of form and polity. He nowhere indicates that the final
word on this matter had been spoken, and everywhere appeals for a reasonable
accommodation to circumstances, an appeal he believed to be Scriptural. In
opposition to all theories which state that the apostles established a closed
pattern of government, Hill states that they consciously left "many "things to be
1 Supra, p. 347. Cf. Flew and Dayies, The Catholicity ox' Protestantism,
p. 107. Gf. F.J. Taylor, The Church of God, p. 130. Gf. H.J. Kontefiore,
Historic Episcopate, p. 107. He states that neither 'esse* nor 'bene esse' is
correct. "The first is erroneous, the second inadequate." He prefers to speak
of the historic episcopate as of the 'plene esse* of the church. Gf. F.W.
Camfield, S.J.T. , Vol. I, 1948, p. 202. Gf, stuart Louden, The True Face of
the Kirk (1963)", p. 25.
2 Supra, p. $11. It is remembered that Hill suggests an essential inapprop-
riateness if not contradiction between the words of Jesus and toe status and
power of the pope (Gf. Daniel Jenkins, The Gift of Ministry (London, 1947), pp.
28-29). It is quite true that an office like that of the pope is difficult
to imagine if regard is paid to the pronouncements of the New Testament, but
it is not on that account fundamentally impossible (Schweizer, Church -Order
in the New Testament, p. 13). "The door cannot thus be shut against toe
legitimacy and propriety of the papal...offices" (J.K.S. Reid, S,J.T.,
Occasional Paper No. 4, p. 3).
3 Such plans have been suggested by toe report on Relations Between
Anglican and Presbyterian Churches (Edinburgh, 1957), pp. 22f.; and by
T.F. Torrance, S.J.T., Occasional Paper No. 3» PP« 103f.
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settled as the future occasions of the church might require"; and that even if
the apostles had established a fixed pattern, it would not be binding today in an
2
entirely different situation. Therefore, since Hill believed that the apostles
had provided only the initial stages-^ of a government suited for their own
peculiar circumstances, since he believed that circumstances had changed and
would continue to change, and since he believed that the form of church government
was to be accommodated to circumstances, there is no reason for us to think that
he thought he had completed the development begun by the apostles or that he had
produced any other completed form. On the contrary, it seems proper to infer
that Hill believed in and allowed for the growth and development of the form of
church government right up to the 'parousia'.^ Hill gives no references in this
discussion, but perhaps he owed many of this thoughts on the subject to Calvin.
The two are certainly of one accord at this point.
The Church cannot be so framed by and by, but that there remains somewhat
to be amended; neither can so great a building be finished in one day,
that there may not something be added to mate it perfect.
As He [_ christ_J7 has not delivered any express command, because things of
this nature...should be accommodated to the varying circumstances of each
age and nation, it will be proper as the interest of the church may .
require, to change and abrogate the old, as well as to introduce new forms.
But in spite of his refusal to name any particular form of government as the
one perfectly revealed in Scripture, Hill never implies that form is unimportant
or a matter of indifference. He suggests that all churches should strive to
1 Hill, Institutes, p. 182.
2 Supra, p. 347 . Cf. T.W. Hanson, The Church's ministry, p. 85. "Because
the Church is a living organism we cannot simply go back to Hew Testament times
and say that whatever we find there must be binding for ever."
3 O.C. Quick, Doctrines of the Creed, p. 3^5.
4 L. Gerfaux, The Church in the Theology of St. Paul (1955), P. 185.
5 Calvin, Commentary on Acts, 6:1.
6 Calvin, Institutes, 4:10:30.
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bring their various forms into harmony with what Scripture does reveal. And
this brings up another point. Althou^i Hill believed that the Scriptural testimony
was inconclusive, he never implied that it was insufficient. The "general
precepts...in all different situations, furnish the most perfect directory for
the government of the church."2 Finally, though Hill believed that the Scriptural
evidence for a particular form of government was inconclusive, he did not think
it inconsistent to affirm the presbyterian system as a lawful form, being based
upon Scriptural evidence.
We feel no disposition to take the Solemn League and Covenant; yet at the
same time, w/e stand firm in that opinion which every minister of the Church
of Scotland declares at his ordination, that the Presbyterian government and
discipline of this Church are, not only lawful, but founded in the word
of God, and conformable to the model exhibited in the primitive times of
Christianity.5
Having thus commended Hill, v,e should also note several weaknesses in his
thinking on the form of church government, all of which seem to stem from the
fact that he has no doctrine of order any more than he had a doctrine of the
ministry. No doubt we witness once again the direct influence of his over¬
emphasis. on the external. Since Hill is primarily interested in the form which
order should take, he excludes from his discussion such important matters as the
nature and source of order. Basically, what he has to say is in agreement with
reformed theology; he simply does not say enough. Three examples may be given
to illustrate this weakness. First, it is true that Hill will not allow/ church
government to become fettered to any one particular form, but his chief motive
for restraint at this point is the desire for reason to be unfettered. This is
not to deny what we have just commended in Hill, the use of reason in the
establishment of government,^ but it is to say that somes thing more is involved.
1 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. I, p. 369. 2 Hill, Institutes, p. 184.
3 Ibid., p. 186.
4 Calvin, Commentary on Numbers, 3:5- "The political distinction of ranks
is not to be repudiated, for natural reason itself dictates this in order to
take away confusion."
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That something more which Hill fails to mention is the operation and guidance
of the Holy Spirit. Change for change's sake is useless unless the new form
"be schematized to the la?/ of the Spirit."'' All efforts to reorder the form of
church government must depend, therefore, upon the providential direction of the
Spirit of Christ.^ This means that the development of form and oi"der must be
determined by "Spiritual" factors as well as "logical" factors.
The second illustration of the weakness in Hill's position is his discussion
of form primarily*' in terms of circumstances, and patterns, and natural law.^
Once again, we do not criticize Hill for his reference to these things, but only
5
for stopping at this point and going no further. Indeed, the church is
inescapably involved in law and historical schematisation, as T.F. Torrance
points out. "But the real form and order of the church are not. to be looked
for in terms of laws and patterns of cosmic and temporal succession, but in
Christ who died in sacrifice for us and who rose again....This means at
least two things. First it means that the form of government must reflect the
form of Christ as the Suffering Servant."'' Hill's failure to grasp this truth
serves only to strengthen his understanding of government in terms of authority
rather than service, ana may account for his unhealthy emphasis on the "honour"
1 T.F. Torrance, S.J.T., Occasional Paper No. 3? ?• 100.
2 On the rise of the idea of providence in this connection cf. Erail
Brunner, The Mtisunderstanding of the Church, p. 41.
3 This is not to deny Hill's references to Scripture; it is only to say
that such references are secondary.
4 Cf. H.F. Woodhouse, The Doctrine of the Church in Anglican Theology,
1547-1603, (London, 1954), p. 107.
5 Schweizer, Church Order in the Key/ Testament, p. 14> The form of church
government is not to be "dictated simply by the existing practical, political,
or economic conditions."
6 T.F. Torrance, S.J.T., Occasional Paper No. 3> p. 55.
7 Ibid., p. 82.
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belonging to those in positions of government. Secondly, it means that the
form of government must reflect the form of Christ as the risen, exalted Lord
p
of the church. Calvin stressed the fact that as Christ "only is the Head," we
are to be "united to each other according to that order and form of polity which
He Himself has prescribed."3 Perhaps it was failure to realize the implications
of this truth which prompted Hill to look first to civil government and then to
Scripture in determining the form of government. Hill does stress the Headship
of Christ over the church, but he sees no relationship between this fact and
the form of government, except as it guards against the usurpations of the pope.
The third illustration of the weakness in Hill's position is his discussion
of form primarily in terms of its organizational utility. This is not to deny
the obvious, that government is beneficial in structuring the Christian society,
but it is to say that this is not the only service it renders. The Faith and
Order Conference meeting in Edinburgh, 1937, suggested that government "is a
gift of Cod to the Church in the service of Yford and Sacrament."^ More
specifically Edward Schweizer says that the New Testament pronouncements on the
form of church government are to be "read as a gospel - that is Church order, is
1 Hill, Institutes, p. 186. Cf. A.T. Hanson, The Pioneer Ministry, p. 100.
"If there is one word in the New Testament for the Christian minister it is
diakonos rather than presbuteros." Cf. also John Knox, "The Ministry in the
Primitive Church", The Ministry in Historical perspective, p. 1. "The Greek
word for 'ministry' is ; and it is significant that this term was
in the New Testament times...the most favored way of referring inclusively
to the church's workers and their work."
2 T.P. Torrance, "The Doctrine of Order", Church Quarterly Review, Vol.
CLX, p. 26, "True order in the Church of Christ is order that points above and
beyond its historical forms to its new order in the risen Christ." Cf. Karl
Barth, The Church in the Churches, p. 63: "every Church should ask itself,
quite simply, this question;. ...Are we serious in saying that our papal,
episcopal., presbyterian system, or ( if we are Quakers) our lack of system
is the true representation of the Lordship of Christ in His Church?"
3 Calvin, Institutes, 4:6:9.
**■ Faith and Order Conference (Edinburgh, 1937, ed. by L. Hodgson), p. 356.
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to be regarded as a part of the proclamation in which the Church's witness is
1 2
expressed, as it is in preaching." Follovdng Earth, he continues, "There may
be times when this kind of proclamation is better heard and regarded by the world
than are any words."5 Had Hill understood this service to be a major function
of church government, perhaps ha would have mentioned it as a factor to be
considered in judging the expediency of any particular form.
A second major area in Hill's doctrine of the form of church government
which is worthy of conment is his understanding of apostolic succession. In his
criticism of the evidence presented in support of episcopacy, and in his own
defense of presbyterianism, he makes several points quite clearly. Perhaps the
one most strongly emphasized is the uniqueness to the apostolate. If it is asked,
what makes the apostolate unique, Hill suggests several answers. perhaps the
apostles wrere unique because they worked miracles, or perhaps because they
exercised their office in the church tender the infallible guidance of the Spirit,
or perhaps because they alone received the gift of inspiration. Hill suggests
all these ansvrers in one way or another, but the answer which he plainly states
is that the apostles were unique because of their unique povrer of oversight. We
readily concur with Hill's emphasis on the uniqueness of the apostles, for it is
only as their uniqueness is asserted that one can maintain their unrepeatable
character and can refute the continuation of their office.^ No doubt it was for
these reasons that Hill himself sought to establish their uniqueness. We question,
however, Hill's wisdom in defining the apostles' uniqueness primarily in terms
of the power of oversight which they exercised in the early church. Hill himself




E. Schweizer, Church Order in the Hew Testament, p. 14.
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. IV/2, p. 682.
Schv/eizer, Church Order in the New Testament, p. 14.
Cf. W. Telfer, The Office of Bishop (1962), p. xii.
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office -was not transmitted to successors. He is faced with the irrefutable fact
that at least two men who were not apostles received this supposedly unique
power of oversight; and his only way out is to prove that these two men were
special cases, which admission necessarily implies a weakness in his argument.
There are those who agree with Hill in stressing the uniqueness of the apostles,
A
but who disagree in making their power of oversight a unique point at all.
There are theologians, in the reformed and presbyterian tradition, who see no
Scriptural reason why there cannot be, in the church today, an office in which
one person permanently presides, in a paternal capacity, over the presbyters
O
and congregations under his charge. In fact, we noted above that Hill himself
might not have been opposed to such an office. It appears, therefore, that Hill
has missed the real uniqueness of the apostles, and that in missing it, has been
denied adequate grounds upon which to maintain their unrepeatable character
and nontransferable office. J.P. Hickinbotham says that the uniqueness of the
apostles was "due to their unique opportunity of seeing the drama of redemption."
He explains: "The primary function of the apostles was to bear witness of the
things they had seen and heard...they had been the Lord's chosen eye-witnesses
and had been directly commissioned by Him to proclaim what they had seen ana its
implications."^ It is becaiise the things which the apostles saw and heard
cannot be repeated that the apostolate is unrepeatable J4 Just as there can be
no succession of Incarnations, no succession of Crosses, no succession of
1 Leon Morris, Ministers ox'God, p. 49. T.F. Torrance, S.J'.T. , 194^7
Vol. I, p. 196.
2 T.F. Torrance, S. J.T. , Occasional Paper No. J>, p. 104. J.IMS. Reid,
S,J.T., Occasional Paper No. 4, p. 47.
3 J.P. Hickinbotham, The Ministry of the Church (1947, ed. 3. Neill),
p. 36. Gf. T.F. Torrance, S. J.T. , Occasional Paper No. 3> P» 27. Cf. Cullmann,
The Early Church (1956), p. 77-
4 T.F. Torrance, S.J,T., Occasional Paper No. 3, p. 28.
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Resurrections, so there can be no succession of apostles in this sense.'' As
Edward Schweizer put it, "The historically unique testimony to the risen Lord
cannot recur.
In describing the uniqueness of the apostles primarily in terms of the
oversight which they exercised, Hill is not only unable to defend adequately
against a continuation of the apostolate, but also engenders other serious
consequences. As a result of discussing apostolic succession mainly in terms
of power he is unable to see the importance, if not the presence, of several
basic issues. For example, he nowhere deals with the significant problem of
the relationship of the Spirit to the doctrine of apostolic succession. There
are those who suggest that the operation of the Spirit is connected exclusively
with the office of bishop as the successor of the apostles, and imply that
without such an office, the church is denied the pov/er of the Spirit.-^ Others
think that Christ freely bestowed His Spirit upon the church in every age
irrespective of this particular office.^ Or again, Hill never mentions the
problem of representation and identity associated with apostolic succession.
There are those who indicate that the bishop, as the successor of the apostles,
is the personal representative of Christ in such a way as to be identical in
person with llim.5 Therefore, the office of bishop is necessary for Christ to
1 T.F. Torrance, S. J,T., 194&, Vol. I, p.
2 Schweizer, Church Order in the New Testament, p. 213.
3 T.O. Wedel, The Coming Great Church (1947), p. 141, and Lesslie Newbigin,
The Reunion of the Churches, p. 163, indicate that this is the logical conclusion
of the position of such contributors to the Apostolic Ministry as K.E«> Kirk
and Gregory Dix.
4 Schweizer, Church Order in the New Testament, p. 18. W.E.L. Clarke says
that justice should be done "to the real strength of the Free Church position,
which is that the Holy Spirit in every age chooses His agents to declare His
will, some of them being outside the hierarchical ministry." Episcopacy
Ancient and Modern (19'j>0, eds. C. Jenkins and K.D. Mackenzie), p. 44.
5 Gregory Dix, Apostolic Ministry, p. 228f.
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be personally represented in the church. Others state that the Holy Spirit
alone is the personal representative of Christ and thus imply that the office
of bishop is not essential to the presence of Christ in the church.^ It may
be suggested that Hill failed to treat these issues because in his day he was
not aware of them; but this hardly seems to be the case, especially in the light
of the claims of Rome and certain quarters of the Anglican church, of vhich he
\
was obviously aware. It seems that Hill failed to deal with these matters either
because his discussion of the apostolate primarily in terms of power did not,
to his thinking, require a treatment of them, or else because they both involve
the doctrine of the Spirit, which in his discussion of the apostolate, is
neglected almost entirely. But regardless of the reasons, the failure itself is
detrimental to both the doctrine of the apostolate and the doctrine of church
government.
Further, because of his excessive emphasis on this unique authority of the
apostles, Kill fails to appreciate the true function of the apostles. P.T.
Forsyth says that the primary task of the apostles was not to rule but to
proclaim what God had done in Christ. "The first Apostles were neither priests
nor bishops. They were preachers, missionaries, hearalds of the Cross, and
O
agents of the Gospel." More to the point of our discussion is C.K. Barrett's
statement^ "The New Testament gives a unique place to the apostles, and their
uniqueness does not lie in administrative authority."3 Perhaps it was his
1 T.F«~ Torrance" S.J.T., 19^7 VolT"I, y.lW. '
2 P.T. Forsyth, Positive Preaching and the Modern Hind, p. 7. Cf. T.F.
Torrance, S.J.T., Occasional paper No. 3, P* 74, note 2; "The Apostle's
main function is the ministry of the Word,..."
3 C.K. Barrett, "Apostolic Succession", The Expository Times, Vol. LXX,
p. 201.
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failure to realize this fact which accounted for Hill's depreciation of the task
of preaching and his exposition of the ministry in terms of control rather than
service *
Finally, because Hill treated the uniqueness of the apostles primarily in
terms of their unique power, he has no grounds for asserting the apostles place
in the church today. Since he thought that the important thing about the apostles
was the power of* oversight which they exercised, and since he has consciously
endeavoured to prove the church can do well without the exercise of such power,
he has no reason left to speak about their relevance today. In fact, any
positive estimate of the apostles could only be interpreted as entailing support
for the succession of apostles, which he rejects.'' Yet, as T.F. Torrance says,
we must affirm the place of the apostles in the continuing life of the church
because the church is historically grounded upon the apostles. They were chosen
to reccjive the revelation of Christ and to pass it on to the church; thus the
church is founded upon the apostles as it is founded upon the canon of the New
Testament. The apostles were also chosen to participate in the reconciling
ministry of Christ. They "formed the hinges of the divine mission, where...the
vertical mission in the sending of the Son by the Father, is folded out horizon¬
tally into history at Pentecost."3 The church, therefore, is founded in the apos¬
tolic witness and the apostolic mission. Professor Torrance states that we can,
and mast, affirm these truths without affirming a succession of apostles, for
we are only affirming the "perpetually persisting foundation of the Church, and
not...the initial stage of a continuing process."^
1 Cf. J.R. Nelson, Consultation on Church Union, 1964, P. 69.
2 T.F. Torrance, Class notes, p. 17.
3 T.F. Torrance, S,J.T., Occasional Paper No. 3j ?• 27.
4 Ibid., p. 28.
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In spite of the fact that Hill rejects a succession of apostles, an! in
spite of the fact that he ignores their true place in the continuing life of Hie
church, he nevertheless speaks of apostolic succession. However inconsistent
with his general approach it appears to be, we commend Hill for this, for no
doubt there is a secondary and correct meaning of the term.'' Kill suggests two
such secondary meanings. First, apostolic succession refers to the succession
of apostolic doctrine. Hill makes this suggestion when he accepts Peter King's
analysis of certain patristic passages in which he finds apostolic succession
"to mean nothing more than the succession of apostolical doctrine conveyed
through men whom the apostles appointed to teach it.Edward Schweizer
indicates that this is not only a possible but a proper meaning of the term
when he writes that apostolic succession means the continual unfolding of the
apostolic message "into the thought and speech of a particular time and place."3
For Hill, however, this meaning is overshadowed by a second one; apostolic
succession means the succession of apostolic functions. It might seem paradoxical
that Hill should even suggest such a meaning since he has been at pains to prove
that many of the apostles functions were not passed on. The answer to the
paradox, however, is found in his distinction between the extraordinary and
ordinary functions of the apostles.
While certain parts of the apostolical office expired with the persons
to whom it was conraitted by the Lord Jesus the right of performing all
the ministerial functions, which were intended to be perpetual in the
1 Ibid. , p.TFT"
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 43-
3 Schweizer, Church Order in the New Testament, p. 213. Of. P.T. Forsyth,
The Church and the sacraments, p. *59. Cf. also G-.S. Hendry, S. J.T.. 1948,
Vol. I, p. 41: "It is the transmission of the Canon in this positive sense
from faith to faith throughout the generations that constitutes the true
apostolic succession. Cf. also T.F. Torrance, S. J.T. , Occasional Paper No. 3>
p. 68; "The Church continues to be Apostolic when...it continues throughout
history to conform to the Apostolic doctrine." Cf. also Hans Kung,
Structures of the Church, p. 161; "The apostolic succession.. .manifests itself
in...the transmission of the apostolic testimony."
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Ciiristian church, is conceived to be conveyed by the act of ordination,
so that every person who is ordained is as much a successor of the apostles
as any teacher of religion can be.^
T.F. Torrance suggests that this, too, is a proper meaning of the term when he
says that, although there can be no succession of apostles, there can be a
2
succession of the apostolic ministry. It is interesting to note that Hill
interprets and expounds this ministry only in terms of pov^er. "Y.'e contend,
that we are successors of the Apostles, invested with all the powers vhich of
right, belong to any ministers of the Church of Christ."3
The gormati on of C hurch Government
Having discussed the various forms of church government, Hill next considers
the actual formation of that system which he thinks is best suited to the needs
of the Christian society in Scotland, that is, the presbyterian system. In the
previous sections, Hill stated that in the presbyterian form of government the
power to rule is conmitted to ministers and lay-elders. If such persons are to
hold positions of authority, on what basis and by what procedure are they to be
elevated to these positions, and how are those so elevated to be "orderly
associated"? These questions raise for Hill three important points about -which
we may center our discussion. They are, the ordination of office-bearers, the
election of office-bearers, and the organization of office-bearers. It should
be noted at the beginning of this exposition that Hill is far more interested
in the office of minister than in the office of elder, and thus the greater
portion of his material is given over to the former. Issues which apply.equally
1 Hiii,T7i7d77v^". iiiTTrw^ — * - - —
2 T.P. Torrance, S.J.T., 1948, Vol. I, p. 196. Cf. T.¥. Hanson,
The Church's ministry, p. 54: "Our contention is that the Church as the Body
of Christ is apostolic in the sense that the apostolic ministry inaugurated
by the Lord in the days of His flesh is continued in Him through her in the
new period of world history inaugurated by the Resurrection."
3 Hill, Institutes, p. 186.
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to both offices are discussed only in terms of the ministry. The peculiarities
of the office of elder, however, do receive attention in due course. It is our
intention to treat the above mentioned points just as Hill did.
1. The ordination of office-bearers
Hill does not discuss the ordination of ministers as a separate topic. V/hat
he has to say on the subject is to be found in various places - in his evaluation
of the independent form of church government, in his arguments against episcopacy
and for presbytery, in his comments on the constitution of the Church of Scotland.
From these varied, yet often repetitious references, there emerge four points
of significance - the nature of ordination, the instrument of ordination, the
procodure or act of ordination, the results of ordination.
a. The nature of ordination. Hill would begin any discussion of the
nature of ordination with a clear denial that ordination is an act of the
people who constitute the Christian society. The mistaken notion that it
springs from the false presupposition that the power implied in ordination
is "given by Christ to the people, and transferred by them at their pleasure to
A
those whom they choose." Against such a position, Hill writes, "we
Presbyterians join with the Church of Rome and the Church of England, in holding
that the persons vested with church government derive their powers, not from the
p
people, but from Jesus Christ." This means then that ordination, the act
whereby a person is so invested with that power, is "the act of Jesus Christ,"
"the appointment of Jesus Christ...."3 Only this concept of the nature of
ordination is consistent with what the New Testament says about the power of
the people and the power of Christ.^ The New Testament nowhere says that this
power is given to the people, and everywhere says that Christ is the King and
--
Hill> L<I>D<- VoI> inTTTirg; ~ " ~~ "
^ 2£i!l* » F« 378, cf. G.D. Henderson, Church and Ivanistry, p. 149.
3 I8id., p. 376. 4 Ibid., p. 370.
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Head of the church. In the -words of the Westminster Confession of Faith,
"The Lord Jesus, as King and Head of his church, hath therein appointed a
government in the hand of church officers...."''
But further, ordination is "the appointment of Jesus Christ, conveying a
character... ."^ This character is the "character of those who are called in
Scripture ambassadors, stewards, rulers, and overseers.By virtue of this
character being conveyed to them, such persons "receive authority and a commission
to perform all the acts" which belong to the office of minister. Basically those
acts are threefold; the preaching of the Word, the administration of the sacraments,
the government of the Christian society.^4" Since Hill, as we have noted, is
mainly interested in ecclesiastical jurisdiction, ordination means primarily
the act of Jesus Christ whereby ha conveys to a person the right to rule and
discipline the Christian society.
Although ordination is an act of Christ and not of men, it is, nevertheless,
an act of Christ through the instrumentality of men.^ Therefore Hill further
defines ordination as "the appointment of Jesus Christ conveying a character
the instrumentality of the office-bearers of his church."They are the
instruments by which Jesus Christ conveys to that order of men, which ha meant
to continue in his church till the end of the world, the authority implied in the
exercise of their office.""'' Because it is natural for us to focus upon the human
side of this act, it is all the more necessary to remember that when these human
instruments act, they are "acting in the name of Jesus and in virtue of the trust
O
derived from him." Hill contends that this element of instrumentality is
consistent with the example of the New Testament.
1 Ibid. , p. 378. Cf. Westminster Confession of Faith, chapter $0.
2 ibid., p. 376. 3 Ibid., pp. 375-376.
4 Kill, Institutes, p. 165.
5 Cf. Samuel Rutherford, A Peaceable Plea for Paul's Presbyterie in
Scotland, p. 2.
6 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, p. 376; cf. p. 378, an act of "Jesus Christ by
his ministers.11
7 Ibid., p. 372. 8 Ibid., p. 375.
Our Lord chose men to be apostles, endowed them with the necessary qualifi¬
cations, and gave them a commission to preach and to baptize. We read in
the short history of their progress, that they ordained elders in the
churches. Paul speaks to Timothy of "the gift which was given thee by
prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery: he says to
Titus, "for this cause I left thee in Crete that thou shouldst ordain
elders in every city": and he enjoins Timothy to "lay hands suddenly on
no man." These passages, when taken together, seem to imply that the
office of the ministry, which Timothy and Titus had received from Paul,
and other office-bearers joined with him, was with like solemn
imposition of hands to be conveyed by them to others.
b. The instrument of ordination. If ordination is an act of Jesus Christ
through the instrumentality of office-bearers, the question naturally arises as
to which office-bearers are the proper instrument of Christ. The answer to this
question is quite naturally determined by the form of church government itself.
Thus, the Independents believe that the whole congregation is the proper
instrument,^ the Episcopaliansbelive that the bishop is the proper instrument
of ordination,3 the Presbyterians believe that the presbytery is the px-oper
instrument. Although determined in part by the form of government,- the
ansvfer to this question must also be consistent with the nature of the church
and the nature of ordination. The Independent answer fails at both points.
Ordination by separate and distinct congregations implies a "disunion of the
Christian society."^ Ordination in the Independent form also implies that
ordination is an act of the people.7 But to Hill's thinking, both the answer
of the Episcopalians and the answer of the Presbyterians qualify on these issues.
Both ordination by a bishop and ordination by a presbytery may be harmonized
with the oneness of the church and the nature of ordination as an act of Christ.
Hill, however, sees certain Rw Testament evidence as favoring ordination by a
^ ikiiL' J LP- 370-371. 2 Ibid. , p. 374. ~ 3 Tbid. , p. 421.
4 Ibid., p. 430. 5 Ibid. , p. 372. 6 Ibid., p. 372.
7 Ibid*> P. 374.
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presbytery as opposed to ordination by & bishop. In the first place, there is
no passage in the New Testament which speaks of bishops ordaining office-bearers
in the church, and ev6n if there were, "still we could not be sure that those
who in other places are called rcpscrptaspo!, , were not included under this
name."'® But in the second place, and more positive, is the clear evidence that
presbyters did take part in the ordination of office-bearers. Hill cites
I Timothy 4:14» "Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee
by prophecy, with ths laying on of the hands of the presbytery." This
"apostolical acknov/ledgnent," says Kill, gives every reason for concluding that
2
the presbytery is the proper instrument of Christ in the act of ordination.
c. The procedure of ordination. Having determined the nature of ordination
as an act of Christ through the instrumentality of church office-bearers, and
having determined the presbyterial association of office-bearers as the proper
instrument, Hill next treats the practical question of the procedure which the
presbytery is to follow in performing this act. There are basically two steps
in this procedure, "the trial of qualifications" and "the solemn deed of
presbytery. "3
Lest some minister be ordained who is deficient in the essentials necessary
to render him acceptable and useful as an overseer, the Church of Scotland
arranges for the qualifications of every man who seeks ordination in that church
to be tried and tested. Hill finds that church's right so to judge a person's
qualifications in "the powers derived from its Divine Pounder" and in "the
directions delivered by his Apostles.Actually it is the presbytery which
bears this responsibility. As it is to be the instrument in the act of
1 Ibid."*, p. 430.
3 Hill, Institutes, p. 188.
2 Ibid., p. 430.
4 Ibid., p. 188.
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ordination, so it is responsible for determining, with the consent of the synod,
those who should receive it. There is, however, a point of confusion in Hill's
writings on this subject. On the one hand he indicates that it is the entire
presbytery, composed of Preaching Presbyters and Ruling Presbyters, which judges
A
a person's qualifications. On the other hand he indicates that only Preaching
Presbyters are to judge such qualifications. "The judgment of qualifications is
vested in those who, having been themselves found qualified, may be supposed
capable of trying others.For the most part, Hill speaks indiscriminately.
It is "the Presbytery" that is "to try, examine, and finally decern" the qualifi¬
cations of a person seeking ordination.
The areas in which a person is to be examined are these - "doctrine,
literature, and moral character."3 To discern the latter, the presbytery requires
"testimonials" as to the person's life and behavior. To insure a high standard
in "literature," the church prescribes a certain amount of prerequisite
education, "a full course of philosophy in some university" and the prosecution
of "the study of Divinity for the time prescribed." To discern generally his
doctrinal integrity, the applicant is asked to subscribe this formula:
I do hereby declare, that I do sincerely own and believe the whole doctrine
contained in the Confession of Faith, approven by the General Assemblies
of this national Church, and ratified by law in the year 1690, and
frequently confirmed by divers Acts of Parliament since that time, to be
the Truths of God: Ana I do own the same as the Confession of my faith.
As likewise 1 do own the purity of worship presently authorized and
practised in this Church; and also the Presbyterian government and
discipline, now so happily established therein; which doctrine, worship,
and church-government, I am persuaded, are founded upon the word of God,
and agreeable thereto.^-
Having satisfied the presbytery as to his qualifications in these areas,
the person obtains "what v/e call a Licence to preach the Gospel. "5 The exercise
~T~fbid. , p."l89T~ ~ 2 Hill, L.I. P., Vol. IIlTTr~372l
3 Hill, Institutes, p. 188.
4 Ibid., p. 191. Cf. Acts of the General Assembly, 1711, Act, 10.
5 dbb±d_. , p. 189.
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of this licence affords the presbytery an opportunity for testing the actual
"abilities" of the person seeking ordination. Hill notes that if a person is
seeking ordination in the Church of Scotland, then he must be licensed by a
presbytery of that Church; and if he has been licensed by the Church of Scotland,
then he is expected to be ordained by that Church.'' The "situation" of those so
licensed "is properly expressed by the ecclesiastical name Probationers; a name
which reminds them that the course of their studies, as well as their general
conduct, should be directed with a view to their future establishment."^ The
probationer, unless he is assigned to assist a particular minister, remains
without a fixed charge during his period of probation. After the probationary
period, the length of which Hill does not state, the probationer is judged
qualified to "receive a presentation to a church."3 The reception of such a
presentation signals a final examination, and affords the occasion upon which
the presbytery actually performs the "solnien deed" of ordination.
The solemn deed of presbytery follows this procedure; After a sermon
suited to the occasion, one of their number, who had been appointed to
perform that service, in their presence, and in the face of the
congregation, proposes to the presentee the questions appointed by the
10th act of the General Assembly 1711 to be put to ministers at their
ordination;^ and having obtained by his answers the declarations,
promises, and engagements which that Act requires, he proceeds to
invest him with the full character of a minister of the Gospel, conveying
to him by prayer, and imposition of the hands of the Presbytery,3 all the
1 Ibid. , p. 191. Of. Acts of the General Assembly , 1779, Act 9»
"The General Assembly...hereby do enact and prohibit all persons educated or
residing within the bounds of this Church, from going out of its bounds to
obtain licences to preach; and prohibit all preachers, licensed by this Church,
from going without its bounds to obtain ordination...unless they are called
to a particular congregation in another country."
2 Ibid. , p. 192. 3 Ibid., p. 193.
4 Hill gives these questions in a footnote.
5 The history of the use of the imposition of hands in the Church of
Scotland is quite clear. In 15^0 the First Book of Discipline stated, "Albeit
the Apostles used the imposition of hands, yet seeing the miracle is ceased
the using of the ceremony we judge is not necessary" (Knox, Works, Vol. II,
P» 193). !he reason for this statement is to be found in the fact that the
Scottish reformers rejected the idea that bishops were successors to apostles,
elevated to their peculiar positions by the imposition of hands. But in
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powers implied in that character, He then, in the name of the Presbytery,
receives and admits the person thus ordained, to be (a) minister,..of the
Established Church,''
Hill's discussion of the procedure by which elders are ordained is quite
brief. He notes that the kirk session, acting upon the principle mentioned
above, that the judgment of qualifications is vested in those who have been
themselves found qualified, determines those who are to be ordained as elders.
The names agreed upon are read from the pulpit, and unless some serious
objections be raised by the people, these steps are followed. First, the elders-
elect are required to declare explicitly their assent to all that is contained
2
in the Confession of Faith. Then, "the minister proceeds, in the face of the
congregation, to ordain the new elders; that is, to set them apart to that
office by prayer, accompanied with an exhortation to them, and an address to
the people.
suggesting the omission of laying on hands, the Church of Scotland at that
time isolated itself from the other reformed churches. In 1566, however,
the Church of Scotland fell in line with other reformed churches when
the General Assembly endorsed the Second Helvetic Confession, which said
regarding those qualified for the ministry: "let them be ordained of the
Presbyters with public prayer and laying on of hands" (Second Helvetic
Confession, 18:6. In Confessions of Christendom, ed. by G.B. Y/iner).
In 1570 the Assembly determined a certain form of ordination which included
the imposition of hands. The actual form has been lost, but its substance is
contained in Alexander Henderson's The Government and Order of the Church of
Scotland (1641). 7/e also learn from John Erskine of Dun that in 1371 the
imposition of hands was in normal use. In his Epistle to the Faithful, he
described the method of admission to the ministry to be "by the imposition of
hands...with admonitions, fasting, and prayers passing before" ("An Epistle
Written to a Faithful Brother, 13th December, 1571", In The Lascellany of the
Spaldinn Club. Vol. IV, p. 100). The Second Book of Piscipline, written in
1578 and ratified by the Assembly in 1581, laid down the imposition of hands
as a requirement in the act of ordination (Second Book of Discipline, 3:10).
The Westminster Form of Fresbyterial Church Governmon-c. adopted by the
Church of Scotland in 1oA5, described the imposition of hands as a necessary
requirement, thus making the matter quite final (Westminster Form of
Presbyterial Church Government, p. 528).
1 Hill, Institutes, pp. 208-210.
^ Acts of the General Assembly, 1690, Act 7; Acts of the General
Assembly, 1720, Act U* '
3 Hill, Institutes, p. 213. According to Wotherspoon and Kirkpatrick, there
is "no necessary' reason" why Hill should not use the term "ordination" with
reference to the making of elders; but they suggest that "for the avoidance of
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d. The results of ordination. For the minister, the results of ordina¬
tion are two-fold.One, it gives to him the right of performing every one of
the ordinary functions of the apostles,^ the preaching of the Word, the adminis¬
tration of the sacraments, and the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
Two, by it he becomes a minister of the one great society, the catholic church.
"Everyone who is ordained, by the laying on of the hands of the office-bearers
of the church, becomes a minister of the church universal."3 por the elder,
ordination means that he is given the right of assisting tne minister in
"the exercise of that jurisdiction over the people with which the office-bearers
of the Church are conceived to be invested."^'1*
confusion, the term 'admission' may in that case be preferred, and has been
used" (Manual of Church Doctrine, p.$2; cf. Alexander Henderson, The G-overnment
and Order of the Church of Scotland, p. 30). T.F. Torrance says that strictly
speaking "ordination" ought to be used only with regard to those who dispense
the Word and sacraments. "It is using ordination in a somewhat loose sense
to speak of ordaining...elders, for they are not ordained to dispense the Word
and Sacraments but are set apart or consecrated to assist in that ministry."
(Scottish Journal of Theology, 1958? p. 22*6). Cf. J.M. Ross, op.cit. , p. 26,
note 32. Even though he applies it to both ministers and elders, it is
obvious that Hill does not give the term the same meaning in both cases.
1 Earlier Scottish sources mentioned a third which Hill does not mention,
namely, that ordination is to an inalienable office. The General Assembly of
1565 enacted that "once a man has entered the ministry he may not leave it and
follow the world." (Abridgment of Acts of General Assembly, p. 18). The
Concordat of Leith (1572) stated that "it shall not be lawful to any entered
into the function of the ministry, to leave that vocation" (Calderwood,
History of Church of Scotland, Vol. Ill, p. 174), The Second Book of Discipline
is equally emphatic: "They that are called by God and duly elected by man,
after they have once accepted the charge of the Ministry, may not leave their
function" (IV:4). Cf. Calvin, Institutes, 4:3s "16; "be who is ordained is
reminded that he is no longer his own, but is bound to the service of God
and the Church."
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 374. Institutes, pp. 166, 210.
3 j P« 372+. "By ordination they become ministers of the church
universal" (p. 375). Cf. Samuel Rutherford, The Due Right of Presbyteries,
p. 200.
4 Hill, Institutes, p. 171.
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2. The election of office-bearers
a. The nature of election. Although a person, by the act of ordination,
is made a minister of the church universal, he is not thereby made a universal
minister. "He cannot perform these acts £~of the ministry^/7 to the church
-j
universal, because it is nowhere assembled." The separated condition of the
church universal, therefore, "renders it expedient that the place in which he
is to perform them the acts_J7 shall be marked out to him. This "assignation
of place" is not essential to the minister's character, nor does it limit the
powers implied in that character. It is "merely a matter of order," and
"serves no other purpose than to specify the bounds in which...the powers shall
be exercised."3 This "assignation of place" Hill terms "the election of a
minister."4 He is careful to avoid confusing this election with ordination.
Whereas ordination is "the appointment of Jesus Christ, conveying a character
by the instrumentality of the office-bearers of His Church," election is "the
appointment of men applying or limiting the exercise of this character, in such
manner as they please, and with more or less wisdom, as it happens.Election,
therefore is "subsequent to" ordination, and "essentially distinct from it in
nature.Ordination is essentially a divine act; election is essentially a
human act.
b. The procedure of election. "What is the most proper manner of assigning
the limits for the exercise of the powers conveyed by ordination i3 a question
1 Kill s**"L,I.J~' Vol. Ill" p. 37 k. Cf. Samuel Rutherford , The Due Right
of Presbyteries; "By ordination he is made a Pastor of the Church Universal!,
though he be not made an Universall pastor " (Part I, p. 200); "A Pastor is a
Pastor of the Catholike Church, but he is not a Catholike Pastor of the
Catholike Church"~(Part II, p. 204).
2 Ibid., p. 375 . 3 Ibid. , p. 375 . 4 Ibid. , p. 376. 5 Ibid. , p. 376. .
^ Ihid., p. 376. Cf. Samuel Rutherford, The Due Right of Presbyteries,
p. 199: "Ordination...is a supernaturall act of the Presbytery separating a
man to an holy calling, election is posterior to it, and is but an appropriation
of a called person to his Ministry, to such a particular flock."
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which has been violently agitated both in ancient and modern times."^ The
principle, however, upon which the question of procedure is to be settled is
simple.
When Christians are not recognised by the laws of the land as entitled to
their protection, ^/"election\J is, of necessity, and of right, the act
of the people to whom the person is to minister; but when Christianity
enjoys the benefits of being incorporated with the constitution of the
state, it comes, in consequence of that civil advantage, to be modified
in such manner as the government of the state is pleased to direct.
In Scotland the conjunction of civil and ecclesiastical authority at this point
results in a two step procedure for the election of ministers - the presentation
of the patron, and the voice of the people.3
As we determined in Chapter III, Hill followed without deviation the
Moderate position on the.question of patronage, and what he has to say in his
own works is but a reaffirmation and restatement of that position. In his
Institutes, Hill does two things; he gives a brief history of the law of
patronage, and then he defends it, as the lav/ of the land, against several
charges. He begins his account in. the year 1565 when the General Assembly
expressed in a letter to Queen Mary their opinion concerning the proper method
of electing a minister to a vacant parish. That letter said in part,
Our mind is not, that her Majesty, or any other patron, should be defrauded
of their just patronage; but we mean, whensoever her Majesty or any other
patron, do present any person to a benefice, that the person presented
should be tried and examined by the judgment of learned men of the church
...the church should not be defrauded of the collation, no more than the
patrons of their presentations. *'
1 Ibid. , p. 375. Hill notes that in "ancient times" the question
concerned "what was called the investiture of church beneficies"; and in
"modern times" the same question "has appeared in Scotland under the form
of a competition between patronage, a call by heritors and elders, and
popular election."
2 ? p. 376. 3 Hill, Institutes, p. 188.
4 Alexander Petrie, A Cc.mpendious History of the Catholick Church From
the Year 600, Until the Year 1600 (1662), pp. 344-345.
376
When presbyterian government was established in Scotland, the advice of this
letter was followed in the Acts of the Scottish Parliament in 1567 and 1592.
These lav/3 spelled out the compromise. The patrons had the right to present
ministers to vacant churches, but they could present only those whom the church
judged to be qualified. At the time of the Revolution Settlement in 169O,
however, the Scottish parliament constituted the heritors and elders of every
parish as patrons. This action was repealed by an Act of the British Parliament
in 1712, which restored to patrons their ancient rights/ and so it stood in
Hill's day. Hill acknowledged that some "complained" that patronage was an
invasion of the church's privileges and thus sought to have the law establishing
patronage repealed; but it appears in fact that the majority of presbyters were
of this mind, for until 1784 the General Assembly annually instructed the
appropriate commission "to make due application to the King and parliament
for redress of the grievance of patronage."-5 In 1784, however, the Assembly
voted to omit this article from the formal instructions given the commission.
Though Hill does not mention it, he was in large measure responsible for this
omission/1' He firmly believed that patronage afforded "the most expedient
method of settling vacant parishes.''^ gut whatever differences of opinion
1 Hill, Institutes, p. 195. Cf. Act 7, 1567 and Act 114, 1592 found in
Appendices 1 and 2 of the Institutes, pp. 425f.
2 Ibid. , p. 195. Cf. Act 12, British Parliament, 1712; "the presbytery
of the respective bounds is obliged to receive and admit in the same manner,
such qualified persons as shall be presented by the respective patrons, as
the patrons presented before the making of the act /"eonstitutii'ig heritors
and elders as patrons^...."
3 Ibid. , p. 196. Cf. Acts of the General Assembly, 1638-1842, p. 820.
4 Cook, Life of Hill, p. 159- Miller, Headship of Christ, p. 140.
Hill's motion said the grievance clause v/as "inexpedient, ill founded, and
dangerous to the peace and welfare of this Church."
5 Hill, Institutes, p. 197. This statement evidences a progression
beyond the earlier Moderate position. Y,He re as Robertson defended patronage as
"an" expedient method of settling vacancies, Hill defends it as "the most"
expedient method.
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prevailed as to the question of expediency, it could not be denied that
A
patronage was the lav/ of the land.
As the lav/, Hill states the case for patronage. He does not, however,
marshall positive support for the law as such, but rather answers some of the
objections raised by its opponents, and indicates how both the rights of the
government, represented by the patron, and the rights of the church are
maintained in balance. This he does in a series of "if-but" propositions which
2
we shall summarize in his own words. '
1. Patronage would be a grievance if the patron had it in his power to
keep a parish long vacant. But the low has empowered the Presbytery, if
a Patron does not present for the space of six months after the coranence-
ment of the vacancy, to take such steps as appear to them proper for
supplying the vacant parish with a minister.
2. Patronage might be an instrument of oppression, if it implied a right
to compel a person to enter the church, or to move against his inclination
from one charge to another. But this evil was effectually removed by the
following clause of the act 1719? c. 29: "Be it enacted, That if any
patron shall present...any person who shall not accept or declare his
willingness to accept of the presentation and charge to which he is
presented...such presentation shall not be accounted."
3. The right of patronage would be productive of the most pernicious
consequences, if a person holding that right were permitted to receive a
sum of money as a compensation for the exercise of it. But the Church,
by the laws against Simony,^ holds forth a warning and a pledge that all.
her vigilance and authority will be exerted in preventing that corruption.
4» The Church would have reason to complain of patronage "if it were
lawful for patrons to present whom they pleased." But the effectual remedy
against the abuse of patronage is found in the absolute and final powers
as to the trial and qualifications of ministers, conveyed to the Church
from the Lord Jesus and recognised by the act of' 1719? c. 29, the last
British statute upon the subject, which declares and enacts "That nothing
herein contained shall prejudice or diminish the right of the Church as
the same now stands by law established, as to the trying of qualities of
any person presented to any church or benefice." A licence is the stamp
of the Church, declaring that a person is qualified to receive a
presentation. She has herself to blame if the stamp is improperly fixed.
1 Ibid. , p. 197. 2 Ibid. , pp. 197-202.
3 Cf. Hill, Institutes, Appendix 8, p. Ai2.
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While the power of the church is effectually guarded against the power of
the patron by these laws, the power of the patron is guarded against the power
of the church by the law of 1592 which states that "in case the Presbytery
refuses to admitt onie qualified minister presented to them by the patrons, it
shall be lauchfull to the patrons to reteine the haill frutes of the said
A
benefice in his owin handes."
The law states that the first step in the election of a minister is the
presentation, by the patron, of a person judged to be qualified for the charge
by the courts of the church.
When Hill cones to speak of the second step in the election of a minister,
2
the voice of the people, he begins with several negative statements. One, the
idea of a right in the whole congregation to appoint their own minister belongs
to the Independents and is inconsistent with the principles of presbyterian
government. Two, the idea of a right in the people to elect a person to be
presented to the presbytery so that in consequence of that election he may be
ordained is inconsistent with the nature of ordination, the nature of election,
and the religious establishment of Scotland. Three, the idea of a right in
the heritors and elders to elect a minister arises purely from the act of ihe
Scottish Parliament in 1690, c. 25, which was repealed by the British
Parliament in 1712, c. 12.
Yet, in spite of these negations, the Church of Scotland, aware of the
interest of 'die people in the person who is to minister to them, "has not
overlooked them in his settlement, but in two different ways affords them an
opportunity of expressing their sentiments."3 in the first place, the people
are asked to sign "a paper named a call" requesting the person to be their
1 Ibid., p. 202. Cf. Appendix 4* P« 432.
2 Ibid.,pp. 203-204. 3 Ibid., p. 205.
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minister and promising him subjection in the Lord. This "call" is settled by
law as one of the necessary steps in the election of a canister; yet "a call
rosy be sustained, however small the number of subscribers." A presentee to a
vacancy can never be refused installation or settlement "upon account of any
deficiency in the subscription to his call."
The second way in which the church provides for the voice of the people
is by giving them the right to act as accusers of the presentee. This they may
do in one of two ways. They may give to the presbytery a formal "libel,11
charging the presentee "with immorality of conduct or unsoundesss of doctrine."
But when they present this "libel," the people "bind themselves, under pain of
O
ecclesiastical censure to prove it." Less drastically, the people may appear
on the day of the person's settlement and "without the formality of a libel"
simply state their objections to him. This arrangement, says Hill, "gives
persons the most unacquainted with the forms of business an opportunity of
stating their personal knowledge of any circumstance in the character and
conduct of the presentee which renders him unworthy of being a minister of
the Gospel."3
It is the duty of the presbytery to hear both libels and objections, and
to judge whether they are valid or not. If they are sustained, the presentation
is rendered void. If they are unfounded, the presbytery proceeds to the
settlement of the presentee as the minister of the parish concerned.
Hill notes that although election is distinct from and subsequent to
ordination, the two are "often conjoined in practice."4 The actual sequence
of events runs like this: the trial of qualifications; the presentation of the
patron; the voice of the people; the act of ordination. If the presentee is
1 Ibid. , p. 200. 2 Ibid. , p. 207.
4 Hill, L.I.D. . Vol. Ill, p. 376.
3 Ibid., p. 207.
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to be ordained as well as installed as minister of the parish, the presbytery
performs both ceremonies. If, however, the person elected to the vacancy is
already ordained, the presbytery simply inquires that the presentee "declare in
the face of the congregation, that he consents and adheres to the declarations,
promises, and engagements implied in his answers to the questions which were
•i
put to him when he was ordained"j and then proceeds to "constitute a connection
between him and the inhabitants of that parish which gives hirn a legal title to
o
the emol\iments provided by law for the person who officiates there." This
connection can be dissolved only by the act of the church, either accepting the
person's resignation, deposing him from the office of minister, or translating
him to a different charge. Hill concludes that this procedure for the election
of a minister preserves "the rights of the Church, of the Patron, and of the
people.
As for the election of elders, Hill says quite simply that they "are chosen
by the voice of the Session." It is of interest to note that with regard to
elders, election precedes ordination. This is a complete reversal of the
procedure which Ilill presents as the onpy proper one for ministers. He finds,
however, Scriptural support for such a procedure in the record of the
election of deacons in Acts 6.
It is true that the apostles desire the multitude to loot: out among them
seven men of honest report to superintend, with the name of deacons, the
daily ministrations of their charity. But although there was a manifest
propriety in desiring the people to propose the persons, who they judged
worthy of being intrusted with the distribution of their charity, yet the
men thus nominated did not begin t^e distribution till they received
from the apostles a solemn appointment.
7
The same is true with elders. They are first elected by the session, but they
do not assume their duties until they have received through the minister their
"solemn appointment."
1 Hill, Institutes, p. 211. 2 Ibid., p. 210. 3 Ibid., p. 211.
4 Ibid. , p. 211. 5 Ibid., p. 212. 6 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, p. 371.
7 Supra, p. 372, The people have a voice in that they may state their
objections to any pei'son chosen by the session.
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3. The organization of office-bearers
So far we have determined how, in the presbyterian system, ministers and
elders are ordained and elected to their respective positions. The question
which remains concerns how aLl these office-bearers are to be "orderly
associated." That is to say, Hill is faced with the practical matter of
organization. In bringing forth Biblical evidence in support of the
presbyterian form of organization, he calls attention to Acts 15° Here "we
learn. ..that a question which had divided the church at Antioch was submitted
to the decision of the Apostles and elders met at Jerusalem, who having
pronounced a solemn decree upon the subject, sent it to be preserved and
obeyed." Hill reasons that this passage gives "apostolical sanction" to
three things: the establishment of "ecclesiastical courts" consisting of
ministers and elders; the "subordination of ecclesiastical courts"; and
the "practice of appeal in the conduct of ecclesiastical business." * These
points serve to outline the exposition of Hill's thought on the subject of
church organization.
a. The establishment of ecclesiastical courts consisting of ministers and
elders. To describe the "judicatories vhich compose the Constitution of the
Church of Scotland," Kill determines totreat the constituency, the meetings, and
the officers of each court. The actual number of courts is detexmiined by so
practical matter as the geographical size of the locale in which presbyterian
government is to be established. Therefore, "in small states such as Geneva,
the purposes of church government are fully attained by the parochial consis~
tories and one consistory of Presbyters;...but when Presbyterian government is
1 Hill, Institutes, ppj 176-177. 2 Ibid., p. 17/.
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established in a country so extensive as Scotland, the facility with which
it is desirable to conduct church-business, requires the.multiplication of
courts." Thus necessity has led to the erection and establishment of four
ecclesiastical courts in the Church of Scotland.
(1). The kirk session. The kirk session is composed of the minister of
the parish together with all lay-elders in the parish. The session is legally
convened when summoned by the minister from the pulpit or by personal citation
to the members. The session cannot exercise any judicial authority unless the
minister of the parish, or some other minister acting in his name by appointment
of the presbytery, constitutes the meeting with prayer and presides throughout.
The officers of this court include a moderator, who is the minister, a clerk of
2
its own nomination, and an officer to execute its orders.
(2). The presbytery. The presbytery consists of the ministers of all the
parishes within its geographical bounds,^ of all the ordained university
professors of divinity schools within its bounds, and of the representatives
from the kirk sessions within its bounds. Bach kirk session has the right of
sending one elder to presbytery. Therefore, excluding the possibility of
university professors, the number of ministers and number of elders in any
meeting of presbytery will be equal. The presbytery has at least two stated
meetings every year and as many other meetings as the local business requires.
The officers of this court include a moderator, who must be a minister, chosen
twice a year, a clerk of its own nomination, and an officer to execute its
ordera.^
(3). The provincial synod. A provincial synod is composed of three or
more presbyteries. Every minister of all the presbyteries within the bounds
1 Ibid. , pp. 177-17&. 2 Ibid'.", pp. "212-213.
3 "As the General Assembly has the power of disjoining and erecting
Presbyteries at its pleasure, their bounds can easily be altered, or their
number increased, according to the change of circumstances." Ibid., p. 214.
4 Ibid., pp. 214-213.
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of the synod is a member of that court,, and the same elder who last represented
the kirk session in presbytery is its representative in the synod. Again the
number of ministers and number of elders are equal. The synod meets twice a
year, and at every meeting a moderator, who must be a minister, is elected.
■i
A synod has its own clerk and officers.
(A). The general assembly. The extent of Scotland requires that the
constituency of the general assembly be determined, in large measure, by
representation. The rules governing the number of representatives were enacted
by the General Assembly of 1694. They provide for ministerial and lay represen¬
tatives from each presbytery, lay representatives from each Royal Burgh, and
either ministerial or lay representatives from the five universities. In Hill's
day the representation was as follows: 200 ministers representing presbyteries;
89 elders representing presbyteries; 67 elders representing Royal Burghs; and
5 ministers or elders representing the universities. It is interesting to note
that in this court the ministers always outnumbered the elders. Besides these
representatives the court was always honored with a representative of the Sovereign
in the person of the Lord High Commissioner. The Church of Scotland claims the
right of meeting in a general assembly by its own appointment, but also
recognises the right of the Sovereign to call a meeting of this court. As the
ecclesiastical business of a whole country is extensive, the general assembly
has frequent meetings as needs for such meetings arise; but there is always one
annual general meeting.
The General Assembly meets annually in the month of May, and continues to
sit for ten days, at the end of which time it is dissolved, first by the
Moderator, who appoints another Assembly to be held upon a certain day of
the month of May in the following year, and then by the Lord High Commissioner,
who, in his Majesty's name, appoints another Assembly to be held upon the
day which has been mentioned by the Moderator.^
1 Ibid. , pp. 215-216.
2 Ibid., pp. 216-217. Hill gives the rules in detail.
3 Ibid. , p. 220.
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At every meeting of the general assembly, a moderator, who must be a minister,
is chosen; "and there is a resectable establishment of clerks and officers.""'
b. The subordination of ecclesiastical courts. Hill says that to under¬
stand the organization of the Church of Scotland, it is necessary to consider
these four courts not only as they have been described, but also "as they
are bound together by that subordination which is characteristic of
2
Presbyterian government,""" Hill does not dwell on the reasons for this sudox"—
dination; he merely states, "subordination.«,is essential to church government."^
Rather his concern is to explain this essential subordination. This he does
in terms of the principles of subordination and the pattern of subordination.
(1). The principles of subordination. In the relationship which exists
between any two of the four courts, the one is superior and the other inferior
in terras of power and authority; and the respective rights of each govern this
relationship of subordination. On the one hand, the superior court has the
right not only to consider matters relative to itself, but may take up any
business of the inferior court "by an exercise of its inherent right of super¬
intendence and controul."^ The superior court may inspect the whole course of
the ecclesiastical transactions of an inferior court; take whatever means appear
to be necessary to enforce the rules which direct the proceedings of the inferior
court; and implement whatever measures ore required "to correct the errors" or
"to redross the wrong" done by the inferior court.J
On the other hand, the inferior court has the right of "reference." That
is to say, if an inferior court entertains doubts or is apprehensive of difficul¬
ties in the settlement of any issue, that court has a right to decline from
giving a decision, and a right to refer the problem to the court immediately
superior to it. In other words, the inferior court has the right to shift the
~
1 ibid. , pp." 2T6^207 2 Ibid. , "97"2217 ~
3 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 377. 4 Ibid., p. 222.
5 Ibid. , pp. 222-223.
385
responsibility of settling difficult matters on to the shoulders of the higher
court. Hill, as a Hoderate, is not filled with praise for this procedure;^
and adds two further words. First, "although inferior courts are entitled, by
the constitution, to refer to the courts above them, ..it is, generally speaking,
more conducive to the public good, that every court should fulfill its duty
p _
by exercising its judgment.""' in short, Hill is pleading with inferior courts
not to exercise their right of reference. Secondly, Hill notes that members
of the court which made the reference "are not precluded from sitting and
judging with the court to which the reference is made."^ Thus, the inferior
court is prevented from shirking entirely its responsibility.
(2). The pattern of subordination, The actual arrangement of the
subordination of the four ecclesiastical courts is as follows: "The highest
Ecclesiastical Court is the General Assembly,"^ which exercises control over the
other three courts. The synod, the second court, is inferior to the general
assembly, bat superior to the presbytery and kirk session. The presbytery, the
third court in descending order, is inferior to both the general assembly and
the synod, but superior to the kirk session. "The lowest judicatory in the
Church of Scotland is the Kirk-Session.
c. The practice of appeal in the conduct of ecclesiastical business.
The subordination of church courts which maintains the rights of both inferior
and superior courts also allows for the practice of appeal in the conduct of the
business of these courts, a practice which of itself helps to explain the system
of subordination which exists among them.
(1). The principle of appeal. The principle upon which this practice
c
rests is simply this, "in the multitude of counsellors there is safety," This
2 Hill, Institutes, p. 224.
4 Ibid., p. 216.
6 Ibid., p. 177.
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principle gives to those who consider they are aggrieved by the sentence of an
inferior court the right of appeal to a superior court. This practice, says
Hillj is one of the great benefits of the presbyterian system of organization,
and renders that "form of government more perfect." '1
In all governments conducted by men, wrong may be done from bad intention,
from the imperceptible influence of local prejudices, or from some other
species of human infirmity. To pi'event the continued existence of wrong,
it is provided, in every good government, that sentences which are
complained of may be reviewed; and although there must be a last resort
where the review stops, the security against permanent wrong will be as
effectual as.the nature of the case admits, if there is a gradation of
authority, by which those who had no concern in the origin of the
proceedings, have a right to annul or confirm them, as they see cause.
This is the .great principle of our republican constitution, which does
not invest any individual with a controul over his brethren, but employs
the wisdom and impartiality of a greater number of comisellors to sanction
the judgments, or to correct the errors of a smaller.^
(2). The practice of appeal. An appeal may be made to a superior court
if it is thought that the inferior court has acted unjustly, or unlawfully.
If it is thought that the lower court has acted unjustly, then a formal "appeal"
is made. If it is thought that the lower court has acted unlawfully, then a
"complaint" is made.3
(a). An appeal from an inferior court to a superior court. When any
party conceives that he has been unjustly judged by an inferior court, he is
entitled to seek redress by appealing the action of that court to the court
immediately above it. This formal appeal, according to ecclesiastical law,
stops the final execution of the judgment of the lower court, brings the whole
_
^ Ybjci,, "^TT7B7 2 ibid., ppTJ 221-222T
3 Ibid. , pp. 221p-225. It appears that Hill's distinction between an
"appeal" and a "complaint" is based on overlapping categories. An unjust
judgment may at the same time be unlawful, and vice versa. Although Hill
describes the appeal and complaint as we have suggested, it seems that he
fails to make explicit the real distinction between the two. Certain passing
references indicate that the difference between an appeal and a complaint
lies in the fact that an appeal is registered by a party apart from the
constituency of an inferior court whereas a complaint is registered by a
minority group w.Lthin the constituency of the inferior court. Even so, the
distinction is not a hard and fast one, for Hill says that in a final analysis
a complaint is dealt with in the same manner as an appeal.
387
procedure of the court which produced the judgment under review, and sits the
members of that court at the bar of the superior court. That means that the
members of the inferior court are not entitled to debate nor to vote in the
review of their own judgment. They can only state the reasons upon which the ir
judgment proceeded. If the members of the inferior court are found to have
acted to the best of their judgment and with good intention, they incur no blame,
even if their sentence be reversed. If, however, it be found that-the inferior
court acted out of some unjust or evil motive, "they may be found deserving of
A
censure."
(b). The complaint from an inferior court to a superior court. If some
judgment of an inferior court appears to be "contrary to the laws of the church,"
the concurring members of that inferior court "have a right to recox'd in the
minutes of the court their dissent, by which they save themselves from any
share of the blame or danger; and they have also a right to complain to the
o
superior court." The complaint, like the appeal, stops the proceedings of the
inferior court and brings the whole matter under review. It "sits at the bar"
both the members of the lower court who concur in the judgment and those who
complain against the judgment. The parties can only state why they think the
judgment in question is either lawful or unlawful, as the case may be. The
superior court has the power of reviewing the judgment of the lower court, and
either sustaining the judgment if the complaint proves to be unfound, or reversing
the judgment.and censuring those responsible for it if, in fact, it be found
contrary to the laws of the church. ^
Hill states that this practice of appeal is productive of two benefits.
By it all members of every church court "are thus taught to consider themselves
as guardians of the constitution." They are also "called to attend, not only to
~1 Ibid., p. 223. 2 Ibid."p. 226. ' '
3 Ibid., pp. 227-228.
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the particular business concerning which, they judge, but also to that general
interest of the Church, which, in the eyes of parties, may be of little
importance."' For Kill, this is but another way of saying that the inferior
court ought always to be careful to obey at every point the rulings which are
handed down from higher courts, whether, in its particular situation, it
understands the reasons for these rulings or not. Certainly such thougits
2
are reflective of' basic Moderate party principles.
i+. Evaluation
When compared with his paltry treatment of many points of ecclesiology,
the great detail with which Hill expounds the polity of the Church of Scotland
verifies our contention that he was interested primarily in the external form
and order of the Christian society. But, as we have already criticized Hill on
the basis of what he did not treat, we must now conduct our evaluation on the
basis of what he did treat; and we must not allow the deficiency at many points
to diminish our appreciation of the one point, even if it is over-emphasized.
We shall note the strong points in Hill's discussion, and then defend these
points against possible objections and apparent inconsistencies; yet at the same
time we shall call attention to specific weaknesses in his approach. Our remarks
shall be concerned primarily with the first two points of the exposition, the
ordination of office-bearers, and the election of office-bearers. In setting
forth his doctrine of the organization of office-bearers, Hill has followed
the standard presbyterian pattern, and it hardly seems necessary for us to
deal with matters of such common and universal knowledge. Besides this subject
has been discussed more fully in the many works on presbyterian polity than the
scope of this present work allows. Furthermore, Hill's own significance lies not
in what he says about this latter point, but in what he says about the former points.
1 IbidT", p. 228. 2 Supra, p. 130.
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No doubt one of the strongest points in Hill's entire discussion is his
affirmation that ordination is the act of Jesus Christ, In expounding this
position Kill, on the one hand, clearly disassociates himself from all who say-
that "the power of Ordination to the ministry rests in the hands of the,..
Church,'1"® or that "the Christian congregation can of itself evolve and empower
a ministry";^ an<3 on the other hand, clearly associates himself with all who
state negatively that "the Christian ministry derives not from the people,"^
or positively that "the office and commission of the ministry are derived from
the Divine Head of the Church."^- It should also be noted that in taking this
stand, Hill is in perfect agreement v-ith the laws of the Church of Scotland,5
and the teaching of earlier Scottish theologians.6
But having commended Hill for his assertion that ordination is the act of
Christ, we must ask whether this does not rule out his conception of ordination
as being through the instrumentality of men. Some have suggested that it doss.
Walter Lowrie, for instance, suggests that a human instrument in any form is
inconsistent with the divine action of Christ.^ Hill, however, saw no incon~
sistency in stating that ordination is an act of Christ, but an act performed
through the instrumentality of men - nor did the earlier Scottish theologians.
Sarauel Rutherford reconciled the issues by making 6 dis iinction between the
1 R.N. Hew, The Minis cry and the Sacraments (ed. by R. Dun'kerleyj , p. 235,
2 A.L. Peck, Anglicanism and Episcopacy (1958), p. 78.
3 Report to the General Assembly of 1911 by Special Committee,
General Assembly Reports - 1911, p. 1170.
1+ William Hanson, The Ministry and the Sacraments (ad. by R. Bunkerley),
P. 177.
5. Act 6, General Assembly, 1698: "The Church of Scotland allows no power
in the people...to appoint or ordain Church Officers."
6 Walter Steuart, Collections, 1:1:21; "Our church doth condemn any
doctrine that tends to support the people's power of ordaining their ministers."
George Gillespie, English - Popish Ceremonies (lb42), p. 166: "The right and
power of giving ordination to Ministers of the Church belongs primarily and
wholly to Christ...."
7 Walter Lowi'io, Problems of Church Unity (1924), p. 176.
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immediate and mediate action of Christ, "The office-bearers of the Church have
the power of the keyes and their office immediately from Christ, by the
immediation of the gift: they have their offices from the Church, by the
mediation of orderly designation: seeing it is the Church which designeth such
J
a man to such an officeIn a similar manner George Gillespie resolved the
tension by making a distinction between the power of Christ given through the
Spirit, and the authority derived from the commission of Christ mediated
p
through the church. True, we are confronted here with a fundamental duality,
but it is, notes T,F. Torrance, the fundamental duality of revelation itself.
Revelation is the act of Christ which is brought to bear upon us directly
through His Spirit, but it is revelation which He communicates to us
through the Holy Scriptures....So it is with Ordination. It is the Risen
and Ascended Lord who acts directly through His Spirit ordaining His
servant to the ministry, but He does that in and through the Church....-?
Hill's position, therefore, appears to be self-consistent and consistent with
Scripture in implying that ordination has a two-fold reference: a direct or
immediate reference to Christ; and an indirect or mediate reference to Christ
through the historical church.
Hill, as we have indicated, is correct in asserting that oi~dination is
through the instrumentality of men. But does this not mean, on the one hand,
that Christ in His divine act is dependent upon the action of men in laying
on hands; and, on the other, that men in this human action of laying of hands
can force the divine act of Christ in bestowing the Spirit and His gifts?
Hill's answer to both questions would be a definite, KOI In respect to both
he says generally that it is Christ who is the actual Ordainer in ordination;
1 Samuel Rutherford, A Peaceable and Temperate Plea for Paul1s
Presbyterie in Scotland ( 1 , p. 7.
2 George Gillespie, Miscellany Questions, p. 43«
3 T.P. Torrance, "Consecration and Ordination", S..J.T. , Vol. II, 1958,
p. 2Z|2. Cf. Bernard Manning, A Layman in the ]iinistry"Ti"9*43) > P« 153*
and reminds us that even when men act in their instrumental role, they are
acting always in the name and on the authority of Christ. This general answer
is sufficient to negate the implications of the questions, but more specific
explanations can and have been given. The first question must receive a
negative answer because a positive one denies that Jesus Christ is "sovereignly
•i
free" over His Church. ' Yet Scripture compels us to affirm His absolute
Lordship. As the living Lord of the church, Christ may bestow all the gifts and
powers implied in the act of ordination quite apart from the act of nsn placing
their hands upon the head of another. According to Samuel Rutherford Christ
can "extraordinarily supply the want of ordination...ministerial power is
p
conferred in that case immediately.This is possible because "it is Christ,
not the Apostles, nor the Church, who bestows upon the ordained minister the
Spirit and the gifts of the Spirit for the exercise of his office.pt is true
that the Westminster Form of Presbyterial Church Government required the imposi¬
tion of hands as a necessary act in a lawful ordination; but we must ask in what
sense this requirement was described as necessary. The answer is well stated
by George Gillespie when he points out that because of the apostolic practice
in laying on hands, this rite should be regarded as a necessity of precept and
institution,^- but that it should not be regarded as a necessity of means, as
though Christ in some way were dependent upon the instrumentality of men in
ordination.5 That is to say, though we are tied to this act of human instru¬
mentality through apostolic example and instruction, Christ is not tied to it.
The second question must also receive a negative answer because a positive one
1 Ibid., p. 21+3' 2 Samuel Rutherford, Peaceable Plea for Iresbyterie,p. 26$.
3 T.F. Torrance, S.J.T., Vol. II, 1958, p. 2A3.
4 Ibid. , p. 243. "Its necessity is one of obedience to the Apostolic
ox'dinance...."
5 George Gillespie, miscellany Questions, p. 46.
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implies that ordination is a mechanical action, i.e., that ordination auto¬
matically and without exception transmits certain gifts and powers by the very
act of laying on hands. This has been denied by a number of scholars in various
ways. Karl Heim declares: "On Protestant principles it is no longer possible
to think that religious authority can be transferred by anointing or by any other
ceremony." Wotherspoon and Kirkpatrick wrote; "Ordination is not a mechanical
but a spiritual action, in which the effect of the act depends on the appointed
0
end." Those responsible for the Consultation on Church Union report on the
ordained ministry in a united church said that no human act "by itself can
accomplish what the Holy Spirit alone can do."3 Walter Lowrie contends that
if a person has not experienced the "inward call" of Christ to be His minister,
then nothing can be given or added by the act of laying on hands.tf T.F. Torrance
writes, "The laying on of hands cannot be understood...as securing or guaranteeing
the presence or operation of the Holy Spirit."5 "Nevertheless," says Torrance,
"it is clear that the laying on of hands was given by the Apostles with the
promise of Christ to impart spiritual gifts for the fulfillment of the ministry.
Ordinarily and normatively we are to understand the laying on of hands as the
apostolically appointed sign and instrument used by the Spirit in bestowing the
1 Karl Heim, Spirit'and Truth (1933) , p. 4T&".
2 Wotherspoon and Kirkpatrick, A Manual of Church 'Doctrine (Second
Edition), p. 92. Cf. T.F. Torrance, S. J.T. , 1938, p. 251: "It is entirely
the divine intention and act that determines the nature of the ordinance and
its effect."
3 Consultation on Church Union Digest, 19&5, P* 21.
4 Lowrie, op.cit., p. 212. Cf. Stuart Louden, The True Pace of the Kirk
(19£>3)} PP. 26-27. By the laying on of hands in ordination "a man is not 'made'
a minister in any formal or linear sense; rather a man is authorized to function
as a minister, because Cod has already called him to this service." Cf.
P.C. Simpson, The Evangelical. Church Catholic (1934), p. 148. 'The church
cannot "make" a man a minister of Christ. What it can do is to recognize
him as one called of Christ.'
5 T.F. Torrance, S.J.T. , 1958, p. 243* Cf. Wotherspoon and Kirkpatrick,
Manual of Church Doctrine, p. 98; "the laying on of hands...in no way secures
the possession of the Holy Spirit."
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charisma for the ministry." Wo cannot, therefore, neglect this aspect of
o
human instrumentality "-without disobedience and loss."
Hill states correctly, we believe, that the act of ordination does convey
something to the person ordained. He would, therefore, oppose those who regard
"ordination as only a recognition of the gifts of grace already received"j-5 but
he would not go so far as others who imply that all special endowments of divine
grace are conveyed only by the act of ordination.^ This latter idea is incon¬
sistent with the idea that persons should be tested and tried before they are
ordained; if gifts are bestowed only in the act of ordination, then there is
nothing to test or try prior to that act. The tendency is to consider
ordination an either-or action. Either ordination is simply the act of
recognizing the person to whom gifts have already been given, or else ordina¬
tion is the act of conveying to a person all the gifts at once. Kill implies
that elements of both positions are involved in ordination. In his emphasis
upon the necessity of trials and qualifications, he implies that ordination is
an act in which the church recognizes one whom Christ has called into His service
as a minister. In his definition of ordination, he -implies that in and through
the act of ordination something special is conveyed to the person ordained. Hill
is not alone in this stand which he takes. "By ordination the church recognises
the candidates divine calling, adequate preparation and special gifts,...and
invokes upon the ordinand the gifts of the Holy Spirit to equip him for the work
of the ministry.T.F. Torrance includes the truth of both positions in his
doctrine of ordination by speaking of ordination both as a "sign" and an
Instrument." Ordination is "the apostolically given sign witnessing to the
1 Yb'idT", p. 24%
2 Wotherspoon and Kirkpatriclc, Manual of Church Doctrine, p. 98.
3 Edward Schweitzer, cited by J.N. Nelson, The Realm of Redemption, p. 146.
4 Of. Arthur Dakin, The Baptist View of the Church and Ministry (1945) >
P» i(2.
5 Consultation on Church Union Digest, 1965, P« 26.
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presence of the Spirit"; ordination is the "instrument used by the Spirit in
A
bestowing the charisma for the ministry." 1
But we must ask of Hill specifically, what is conveyed in ordination. His
answer is always the same - power and authority. No doubt this is true, but
certainly this is not all that is involved as is implied by the above discussion.
It is perhaps because Hill emphasized these aspects of power and authority that
he thought of ordination exclusively in judicial terras. Once again, this is,
without question, involved, for the judicial aspect of ordination has its
appropriate place in the trials, the interrogation and response, the signing
of the vow, the laying on of hands which is essentially a legal act attesting
the lawful commission and authority to minister the Word and sacraments. But
whereas Hill implies that this judicial aspect is the only aspect, others
suggest a second. According to J.S. Whale, "ordination to the ministry is a
O
spiritual act." T.F. Torrance suggests that in fact this is the most important
aspect. "Ordination is primarily a spiritual act."3 It is described as a spiritual
act because Christ, not the church as in the judicial act, is the principle agent.
It is a spiritual act because it is dependent upon the Word of God - it is
through the Word that Christ calls men into the ministry; it is the Word which
commissions to the ministry; it is the Word which is the sole repository of
divine authority. It is a spiritual act because it is an act of prayer in which
the church calls for the bestowal of the Spirit upon the one being set apart to
the ministry.4 Torrance explains the relationship between the judicial and
1 T.F. Torrance, S.J.T., 1956, p. 243.
2 J.S. Whale, The Ministry and the Sacrament (ad. by S. Dunkerley) , p. 21A.
3 T.F. Torrance, S,J.T. , 1958, p. 250.
4 It should be noted that in the Second Book of Discipline, the order of
ordination was fasting, prayer and imposition of hands. In the Westminster Form
of Presbyterial Church Governnnnt (p. 528), the order was changed to imposition
of hands, prayer, fasting. According to T.F. Torrance, "the significance of that
change is to be found in the fact that while ordination was always-understood to
have a spiritual constituent and a judicial constituent, in the Westminster
standards the judicial cr legal aspect received greater emphasis." (class notes)
Hill followed the Westminster order.
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spiritual elements of ordination in this way;
This judicial part of ordination is not carried out in and by itself apart,
but only within the whole spiritual action of ordination, though it is
particularly in the laying on of hands that the overlap between th^
judicial and the spiritual aspects of ordination is most apparent.
Surely we must conclude that it is a weakness in Hill's position that he ovex-~
emphasised the judicial aspect of ordination to the exclusion of the more
fundamental spiritual aspect.
Since for Hill, ordination is at least a judicial act, he implies that
no man may take upon niraself the office of the ministry. That means that no man
can perform the functions of a minister until he has been commissioned so to do
by this judicial act of the church. This position of Hill has not gone without
its opponents. Some have suggested that the inward call given by Christ to an
individual is all that is necessary to authorize him to do the work of a minister.
Walter Lowrie makes this point and argues that any further authorization on the
part of the church implies a deficiency in the authority already bestowed by
Christ.^ This is but another way of suggesting that all believers have the
authority to perform all ministerial functions. Thus A.R. Vine, a Congregation-
alist, can say, "We must therefore face the fact that to us ordination does not
mean what it means to a Roman or an Anglican. When they ordain a man, he is set
aside to do v/hat laymen must not do. When we ordain a man, he is set apart to
do what laymen may indeed do if need be."3 In commenting on the Plymouth Brethren
position, P.P. Bruce writes, "The Brethern have no ordained ministry set apart
for functions which others cannot discharge."^ Since the objection to the
insistence upon a judicial act is but another way of denying the unique place
of an institutional ministry within the corporate ministry of the church, Hill's
general answer to this objection is found in the arguments which he sets forth
'i T.P. Torrance, S. J,T. , "1958? P» 250.
2 Walter Lowrie, op.cit., p. 212.
3 A.R. Vine, The Congregational Ministry in the Modern World (1955), "10.
4 P.P. Bruce, Who are the Brethren? (19^2), p. 11.
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in defense of an institutional ministry. No doubt this is a valid answer, but
he mentions a rriore specific one drawn from the Scriptural record of the election
of deacons. There he notes that though these men were elected by the church,
they did not assume their tasks and responsibilities until after they had been
legally commissioned and authorized by the apostles. If those who exercised
purely secular authority refrained from exercising it until after a judicial
appointment had been made, then surely such an appointment is prerequisite to
"the exercise of spiritual authority."'*
In calling for judicial authorization before the performance of minis¬
terial fractions, Hill is in complete agreement with the standards of his
church. The 'Westminster Form of Pres'oyterial Church-Govematent plainly states,
"No man ought to take upon himself the office of a minister of the Word,
without a lawful calling.George Gillcsspie explained this "lawful calling"
in terms acceptable to the General Assembly of 16^7.
It is not lawful for any nan, how fit soever and how much soever enriched
or beautified with excellent gifts, to undertake the administration either
of the word or sacraments.. .by his own judgment. But before it be lawful
to undergo that sacred ministry, a special calling, yea besides...a mission
or sending, or ( as commonly it is termed ) ordination, is necessarily
required....The church ought to be governed by no other persons than
ministers and stewards preferred and placed by Christ.^
Gillespie's explanation avoids the either-or tendency in authorization, i.e.
that either Christ authorizes the person to perform the acts of the ministry,
or else the church authorizes the person to perform them. According to
Gillespie authorization involves an element of both. It involves the spiritual
1 HiirTL.i.p., voi» iiiTfTTTu ~ " ~ ~ "
2 Westminster Form of Presbyterial Church-Government, p. 527. Of.
Articles of Religion of the Church of England, Article 28: "It is not lawful
for any man to take upon him the office of public preaching, or ministering
the Sacraments in the Congregation, before he be lawfully called." Book of
Common Prayer (19&5 e(3.)> P* 607.
3 George Gillespie, CXI Propositions concerning the ministry and
Government of the Church (T647)> Propositions III, IV.
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consaission of Christ and it involves the judicial appointment of the church.
It is this twofold reference which lies behind Alexander Henderson's distinction
between "an inward calling from God" and an "outward calling of the officers of
the Church in election and ordination." In requiring both inward authorization
and outward authorization, the Church of Scotland claims to be acting in a manner
"agreeable to the Y/ord of God.
But if, as liill contends, a pex-son must be authorized in the act of ordina-
tion before he can preach the Word and administer the sacraments, does this not
imply that the ministry of Word and sacraments is contingent upon crdination,
that is, contingent upon the office to v/hich the person is ordained?-' T.P.
Torrance suggests that such an objection cannot be maintained when it is remem¬
bered that "what determines ordination is the end to v/hich ordination is
directed.11
Ordination is in Order to the 'lord and Sacraments, and therefore ordination
is subordinate to the word and Sacraments which it serves. In other words
the ministering of Word and Sacraments is subservient to the Word and
Sacraments themselves.«..Therefore in the ministering of the Word and
Sacramentsthe ministering itself must be dependent upon that v/hich is
ministered and can never exalt itself over it. Ordination does not give
the minister authority over the Word and sacraments, but sets him in a
servant-relation to them....The very authority which a minister has for
ministering Word and Sacrament lies in the Word and Sacraments and not
in himself - that is anotner way of saying that the ministry is in every
point dependent upon the Apostolic Word and Ordinances.^
It is not inconsistent with the nature of that v/hich is ministered, therefore,
for Hill to insist upon a judicial authorization before the actual functions of
ministry are performed.
It is commendable that Hill underscored the necessity of the perpetual
orderly transmission of this required ecclesiastical authorization from
1 Alexander Henderson, The C-overnment and Ore"!er of the Church of
Scotland (first published in 1641J", pp. 4~5♦
^ Westminster Form of Presbyterial Church Government, pp. 528, 530»
3 Nathaniel Micklem states that such contingency is a danger in
episcopacy. What is the faith?, p. 215.
4 T.F. Torrance, S.J.T. , 1958, p. 246. Cf. Consultation on Church Union
Digest, 1965, P. 195.
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generation to generation. Like the Second Helvetic Confession (adopted by the
General Assembly of 1567") he believed that this insistence upon the continuation
of ordination was "according to the commandment of Christ."
.For since it was the intention of Christ, that there should be a succession
of office-bearers having rule in His church, and since the natural method
of continuing this succession is through those who have been themselves
invested with this character, nothing less than an express inhibition
can satisfy us that the Tcpeoptaepoi , the first office-bearers, whom the
apostles ordained, were restrained from ordaining others. But there
neither is any such inhibition, nor is it possible there can be.-2
It is also commendable that Hill understood the orderly transmission of this
ecclesiastical authority to be intrusted to the presbytery. Obviously this
position would be in perfect agreement with the constitution of the Church of
Scotland/5' based as it was upon the presbyterian form of government; but Hill
reached back beyond the practical legal institutions of his church and established
the fact that the presbyterial transmission of authority was in full accord with
5
the apostolic practice and teaching. It is of interest to note here that not
only the established Church of Scotland but also the covenanters and seceders
insisted that the presbytery was the only proper instrument of ordination.
Richard Cameron went to Rotterdam to be regularly ordained by presbyters in the
year before his death,^ and from his followers we have these words:
We look upon it as unlawful for any man, never so well qualified
otherwise, to take upon him the work of the Ministry without license
or a lawful call and ordination by laying on of hands of the presbytery....
In his exposition of the presbytery's role in the transmission of ecclesias¬
tical authority, Hill implies two significant facts. First, although presbyters
1 Cf. '//estminster Form of Lresbyterial Churchliovernment, p. 527:
"Ordination is always to be continued in the Church."
2 Abridgment of the Acts of the General Assembly of the Church of
Scotland , 8AO, p. 21.
3 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. ni, p. 430; cf. p. 370.
4 Westminster Form of Presbvterial Church-Government, p. 529.
"Ordination is the act of a Presbytery."
5 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 430.
6 Stuart Louden, The True Face of the Kirk, p. 28.
7 Cited by T.F, Torrance, Class notes.
are given the right to ordain, no one presbyter has the authority to exorcise
this right by himself. Throughout his discussion Hill always suggests that the
presbytery must act as a corporate body in ordaining a person to the ministry.
No doubt his own particular stress on this point was due to his adherence to
certain Moderate Party principles; the point itself, however, was in keeping
p
y/ith gha stsnuchrds oi "tlis chupch.© G-ooitqs G-iligspiig, long "bolex*g *th.g x*xsg of
the Moderate Party, stated that no minister holds the paver of ordination
personaliter but only collegialiter.3 That is to say, the minister exercises
this power only in conjunction with others acting corporately in the presbytery.k
According to the 'Westminster Form of Presbyterial Church-GovernTnent, there must
be at least three ministers co-operating in this act."''
The second fact Hill implies is that only Preaching Presbyters actually
take part in the act of ordination itself. It is true that Hill does not make
this point explicitly and that he does speak indiscriminately about ordination
at the hand of "office-bearers" and "the presbytery"; but it is also true that
he speaks of ordination at the hands of "the ministers of Jesus Christ," and ho
specifically states that the succession of ecclesiastical authorization "is
through those who have teen themselves invested with the character."^ Further-
1 Supra, p. 127.
2 Westminster Form of Presbyterial Church-Government, p. 529. "The power
of ordering the whole work of ordination is in the whole Presbytery....It is
very requisite that no single congregation, that can conveniently associate, do
assume to itself all and sole power in ordination....The preaching presbyters
orderly associated in cities or neighbouring villages are those to whom the
imposition of hands doth appertain for those congregations within their bounds
respectively."
5 George Gillespie, English Popish Ceremonies, p. 168.
4 "Ordination is not properly and validly enacted except by an association
of presbyters duly convened within the Church and according to discipline and
constitution of the Church by a resolution of the appropriate court as a whole."
T.P. Torrance, S.J.T., 1953, p. 250.
5 Westminster Form of Presbyterial Church-Government, p. 433.
6 Hill, L.I.P., Vol. Ill, p. 430.
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more it was the lav/- of the Church of Scotland that only Preaching Presbyters
A
lay on hands, and there is no reason to think that Hill departed from this
standard procedure.
But if this is true, does it not involve an open contradiction? How can
it be said on the one hand that the power of ordination resides collectively
in the presbytery, composed of both ministers and elders, and yet on the other
hand that elders have no part in the act of ordination? The explanation of this
apparent contradiction may be found in the distinction which the Second Book of
Discipline makes between the "power of order" and the "power of jurisdiction."
Ministers possess both, but elders possess only the latter. Because Ruling
presbyters do not have the power of order, they cannot take part directly in
handing it on through the act of ordination; but since they do have the paver
of jurisdiction they can take part indirectly by giving their judicial consent
2
to the action of the Preaching Presbyters. This is what the Westminster Form
of Prasbyterial Church-Government asserts when it says that the paver of ordering
the whole work of ordination is in the whole presbytery, although the imposition
of hands pertains only to Preaching Presbyters. Hill, therefore, is quite
consistent in stating that the power of ordination rest with the entire
presbytery while at the same time implying that the act of ordination itself
is committed solely to ministers.^
1 Westminster Form of Presbyterial Church-Government, p. 52b. "Every
minister of the word is to be ordained by imposition of hands and prayer, with
fasting, by those preaching Presbyters to whom it doth belong." "It is
requisite that ministers be ordained by some, who, being set apart themselves
for the work of the ministry, have power to join in the setting apart of
others, who are found fit and worthy."
2 Samuel Rutherford marks a relevant parallel in the fact that though
elders have not the power to forgive sins directly by preaching, they have the
power to forgive sins indirectly by the removal of church-censures. "Howbeit,
the power of preaching be not given formally to ruling Elders, yet it is
effectually in the fruit given to them, in the judicial and authoritative
application in the external courts of Christ's Church." Peaceable Plea for
Presbyterie, pp. 9~10.
3 Some have suggested that elders should participate directly in the act
of ordination. It is argued that since the person ordained has been sustained
2f01
Hill rightly asserts that ordination by Jesus Christ through His office¬
bearers constitutes the person ox-dainea a minister of the one true church of
Christ. It would appear, therefore, that all men so ordained, whether by the
Church of Scotland or not, have the right of preaching the Word and administering
the sacraments in that Church. This, however, Hill explicitly denies. The choice
of patrons in making a presentation to a vacant church is restricted by law to
those whom the Church of Scotland has either licensed or ordained. "The Church
has found, since her own act in 1779j that a presentation granted to a person
who had obtained his licence from one of the Dissenting Classes in England,
A
was void, and that the patron was bound to present another." But does not this
position also involve a contradiction? How can it be maintained on the one hand
that by ordination a person becomes a minister of the universal church, yet on
the other hand that that person is authorized to perform ministerial functions
only within the particular church through which he received ordination? The
answer to this apparent contradiction is to be found in the dual nature of
ordination itself. We have emphasized the fact that ordination is an act of
Jesus Christ; and because it is Christ who ordains we most insist that whenever
He ordains He always ordains to ministry in His one universal church. But here
we must also emphasize the instrumental element in ordination. Ordination
cannot be given in abstraction, but involves the discipline and polity of a
and guided in his Christian life by a particular congregation, the congregation
should be represented in the act of ordination, and in what better way may the
congregation be represented than by its elders. "Ought not the 'form of
ordination call for the laying on of hands by local elders...the duly chosen
representative of the Church which has nurtured the ordinand in the way of
Christ." (Consultation on Church Union Digest, 19<x5, p. 205). T.P. Torrance
moves beyond the local congregation, and asserts that "ordination is an act
in which the whole Church concurs," or again, that "the act of oi'dination
requires the imprimatur of the Church as a v/hole." But he still insists
that "the act of ordination itself is cairried through by those who have
already been ordained, for they only are the proper instruments." Indeed,
the local congregation should be represented in ordination, and is
represented, but in ways other than the laying on of hands by elders.
S.J.T., 1958, pp. 248-252.
1 Hill', Institutes, p. 201.
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particular church. As we have already noted, this historical ecclesiastical
instrument does not limit the operation of the Spirit, but it does limit the
operation of the one ordained. This distinction is clearly explained by
T.F. Torrance.
In the Church of Scotland we ordain a man to the ministry of the Y/ord and
Sacraments in the.Church of God, because we believe it is Christ Himself
who ordains, but in ordination the Church ( through its authorised
ministers ) commits to him due authorisation to administer the Word and
Sacraments within the discipline of the Church of Scotland within which ho
also promises at ordination to be subject to the Church. But the Church
of Scotland does not thereby claim, that in that sense of authorization,
it has authorised its members to administer the Word and Sacraments in
every other Church. It does not necessarily acknowledge the authorisation
of those ordained in other Churches as giving them authority to administer
the Word and Sacraments in the Church of Scotland. '
On the basis of his understanding of the nature of ordination as an act of
Christ through the office-bearers of a particular church, Iiill is justified in
stating that by ordination a person becomes a minister of the universal church,
while at the same time insisting that only those ordained by the Church of
Scotland be allowed to exercise ministerial powers within that Church.
As we move from Hill's doctrine of ordination to that of election, we move
into a field which we have ploughed many times in this thesis. That this should
be inevitable is entirely understandable if we accept G.D. Henderson's statement
that "Church interest in Scotland in the eighteenth century centered round the
problem of the method of electing ministers.But precisely because we have
treated this problem in various contexts, perhaps it will be well for us at
this point to draw together the main points that have been made, with particular
reference being given to the part Kill played in this struggle over method,
the struggle between patronage and popular- election.
~~
1 T3rrTorrance7 S. P. 243.
2 G.D. Henderson, The Burning Bush, p. 126.
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It would be repetitious for us to sketch the history of the law of
•]
patronage}' but we should set straight several errors in Hill's own historical
survey. Biased by his own allegiance to the practice of patronage, Hill does
not begin at the beginning, but rather with the first introduction of patronage
into the procedure of the church.-, i.e., the statute of 1567 which established
patronage as the law of the land. He states that the idea of popular election
arose "purely from the act of the Parliament of Scotland 1690, c. 23.This
simply is not true. Eleven years (1556) before the passing of the first law-
establishing patronage, John Knox's Form of Prayers for the English congregation
in Geneva described the manner in which the "whole Congregation" was to proceed
in the election of their minister.4 In 1560, seven years before the patronage
act, the First Book of Discipline stated categorically, "It appertainsth to
the people and to every several congregation to elect their minister."+ Indeed,
after the statute concerning patronage was passed, yet still prior to 1690,
the Second Book of Discipline (1581) , protested no less distinctively than the
first against patronage; "In the order of Election it is to be eschewed, that
any person be intrusted in any offices of the kirk, contrary to the will of the
congregation to which they are appointed, or without the voice of the eldership."5
Thus Hill is v»rong at two points. First of all, he is mistaken in presenting
patronage as the original method of electing ministers in Scotland and the
popular call as an innovation. Just the opposite is true. Popular election,
instituted at the time of the reformation,6 was the earlier method and,
patronage the latter variation. Secondly, therefore, Hill is mistaken in
dating the origins of the theory of popular election. According to the
1 Supra, p. 375« 2 Hill, Institutes, p. 204.
3 John Knox, Works, Vol. IV. p. 175.
4 Ibid. , Vol. II, p. 189. 5 Second Book of Discipline, 3:18.
6 G.D. Henderson, The Burning Bush, p. 126.
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historical data one must trace the provenance of that practice back beyond
the Revolution Settlement. At least 130 years earlier the theory found
expression in the First Bool: of Discipline; find individual theologians, prior
to 1690, voiced the same opinion. Samuel Rutherford said, "the people have
power to reject a Minister.""' And George Gillespie wrote, "the question is
whether it be necessarily required to the right vocation of a pastor, that he
be freely elected by the vote of the eldership, and with the consent of the
major or better part of the congregation....The affirmative part of this question
is proved from Scripture, from antiquity, from Protestant writers.
But Hill was not really interested in the history of the struggle between
patronage and popular election. In his day patronage was, without dispute,
established by lav/ as the proper method of electing a minister; and as such,
Hill sought to defend it. In the first place, patronage was the law of the
church. When first introduced the practice of patronage was no problem at all.
In fact G.D. Henderson says that at the time, it v/as "the only practical way"
of electing a minister. "The people were not capable of judging or of expressing
a judgment in the matter and they had no money with which to pay a minister.
Lairds provided a minister ss they provided churches and mills and.•.schools."3
In the course of events, however, abuses crept into the practice. Patrons
failed to provide ministers, or else they chose men for political reasons who
were unacceptable to the people. The people, on the other hand, were becoming
more educated and were then in a position to make qualified judgments. At
this point it would seem that, since patronage had served its purpose and now
lost its usefulness, it should have been abandoned as the most expedient method
1 Samuel Rutherford, Peaceable Plea for Paul's Prosbyterie, p. 255*1
2 George Gillespie, Miscellany Questions, p. 4.
3 G.D. Henderson, The Burning Bush., p. 127. Gf. The Church of Scotland,
p. 85 "No other arrangeuait would have worked so satisfactorily."
of electing a minister. This, however, in the thinking of the Moderates, was
impossible, for what had begun as a matter of expediency had become a matter
of principle - a principle, in fact of presbyterian government itself. The
Moderates argued that if a patron presented a qualified person, and if the
presbytery approved, then the congregation had to accept. If the lower court
(kirk session) could disobey at will the decision of a higher court (presbytery)
then that signalled the end of presbyterianism, with its gradation of courts
9
and system of discipline J •-
Once Hill had adopted this position he was committed to a course which
denied, for all practical purposes, the voice of the people in the election
of their minister. Accordingly, one of his earliest legislative acts in the
General Assembly was his attempt to abolish the call altogether.^ Such action,
however, was too strong even for some of Hill#s Moderate brothers. Thus, while
Hill made a motion which "enforced nothing with respect to such a call,"^"
McKnight, Hill's Moderate compatriot, moved that the call "ought to be continued.
Hill lost his motion, but he wrote rather obdurately, "Whatever was the state of
the matter at the time when the practice began, it is now understood that a call
may be sustained, however small the number of subscribers."0
Although Hill failed to carry his motion on the call, he did succeed in
carrying a motion on the other side of the same coin. Ha managed to persuade
the General Assembly to reaffirm patronage by dropping the grievance clause
against that practice from the annual instructions given the Commission to
1 Henderson notes, in fairness to the Moderates, that patronage became a
principle for its opponents as well. "Indeed it was said that these pious
people would reject the Apostle Paul himself, if ha were presented to a parish
by a patron." The Burning Bush, p. 226.
2 G.D. Henderson, The Church of Scotland , p. 110.
3 Hugh Miller, Headship of Christ, p. 139. b Cook, Life of Hill, p. 11-A.
5 Acts of the General. Assembly, 1638-1812, p. 811.
6 Hill, Institutes, p. 206.
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Parliament. In a final analysis this had the same effect that his motion on
the call would have had had it passed, for patronage and popular election cannot
be conjoined. Hill did not admit this and attempted, as we have seen, to hold
the two in balance, but it was 'impossible. Even Cook, Hill's biographer and
advocate, himself a Moderate, says that in Hill's presentation the call "is
really nothing else than a delusion of the people," "a kind of mockery,"
'Merely an empty form." Therefore, though he failed to abolish the call
completely, Hill did succeed in confirming it in its desuetude.^
As long as he lived, Hill y/itnessed the enforcement of his principle in the
Church of Scotland; but even before his death in d819 a growing section of the
Church was calling for a return to the ancient practice of a popular call. The
matter came to a head in the Disruption of 1843; when some 400 ministers left
the Church of Scotland ostensibly because of patronage; but the issue was not
finally decided until 1874 when the British Parliament abolished patronage and
enacted that the right of election of a minister is "vested iiftvthe regular
communicants along with such adherents as the Church through its own Courts
might decide to admit to the roll of each parish."3 Today the Church of Scotland
considers the vote of approval, by the people an absolutely essential prerequisite
in the election of a minister to a particular charge.^ It appears then that Hill
defended, on the basis of principles set forth by a particular ecclesiastical
1 Cook, Life of Hill, p. 153*
2 Hugh Miller, Headship of Christ, p. 139. Miller says that Robertson
had already succeeded in "reducing it to a dead letter." Hill's son, Alexander,
notes that Kill often chose to speak of an "edict" rather than use the term
"call." He admits that the former term "may be unhappily chosen," but he
defends his father by saying that he used it "without any disparaging purpose."
(See Hill, A View of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland, "Notes by the
Editor", p. 13677 This, however, is open to question.
3 J»R. Fleming, The Church in Scotland, 1843-1874, p. 200.
4 J.T. Cox, The Practice and Procedure of the Church of Scotland, pp.
230f, 575. It should be noted that not all agree with this position voiced by
the Church of Scotland. W".R• Lewis writes, "It is not the function of a flock
to choose its shepherd." The Church; A Symposium (ed. by J.B. Watson, 1949)>p. 83.
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party of the time, a position -which was but parenthetical in the overall
history of the Church of Scotland. Since then that Church has seen fit to
reject both the position and the principles upon which it was founded.
But there was a second reason why Hill defended patronage ~ it was not
only an ecclesiastical law, but also a civil law. The Church, however
dissatisfied, admitted the validity of the act of "1712 which re-established
patronage as the law of the land. It was impossible, therefore, for the Church
to deviate from that practice without "setting itself against the civil
authority." This was something, argued Hill, "which a Church protected by
•4
that authority and receiving numberless civil privileges, could not do."
It is obvious that this defense involves a certain relationship between the
O
church and the state. It is to Hill's understanding of that relationship
that we now turn in an exposition of his doctrine of the power of the
Christian society,
1 Cook, Life of Hill, p. 151•
2 Cf. R.H. Story, The Apostolic Ministry in the Scottish Church
(1897), p. 302. ~ " .
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CHAPTER VII
THE FOY/ER OP THE CHRISTIAN SOCIETY
Hill was primarily interested in the church as an external society. Because
every external society possesses an inherent authority, this interest was not
fully satiated by a treatment of the polity of the Christian society, though
this was essential, but also demanded a discussion of the power of that society.
In gratifying this concern Kill treats the nature and extent of church power,
the objects of church power, and the distribution and exercise of church power,
A. The Nature and Extent of the Power Implied in Church Government
Believing that it is unnecessary to be "intimately acquainted with all the
tenets and arguments which have been broached in this voluminous controversy,"
Hill determines to treat only "the chief opinions" which should be stated on
the subject of church power. To this end he reduces all he wants to say and all,
he believes, that should be said "concerning the powers implied in church
government, under five general positions."^ Because, as we have indicated,
this branch of the doctrine of the church was central in Kill's ecclesiology,
it is natural that he should give it clear systematic treatment. ¥Ye aro not,
therefore, called upon tc draw material from various incidental references as
we have been forced to do at some points, but can simply follow Hill's own
detailed exposition. We shall, however, incorporate relevant data from his
Institutes, Sermons, correspondence, and General Assembly speeches; but for
the most part, we shall expound in his own order, "the most natural order,"2
the five propositions, stating them in his own words.
1. The power implied in church government is not created by the state.
"The first general position is this, that the power implied in the exercise
of church government is not a power created by the state, or flowing entirely
from those regulations which the supreme rulers of the state may choose to make
1 Hill> L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. A49. 2 Ibid»» F. 449.
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with regard to the Christian society*®' Electing to discuss the source of church,
power in negative terms, Hill appoints as his protagonists the Brastians and
debates the issue with them* Erastus (1524-1583), & Swiss scientist, philosopher
and theologian sought "to resolve all the powers exercised by church governors
into the will of the state.In his opinion all office-beares in the church
were merely instructors, who fulfilled their office by admonition and persuasion
but who had no power to inflict penalties of any kind, unless that power was
given to them by the state. Everything "which we are accustomed to call
ecclesiastical censure" was considered by him to be a civil punishment, which
the state might employ the ministers of the church to inflict; but even so, the
occasion, manner, and effect of the inflicted punishment was completely under
the direction of the civil power just as any other branch of the criminal code.3
Ultimately, therefore, all the power implied in the exercise of church government
is derived from the absolute authority of the state.4
To invalidate this idea, Hill calls attention to several facts. First,
Erastus propounded his theory in an attempt to refute "the exorbitant claims
advanced both by the lope and by the rulers of some of the re forced churches."
1, Ibid/, p. 150. "2 Ibid., p. 450. "
3 Ibid., pp. 450-451 • Cf. Thomas Erastus, An Examination of That Host G-rave
Question, Whether Excormm-micatIon, In the Debarring Fx-om the Sacraments of
Professing Christians, Because of Their Sins, Be j» Divine Ordinance, or a Human
Invention (trans. Robt. Lee) , "I see no reason why the Christian magistrate at
the present day should not possess the same power which God commanded the magis¬
trate to exercise in the Jewish corouianwelath.,»the power to coerce the impure
and criminal lay with the magistrate, to whom it pertained not only to punish,
according to the law of God, such characters as these, but even to order the
whole external part of religion...wherever the magistrate is godly and Christian,
there is no need of any other authority, under any other pretension or title,
to rule or punish the people....If then the Christian magistrate possess not
only authority to settle religion according to the directions given in Holy
Scripture, and to arrange the ministries and offices thereof...but also in like
manner, to punish crimes; in vain do some among us now meditate the setting
up of a new kind of tribunal...that there should be any such ecclesiastical
tribunal to take cognisance of men's conduct, we find no such thing anywhere
appointed in the holy Scriptures." pp. 160-164.
4 Cf. Erastus Evans, Srastianism (1933)f FP» 76f. Cf. also J.N. Figgis,
"Erastus and Erastianism", Journal of Theological Studies, 1901, Vol. II, Pp. 66f.
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Admittedly, this was a worthy motive, but "the inconveniences which this
opinion was meant to remedy, may be alleviated in otter ways."^ Acceptance of the
Erastian understanding of the source of church power is not, therefore, essential
to the correct exercise of that power. Secondly, Erastus formed his theorem
upon "partial views" and "it seems impossible for any person, Those mind
2
comprehends the whole subject not to perceive that the opinion is false."
Even if the Christian society were merely a voluntary association, "still this
society would possess the right which is inherent in the nature of all societies,
of defending itself against intrusion and insult, and of preserving the
character which it chose to assume, Here then is at least one power not
de-rived from the state. Thirdly, Hill points to the irrefutable facts of
history. Even when the church received "no countenance or support from the
state" and in fact "suffered persecution" at the hands of the state, it still
exercised the powers implied in church government. In so doing it acted
"totally independent of any authority which...may derive from the state.
These arguments not only confute the Erastian position, that all the power
implied in church government is created by the state, but also indicate what
Hill considered to be the true source of this power, the church itself. To
bolster the credibility of his own position, he makes his usual two-fold appeal
- to reason and to revelation, considering first the "general reasons arising
from the nature and purposes of the Christian society.The Christian church
is not merely a voluntary association, but a society created by divine institu¬
tion, founded in the duty which Jesus requires of his disciples "to unite for
the purpose of performing certain rites." The administration of these rites
riiiiiTL. i.P..vol. in, p, 45"iT~~ ~ 2 Ibid., p. 451~ ~ "
3 Ibid., p. 451. Cf. James Bannerman, The Church of Christ, Vol. II,
p. 188; "The power to regulate the matter of admission and the exclusion of
members, as well as their conduct while they continue members of the society,
belongs to the Church by the light of nature itself. It is an inherent right
vested in every voluntary association of whatever nature it may be."
4 Ibid., p. 451. 5 Ibid., p. 453*
6 Ibid., p. 451. Cf. John Potter, Discourse on Church g-overnment, p. 5*
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not only prevents those who do not comply with the terms (profession of faith
in certain doctrines) from being admitted, but also indicates "a warrant from
the founder of the society" to withhold certain privileges from those who, after
having been admitted, depart from the terms upon which their admission proceeded.
"It is reasonable to think," says Hill, "that the same persons who are appointed
to administer the solemn rites. ..mil be entrusted with the power of judging
who are to be admitted and who may deserve to be excluded from the society."^
This views, says Hill, is agreeable to the evidence of the New Testament. The
names and instructions given to office-bearers are expressive of the power and
authority implied in the exercise of church government.
They are called fffoupevot, eracrxoran , TtpoeoTarcec . Thejr are commanded
not only 6t6dcrxetv, vavdsxeVv, rapamAeCv, but also eXeyxetv,
e7uxtpa£iv> . Our Saviour, in the days of His ministry, before he had
fully constituted his church, spoke of a case in which it was the duty of
Christians to consider a person, who had been a brother, as having, by
his own fault, forfeited that character, so as to deserve to be looted
upon as a heathen and a publican. Matt, xviii, 17. After the churchy
was constituted, the apostle speaks of xw(3epvitreiq as well as biS5<rx.akovc
being set in it by God. 1 Cor. xii, 28. He claims a egoucria as
belonging to him. 2 Cor. x. He exercises that Igoucta by commanding
the Corinthians IgatpetTv a wicked person, who had been a member of
that church; he exhorts Christians pr) crovayau£yyucrOai s&y at. c adeXcpoc
ovoi-LOtjopeyoc AoCSopog rj pe6uot>e, V apra| : he represents it as their
duty xptvetv 6v xovq eEw aAAa xovq earn.
Hill thus asserts that the power which the church exercises by rebuking and
censuring the faults of its members and expelling those whom it judges unworthy
of its privileges is a power "resulting from its character, delegated to it by
its author, and implied in the designations given to its office-bearers.Since
this judicial power is comprehensive, involving the other powers implied in the
1 Ibid., p. 452. cf. Report of the Archbishops' Committee on Church and
State. p. 32; "It may indeed be said to be an axiom of government that a
society, founded with certain objects, and requiring certain qualifications
in its members, must possess an autonomy adequate to promote the attainment
of those objects and the fulfillment of those qualifications."
2 Ibid- » P» >52. 3 Ibid., p. 453.
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exercise of church, government,' it is reasonable to assume, that these other
powrs also derive from the same origin.
The evidence presented against the Erastian position and the evidence
arising from reason and revelation presented in favor of his own position caused
Kill to draw the following conclusions:
These reasonings and facts seem to establish, with incontrovertible evidence,
that some kind of authority over the members belongs essentially to the
governors of the Christian society; that as the church did exist before it
was. united with the state, it may exist without any such union; and that
it will possess, in this state of separation, when it can derive no aid
from civil regulations, all the authority which Christ meant to convey
through his apostles to their successors, and of the exercise of which the
apostles have left examples. The same reasonings and facts also prove,
that when the church receives the protection and countenance of the civil
power, she does not, by this alliance,lose those rights and powers which
are implied in church government, as such.^
Having made his rejection of the principles of Erastus unmistakably clear,
Hill moves to discuss what he calls "the modern meaning of Erastianism."^ He
states that few follow the principles of Erastus so far 83 to deny the church
any power except what it derives from the state, but there are many who, while
admitting that the church has powers independent of the state, are willing for
the church to relinquish certain of those powers to the state in return for
certain benefits which only the state can provide for it. They maintain,
however, that the church's acquiescence in these limitations is not a forced
but "a voluntary surrender, a compact^ in which the church has gained, by-
giving up what she has a right to retain." In other words, "the advantages
Y/hich the church derives from an union with, the state f~arc_y more than a
compensation for any restrictions which are imposed upon her."
1 Ibid., p. 344. Of. Report of the Archbishops' Committee on Church and
State, p. , "It does not seem to be an open question that the authority to
bind or loose...was interpreted as involving the possession of the full legis¬
lative and administrative and judicial powers which the effective realisation
of such an authority demanded."
2 Ibid., p. 453. 3 Ibid., p. i£5«
4 Cf. Warburton, The Alliance Between Church and State, pp. 104f.
Cf. L.M. Hawkins, Allegiance in Church and state, p. 126.
5 Cf. Warburton, Ibid., p. 85. For a discussion of the term "marriage"
which was often used seeTidier, The Orb and the Cross, pp. 94-95.
6 Hill, Institutes, p. 455.
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And thus the modern system of Srastianism proceeds upon this principle,
that the power of the church is essential and intrinsic; it admits of
modifications of this intrinsic power which to some appear exceptional;
but it acknowledges, that if th6 church, instead of deriving any benefit
from the state, were opposed and persecuted by the civil magistrate, it
would be not only proper, but necessary, to put forth of herself those
powers, which, in more favourable circumstances, she chooses to exercise
only in conjunction with the state.!
Since this "modern Erastianism" represents not only the "official"
Moderate position, but also his own, Hill is at pains to defend and explain it.
2
But because many argue against all connections between church and state, and
precisely because he himself has stated that the church can and did exist
without union with the state, his first task is to produce reasons why any
union should ever- exist at all. In the first place, the state needs the
church. In every civilized country the wisest philosophers have always acknow¬
ledged that the foundation of civil laws ought to be laid on the principles
of natural religion, especially belief in the being and providence of God.
If these principles were rightly understood and universally believed they would
form "the cement of civil society." But alas, "as all speculations concerning
the being, the providence, and the moral government of God, which are conducted
by the unassisted powers of reason, necessarily abound with error, those great
principles could not enjoy...public national support."3 Hence the state needs
the church to "disseminate those principles in a manner which more effectually
preserves them from adulteration." The "peculiar doctrines" of the church
"involve a complete revelation of the great principles of Natural Religion,
which are essential to civil government."^
1 Ibid., p. 455.
2 Hill, Institutes, pp. 140-141. Hill believes that the reasons for this
denial of an alliance are to be found "in the private resentments or the political
situation of those from whom it proceeds"; or that they are dictated by some
"spirit of innovation which is weary of present situations in society"; or that
they are'teerely the rash expression of an opinion -which has been formed without
due attention to the...course of human affairs."
3 Ibid»f FP« 13^-137. Cf. Warburton, op.cit., p. 89.
4 Ibid., p. 138.
419
In the second place the church needs the state. In human society we witness
not only an indifference towards religion, but an open hostility which drives
at the disruption of the church's activities and a corruption of its moral system.
Fully cognizant of these evil forces, "we will not feel ourselves entitled to
presume, that the pious seal of the friends of Christianity will, in every age,
be sufficient to defeat the designs of its enemies."'® Therefore, while we rely
with complete confidence upon the promise of Christ that the gates of hell shall
not prevail against His church, we nonetheless thankfully acknowledge His wisdom
in employing civil government as the instrument of fulfilling His promise.
"Ecclesiastical power, feeble and unarmed when opposed to the violence of man,
p
is aided by the authority of human government."
In the third place Hill notes that an alliance between church and state was
predicted in the Old Testament. David, looking forward to the reign of his
Descendant, says of him, "The kings of Tarshish and of the isles shall bring
presents; the kings of Sheba and Seba shall offer gifts; yea, all Icings shall
fall, down before him" (Ps. 12% 10-11). Isaiah introduces God as saying to toe
church, "Behold, I will lift up raine hand to the Gentiles, and set up my standard
to the people; and kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their queens thy nursing
mothers; they shall bow down to thee with their face towards the earth" (is. 49:
22-25). Hill concludes that "a connection between the Church and the State"
enjoys the support of "these authorities and recommendations."3
If these are the reasons for a connection between church and state, what
is the actual result? "A connection between the Church and the State produces
a Religious Establishment."*1' Simply put a religious establishment means that
Christianity becomes a part of the law of the land,"^ that Christianity is
1 Ibid. , iTl427- *™ * —— —
2 Ibid. , p. 142. Cf. Warburton, op.cit., pp. 85-86.
3 4bid#» PP» 139-140. 4 Ibid., p. 147.
5 Ibid., p. 145.
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"incorporated with the state, so as to make a part of the constitution," In
other words, the days on which Christians worship, the places in which they
worship, and the persons who conduct their worship are all protected by approp¬
riate civil injunctions. But there is a problem. If all who agreed in receiv¬
ing the faith of Christ also agreed in the interpretation of Scripture, then the
connection between church and state would involve no other principles than these
mentioned above. But they do not agree, and their differences respecting the
procedure of public worship, the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and
contradictory systems of polity have "produced separate communities, sects or
divisions," Now it is "impossible for the Magistrate, understanding by that
word the supreme civil power in the State, to avoid making a distinction amongst
those separate communities."2 pho problem is thisj which sect or community in
the state is to be united with the state. In the early days of the problem,
the solution was provided by the principle of simply majority; "the religious
community to which the majority belonged put in an irresistible claim for the
favor."2 xn the course of history, however, that principle gave way to a second
and more despotic one - that of expediency; "in other words, the connection
which any particular state formed with religion, was agreeable to the will of
the state. It was a connection with that system of opinions, and that form
of Church polity, which wore...best adapted to circumstances, and likely to
communicate in the most effectual manner those advantages which religion is
fitted to impart to society.
1 Ibid. , p. 154. Cf. John Kettle'weiX7~0f Chris'tian Comsiunion""[*1693),
Part II, p. 1: "In Christian Kingdoms the Church is incorporated into the
State."
2 Ibid., p. 144. 3 Ibid., p. 145.
4 Ibid. , p. 145. -4 combination of both principles determined the Treaty
of Union (1707) in which episcopacy was established in England and presbyterian-
ism in Scotland. "A difference of circumstances in the two countries led to
different religious establishments" (institutes, p. 153)• The framers of this
treaty were also influenced by "the inclinations of the great body of the
people" (institutes, p. 159)«
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But as one problem is solved another is created. What is to bs done about
those sects and communities not favored by union with civil government? Yftiat
is to be the attitude of both state and established church to these outsiders?
*5
In one word Hill's answer is this - "tolerance." A religious establishment
p
must always be conjoined with "an entire toleration." The state made its
position known in the Toleration Act of 1712 and in subsequent laws which
protected "all places where Dissenters of any description assemble for worship."2
The church? no less then the state, is to manifest this same spirit of toleration.
The pillar of truth is erected in the Established Church; but those who
entertain doubts concerning the truth of what is inscribed upon that
pillar, may resort to the teachers of another society, where they think
they will find doctrines more agreeable to Scripture. A certain mode
of worship is statedly observed in the Established Church: but those to
whom there appears a superfluity, a deficiency, or any exceptionable
circumstance in the regulations and ceremonies which constitute that mode,
are at liberty to join in communion with Christians whose worship they
consider as more conformable to divine institution. A legal maintenance
is provided for the ministers of the Established Church...but those who
do not choose to avail themselves of this legal provision, are allowed
to make their own terms with the teachers whose ministrations they
attend.^
When a religious establishment is thus blended with toleration, then "authority
is blended with liberty in a manner most agreeable to the reasonable nature of
man, and to the genius of the Christian religion." The state enjoys the salutary
influence of the faith of all Christians without subjecting any to hardships.
Civil government lends its aid to the church, yet doa3 not impose its favor's.
The established church is able to defend its rights without being forced to
treat the various sects as its enemies. This, says Kill, is a "happy"
situation.
1 Ibid. P." 15"S". 2 Ibid., p. 161,
3 Ibid., p. 161. There was, however, one exception; "The benefit of the
Toleration Act was withheld from Papists, not because their theological
tenets were- conceived to be false, but because their subjection to a foreign
power rendered them dangerous to the state" (p. 160). Cf. also Hill's
Speech Before the General Assembly, May 23, 1807, pp. 11f.
U Ibid., p. 162. 5 Ibid., p. 161.
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But the problems posed by the divisions within Christianity are not the
only problems confronted in the establishment of religion,, After it has been
decided as to which ecclesiastical community shall be united with the civil
government, the state and that established church face the intricate problem of
distributing power between them. Hill states that the lines along which this
distribution is to proceed were first elucidated at the time of the first
Christian religious establishment. Constantino declared to an assembly of
ministers, "You are appointed by God overseers of those things which are within
A
the Church, and I of those things which are without." "In these few words,"
says Hill, "Constantine expressed with considerable accuracy the leading
principle upon which every religious establishment ought to proceed." Those
things within the church, the preaching of the Word, the administration of the
sacraments, the exercise of ecclesiastical discipline, are committed to those
office-bearers appointed by Christ. Those things without the church, those things
involving the protection of the church, are left to the care of the civil magis¬
trate.^ The principle itself is obvious enough, but the actual application of
it has given rise to heated controversy, especially in Scotland, concerning the
limits of civil and ecclesiastical authority. Indeed, sorae powers clearly belong
to the church, and some clearly belong to the state.' But what about those powers
occupying a "no-man's land" between the two? "There is not a perfect uniformity,"
admits Hill, "as to the manner of distributing those branches between the Church
and the State.There are, however, certain principles subsequent to the
leading principle which are relevant to this problem. Hill considers first
those secondary principles affecting the church, and then those affecting the
state. With regard to the church, he notes three secondary principles. One,
1 Ibid., p. 147. Cf. Macpherson, op.cit.p.' 184, where he describes
Rutherford's reaction to this statement. Cf. Samuel Rutherford, Divine Right
of Church Govex-nment and Excoirmunication, p.
^ Ibid., pp. 147-148.
3 Cf. William Temple, Christianity and the State (1928), pp. 194-195.
4 Hill, Institutes, p. 149-
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in all matters of church order, it is "a matter of indifference" -whether
"j
enactments are made by a civil or an ecclesiastical power. Two, although there are
certain powers which the church has a right to exercise, "she may choose to
submit to the regulations of the civil magistrate from a conviction that the
end for which those powers were given her is roost effectually attained by this
9
submission." Three, so long as ministers are not disturbed in the performance
of their duties, it would be "unwise" to resist civil restrictions since such
action gives rise to "undefinable questions" which "agitate the public." In
fact, says Hill, the church is "required, by the genius and the precepts of th©
Gospel, to exercise an accommodating spirit in every case where it does not
interfere with sacred obligations."3 Furthermore this accommodation is mutual.
The church not only relinquishes certain powers to the state, but certain
matters of a civil nature are committed to the judgment and decision of
ecclesiastical courts.^ With regard to the state, he notes two secondary
principles. One, the civil magistrate is entitled to know the opinions of the
community of Christians to which he imparts the benefits of an establishment.
He adopted that community in preference to others because of its particular
tenets, and if it enbraces opinions essentially different for its original ones,
then he might have cause to withdraw his preference. "Hence confessions of
faith...become a declaration to the state of the opinions and principles held
by the ministers of the established religion";^ and the magistrate has a right
1 "^Id77~p7n*49T 2 Ibid. , p. 12$. 3 Ibid., p. 149.
4 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 4^7. "In order to prevent misapprehension
upon this subject, it is necessary to observe, that in the progress of the
connexion between the church and the state, it generally happens that some
matters of a civil nature are committed to the judgment and decisions of
ecclesiastical courts. This delegated jurisdiction is no usurpation on the
part of the church, because...it is the effect of statute."
5 Cf. Kettlewell, op.cit., part II, p. 1; "What the State gives, the
State when it sees cause may deprive them of." Cf. Rogers, Civil Establishment
of "Religion, p. 59; The magistrate "has the same right to repeal an
Establishment, that he had to enact it."
6 Cf. Wotherspoon and Kirkpatrick, op.cit.; "Function of the Creeds",
p. 62f. Cf. J.T. Cox, Practice and Procedure in the Church of Scotland , p. 'j.
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to require subscriptions to such a creed from the ministers "as a solemn pledge
.-•that they will not, without his knowledge, make any change upon that system
of doctrine which had received his sanction."'1 Two, the magistrate is entitled
2
to see -that the established church fulfils its responsibilities, and that none
of its resolutions and acts disturb the public peace.^ To this end power is
granted the magistrate to call ecclesiastical courts to meet and to prevent them
from meeting.*1" He also possesses a right, "agreeable to common sense and conmon
equity," to withhold his benefits in order to prevent the church from neglecting
its duties, or from exercising its rights in a manner which appears hurtful
jy
to the state. It is interesting to note that with regard to the church the
secondary principles have to do with yielding submission whereas with regard
to the state the secondary principles have to do with asserting authority.
Throughout his discussion Hill has made necessary references to tie benefits
6
which both church and state receive from a religious establishment; but because
this point is central to the defense of the Moderate position, he takes a whole
chapter in the Institutes to delineate these benefits clearly. We shall simply
enumerate these blessings.
1 Hill, Institutes, pp. 150-151. The magistrate's sanction is evidenced
by a civil ratification of the church's confession.
2 Gf. James Durham, Treatise Concerning Scandal, p. 229; "Magistrates
might and ought to put Ministers and Church-Officers, and others to their Duty
(in case they be negligent) in trying, discovering, convincing, etc. such as
by their corrupt Doctrine may hazard others."
3 Hill, Institutes, p. 151.
4 Ibid., pp. 152, 219, This is no longer the case. Cf. Cox, op.cit.,
PP. 70, 367.
5 Ibid., pp. 152-153.
6 Cf. Warburton, op.clt., pp. 88f. For a historical survey of the early
Scottish position, cf. Macpherson, op.cit., pp. I85f. For a theological treat¬
ment of this issue see Earth, Church and State, Chapter 3> "The Significance of
the State for the Church", and Chapter 4» "The Service which the Church Owes to
the State"; and J.P. Chamberlain, "The Mutual Obligations of Church and State",
Church and State in the Modern World, pp. 85.
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The advantages -which the church imparts to the state arise from the nature
and purpose of that power which exists in the church. "This power, addressing
itself to the understanding, to the conscience and the heart, may correct
excesses of the passions which human regulations cannot reach, and, by furnish¬
ing refined end permanent principles of good conduct, rosy minister most effec¬
tually to the order and happiness of the community." The "sentiment of
religion" exercises a powerful influence on a citizen's character and conditions;
it "extends the sphere of his enjoyments"; it "gives refinement and elevation
to his affections, his pursuits, his hopes"; it "unites rulers and people in
subjection to a common sovereign"; it enforces "the performance of their recip¬
rocal duties"; it "co-operates with human laws in preserving the peace and order
of the community." Ministers "repay to the state the advantages which they
derive from the establishment by explaining and enforcing those precepts of
the gospel which inculcate obedience to civil authority and a spirit of peace
A
and subordination." In short, "religion is the cement of civil society."
As the organ by which the state conxnunicates with the people in matters
respecting religion, the church expects and receives numerous and varied benefits
p
from the civil government. These we shall summarise in Hill's own words.
1. The state, by its protection, provides for the respectable appearance
of the church as a society thus rendering its ministers more respectable
in the eyes of the people.
2. The state makes legal provision for the worship of the church. Funds
are provided for the erection and maintenance of places of worship; the
day upon which Christians worship is guarded by law from profanation;
worshippers are secured against rude interruptions; the leaders are
protected in the administration of the ordinances of the gospex and the
communion elements, bread and wine, are furnished by the state.
3. The state inflicts civil punishment upon those who are guilty of
blasphemy and open impiety.3
1 Hill, L, I.D. , Vol*' 'p.' 'if^T^In's'tltut'es, pp. 135-136? 164; Sermons, p . 412.
2 Hill, Institutes, pp. 148, 154-155, 270-290.
3 Cf. Kettlewell, op.cit., part II, p. 1; "Bishops and Pastors have their
spiritual ministrations backed with secular effects and censures." Cf. James
Durham, Treatise Concerning Scandal, p. 230; The civil ruler "may and ought to
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4» The state provides for the orderly conduct of ecclesiastical
business. Meetings of office-bearers aro recognised by law and the
decisions which such meetings lawfully enact are supported and enforced
by civil authority.
5. The state assumes the maintenance of the ministers. Ordained
ministers in the established church receive from the state a stipend,
a manse, a glebe, and an insurance policy for their widows. All these
things serve to preserve the minister in a state of decent independence.^
These mutual benefits, however, do not blind Hill to toe danger inherent
in any alliance between civil and ecclesiastical power - the danger of mutual
encroachment. The church has often encroached upon the power of the state by
advancing claims which are not warranted by the purpose of its institution nor
the will of its founder. The state has often violated the authority of the
church by intruding upon that jurisdiction which is essential to its character
as a Christian society. Aware of this double-edged danger, Kill subscribes not
only the first half of the modern Erastian principle, the submission of certain
ecclesiastical powers to the state, but also the second half, namely "that if
the church, instead of deriving any benefit from the state, were opposed and
persecuted by the civil magistrate, it would be not only proper, but necessary,
to put forth of herself those powers, which, in more favourable circumstances,
O
she chooses to exercise only in conjunction with the state.11 Coniarary to the
Res'traIn~anaJ Censure aTi'blaspEornous an3' irreverent ExpreVsions~nd Speeches"* ''
against the Majesty of G-od and his Ordinances."
1 According to the Moderates this was one of the greatest benefits of an
establishment. "When they who preach the Gospel depend for their subsistence
upon the goodwill of ihose to whom they minister, they are laid under a strong
temptation to flatter the prejudices or inflame the passions of the peopxe;
and if the firmness of an enlightened virtuous mind enable them to withstand
the temptation, they and their families may be reduced to severe distress;
whereas the fixed provision for the Clergy of the Established Church, while
it delivers them from the humiliating condition which embitters the lives
and impairs the usefulness of many Dissenting Ministers in England and
Scotland, may be regarded as a national blessing; because, by rendering
them completely independent of the opinions and maxims of the world, it
leaves them at perfect liberty, in fulfilment of the sacred obligations
derived from the authority and example of the Shepherd and Bishops of
souls, to declare the truth as it is in Jesus, and to oppose their influence
to prevailing vices." (Hill, Institutes, pp. 154-155)•
2 Hill, L.I.D.. Vol. Ill, p. 455.
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accusations of his critics, Hill firmly upheld this principle as he interpreted
2
it. It is true? that, prompted by "a sacred regard to duty," Hill paid his debt
to the state by supporting its government. At the time of the French Revolution,
he preached a sermon commanding the British Constitution; "There did not exist
in times past a government more perfect than ours. It is at present the best
that is knov/nj and it is continually receiving improvements."^ Hill's Moderate
compatriot, Alexander Carlyle, said that the publication and distribu-.ion of
this sermon did much to cool the ferment of revolution in Britain and "turned
the tide in favor of Government. '*'+ George Cook, Hill's biographer, stresses
the fact that this sermon propounded only "those sound political principles
which are connected with the best interest, and the civil and l-eliglous liberty
of mankind" and, therefore, "is not to be confoundod with what is usually
denominated political preaching, which consists in carrying into the pulpit
the private sentiments of the individual as to the administration of affairs.
In other words, Hill praised the British Constitution in general, not a specific
political party within British government.^
It is also true that Hill not only supported government as government, but
followed what he conceived to be an injunction of Scripture in accommodating the
1 Cook, Life of Hill, p. 3°9. 2 Ibid., p. 279.
3 Hill, Sermon preached in the End of 1792 on Dauk, 33*29. Sermons, p. 418.
4 N.L.S., 34oVf*95» Carlyle to Bund as, 1793« Hill's biographer
proudly reproduces this note from Hill's publisher: "I congratulate you upon
the extensive circulation / over 12,000 copies_/' of the sermon, for never was
such a number of a sermon sold in this country before" (Cook, Life of Hill„
p. 286). In 1793 Hill published another sermon, similar in substance, entitled
"Instructions Afforded by the Present War to the People of Great Britain",
and based upon Deut. 23:9. Though highly commended by many, Cook notes that
it did not have "the same rapid and extensive circulation with the one that
had preceded it" (Life of Hill, p. 289).
5 Cook, Life of Hill, pp. 283-284.
6 "The Church of Scotland is independent of any party and of any
ministry"} Hill's remark, cited by Cook, Ibid., p. 132.
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state in ecclesiastical matters. This spirit of accommodation in non-essential
•j
matters caused him to oppose the unrestricted erection of chapels of ease.
His opposition sprang not from a disdain for the poor and unchurched, but was
due, dm part,^ to the fact that he thought such chapels posed a threat to the
civil government. He found them to be "in certain circumstances, nurseries of
sedition and fanaticism."3 This same spirit of accommodation also caused Hill
to oppose those who wanted to repeal the Test Act.^ This act discriminated
against members of the Church of Scotland by making it impossible for them to
hold an official post or military or naval commission in England without first
receiving the Lord's Supper according to the rite of the Church of England.5
Although the act was seldom enforced, the G-eneral Assembly of 1790 decided that
it constituted a "grievance," and to the dismay of the Moderates a committee
was appointed "to obtain redress." Hill was placed on this committee, along
with Alexander Carlyle, as a representative of the Moderate interest. Together
they argued that the Test Act was an integral part of the Act of Union and that
c
the church had no ri$it to change the civil law. Hill himself regarded the
intricate laws regulating the religious establishment as the intimately connected
parts of a delicate machine and thus not lightly to be tampered with.'' "In a
1 For a description of chapels of ease see A.J. Campbell, op.cit. , p. 156.
2 He also thought the unrestricted erections of chapels posed a threat
to ecclesiastical government - it left an entire area of church life outside the
supreme control of the General. Assembly. Hill drafted the Moderate motion on
chapels of ease which said in part that a church had to receive the approval
of both the presbytery of which it was a member and the General Assembly
before itoould erect a chapel.
3 S.A.U.L., 4765 . 4 S.A.U.L., 4784.
5 According to J.H. Burton, the Act was originally passed in 1681 for
purely political reasons, to protect the sovereignty of the crown from all
foreign authority. The History of Scotland, Vol. VII, p. 2L\2. Cf. J.H.3.
Burleigh, Church History of Scotland, p. 250.
6 Minutes of the Proceedings of the Committee of the General Assembly on the
Subject of the Test Act, 1790 (Ms volume in Registry House, Edinburgh., CH/5/124),
pp. 3f. Cf. S.A.U.L. , 4758.
7 Cook, Life of Kill, p. 273«
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government so complicated as ours, the probability is, that any violent change,
1
although intended to superinduce some new perfection, may create some new defect."
Hill further argued that only one presbytery complained against the act, and
that even if the v/hole church considered it a grievance, it should not begin by
petitioning Parliament for repeal, but should begin by "corresponding with
Ministers of State in order to learn the sentiments of Government with regard
to the claim of members of the Church of Scotland." Hill also believed that
"to a liberal and enlightened Presbyterian it coxild be no hardship to partake
of the Lord's Supper according to the mode sanctioned by a church, whose views
of the nature and design of that ordinance were the same as his own."3 He,
therefore, urged the Church of Scotland to accommodate the state in this matter.'1
It was, in a final analysis, this spirit of accommodation which determined the
wording of Hill's controversial motion on calls.
Because the Moderates, following the leadership of Hill, not only
supported the government in its own functions, but were willing to accommodate
the state in these ecclesiastical issues, Hill saw the Moderates alone as the
true supporters of government. He was perturbed that those in the Evangelical
1 Hill, Sermons, p. 417. 2 Registry House") CH/5/124, pp. 3"4«
3 Cook, Life of Kill, p. 276.
4 The Assembly was unconvinced by Hill's reasoning, and proceeded to
send a resolution to Parliament demanding the abolition of the Test Act.
The Committee which presented this resolution had no effect, however, and
the lav/ remained. In 1823 the Commission of the General Assembly was
instructed to prosecute the annulment of "the sacramental test imposed upon
members of the Church of Scotland." This later effort was successful,
and in 1820 the Assembly considered a motion that an address should be
sent "to His Majesty expressive of their high satisfaction with an Act
which had lately received the sanction of the Legislature for repealing
so much of several Acts as imposed the necessity of receiving the
sacrament of the Lord's Supper as a qualification for certain offices
and employments." John Wilson, Index to the_ Acts and Proceedings of the
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, p. 264.
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Party who only supported civil laws without accommodating the state in
ecclesiastical lavs were also the recipients of government benefits. "If the
scheme of equalizing court favors goes on, the Moderate interest vail soon
vanish from the face of the earth; and Government may have more trouble than
-j
they are aware of." Though this was Hill's personal feeling on the natter
of accommodation, he was aware that soma thought the Moderates allowed "too
great a deference to the civil authority from which they derive protection,
and an unbecoming tameness in submitting to the invasion of those xlghts,
which the church ought to hold sacred."2 This, he admitted, might possibly be
a just criticism for "it requires a sound judgment, a mind which can easily
disembarrass itself from the false views suggested by prejudice, passion, and
interest, to make, upon all occasions, the necessary discrimination between
the rights of the church, and the rights of the state...the line of distinction
is not always obvious."-5 But when that line, at least to his thinking, was
obvious, then he fought encroachment from either side. He would never admit
that he encouraged the church to yield to the unlawful invasion of the state
nor that he ever encouraged the church to usurp the right of the state. There
are several clear examples of Hill's resistance to civil encroachment in the
church. For instance, Hill's biographer records that when
The Ministry, in the course of the first war with Prance, attempted to
raise supplies, by having recourse to a voluntary subscription...it was
suggested that the clergy of Scotland should recommend to their congrega¬
tions, from the pulpit, to subscribe. A meeting, for arranging the best
mode of doing this, wa3 held at Edinburgh, which Dr. Hill attended. He,
at once, opposed the whole plan, urging, that it was inconsistent with the
nature of the clerical profession, and that it would be ruinous to the
independence and usefulness of the church, if the clergy should thus be
made the instruments of promoting political measures, when in the
discharge of their sacred duties, and particularly should call upon the
people to furnish the means of carrying on war, which, however just,
1 E.U.L., DO. 4.41. No. 76. Cf. N.L.S. , 3432/f.43.~
2 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 454.
3 Ibid., p. 454.
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it was riot within the province of the ministers of peace, in such a way,
to support. This opinion was received, by the leading men in official
situations and in the church to whom it was addressed, with much dis¬
satisfaction, and with an apparent resolution of wholly disregarding it.
To soma warm observations made upon it, Dr. Hill replied, that he would
oppose the scheme to the utmost; that willing as he was to furnish his
own private contribution to the full extent of his ability, he would,
should the order be given to enjoin contribution from the pulpit, disobey
it, and that, should it be necessary, he would strip his gown.from his
back, rather than do what he was convinced would disgrace it. "
In this matter the government withdrew its demands and Hill was thus
spared conflict with the civil authorities. In another matter, however, he
openly defied the 3tate because he thought its action threatened the
independence of the church. When the office of Principal Clerk of the General
Assembly became vacant, the Moderates nominated a Mr. Dickson, and the
Evangelicals chose as their candidate a Mr. Duncan. The state, for various
reasons, favored the election of Mr, Duncan. To accomplish this end an official
letter was sent to Hill requesting that Dickson be withdrawn. Pressure was
further brought to bear on Hill by an intimation that the civil authorities
would be much displeased if any who held the office of Chaplain to His Majesty
(which he held) should oppose the wishes of the government, the implication
• being that those in these offices who voted for Dickson would be deprived of
their offices along with the emoluments which accompanied them. In framing
his reply, Hill was guided by the principles of "modern Erastianism." He noted
that he was most reluctant to bring the church into conflict with the state, and
that if any compromise consistent with honor could be devised, he would support
it. "But," he adds, "if such an arrangement cannot be adjusted, it is impossible
that the unblemished honour of the noble Lord (/^~Lord SpencerJ'7 whom he now
1 Cook, Life ofiiill, pp. 134-133.
2 That Hill did not consider this an idle threat is evidenced by the
fact that he began making definite plans to compensate for this loss of
revenue. N.L.S., 3432/f.32.
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presumes to address, will impute to him blame,..or that the apprehension of any
personal suffering can induce him to follow a course of conduct for which he
4
would deserve scorn and reproach." !he government, however, made no effort to
effect such a compromise, but only "wantonly and tyrannically disturbed" the
O
church. "This," says Hill, "was not to be borne," so in open defiance of the
government he "exerted himself most strenuously for Dr. Dickson."-' To his
nephew he wrote; "We fight for our principles and our independence,"^'
John Macleod might be correct in labelling certain of the Moderates as
Erastians, but he is definitely incorrect when he accuses Hill of "making the
church little more than a pendicle of the life of the State, a department which
in its courts was allowed to have the shadow of self government so long as it
took no step to which civil rulers might take exception as out of keeping with
their line of state policy."^ A.J. Campbell is closer to the truth when he says
that "Hill steadfastly and not unsuccessfully resisted the encroachments of the
politicians."^
But if Hill fought against the state's interference with the affairs of the
church, he fought just as rigorously against the church's interference with the
affairs of the state. He soundly condemned the Church of Rome for claiming "a
right to control the exercise of all civil jurisdiction,"^ and was not blind to
the fact that the Reformed Church was equally susceptible to this error.® He
certainly did not excuse his own church when he thought that it had overstepped
~~
1 CookTLTfa of Hill7"p.~13^ 2 N. L.U.7 3432/f.997" " ~
3 Cook, Life of Hill, p. 139* 4 Ibid. , p, 138.
5 John Macleod, op.cit., p. 209. 6 A,J. Campbell, op.cit., p. 121.
7 Hill, L.I.D. . Vol. Ill, p. 466.
8 Hill, Institutes, p. 148. Cf. J.N. Figgis "Political Thought in the
Sixteenth Century", Cambridge Modern History, Vol, III, p. 738, "To transfer
the allegiance of the human spirit from clerical to civil authority was rouglily
speaking the effect of the movement of the sixteenth century,.It was less
successful in those lands or cities where Calvinism, manipulated by a highly
trained ministry, obtained predominant or exclusive control."
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its bounds. In Scotland from about 1770 a number of presbyteries sent up
overtures to the General Assembly on the subject of slavery. In 1788 tho
Assembly passed a strongly worded motion condemning slave trade, and calling
2
upon the legislature to abolish it. When the subject was again brought before
the Assembly in 1792, Hill discouraged the Assembly from making a further
declaration on the subject. Hi3 reasons for doing so were purely political.
First, the proposed declaration called for civil legislation and Hill disapproved
of the church either approving or disapproving of petitions which "might tend
to impinge thd Constitution."3 Secondly, he disapproved, on constitutional
grounds, of approving or disapproving of petitions which did not directly
concern, the petitioners. "I would oppose with all my weight every expression
which convoyed the most oblique approbation of the maimer in which Petitions on
the Slave Tradeliad been obtained or of the general system of operating upon the
Legislature by petitions from those who have no patrimonical interest in the
subject of them. "A- In other word3, the church owned no slaves and therefore
had no rigfrt as an institution to endorse a petition dealing with slaves,
Thirdly, the petitions dealt with the "properties" of individuals, and the
church had no powors over the properties of individuals even if the individuals
were members of the church. When the church assumes such power itusurps the
authority of the state. To ask why the church has no such power leads us to
Hill's second proposition concerning the nature and extent of the power implied
in church government.
2. The power implied in church government is purely spiritual.
"My second general position is, that the power inherent in the nature of
_
—ibid., pp." 157-190.
^ Acts and Proceedings of the General Assembly, 1788, session 6.
3 Public Records Office, London, H.O. 102/5/f.60. Letter from Hill
to Henry Dundas, May 25, 1792.
4 Ibid.,
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the Christian society, which it derives from divine institution, and not from
civil regulation, is merely a spiritual power; in other words, it is concerned
only with the consciences of men, and gives no claim to any authority over their
A
persons or their properties." This power includes the right to administer
instruction, admonition, reproof, censure, and excommunication, "i.e. a right,
by judicial sentence, to deprive of the privileges and benefits of continuing
O
members of the Christian society those who are found unworthy."^ Since
excommunication is the severest infliction within the compass of the power
implied in church government, it completely exhausts thab power.
That this power is merely spiritual may be easily proved by the evidence
drawn from reason and revelation. The truth of this second proposition is
3
deduced from the purpose for which the Christian society was instituted. Civil
government exists for the purpose of securing citizens in the possession and
enjoyment of their rights. The administration of civil government implies,
therefore, the exercise of a coercive power, the purpose of which is to restrain
those who are disposed to violate the properties or invade the rights of others,
and also the power to inflict punishment upon those guilty of such violation and
invasion. The kingdom of Christ, however, is not intended to secure men in the
enjoyment of their rights, nor was it founded in opposition to human violence.
It was established for the purpose of delivering men from spiritual thraldom to
an evil spirit by imparting to them the knowledge of that truth which Christ
reveals. "The administration of this kingdom, therefore, does not imply the
exercise of force...in that branch of the administration of the kingdom of
Christ, which we call church government, he does not suppose that his office-
1 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. Ill7 PP. 455~456. Cf. Bannerman, op.cit.7 Vol. I,
p. 225.
2 Ibid., p. 456.
3 Ibid., p. 456. Cf. John Potter, A Discourse on Church Government,
pp. 10-11. Hill recommends this work to his students.
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bearers are invested with, civil pov.-er." Stated positively this rasans that the
power implied in the exercise of church government is purely spiritual.
Added to this logical deduction is the testimony of Scripture. The N6w
Testament records three occasions in the life of Christ upon which "he declared
explicitly that the administration of his kingdom upon earth implied a spiritual,
O
not a civil power." The first was Bis answer to a request made to Him by one
of His followers, "Master, speak to my brother that he divide the inheritance
with me" (Luke 12;13). Christ's reply, "Man, who made me a judge or a divider
over you?", intimates that any of His disciples who considered himself aggrieved
should resort to the laws of his country and seek redress in the ordinary
course of justice. The second occasion followed upon a mother's request that
her sons sit on Christ's right hand and His left hand in His Kingdom. The
petition evidenced a desire for position and power. Once again Christ's answer,
"Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them; and
they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be so among
you; but whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister" (Matt.
20;26), implies that though His disciples have authority, they have none of the
power which is implied in the office of earthly rulers. The third occasion was
furnished by ChrislJs examination before Pilate. The astonishment expressed
by Pilate at the humble appearance of a man who claimed to be a king drew from
Christ this declaration, "My Kingdom is not of this world, if my kingdom were
of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to
the Jews; but now is ry kingdom not from hence. Pilate therefore said unto
Him, Art thou a King then? Jesus answered, Thou sayest that I am a king.
1 Ibid., pp. 457^4537 2 ^TdTTpTW
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To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should
bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice."
(John 18; 36-37). Says Hill,
These words require no commentary. Our Lord disclaims the use of force;
represents the influence of truth over the mind as the great instrument
of his dominion; and characterises the power exercised in his kingdom
as a spiritual, not a civil power.^
Besides these words from Christ, Scripture also records the directions of
the apostles in Romans8:1, 5, II Cor. 10;4J I Peter 2; i19-80; 'yA4 which
express the same idea, "Thus clear and superabundant is the proof, that the
power implied in church government is purely spiritual and not in any degree
p
a civil power."
Before leaving this second proposition, Hill makes one further point. "The
uses which may be made of the position are not less important "than the proof of
it is clear.Hill lists three uses. One, this proposition exposes the fallacy
of old Erastianism, and gives credence to the principles of modern Erastianism.
It was argued by the old Erastians that there could be no power in the state
except that created by the state, for otherwise there would be two separate
authorities asserting contradictory claims. This argument would be unanswerable
if the powers were of the same order, but "if one is civil and the other a
spiritual power, they may unite with the most perfect harmony."^ Two, principles
based upon this proposition protect the state against the encroachment of the
church both negatively in terms of unlawful exemptions and positively in terms
of unlawful powers. This proposition implies that the church has no right to
claim an exemption but such as is agreeable with the conduct of Christ, and
Christ by His conduct indicated that the authority of the state extends over
ecclesiastical as well as other persons. This proposition serves "to restrain
1 Ibid., p. 460.
3 Ibid., p. 461.
2 "ibid., p. '46I.
4 Ibid., p. 1)62. Cf. Y/arburton, op.cit., p. 85f.
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every attempt which, any sect may make to engraft civil upon ecclesiastical
power."1 Three, this proposition is useful in determining the nature of and
the effects of excommunication. Because the power exercised in church government
is purely a spiritual power, then excommunication must ba "purely a spiritual
2
censure"; " and because this is true, the effects must be purely spiritual. "The
church has no right to say that a sentence, excluding a person from the partici~
pation of the ordinances of religion, shall in any manner affect his liberty,
his property, or his condition as a member of civil society."3 Hill adds,
however, that excommunication is not upon this account a nugatory sentence.
Every person v/ho believes that Christ...established a visible society upon
earth, and required his disciples, as members of that society, to unite
in acts of worship...must consider a sentence by which he is justly
excluded from that society as placing him in a dreadful situation; and
although it does not produce any consequences that are immediately felt
to be hurtful in the business and common intercourse of life; yet if, in
this state of separation, he retains the faith of the Gospel, his mind
will not be at ease, till he takes every proper and competent method
of being restored to the conmunion of the church.^
3. The power implied in church government is subject to the
authority of Christ.
"My third general position is, that the spiritual power implied in church
government, being derived from the lord. Jesus, is subordinate to his sovereign
authority over the church." Actually two things are involved here, the former
being the reason for the latter. The first is the fact that the power implied
in the exercise of church government does flov/ from Christ. This does not
contradict the point made in the first proposition, namely that this power is
inherent in the nature of the Christian society. Even then Hill intimated that
1 Ibid.~PP. 2 Ibid., p. 473•
3 Ibid.t p. 472.
4 Ibid., p. 474. Cf. Samuel Rutherford, The Divine Right of Church -
Government and Excommunication, p. 266.
5 Ibid. , p. 474* Cf. John Rogers, A Discourse of the Visible and
Invisible Church of Chi-ist, pp. 126f. Hill recommends this work to his
students, and draws a great deal from it as we shall observe.
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such power was "delegated" to the church "by its author," At this point
he has simply gone beyond the nature of the church to the divine founder
of the church. If, as Scripture teaches, Christ is head over all things to
the church (Eph. 1j22), then the only power which the church as the Body of
Christ can exercise is the power which derives from Him - "all authority in the
church that is not derived from Him must be an usurpation."^ This means, says
Hill, that all who exercise the power implied in church government are required
to acknowledge the origin of their power as being outside themselves.
The second fact is that the power which the church exercises must be
subordinate to the sovereign authority of Christ. This is fairly deduced from
the source of the power - "this subjection is implied in the origin of the
p>
power." If Christ ultimately possesses the power from -which flows the power
of the church, then it follows that the church's derived power is subordinate
to His sovereign power.3 This means, says Hill, that it is not "enough that
those who exercise the authority use His name in acknowledgement of the origin
of their power; for the sovereign authority of the Lord Jesus requires, that
what they profess to derive from him; they uniformly exercise according to his
directions.That is to say, the church must exercise its subordinate power
according to the directions of Scripture. As the church received its form not
only from the instructions of Christ but also from "the orders given by his
apostles in their discourses and their writings...so every legitimate exercise
of authority, in succeeding ages, is regulated by the words of Jesus and his
apostles."5
Hill states that it is "not necessary" to prove this third proposition
1 Ibid. , pp. 474-473.
3 Ibid., p. 479.
5 Ibid., p. 476.
2 Ibid., p. 47
4 Ibid., p. 475.
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"because after the meaning of the terms is fairly stated, the truth of it
appears hardly controvertible."
4. The power implied in church government is given for
edification and not for destruction.
'The spiritual power Implied in church government is given "for edification
O
and not for destruction."' Hill chooses to employ this Pauline phrase
(II Cor. 10;8) because it is equally applicable to the authority of the office¬
bearers of the church in every age, and because it expresses most clearly what
he wants to say under this fourth proposition.
That the power implied in church government is given for edification is
verified by the evidence drawn from natural and revealed revelation. Those who
entertain just views of civil government consider it to be instituted for the
good of all the subjects. Indeed the power implied in secular government is often
committed auto the hands of a few, but only that its blessings might be more
successfully communicated to all. Reasoning analogically Hill argues that if
civil government is established for the well being of its subjects, then certainly
it must follow that church government, with its "spirit of enlarged benevolence...
has the like impartial destination"; and if civil government is not given to
gratify the ambition of the few who wield power, then it must also follow that
the government which Christ has entrusted to His office-bearers is not intended
to aggrandise them, but is established to aid all Christians in the "practice
of virtue" by "maintaining the truth" and by "restraining vice."^ Hill finds
the conclusions of this argument to be in perfect agreement with the teaching
of the New Testament. He cites without comment I Cor. 3:5» II Tim. 2; 24~259
and I Pet. 5; 1-3.^
When Hill turns to the negative aspect of this proposition he is compelled
1 Ibid. , p. 2. ~ ™ ~
2 Ibid., p. 479« Cf. Calvin, Institutes, 4:8:1; G. Gillespie,
CXI Propositions, No. 71; Bannerman, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 257f.
5 Ibid. > pp. 479-481. x 4 Ibid., p. 2(80.
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to define his terms. Obviously the "destruction" mentioned does not effect a
person's being nor his material, goods, for "the exercise of a power which is
purely spiritual cannot indeed affect the lives or the outward estate of
i
Christians." But this is not all that man possesses which is susceptible to
destruction. He possesses certain mental and spiritual rights as sacred as
those which respect his person or his property. There is liberty of thought,
'the right which every man has of exercising the powers of his mind upon any
subject. There is liberty of private judgment, the right which every man has
of forming his own opinions. There is liberty of conscience, the right which
every man has of judging what God requires of him, and of resisting any attempt
to teach for doctrines the cocmandments of men, or to impose obedience to
regulations merely human. As these rights belong to the nature of a moral
creature even a purely spiritual power lias the ability to violate them, but
any power which did would be employed not for edification but for destruction.
"It would destroy, not perhaps the person, but the character of the being over
whom it was exercised; it would degrade his mind."-5 That the spiritual power
implied in church government, though capable of destroying these rights, should
not is deduced from the general conduct of God towards His reasonable creatures,
from the regard to the reasonable nature of man which appears in the institutions
of the gospel, from the style of argument by which Jesus always calls forth into
exercise the understandings of those who head them, and from all the provisions
which He has made for enlarging and improving the minds of His disciples.
Since God Himself created man a reasonable being, Christ could not possibly
institute in the church a power which would destroy or violate man's rational
nature.^
_
p. Li8Ji'. —— " '
2 Ibid., pp. 481-482. Cf. John Rogers, A Discourse of the Visible and
Invisible Church, pp. 142-143.
3 Ibid., p. 482. 4 Ibid., pp. 481-482.
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Once again Hill claims that further verification of this proposition is
unnecessary for the vary explanation of v.-hat is involved renders it incontrovert¬
ible. It was necessary, however, to explain the third and fourth propositions
in the above manner since the fifth and final proposition assumes them as proven.
5. The power implied in church government is limited with
respect to means and ends.
"The power implied in church government is limited by the sovereign
authority of the Lord Jesus, and the liberties of His disciples, both as to the
A
objects which it embraces, and as to the manner in which it is exercised."
Church government is to maintain the credit of religion by preserving the
truth uncorrupted, and by watching over the conduct of Christians. It is to
minister to the edification of individuals by giving them assistance in the
pursuit of righteousness, and by employing various means to x'eclaim them from
error and vice. These are in themselves excellent objects, but "it is not
competent for church government to take every conceivable method of accomplishing
them." Why? Because a spiritual power which is subordinate to Christ and which
is given for edification and not for destruction is restrained by these charac¬
teristics from doing many things which without these characteristics might
appear expedient.
No exercise of any power can be legitimate, which is in direct opposition
to the nature of that power; and the evils arising from admitting a contra¬
diction between the general character of the power, and a particular
exertion of it, will, in the result, infinitely overbalance any local or
temporary advantage, which might be purchased by en exercise of the power
that is illegitimate.^
6. Evaluation
Because Hill's latter propositions recur time and again in the next section
of this chapter, we shall here direct our attention to the first twc propositions
1 Ibid. , p. 482. Cf. John Rogers, Discourse of the Visible and Invisible
Church, pp. 126, 142 where he says that the powers assigned to church officers
must be "consistent with the Supremacy of Christ," and "consistent with
Christian Liberty."
2 Ibid. , p. 483.
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and discuss the others only as they relate to thorn. Hill's basic application
of those propositions is to the doctrins of church-stats relations.
When Tertullian wrote, "No interest concerns us so little as that of the
1 2
state," that was no doubt an accurate, but nonetheless contemporary judgment.
It would not have been true after the edict of Constantino in 321.
The establishment of Christianity in Rome merged and brought face to
face two societies that up to that time had been separate. The peculiar
problem of Church and State had definitely, emerged....For a thousand years
after the establishment of Christianity in Rome political writing of every
sort was affected directly or indirectly by this great question, and for
the half-millennium between the eleventh and the seventeenth century
it is not too much to say that the bulk of all the writings which we may
term political were directly and primarily concsxTted wi.th the great
controversy between the spiritual and the secular authority,2
Far from curtailing this interest in church-state relations, the Reformation,
by freeing the 3tate from the tyranny of the church, served only to secure the
possibility of experimentation with entirely new relationships,^ and the
c
resulting queries coming from such relationships are still being answered today.
It is obvious, therefore, that in a work of this size we cannot evaluate Hill
in terms of the historical record of church-state relations.^ Nor can we
™
1 TertulITan"7 'Apologe ticus~Adversus Gentes, 30.
2 A.J. Carlyle, Mediaeval political Theory in the "West, Vol. I, p. 176.
3 C.H. Mcllwain, The Growth, of Political Thought in the West, pp. 146-147.
4 Walter Hobhouse, The Church and the 'World in Idea and in History,
"The Reformation and Its Effects", pp. 21/f., esp. pp. 239> 22x8.
3 "The relation of the spiritual and secular power is...one of those
problems which remain perpetually open, to receive light from meditations and
experience of all ages." Lord Acton, The History of Freedom and other Essays,
p. 191. "The problem of Church and State...is probably insoluble here on earth
where the redeemed of the Lord are still in the body, still subject to vanity
and corruption." J.S. Y/hale , on.ext., p. 312.
6 For a historical treatment of this subject see R.W. and A.J. Carlyle,
Mediaeval Political Theory in the 7/est; C.H. Mcllwain, The Growth of Political
Thought in the West; "Walter Hobhouse, The Church and the World in Idea and in
History; N.P. Van Dusen,"Church and State Through Christian History", Church and
State in the Modern World; Frank Gavin, Seven Centuries of the Problem of Church
and State; for a specifically European survey see Adolf Keller, Church and State
on the European Continent: for a specifically English survey see Norman Sykes,
Church and State in England in the 18th Century; Cyril Garbett, Church and State
in Engl and: for a specifically Scottish survey see W.L. Mathieson, Politics
evaluate him in terms of a comprehensive conceptual statement. Such an
evaluation would require a complete exposition of not one but several possible
relationshipss involving a doctrine of the state' as well as the church, not
p
to mention an understanding of all the various forms these different relation¬
ships might take. Our purpose is best served by following the procedure we have
already established, that is, a limited evaluation of the doctrine which Hill
himself presents. Even then we shall not be concerned with the actual form
which resulted from the implementation of this doctrine, for as Barth has said,
the form "is a secondary question."3 \ye shall only concern ourselves with the
basic principles which Hill expounds.
Rejecting the old Erastian theory which develops the state at the expense
of the church, the mediaeval Soman theory which develops the church at the
expense of the state,^ and all theories of mutual disinterest and mutual fore-
bearance, Hill adopts what he terms the "modern Brastian" theory. This is but
and Religion in Scotland; Thomas Brown, Church and State in Scotland; for a
specifically American survey see A.W. Johnson and F.H. Yost, Separation of
Church and State in the United States.
1 On this point see Oscar Cullmann, The State in the New Testament;
Willihm Temple, "Historical Theories of the State", Christianity and the State;
Karl Barth, "The Essence of the State", Church and State; J.P. Chamberlain,
"The Nature of the State", Church and State in the Modern World.
2 cf. Keller, op.cit., "Forms of Relations Between State and Church",
pp. 151f.
3 Karl Barth, Church, and State, p. 83. Cf. Alex. Martin, Church Union
in Scotland, p. 37. In defense of Kill's form see Daniel Fraser, Church
Establishments; against Hill's form see H.H. Henson, Pisestablishraent.
K Gladstone also rejected the Erastian and Roman positions "since those
are theories not of connexion between State and Church, but of the derivation
of one from the other." Vidler, Orb and Cross, p. 30. Cf. Gladstone,
The State in its Relations with the Church, Vol. I, p.
W4
another name for the "social contract" theory of Warburion. We made reference
to various aspects of that theory in the exposition, but a brief summary of
it will indicate how much Hill depended upon it* The state, a civil society,
contemplates for its end the body and its interest; has for its means,
coercion; for its general subject matter, utility. The church, a religious
society of distinct origin, has for its end the salvation of souls; for* its
means, persuasion; for its general subject matter, truth. Because they are
independent societies, having different provinces, the church and state could
remain separated; but because the state needs the influence of religion and the
church requires the protection of the state, they both have sufficient reason
to induce a voluntary and free compact. ^
This theory certainly does not deny that the church's power is a spiritual
power. If anything, it demands that the church claim just such a power. It is,
nevertheless, to Hill's credit that he, in his own exposition of this theory,
made that point quite clearly. Though some might question this assertion, most
would not. Barth, for instance, says, "Ecclesiastical authority is spiritual
authority";and in language reminiscent of Hill's, R.L. Calhoun writes, "Its
/_ the church' aJ power, must be, in the last analysis, the power of God m rking
upon the minds and wills of those before whom the witness of believers is borne.
Nor would any question the grounds upon which Hill made this assertion ~ the words
5
and actions of Christ and His apostles recorded in the New Testament, According
1 "The whole train of reasoning, and the conclusions to which it ieads,
are, for substance, the same as are to be found in the celebrated work of
Bishop Warburton on the alliance between Church and State" (Loose review of
Hill's 1803 edition of Theological Institutes, dated January, 1804).
2 Warburton, op.cit., pp. 83-87. Summary based on Gladstone's summary,
op.cit., Vol. I, p. 17.
3 Barth, Church and State, p. 58.
4 R.L. Calhoun, "Church, State, and Human Devotion", Church and State
in the Modern World, p. 78.
5 Barth, Church and State, pp. 13f.
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to Macpherson, Hil.l, in insisting that the power implied in church government
is purely spiritual, is only following in the tradition of the reformed Church
of Scotland.^
It is also commendable that Hill's theory allows for the church's
independency from the state. Whatever his critics might have said to the contrary,
Hill was not an Erastian in the usual sense of that term. In fact he could not
have been an Erastian and have adopted the theory of Warburton, for that
2
. contractual theory presupposed equally independent parties. Once again, if
we accept the analysis of Macpherson, Hill was simply following in the tradition
x
of the earlier Scottish theologians. Two further points, however, should be
noted. First, Kill defends the independency of church power on the grounds of
its dependency upon, "the Lord Jesus, the King and Head of the Church."1 Since
Christ as Head of the Church is the source of all legal authority in the church,
then the power which the church exercises in government is necessarily derived
from Him. The realization of this fact, that church power comes from Christ and
not from the state, serves to guard the Church's independency from the state.
A.R. Vidler concurs with Hill's line of reasoning. "Only a Church, which is
conscious of bearing an intrinsic and transcendent authority from God, is fitted
to confront the temporal sovereignty of the State."5 Secondly, Hill contends
1 Macpherson, op.cit., pp. To0~161™ In 1638 the General Assembly
enacted that it was "BotTTTnexpedient and unlawful for persons separated unto
the gospel to hold civil offices, or to be judges, or to vote in Parliament
(Acts of the General Assembly, 1636-I642, pp. 29-30)« In 1639 the Assembly
passed an act entitled "Act containing the Causes and Remedy of the bygone
Evils of this Kirk", which condemned as an evil the "giving to persons merely
ecclesiastical the power of both swords" (Acts of the General Assembly,
1638-1842, pp. 36-37). ~ "
2 7/arburton, op.cit., p. 86; "were they not independent on each other,
there could be no ROOM" for an alliance.
3 Macpherson, op.cit., pp. I71f. He cites the famous "twa Kings ana twa
Kingdomes" passage from James Melville's Diary (p.245), together with selections
from the correspondence of John Welsh ("she is free in her government from all
other jurisdiction except Christ's." W.K. Tweedie, ed., Select Biographies,
Vol. I, p. 23), and the Second Book of Discipline.
4 Hill, L.I.D.. Vol. Ill, pp. 478-479.
5 A.R. Vidler, The Orb and the Cross, p. 80.
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that the independency of the church, has been beneficial not only for the church
but also for the state. The state has enjoyed the influence of the Christian
relgion in terms of "liberty" and 'tolerance." The "glorious Revolution," a
religious settlement, produced a "Blessed change...upon the character of our
government.,..That indulgence to the consciences of others which had been
avowed by the Independents as their principle, but which every other sect had
reprobated, was adopted by the Legislature."^ Hill's thought has been expressed
by P.T. Forsyth in these words: "the Church...has been, and must always be,
p
directly or indirectly the mother of public freedom. Freedom in the State
owes most to those who stood and stand for freedom from the State."3
It is significant to note that Hill's theory calls for a high view of the
state. He nowhere formulates a doctrine of the state as such, but he makes
several important points in passing. We have already seen that Hill argued just
as strongly for the independency of the state from the church as he did for the
independency of the church from the state. Though Kill does not say so, Vidler
says that the former is but the result of the latter. A church which is conscious
of its own spiritual independence will "teach a high doctrine of the State as
v/ell as of the Church."^ But Hill does far more than defend the independency
of the state. He maintains that the state is of divine institution: "Human
5
government is ordained of God"; "those who entertain just views of civil
government consider it as instituted by God."6 As instituted by God, civil
government is not in itself evil as some have supposed. Hill, therefore,
1 Hill, Institutes, pp. 15&-159.
2 J.N. Figgis, Cambridge Modern History, Vol. Ill, p. 769; "religious
liberty is rightly described as the parent of political."
3 P.T. Forsyth, Theology in Church and State (1914), p. 177.
4 A.R. Vidler, The Orb and the Gross, p. 80.
5 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 456.
6 Ibid., p. 479.
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soundly condemned the Anabaptists 1 not only because they considered the office
2
of magistrate as useless, but because "they came to revile it as sinful.'' He
further states that all Christians, including those entrusted with the government
of the church, are subject to the authority of the state. He quotas with
approval the Confession of Faith which declares that "ecclesiastical persons
are not exempt from the duty of the people to pray for magistrates, to honour
their persons, to pay them tribute and other dues, to obey their lawful commands,
and to bo subject to their authority for conscience sake."3 In his own wards
Hill declared this to mean "that the authority of the state extends over
ecclesiastical, as well as other persons.With this high view of the state it
is not surprising to find Hill agreeing once again with the Confession "that
it is lawful for Christians to accept and execute the office of a magistrate.
This brings us to another essential principle in Hill's theory, that is,
the participation of all Christians in the government of society in general.
In fact, the fact that a man is a Christian will, according to Hill, increase
his sense of responsibility in the political sphere, for Christianity inculcates
those principles which produce responsible political action. It is true that
ministers are not allowed to hold civil positions, but they play an important
role in the political life of the state nonetheless. We have already commented
upon the Moderates overemphasis on the moral and ethical implications of the
gospel; but we should not allow their overemphasis to blind us to the legitimate
emphasis which should be given to this aspect of the gospel. Indeed it is the
1 A. Lang, History of Scotland, Vol. Ill, p. 122, and P.H. Brown,
History of Scotland", Vol. II, pp. 414-H5, indicate that the covenanters were
also "anti-government" in attitude.
2 Hill, L.I.D, , Vol. HI, p. 463. Hill refers the reader to J.L. Mosheim,
Ecclesiastical History. 4:3:4, where he states that the Anabaptist "declared
war against all laws, governments, and magistrates, of every kind."
3 Ibid., p. 465. Cf. Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter 23:4.
4 Ibid., p. 466.
5 Ibid., p. 164. Cf. Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter 20:23.
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task of ministers to proclaim and interpret the moral and ethical implications
-s
of the gospelj and, according to J.H, Oldham, this cannot be done without
political consequences: "The Christian ethic cannot be accepted and acted on
2
without resulting consequences in the political field." That is to say,
Christians give expression to their faith not only in "the pre-political sphere
of aims, standards, and values," but also in the field of concrete political
action.J This means, then, that all Christians, ministers and laymen, must act
responsibly in the political arena.
Thus to the extent that the church through its ministers proclaims the
ethical demands of Christ and calls for action from its members based upon these
demands, it is a political factor. But it is quite a different matter as to
whether the church as a corporate organised institution should intervene in
political affairs. These issues have often been confused,^ and it is to Hill's
credit that he sharply distinguished between them. That is to say, he made a
distinction between an individual taking political action and the church taking
political action. We see this most clearly in an incident already cited. When
the government asked the church to call for support for the war with Prance,
Hill said he would refuse to do so as a minister representing the church, yet
5he would as an individual Christian make his contribution. In other wards
Hill believed that the individual could and should take political action on the
Of* G-od's Will for Church and Nation (Reports of Commission of G-eneral
Assembly of Church of Scotland, John Baillie, Convener), p. 173»
2 J,H. Oldham, The Church and Its Function in Society, p. 214.
3 Ibid. , p. 216. Cf. God's Will for Church and Nation, pp. 173~"174>
"we feel that all this speech of ours is literally worse than useless, if it
is to remain as mere speech.„..Nothing could be more damaging to the Church's
own spiritual development or to its influence in the world at large than that,
having shown valiancs in the acceptance of general principles, it should refuse
every suggested application of the same."
4 Cf. R.W. Zeuner, "Church and State", The Pulpit, Vol. 39, No. 7,
July-August, 19^8, pp. 12-13.
5 Supra, p. 431.
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basis of the Christian ethic, but he did not believe that the church as an
organised institution could or should take such action. Over one hundred years
later a commission of the Church of Scotland, dealing with this problem, echoed
Hill's sentiments in these words: "The action here called for is the action
of Christian individuals in the exercise of their individual rights of citizen¬
ship, and the use of such influence as they severally possess in the leavening
of general society."'' Others, outside the Church of Scotland, have voiced the
same opinion and for various reasons, which we might mention in Hill's defence.
J. 11. Oldham, writing in connection with the Interdenominational Oxford Conference
on Church, Community, and State, says that the church as an organized society
should not intervene in the sphere of politics because the church as a society
is organized for purposes other than political ones. If it enters the political
arena then it runs the,risk of obscuring or compromising the purposes for which
O
it does exist. Malcolm Nygren, a pastor in the United Presbyterian Church,
U.S., agrees: "When the Church tries to become a political leader, it harms both
its own mission and the world it seeks to help.Oldham further argues that
upon entering the political field the church also runs the risk of compromising
its character as a church, for it is tempted to adopt means to certain ends which
are not appropriate to the Body of Christ.^ In this regard Nygren says that
"political leadership casts the Church in the role of master" as opposed to
that of "servant" which is essential to its character.^ Both Oldham and Nygren
agree that political action on the part of the church results in "loss of
6 7
religious depth," and is, therefore, "disastrous for the faith."' If the church
^ God's Will for Church and Nation, p. 173*
2 J.H. Oldham, The Church and Its Function in Society, p. 216.
3 Malcolm Nygren, "The Church and Political Action", Christianity Today,
Vol. 13, No. 12, March, 1969, p. 9.
4 Oldham, Church in Society, pp. 218-219. 5 Nygren, op.cit., p. 10.
6 Oldham, Church in Society, p. 218. 7 Nygren, op.cit., p. 10.
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enters the political arena it is coraaitted to the attainment of relative goals ,
and its own relevance is thus seen to depend upon the relevance of its civil
programmes.'' Consequently the credibility of the Christian message is itself
judged on the basis of its apparent relevance in this arena. "When the Church
ventures into endorsement and activism in specific political programmes, the
p
credibility of the Word rests on the church®s judgment in these matters." John
Co Bennett, Union Theological Seminary, argues that when the church becomes a
political commentator, it gives the force of "thus saith the lord" to its own
fallible judgments. The results are tragic. The church divides Christians on
a purely political basis and often goes so far as to label as unchristian all
who do not espouse its own particular political cause. Others, moving from
the question as to why the church should not enter the political field, ask
why it should. R.p. Barnes and K.G. Grubb, granting that the church might have
a right to speak on political issues, question its "competence to do so."^
R.L. Calhoun reminds us that "the Church is not exempted from the limitations
on human knowledge that baffle sincere men on every hand."5 Nygren says
specifically that in the political field "the Church has no special competence
to offer....Clergyman are not better statesmen than laymen, and church councils
6
have no special abilities in statescraft that are denied to others." Oldham
goes even deeper into the matter. He states that the church has to do with the
principles of the new order inaugurated by Christ. There is, therefore, "no
~1 Oldham," Church in' Socially, p.""2T5~ ~~2 Nygren, op.cit. 7 pT 12.
3 John C. Bennett, "The Involvement of the Church", The Church and the
Disorder of Society, pp. 91f.
4 R.P. Barnes and K.G. Grubb, "The Church's Approach to International
Affairs", The Church and the International Disorder, p. 22.
5 R.L. Calhoun, op.cit., p. 76.
6 Nygren, op.cit., p. 10.
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reason to suppose that the church can offer any helpful advice as to hoy/ the
affairs of the world should be conducted on the assumption of the old, unregenerate
order,"' Reinhold Niebuhr pushes the matter one step further. Granted that tho
church has a right to speak, and granted that it is competent to speak, it has
nothing to say, that is, no real solution to offer. If the church is true to the
faith, it will be "unable to promise some final historical redemption from all
social evil."2 Each of these arguments in its own way supports Hill's contention
that the church as an organised institution should not enter into politics.
But as Hill admits by precept and example that at times the individual must
withstand the demands of the state, the question arises as to whetser it is ever
true that the church as a society should withstand the state. Hill's biographer
indicates that he would have answered in the affirmative. He cites Hill as
arguing that, "had the people of Scotland indicated a strong feeling of
oppression arising to them from the lest Act, it would have been the duty of
the Assembly to join with them in endeavouring to be freed from it."3 it is
interesting to note at this point that Hill receives support from the same people
who supported his contention that the church should not enter the political field.
Oldham says that it is inevitable that the church will find itself in conflict
with the state, and that when this situation occurs, the church must make its
own stand known.^ The Commission of the Church of Scotland on God's Will for
Church and Nation said that "the Church as an institution" has a "responsibility"
to speak out against moral laxity within the state.'' J.C. Bennett states that
"the churches as institutions" have a "responsibility" to speak against the
chaos of society partly because of their own casual involvement in that disorder.^
1 Oldham, Church in Society, p. 218."
2 Rienhold Niebuhr, "God's Design and the Present Disorder of
Civilisation", The Church and the Disorder of Society, p» 26.
3 Cook, Life of Hill, p. 276. 4 Oldham, Church in Society, pp., 209f.
5 God's Will for Church and Nation, pp. 149f»
6 J.C, Bennett, op.cit., pp. 91-92.
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Rienhold Niebuhr contends that "the Christian Church" must speak to the state
because it is called upon to msdiate divine judgment and grace not only upon men,
-5
but also upon nations. Karl Earth reminds us that when the church finds itself
in conflict with the state it should remember that it is to render unto Cod
7 2
the things that are Gods, that it "must be and must remain the Church," '
Hill, however, not merely implies that the church as an institution should
speak out against the state when its actions ai*e contrary to the gospel, but he.
suggests certain principles to guide the church in this action. These
principles are essential to an understanding of Hill's doctrine of church-state
relations. First, he implies that if the church is to speak as an organized
institution, then its pronouncements must represent the opinions of the
majority of its members. He did not think that the church should issue a
statement denouncing the Test Act because, if for no other reason, only one
presbytery complained against it,3 j.h, Oldham accepts this principle. He
condemns those resolutions which "are passed as an expression of the Christian
mind on a particular public issue, when they do not in fact represent more than
the opinions of the more or less chance collection of individuals who happen to
be present at the meeting."^ Ernest Johnson says that it is quite dishonest for
a church to adopt stateraents which "are no more than wishful thinking on the
part of a small minority."^ Secondly, Hill implies that if the church is to
speak as an organized institution, then it must be aware of all the facts involved
in any political issue. Once again J.H. Oldham concurs wholeheartedly. "It
should be a principle, to the application of which there ought to be no exception^
1 RfVnhoid Ni'ebuhr, op.cit., p. 25.
2 Barth, Church and State, p. 68.
3 Cook, Life of Hill, p. 276.
4 Oldham, Church in Society, p. 224.
5 Johnson, The Church and Society, p. 86.
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that the Church as an organized society should not pronounce on questions of
political policy...until it has...ascertained all the relevant facts." Thirdly.
Hill implies that the church should deal only with principles and not with actual
policies. He thus opposed the state's use of the church to publicise its call
for voluntary collections to support the war against Prance, but did not think
it within the church's power to criticize the state's policy regarding the war
nor the state's right to call for such offerings. Likewise he debated the Test
Act, not on the grounds of its political consequences, but on the grounds of its
spiritual consequences. The question was not whether it was lawful for the
government to exclude Scotsmen from high military offices, but whether the
demand for the celebration of the Lord's Supper according to the Anglican ritual
2
was an invasion of a person's religious freedom. J.P. Chamberlain echoes Hill's
sentiments in these words; "The churches and church leaders would be treading
on dangerous ground if they forgot that tney should deal with principles and
rarely with express proposals for legislative or executive action."^ Fourthly,
Hill implies that if the church wishes to speak to the state then the most
expedient course is not that of a political proclamation in which the church
demands certain action from the state, but that of consultation in which the
church informs the state of its position. This is precisely the action which
Hill recommended in the Test Act case of 1790,^ and J.H. Oldham recommends
exactly the same procedure for the px^esent. He says that the church should
refrain from making any pronouncement on social or civil issues until it has
submitted the proposed statement "to those who have to deal in a practical
1 Oldham, Church, in Society, p. 222.
2 Cook, Life of Hill, p. 276.
3 J.P. Chamberlain, op.cit. , p. 101.
4 Supra, p. 429.
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capacity with, the questions involvedr Fifthly, Kill implies that if the church
does go contrary to the state, then it must still honor the state by accepting
its "punishments." When the government intervened in the clerkship election
of the General Assembly, Hill fought this action, but was at the same time
willing to be stripped of all the honors and benefits the state had given to
him. Earth agrees with Hill's position. He agrees with Hill's implication that
resistance must be "passive," and he agrees with Hill's implication that such
resistance is consistent with the honor the church owes the state. In the
first place, when the church passively resists the state then it honors the
state by becoming its victim. In the second place, if the state has perverted
its God-given authority, then it cannot be honored better than by criticism.^
But at this point the question may well be asked, does not Hill's position
involve an open contradiction? How can he say that the church as an organized
institution should not enter the political arena, and yet say that the church
has a responsibility to speak against the state if its actions are contrary to
the principles of the gospel. According to J.H. Oldham the apparent contradiction
can be reconciled in the distinction between political action and pastoral action.
He cites as an example of this difference the church situation in Germany during
World war II.
In a memorandum submitted by a group of leading churchmen in Germany, it is
recognized that, while it is not the business of the Church to interfere in
the policies of the State, it is nonetheless necessary for the Church, in
virtue of its responsibility for the spiritual welfare of the nation, to
judge whether these policies in their fundamental tendences are 3.ikely to
benefit or injure the soul of the people. In the latter case the Church
must pronounce against them. That is, however, not political but pastoral
action.^
1 Oldham, Church in Society, p. 222.
2 Supra, p. 431.
3 Earth, Church and State, pp. 67-69. Cf. William Fulbright, The
Arrogance of Power, p. 135; "To cx^iticize one's country is to do it a service
and pay it a compliment."
4 Oldham, Church in Society, p. 214.
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J.C. Bennett, who makes the same distinction, cites a similar example to
show how the institutional church's pastoral judgment may operate in a political
issue. On October 24, 1940, six church bodies in the Netherlands united in
sending a letter of protest to the Reich Commissioner for occupied Holland,
stating
Y/e feel impelled to appeal to your Excellency in view of the regulations
recently issued in Holland forbidding the nomination or promotion of
officials or other persons of Jewish blood. We hold that the spirit
of these regulations is contradictory to Christian mercy. Moreover,
these regulations also affect members of the Church itself who have
joined within the last few generations and who have been received as
equals as is expressly commanded in Holy Scriptures.
If we accept this distinction, then it may be said that the action which Hill
allowed the organized church to take, limited by his five principles, is really
pastoral not political action. It is true that pastoral action may have
political consequences, but this does not make the pastoral action political
action. Hill, therefore, is consistent in saying that the church should not
enter into politics while at the same time maintaining that the church must
speak against the state when it transgresses the,gospel of Christ.
But whether the church can or cannot, should or should not enter into
politics, Hill's concluding point is that the church best serves the state
not by proclamations on political issues but by the proclamation of its own
unique message. The church repays the state the advantages which it derives
from the state "by explaining and enforcing those precepts of the gospel which
O
inculcate obedience to civil authority, and a spirit of peace and subordination.""
Although Barth would not necessarily agree with Kill's doctrine of preaching,
he would agree with him in principle.
1 J.C. Bennett," oplci't. , p. 111.
2 Hill, Institutes, p. 164.
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No direct action that the Church night take (acting partly or wholly
politically, with well-meaning zeal) could even remotely be compared with
the positive relevance of that action whereby, without any interference
with the sphere of the State, this Church proclaims the coming Kingdom
of Christ, and thereby the gospel of Justification through faith alone.
In a similar vein Oldham writes that the church's "greatest contribution to the
Renewal of society is through the fulfilment of its primary functions of preach¬
ing the Word and through its life as a worshipping community.
Despite the fact that the church is not to interfere with the state and
vice versa, and despite the fact the temptation so to do is provided by any
union of the two, Hill nevertheless calls for an alliance between church and
state. In adopting this position, he rejects that of Locke which implies that
there can be no such union. "The church itself is a thing absolutely separate
and distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both sides ere fixed and
immovable. He jumbles heaven and earth together, the things most remote ana
opposite, who mixes these societies."3 in adopting this position, Hill, if ha
does not "reject" the position of the reformers, certainly noves beyond it.
According to Barth the reformers, Luther and Calvin included, were content to
say that church and state can exist side by side without conflict, and that each
is competent in its own sphere.^ Hill, believing that the power of the church
was purely spiritual and that of the state purely political, acknowledged the
truth of the reformers position but was not willing to stop there. Nor was he
satisfied with the theory developed by the Y/higs which stated that in a given
situation church and state might possibly be united: "It might or might not be
expedient for the state to enter relations with a church; that depended on
circumstances and on the state's convenience."5 in opposition to all these
1 Barth, Church and State, p. 82.
2 J.H. Oldham, "A Responsible Society", The Church and the Disorder
of Society, p. 127.
3 John Locke, Works, Vol. VT, p. 21.
4 Barth, Church and State, p. 3»
5 The Whig theory as paraphrased by A.R. Vidler, The Orb and the Cross, p. 21.
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theories Hail contends that church and state must be united. This contention
anticipates the thought of another Scotsman, William Symington, who wrote,
"A union between Church and State, of an unexceptionable kind, is capable of
being formed, and moreover...the foundation of such a union is not only lawful
p
in itself, but dutiful and obligatory... „" Oddly enough Hill, in harmony
with the Whig theory, indicates that the initiative for such a union rests with
the state,^ but this in no way contradicts the fact that some alliance is
necessary.
It is commendable that Hill bases his assertion of a union between church
and state not only on the pragmatic value of such an alliance, but also on the
prophecy of the Old Testament. But it is equally commendable that Hill does not
go beyond Scripture in giving specific directions as to how this alliance should
be effected. It is to his credit that he admits the silence of the Scriptures
on this point, and that he refuses to supply the void with his own thinking.
He is willing to acknowledge the fact that different circumstances lead to
different forms of unions between churches and states, and therefore is not
willing to label any one form as the Biblical form.4 Barth concurs whole¬
heartedly with Hill's position. He says that the "phenomenon" of a relation¬
ship between church and state "cannot well be denied," but that "the question of
how this mutual relation can be explained is not actually answered" by Scripture.5
1 Gf. J.N. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, p. 215; where he indicates
that this concept is not original with Hill.
2 William Symington, Messiah the Prince; or, The Mediatorial Dominion of
Jesus Christ (1881), p. 263. Symington, like Hill, appealed to the Old
Testament, pp. 194f.
3 Supra, p. 2|20. Cf. John Rogers, A Vindication of the Civil Establishment
of Religion, p. 55; "Now that religious considerations may be among the Motives
to an Establishment of some Religion, yet the Act itself is purely civil and
therefore must be determined by the judgment of the supreme civil Magistrate
....To this Magistrate it must be left to choose what Religion he should
establish." Hill recommends this work to his students.
4 Hill, Institutes, p. 153*
5 Barth, Church and State, p. 61.
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We would of course give a great deal to receive more specific instructions
in Romans xiii - and elsewhere in the New Testament - about what is, and
what is not to be understood by these particular political duties toward
the State which are expected of the Church. The questions which arise
in this connection cannot be answered directly from the New Testament.
In a final analysis he says that "it is a question of continual decisions." Why?
Because, as Hill says, there are "distinctions between one state and another,
O
between the state of yesterday and the state of today." Similarly J.H. Oldham
writes that the right relationship between church and state "cannot be determined
in advance by any abstract rule, but must be an act of obedience to Cod in face
of the concrete situation.Hill is correct then in implying that each church
and each state must work out their own unique relationship.^
It is one thing to say that church and state ought to be related, and
another thing to say howr they are to be related. It is still another to say
why and on what basis they are to be related. We agree with. Hill in his rejection
of the theories of the Erastians and Independents, but what should we say about
his own? Is it any more Biblically oriented than theirs? Buber suggests that
it is too mechanical,5 but it manifests a far greater weakness than that. It
is the weakness we have mentioned more than once in this thesis, namely, the
failure to relate this aspect of ecclesiology to the Person and work of Jesus
Christ. It is true that Hill asserts the spirituality of the church's power on
the basis of Christology. It is also true that he maintains the church's
independency from the state on the basis of Christology. But when he comes to
talk about the relationship of church and state, he completely divorces this
discussion from Christ. Hill does not stand alone in this weakness. It may
be true in general, as MacG-reggpr says, that "in the Reformed tradition,
1 Ibid.", pp.' 73-74. 2 rbicT.p. 32
3 Oldham, Church in Society, p. 218.
4 Hill, Institutes, p. 146.
5 Martin Buber, I and Thou, p. 48.
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A
scclesiology is closely linked to ChristoXcgy," but according to Barth when
wa ask specifically about the relationship of church and state,
we receive from the Reformers either no answer at all, or, at the best, a
very inadequate answer. Whatever our attitude may be to the content of
that last chapter of the Institutio, "De Politica Administrations" (and,
so far as we are concerned, we are prepared to take a very positive position),
this at least is clear, that as we look back on the earlier parts of the
work, and in particular on the second anu third books and their- cardinal
statements about Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit, sin and grace, faith and
repentance, we feel like a traveller suddenly transported to a distant
land, who is looking back at the country from which he started. For on
the question of how far the politica administratio in the title of the
fourth book belongs to the externis medais vel aaminiculis quibus Deus
in Chris ti societatim nos invitat et in__e_a re tine t we shall find only
the most scattered instruction, for all the richness which the book
. otherwise contains."'
We find the same weakness in the earlier Scottish theologians. Again, we rrdujit
agree with the judgment of Macpherson when he says in general that "the studies
3
which these divines prosecuted were Christological rather than ecclesiastical"j
but when he comes to discuss church-state relations, he is forced to admit that
the issues were treated on the basis of "assistance given to secure the execution
01 ecclesiastical decisions.But whether or not this criticism is applicable
to the reformers and early Scottish theologians, it is certainly applicable to
Hill. Although he found the reason for a relationship between church and state
in Scripture, he did not look there for the basis for such a relationship.
Ironically the Christological basis is mentioned in the very text Hill cites to
substantiate his reason (Ps. 72; 10-11); but he missed the implication. Perhaps
he felt as Gladstone. Gladstone argued there could be no direct appeal to
Scripture in this matter because the Hebrew commonwealth differed in so many
1 Geddes Macgreggor, Corpus Chris ti, p. 22. Cf. p. 248".
2 Barth, Church and State, p. 4« Barth contends that the same thing
holds true for the corresponding theses of Luther and Zwingli.
3 Macpherson, op.cit., p. 2.
4 Ibid., p. 187. He cites relevant passages from Samel Rutherford's
Divine Right of Church Government and Excomrnunication, p. 13; James Durham's
Dying Man's Testament to the Church of Scotland, or Treatise concerning Scandal,
pp. 231f.j George Gillespie's Aaron's Rod Blossoming, p. 1l6f.
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important points from any that concerns us today, and because "the Scriptures
of the New Testament were written at a time when there was no case of a nation
of persons professedly Christian." Or perhaps Hill missed the Christological
basis for church-state relations because of the order in which he discussed his
propositions. He claims that his order is the "most natural," but it may well
be asked whether it is the most theological. He begins his treatment of church
power with the theories of church-state relations and the nature of the Christian
society. The relationship of church power to the Person of Christ is considered
only after these prior issues have been determined. Though Hill does not appear
to be aware of the theological, problens raised by his method, he does indicate
that it might not be the most logical after all, for after treating the second
proposition, he reverts to the first in describing its uses. We might excuse
Hill's order on logical grounds as nothing more than the problem of methodo¬
logical sequence, but according to Barth we "can neither overlook nor take
2
lightly...the lack of a...Christological foundation" in such an approach. The
church as the Body of Christ must always ask whether its relation to the realities
and problems of its environment are determined by Christ the Head of Jthe Body.
This is certainly true in the church's relation to the state.
Do we allow Christ...to determine our relationship to the State - a
part of our environment which is present to all our minds just now - as
our confession requires and our standards have declared? Or, in this
connection as in others, do we allow ourselves to follow a line of
tactics or strategy in which we do in fact listen for other voices,
respectable perhaps, but alien from Christ.3
Hill would have to answer "no" to the first, and "yes" to the second of these
searching questions. This criticism is not to deny Hill's point that church and
1 W.E. Gladstone, The State and Its Relations with the Church, Vol. I,
p. 40.
2 Barth, Church and State, p. 6.
3 Barth, The Church and the Churches, pp. 61-62.
state should be related, but it is to call into question his only basis for such
a relationship. The basis for such a relation is not merely a contractual one,
a compact between church and state, but primarily a personal one, grounded in the
Person of Jesus Christ. The true basis for a relationship betv/een church and
state is to be found in the "dominion of Christ over the whole world.15'' This
O
dominion implies far more than Christ's Lordship over the church. It means that
everything, state as well as church, is a part of Christ's Kingdom. The state
then as well as the church, must serve the purpose of Christ. Accordingly Barth
says that the stats "should serve...the justification of the sinner."-^ Hill is
willing to say that church .and state are subject to the same sovereign, and he
goes so far as to say that Christ uses the state to protect the church, but there
is absolutely no indication that he saw the state as participating in the saving
activity of Christ. Yet it is just because and only because Christ works in and
through the state as well as the church to accomplish His reconciling purpose
among men that the church and the state are to be related. They are caught
up and united in the continually unfolding event of Christ's redemptive activity
for the world.
B. The Objects of the Power Implied in Church G-overnmsnt
Having determined the nature and extent of the power implied in church
government, Hill turns to the objects of that power. Following the distribution
which he finds in the "ordinary systems" of theology,^- he divides "church power
into three part3, which, for the sake of memory, are expressed by three single
words; the potestas boYP&ctxr), btardxntxri, and SiaxpCtixn."-' The first
respects doctrines or articles of faith; the second respects ecclesiastical canons
1 Claude Welch', The Reality of the Church, p. 20l'.
2 Cf. Barth's use of Phil. 2;11, Eph. 1:20-21, and I Peter 3:22.
Church and State, p. 26.
3 Ibid., p. 29. 4 Cf. Calvin, Institutes, 4:8:1.
5 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 483- Cf. James Bannerman, The Church of
Christ, Vol. I, pp. 225-227, 277. ~
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or constitutions; and the third respects discipline or the exercise of judgment
in inflicting or removing censures. To each of these powers Hill applies the
limits and regulations suggested by his third and fourth propositions, i.e.,
each power must be consistent with the sovereign authority of Christ and the




The church's potestasSoypS/u xrj refers to its right to formulate doctrinal
creeds. According to Hill the position which he adopts in this regard is one
which lies half—way between the extreme positions of the Church of Rome and the
Socinians. The Church of Rome maintains that Scripture is in many places so
obscure that ordinary people cannot derive from it all the knowledge necessary
for salvation. The church, therefore, has the right to set up along side
Scripture an authoritative interpretation of Scripture. This definitive conmen-
tary is judged to be equal with Scripture in terms of reverence and authority.
Consequently, it is a sin worthy of eternal punishment to disagree with any
1
article which it contains.
The Socinians, on the other hand, hold that the essential articles of faith
are so few and so simple and so easily deduced from explicit Scriptural texts
that it is impossible for any man who has the exercise of his reason to miss
them. Therefore, "as Scripture may be sufficiently understood for the purposes
of salvation, without any foreign assistance, all creeds and confessions of faith
composed and prescribed by human authority, are an encroachment upon the
prerogative of the supreme teacher, an invasion of the rights of private judgment
1 Ibid, pp. 485-486.
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and a pernicious attempt to substitute the commandments of men in place of
1
the doctrine of God." It is an adequate declaration of the Christian faith
simply to say, M7«'e believe the Scriptures."
Hill propounds a roediating position. He rejects the position of Rome
because he believes, contrary to its bipolar system of authority, "that the
Scriptures are the only rule of faith";^ but he also rejects the Socinian
position because he believes, contrary to their exclusive adherence to Biblical
terminology, that Scripture does need to be interpreted and explained. Several
passages in the New Testament (notably Matt. 7:15> Eph. 4:13j Heb, 8:7-9,
Titus 1:9-11)
teach clearly that an acknowledgement of the truth of Scripture is not
a sufficient security for soundness of faith, because they state a
perversion of Scripture by those who have received it, as not only a
possible case, but as a case which actually existed; and consequently
they imply that it is lawful for the ministers of religion to employ
some added guard to that "form of sound words," which they are
required to hold fast and to defend.3
Although Scripture gives to office-bearers the task of defending the truth,
it does not indicate specifically how they are to do it; "it is left to them
to devise the most prudent and effectual methods of fulfilling that duty.
The earliest method of discharging this responsibility involved the publication
of particular doctrinal statements formulated by assemblies of Christians.
This method "appears to be agreeable both to the nature of the case and to
Scripture." It may be said to be agreeable to the nature of the case because
it is "natural" and "expedient? and because "the consent of a number of teachers
in any doctrine /jls/ the best security of their having attained the truth." It
may be said to be agreeable to Scripture because it "received a sanction from
1 Ibid. , p. 490. 2 Ibid. , p. 2.87. *
3 Ibid., p. 496. 4 Ibid., p. 498.
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the practice of the apostles." Paul submitted the question of the necessity
of circumcision to the council of apostles and elders in Jerusalem. After
debating the matter they published a definitive statement -which Paul delivered
4
to-the churches "for to keep" (Acts 16;A). Although it is impossible to have
recourse to the infallible authority which the apostles exerted, nevertheless
this method appears to have been "in all ages'^the most prudent and effectual
method of maintaining and defending the truth of the gospel®
Hill notes that though councils should concern themselves primarily with
the fundamental doctrines of the faith, they are not limited to the words of
Scripture in the formulation of their statements.
It is certainly not desirable that confessions should descend to minute
controversies..».But the very purpose for which they are composed, being
to guard against error, it is plain that they become nugatory, if they
deliver the truths of religion in those words of Scripture which had been
perverted, or in terms so general as to include both the error and ihe
truth.3
Thus contrary to the Socinians, Hill believes that the church does have
the right to formulate doctrinal statements or confessions of faithj but contrary
to the Church of Rome, he does not believe that such statements or confessions
are to be given the sans authority as the Scripture which they only claim to
interpret.
/
So understood, the churches potestas &0Y|i2h:tx,n is neither inconsistent with
the supremacy of Christ, nor destructive of the liberties of His disciples. It
is not inconsistent with the sovereignty of Christ because it is purely
ministerial, i.e., it professes only to interpret the words of Scripture and to
1 Ibid., p. 499. Cf. Rutherford, Peaceable Plea for Paul's Presbyterie,
P. 99.
2 Hill refers to the "four general councils which are mentioned with
honour in ecclesiastical history," the Augsburg Confession in Germany, the Synod
of Dort in Holland, the Thirty-nine Articles in England, and the Tfestminster
Confession of Faith in Scotland. Ibid., pp. 500-502.
3 Ibid., p. 504.
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prove from them all the assertions which are published,. "The confessions of
Protestant churches claim to be true, not in respect of the authority by which
they are composed, but in respect of their conformity to the words of Scripture;
and therefore, instead of invading, they assert the prerogative of the Supreme
Teacher."^ It is not inconsistent with the liberties of Christians because it
does not imply a submission of the understanding. It is admitted that the
creed, proceeding from fallible men, may be erroneous; and that it is the duty
of Christians to "judge of themselves what is right, to search the Scriptures
O
whether the things are so, to try the spirits, whether they be of God." If
individuals judge that the church's confession is not agreeable to the Word of
God, then "they are perfectly acquitted in the judgment of their own consciences,
and in the sight of God, for refusing to adhere to what appears to them an
erroneous decision."3
Hill's exposition of the church's potestas SoypiSxtxri clearly reflects
Calvin's exposition of the same subject. This fact is made obvious enough by
simply presenting a brief summary of Calvin's teaching. Because Scripture is
sufficient in matters of doctrine, "God denies to man the right of promulgating
any new articles of faith.But because the doctrines of Scripture may be
perverted,^ God does give to the church the right of setting forth "the pure
and natural interpretation of Scripture."^ The church is thus constituted a
"faithful guardian" and its "guardianship consists in the...faithful preservation
of the purity of the word of God."'' How may this guardianship be best performed?
1 lYici.'Y p. 5~0 TT" Cf. Bannerman, op.c'it'., p. '283.
2 Ibid. , p. 507. Cf. Bannerman, op.cit., p. 283.
3 Ibid., p. 508. 4 Calvin, Institutes, 4;8:9.
5 Ibid. , 4:9:3-4. Calvin, like Hill, cites passages from Scripture
to verify the reality of such perversions.
6 Ibid., 4:9:8. 7 Ibid., 4:8:12.
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If a controversy arise respecting any doctrine , there is no better or
more certain remedy than to assemble a councils®.in which the contro¬
verted doctrine may be discussed. For such a decision, formed by the
common consent of the pastor-s of the Churches, after an invocation of
the Spirit of Christ, will have far greater weight, than if everyone
of them separately were to maintain it in preaching to his people, or
if it were the result of a private conference between a few individuals
....Paul prescribes this method.„.when Arius arose, the Council of Nice
was assembled....In short, this has been the ordinary method of the Church
i *
from the beginning.
Calvin further notes that in formulating doctrinal statements, the church is
free to use words other than those found in Scripture.
The word consubstantial (ofuooca'toc ) I confess, is not to be found in
the Scripture; but while, on the one hand, it is so often affirmed that
there is but one God, and on the other, Christ is so frequently called
the true and eternal God, one with the Father, what have the Nicene
fathers done, but simply expressed the natural sense of the Scripture,
in declaring the Father and the Son to be of one and the same substance?^
Exercised in this way the church's power to formulate creeds does not
"derogate anything from Christ" because it fixes "the boundary of its wisdom
where Christ has made an end of speaking"; i.e., the church in exercising this
power rejects "all the inventions of its own reason" and treats only "those
things in which it is supported by the word of God."3 This power is not
inconsistent with the "liberties" of Christians. If the declaration, resulting
from the exercise of this power, is consistent with Scripture, then it may be
"cheerfully received and reverenced" as no limitation on the freedom of the
conscience. If, however, this declaration is "repugnant to Scripture,"
Christians have every right and duty to "reject" it.'f
From this brief summary it appears that Calvin and Hill agree completely
respecting the church's right to exercise this po¥/er, the necessity of
exercising it, and the best method of exercising it. Both agree that this
power, properly exercised, is consistent with the authority of Christ and the
liberties of His disciples.
1 Ibid. , 4:9:13. 2 Ibid., 4:8:16.
3 Ibid., 4:8:13. 4 Ibid., 4.9.9.
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f
2. Potestas 61,a/cSocTi xtj
The church's potestas 61o/c&xtirrj refers to its right to enact ecclesiastical
canons. With respect to this power Hill again adopts a mediating position; this
time it is a position which lies between the extremes of the Church of Rome and
the Puritans, The Church of Rome asserts that Christ never intended that
Scripture should contain a complete rule of faith and practice, and thus it
evidences many defxciencies at these points. Its deficiencies, however, can be
supplied from the unwritten word which has been safely handed down through the
church since the days of Christ and the apostles. On the basis of this unwritten
word the Church of Rome has made numberless additions to the essential parts
of the worship of God, which, although not enjoined in Scripture, are represented
as indispensably necessary in order for the worshipper to be accepted by God.
Once again these extra laws cannot be broken without incurring the guilt of
-j
deadly sin, i.e. they are equal in authority with the laws of Scripture. The
Puritans, prompted by extreme reaction against the position of Rome, opposed
the potestas Siarcmertxr) altogether. They taught that if the church enacted any
law not expressly commanded by the Word of God, then it invaded the sovereignty
2
of Christ and abridged the liberty of Christians. Once more Hill places himself
on middle ground. He rejects the position of Rome because he believes that the
church's "enactments are not put upon a footing with the laws of Christ"; but
he also rejects the Puritan position because he believes that there are
"numberless occasions upon Y/hich the church is called to make enactments by her
7
own authority."-^ This, he claims, is a conclusion fairly deduced from the
writings of Paul. Paul intimates that some of the regulations which he pres¬
cribed did not proceed from the Spirit of God, but were of his own judgment,
given by him "as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful"
1 Hill, L.I.D. . Vol. Ill, pp. 511-515
2 Ibid., p. 533. 3 Ibid., p. 515.
468
(l Cor. 7:25). He concludes the particular directions in I Cor. 14 -with these
general words of exhortation; "Let all things be done decently and in order."
He writes to Titus, "For this cause I left thee in Crete, that thou shouldest
set in order the things that are wanting" (Tit. 1:5)•
Laying all these things together we thus reason. As the apostle, from his
ovm judgment, gave such directions in external matters as the circumstances
of his times seemed to him to require; as he committed to the church at
Corinth a discretionary power with regard to such matters, by desiring them
to "do ail things decently and in order"; and as he charged one minister
whom he ordained, to supply what he had left deficient, it is a part of
the duty of the office-bearers of the church in succeeding ages - a duty
which does not require inspiration, which is included in their ordinary
commission, and to which they are fully competent - to make such ,,
regulations with regard to like matters, as to them appears expedient.'
Hill further notes that this idea of the church's right to enact certain
regulations is agreeable to the character of the gospel as a universal religion.
Just as Scripture does not prescribe any one form of church government but
allows each church to accommodate circumstances, so it does not prescribe all
rules regulating the church's life but allows each church to enact such laws
as circumstances require.^
In the correct exercise of its potestas otamxxixT] the church embraces
basically two objects •- first those regulations respecting matters of order,
and secondly those regulations respecting matters of worship. Because the church
is a society in which a number of people are to assemble frequently, there must
be regulations enacted to give the polity of this society its form, to ascertain
the terms upon which persons are to be admitted and expelled; and to determine
__
jbjd., p7~322. ~
^ Ibid., p. 525* Hill gives a humorous example. "Immersion at baptism,
which was commonly practised where Christianity was first published, would,
in our northern climates, be inconvenient or dangerous." Cf. Scots Confession,
Chapter 20: "We think not that any one policy, or order in ceremonies, can be
appointed for all ages, times, and places; for as ceremonies, such as men have
devised, are but temporal...." Caldervrood, History of Church of Scotland,
Vol. II, p. 31.
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the time, day, and place of meeting. Since such matters cannot be left to the
p
discretion of every individual member, and since the society has within itself
the powers necessary for its own preservation, the "authority of order raust bo
lodged in the office-bearers of the society.Because the church is a society
formed for a specific purpose, the worship of God the Father through the Lord
Jesus Christ, there must be regulations enacted by the church respecting the
conduct of this divine worship. It is true that the church cannot raise up new
objects of worship, or make any alterations upon the substance of the sacraments,
or omit anything which Christ has appointed such as the reading of Scripture,
prayer, and praise; yet "still in the manner of performing that worship. .„ there
are circumstances which the wisdom of Cod has left to be regulated by human
authority."^
Though specific directions are wanting, Scripture does provide "general
5
rules" to guide the church in emoting laws which regulate worship. One, all
laws should be of a kind as to promote the order, decency, and solemnity of
public worship. Two, the laws ought to be few in number. Three, the laws
should evidence respect for the opinions, manners, and prejudices of those for
1 Cf. First Book of Discipline, $'.i- "As that no Common-wealth can
flourish or long indure without good Lawes...so neither can the Kirk of God...."
(Dunlop, A Collection of Confessions of Faith, Vol. II, p. 568. Cf. James
Bannerman, The Church of Christ, Vol. I, p. 212. "If the Church is a regular
and organized society at all, it must have some kind of rule by which it acts
and administers its functions. Without this, no society, much less the
Christian Church, could long act, or even exist at all."
2 Cf. Calvin, Institutes, 4:10:31. "What a source of contentions would
be produced...if these things were undetermined and left to the choice of every
individual,"
3 Hill, L.I.P. , Vol. Ill, p. 515. Cf. p. 522.
4 Ibid., p. 520. Cf. Westminster Confession of Faith, 1:6, "we acknowledge
...that there are some circumstances concerning the worship of God, and govern¬
ment of the Church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be
ordered by the light of nature, and Christian prudence...." Cf. William
Cunningham, Church principles, p. 253, where he states that "common sense
requires this."
5 Ibid. , p. 529. Cf. Westminster Confession of Faith, 1:6. Cf. George
Gillespie, English - Popish Ceremonies, 3: /:5 (p. I3U) where he lays down
i+70
whom they are prescribed. Four, existing laws ought not to be lightly changed.
Five, the authority which enacts the laws should never employ an expression
or any means of enforcing them which might convey the idea that thay are
accounted necessary to salvation.
So exercised, the church's potestas bicvcKxxixt} is neither inconsistent
with the sovereign authority of Christ, nor inconsistent with the liberty of
His disciples. It
is not inconsistent with the sovereign authority of the Lord Jesus;
because it does not presume to alter any thing which he appointed.,..
It professes only to regulate those things which may be varied, without
touching what is substantial; and in the canons enacted for this purpose,
far from invading the prerogative of Christ, it professes to follow out
directions which he left by his apostles, and to exercise the authority ^
created by these directions in the manner which is most agreeable to him, "
It is not "inconsistent with the liberties of Christians; because, being
exercised purely for the sake of decency and order, it does not profess to
alter the nature of those objects about which it is conversant, so as to fetter
the conscience," In other words, the laws which the church enacts are consid¬
ered to be in their own nature indifferent, matters which the 7/ord of God has
not determined either good or evil,'+ but which from the standpoint of expediency
have been established by human authority. Indeed, the authority by which such
lows are ordained creates an obligation to observe them,5 but this does not
violate the liberty of Christians for there is a distinction between "freedom
of judgment" and "freedom of practice,"^ If a person's judgment is left free,
"three conditions.,.necessarily requisite in such a thing as the church hath
power to prescribe by her laws." It must be "only a circumstance of divine
worship; no substantial part of it." It must be something "not determinable
by Scripture." It must be "accompanied with some good reason and warrant
given for the satisfaction of tender consciences."
1 Ibid- » PF. 529-531.
2 Ibid., p. 524. Cf. Bannerman, The Church of Christ, Vol. I, p. 3^3*
3 Ibid., p. 524. Cf. Bannerman, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 3^9.
4 Cf. Samuel Rutherford, The Divine Right of Church-Government and
Excommunication, p. 201.
5 Cf. Ibid., p. 652. 6 Hill, L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, p. 525.
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his practice may without any sacrifice of liberty, be restrained. For example,
Paul believed that no meat was of itself unclean, yet out of deference for the
prejudicies of the Jewish converts, he resolved to abstain from eating meat v/hich
offended them. "Here," says Hill, "is liberty of conscience remaining entire;
A
yet practice restrained by Christian charity." Similarly, the canons of the
church, though neither holy nor indispensable to the worship of God, are to be
obeyed for the sake of decency and order. In enacting these laws and in calling
for obedience to them, the church is merely regulating practice, not binding
the judgment of the worshipper. If, however, a person judges a law to be, not
indifferent, but sinful, then this judgment, erroneous though it may be, will
2
justify him for refusing to render obedience to it.
Once again it is obvious that Hill has followed closely the teaching of
Calvin on "the second branch of the power of the Church."3 Calvin notes ths
double danger involved in this power. "There is a danger here, on the one hand,
that the false bishops may seize a pretext to excuse their impious and tyrannical
laws, and, on the other, that there may be some persons who, from an excessive
fear of falling into the evils we have mentioned, will reject all ecclesiastical
laws, however holy and useful they may be."^' Though Calvin contends against
"whatever edicts have been issued by men respecting the worship of God,
independently of his word," he does not contend against "the holy and useful
constitutions of the Church, which contribute to the preservation of discipline,
or integrity, or peace."5 The chux-ch is free to enact such laws because Christ
"has not been pleased to give us minute directions on what we ought to do in
every particular case," and because these laws "depend on the different circum¬
stances of different periods...one form would not be adapted to all ages."^
Ibid., p.' 52<~r. 2 Ibid., p. 525.
3 Calvin, Institutes, 4:10:1. 4 Ibid., 4:10:30. Cf. 4:10:14.
5 Ibid., 4:10:1. 6 Ibid., 4:10:30.
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Properly exercised this power of the church embraces basically tyro objects -
first -those regulations respecting the "order" of worship, and secondly those
regulations respecting the "d ecorum" of worship. Of the first sort are laws
regulating "the hours appointed for public prayers, sermons, and sacraments,..«
the places appointed for these services, and the days fixed for the celebration
2
of the lord's Supper." Of the second sort are laws respecting "the modesty,
fear, and reverence" which surrounds sacred services, i.e., laws demanding "that
we administer the sacraments of the Lord, not in a slovenly manner, but with
due decorum, that we observe soma decent order in the burial of the dead; and
other things of a similar nature."3 But precisely because Christ has given no
specific instructions, "here we must have recourse to the general rules which he
has given, that to them may be conformed all the regulations which shall be
necessary to the decorum and order of the Church."^ What are these general rules?
One, laws should be applicable "to the edification of the Church."3 Two, it is
necessary to maintain "paucity in number.Three, regulations should be
"suitable to the manners of each age and nation.Pour, one "ought not to
resort to innovation rashly or frequently."® Five, it should be made clear
that "these things are not necessary to salvation."^ Properly exercised this
"power of legislation" is not inconsistent with the authority of Christ because
it "approves of no human constitutions, except such as are founded on the
authority of God, and deduced from the Scripture."^ Although "it is the duty of
Christian people to observe" regulations resulting from the exercise of the
church's legislative power, this obligation is not inconsistent with the












It mil ba asked, what kind of liberty of conscience can bs retained
amidst so much attention and caution? I reply, it will very well be
supported, when we consider, that there are not fixed and perpetual laws
by which we are bound, but external aids for human infirmity, which
though we do not need, yet we all are because we are under obligation
to each other to cherish mutual charity between us...every pez-son
will retain his liberty in all these things, and yet will voluntarily
impose some restraint upon his liberty, so far as the decorum we have
mentioned, or the dictates of charity, shall require.^
This brief comparison indicates that Calvin and Kill agreed entirely as to
the necessity of exercising this potestas Siaxaxxixri , the objects which acre
embraced in the exercise of it, and the general rules which govern the exercise
of it. Both agree that the church's power of legislation, properly exercised,
is consistent with the sovereign authority of Christ and with the liberties of
Christian believers.
^ /
3* Potestas oia.xpt.Tt xt)
_ /
The Church's potestas oiaxpTxi xr] refers to its right to exercise judgment
in inflicting and removing censures. Hill notes that he has already shown that
the church possesses such a power,2 and that it is to be exercised by the
office-bearers.3 it should also be noted that we have partially treated Hill's
thinking on this subject under discipline as a mark of the church.^ At this
point Hill is primarily concerned with the effect and extent of discipline as
it is limited by the sovereignty of Christ and the liberties of Christians.
r~Ibid., 4:107Il~~ " "
2 "We found formerly that this branch of power belongs to the church. Even
a voluntary association has an inherent right of removing those who are judged
unworthy of remaining; and the church, that society constituted by Jesus Christ,
into which it is the duty of his disciples to enter, is invested by its Divine
Pounder with the right of exercising, by its ministers, the office of
admonishing, reproving, suspending, or excluding from the privileges of the
society." L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, p. 53^. Cf. p. 451.
3 "We saw formerly, that the same persons, who are invested with the
office of admitting into the church, are also invested with the office of
excluding from it." L.I.D. , Vol. Ill, p. 543. Cf. p. 452.
4 Supra, p.' 279
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To perceive the effect and extent of discipline, it is necessary, says
Hill, to recall the words which describe the way in which the power of discipline
was first conveyed to the church and exercised by the church. Christ said to
Peter, "I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven," and He
explained that figurative expression by adding these words, "Whatsoever thou
shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose
-|
on earth shall be loosed in heaven" (Matt. 16; lb; 18; 18). After His resurrection,
Christ "breathed on the apostles, and said unto thera, receive ye the Holy Ghost.
Whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and those soever sins
ye retain, they are retained " (John 20: 22-23). Paul, in the exercise of this
authority, judged that the incestuous person at Corinth should be "delivered
unto Satan" (i Cor. 5s 3-5); and he says of Hymensus and Alexandra, who
f ^
"concerning faith had made shipwreck, I have delivered them unto Satan, that
p
they may learn not to blaspheme"(i Tim. 1: 19-20)."
The Church of Rome has given a false interpretation to these passages.
It teaches that the sentence of excommunication, by its own intrinsic authority,
condemns to eternal punishment, and that the excommunicated person can be
delivered from this condemnation only as the church grants him absolution. Hill,
on the other hand, believes "that future and eternal punishment of sin is in the
power of God; that none can forgive sins, so as to deliver from that punishment,
but God alone; and therefore, that the judgments pronounced by the church can
respect only those external censures and penalties of sin, which it has the
1 Hill assumes the authenticity of these statements, but the question
has been debated. Those who reject the authenticity of these texts include
T.W. Manson, The Sayings of Jesus, pp. 201-203; C.J. Cadoux, The Historic
Mission of Jesus, p. JoB; P.J. Foakes-Jackson, The Beginnings of Christianity,
Vol. I, p. 329; G. Johnston, The Doctrine of the Church in the New Testament,
p. 49« Those who defend the authenticity of these texts include R.N. Flew,
Jesus and His Church, p. 13; C. Gore, The Holy Spirit and the Church, p. 47;
A.T. Cadoux, The Theology of Jesus, p.~~2~2~5; A. Schweitzer, The Mysticism of
Paul the Apostle, p. 103; K.L. Schmidt, " exxXricrCa, ", Theological Dictionary
of the New Testament (ed. Gerhard Kittel), pp. 5l8f.
2 Hill, L.I.D.. Vol. Ill, p. 537.
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power of inflicting; and which, consequently, it has the power of removing."^
This interpretation is based on a distinction between the power of discipline
2
which is "declarative" and that which is "authoritative," or to put in another
way, a distinction between the "key of doctrine" and the "key of discipline."3
In exercising its declarative power the church simply interprets, declares,
and applies the truth of Scripture, namely, that sin deserves the wrath of
God, both in this life and that which is to come; that every obstinate and
impenitent sinner shall endure the everlasting effect of this wrath; but that
all who repent and believe in Christ have "redemption through his blood, the
forgiveness of sins."^- The church applies these great doctrines of the gospel
to a particular person to warn him of the danger of his sin; and when he becomes
ashamed of his conduct, they are applied "to compose his mind with the hope of
forgiveness."5
But there is another branch of the church's power of discipline which is
authoritative, in which those who exercise this power act, strictly speaking,
as judges pronouncing a sentence. The question here does not concern the right
which the church has to pronounce, through its office-bearers, a judicial
sentence, but rather the effect of such a sentence. According to Hill, however,
the effect is determined by the passage in which the right is conveyed.
Contrary to the interpretation of Rome, Hill believes that "the kingdom of
heaven," the keys of which Christ gave to Peter and the apostles, refers not
to "that state of glory for which Christians are prepared by the discipline
of this life; but according to a phraseology often used by our Lord, it denotes
1 Ibid., p. 539.
2 Ibid., p. 540. Cf. William Cunningham, Church Principles, pp. 235-236.
3 Ibid. , p. 541. Cf. James Durham, Treatise Concerning Scandal, p. 93;
Y/llliam Cunningham, Church Principles, p. 247; James Bannerman, Church of
Christ, Vol. II, p. 194.
4 Ibid., p. 540. 5 Ibid., p. 540.
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the dispensation of the Gospel, that spiritual economy which he has established,
A
his church, the great society of which he is the Head," The "key of discipline,"
therefore, refers to the power of admitting into the church or excluding from
the church. In terms of binding and loosing it means that the church's judicial
sentences "bind upon men their sins, so that they are prevented from entering
2
into the church, or loose them from their sins, so that they find admission,"
After His resurrection Christ significantly substituted restraining and
remitting for binding and loosing but the reference is still to the earthly
society. So also the phrase "delivered unto Satan has...a reference to
admission into the church." The New Testament presents the existence of two
opposite kingdoms - one in which Christ is King, the other in which Satan
reigns. Persons upon entering the church leave the kingdom of Satan; when
they are excluded from the church, they are sent back to that kingdom.'
The church's power of discipline, understood in this two-fold sense, is
not inconsistent with the sovereign authority of Christ nor with the liberties
of His disciples. It is not inconsistent with the supremacy of Christ simply
because Christ has given it to the church; "I give this key." It is, therefore,
H a legitimate part of the constitution of his church, the exercise of which,
far from being any invasion of his sovereignty, is an act of obedience to him,
and a fulfilment of his purposes."4 it is not inconsistent with the liberties
of Christians for it respects only external matters. With respect to Christ,
an unjust sentence,5 and there is no promise of infallibility to those who
i Ibid., pTTVU 2~Ibid7™7T427'
3 Ibid., p. 542. Cf. Calvin, Institutes, 4:11:2, 4:12:5; Samuel
Rutherford, Divine Right of Church-Government and Excommunication, pp. 235-236,
238. ~ ~~
^ Ibid. 9 p. 543* Cf. Bannerman, Church of Christ, Vol. I, p. 194.
5 The question of liberty arises only in connection with unjust sentences.
"j
exorcise this power, "is the same as if it had not been pronounced," In other
words, it does not effect a person's saving relationship with Christ, for thai
depends entirely upon God's divine grace and not man's judicial sentence. It
is true that a person may suffer as a result of an unjust sentence which
excludes him from certain privileges; however, such an inconvenience is "of the
same kind with those, which must always result from power being lodged in the
hands of fallible men." But even then this inconvenience is not altogether
without remedy for Christ can compensate for the absence of those external
privileges by resorting to extraordinary methods of conveying that grace which
p
such privileges ordinarily convey.
Although we have noted Hill's general disavowal of the Erastian system, we
should also note his specific rejection of its subordinate principles, particularly
those respecting the church's power of discipline. Some, while refusing to accept
the Erastian theory that all church power is derived from the state, nevertheless
contend that with respect to discipline the magistrate exercises the power of
excomnunication. Calvin, for instance, opposes those who, while admitting that
this pov>er originally belonged to the church, maintain that it was merely a
temporary possession, entrusted to the church only "while all civil magistrates
vrere strang3rs to the profession of Christianity."^ Y/hen, however, princes were
converted and nations became Christianised, this power passed into the hands of
the civil authorities. In answer to this Calvin argues that the words in which
Christ bestowed this power upon the church describe a "stated and perpetual
order and not any temporary regulation."^ The early Scottish theologians defended
1 Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 543- "It is impossible that Jesus can give
his sanction to any sentence pronounced in opposition to his own directions."
2 Ibid., p. 5A4. 3 Calvin, Institutes, 4:11:3*
4 Ibid., 4:11:4.
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the same position* George Gillespie wrote, "This power of binding and loosing
belongeth/~~not_/... to civil magistrates";'' and Sariuel Rutherford said, "It
O
belongsth not to the magistrate to debar from, the seals.,! When Hill, therefore,
states that the power of excommunication belongs exclusively to the church, he
is simply adopting the position of the reformed church, a. position which has
been perpetuated in Scotland both in the free church and in the established
church. William Cunningham, lecturing in New College from 1843, said to his
students, "No civil authorities may assume to themselves...the infliction or
relaxation of church censures";-' and the 19^4 edition of J.T. Cox's Practice and
Procedure in the Church of Scotland reads, "The proceedings or judgment of a
civil court...can be no substitute for due process in a church court....In
discipline Church courts form their own judgments independently of proceedings
in othercourts.,
But if the magistrate cannot initiate church censures, neither can he add
to them. Some, while refusing to accept the Era3tian theox*y that church power
is derived from the state, nevertheless contend that vbLth respect to discipline
the verdicts resulting from the exercise of church power are supported by decrees
5from civil authorities. In other words, excomnunication results not only in the
loss of certain ecclesiastical privileges, but also in the loss of certain civil
privileges as well. Hill, hov/ever, is consistent in his rejection of Erastianism.
Although the magistrate may, by statutes of a general nature, protect the church
r
in its life and work,0 he may not add to the sentence of excommunication by
imposing specific civil punishments on the one excommunicated. "The civil
magistrate does not afford his aid in giving effect to excommunication."^ This
1 G. Gillespie, Aaron's Rod Blossoming, p. 191*
2 Rutherford, Divine Right of Church-G-overnment and Excommunication, p. 253.
3 W. Cunningham, Church Principles, p. 229.
4 J.T. Cox, op.cit. , p. 298.
5 Kettlewell, op.cit., Part II, Chapter 1. Henry Barrow, A Brief
Discovery of the False Churches, p. 3^0.
6 Cf. Calvin, Institutes, 4:11:3. 7 Hill, Institutes, p. 256.
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position is but the logical implication of Hill's second proposition on the
nature of church power. Because church power is purely spiritual, exconmunication
must be a purely spiritual censure, devoid of civil consequences. Hill in adopt¬
ing this position places himself in the camp of the continental and Scottish
reformers. Calvin clearly disallowed the church's use of "prisons, fines, or
other punishments, like those inflicted by the civil magistrate";'' and George
Gillespie wrote, "The proper effect of ecclesiastical pov/er. ..is wholly
spiritual; for the act of binding and loosing, of retaining and remitting sins,
doth reach to the soul and conscience.
But to state that the magistrate does not have the power of excommunication,
neither initially nor additionally, does not really answer the question as to
who does. At the time of the reformation basically two answers were given,
both of which found a place in the Church of Scotland. Luther taught that
excommunication was a matter for the whole congregation; in fact, it was valid
x
only when so exercised. This position is evident in the Order of Excommunication,
adopted by the General Assembly in 1569* According to that document excommunica¬
tion is pronounced in the name of Christ, "and at the Commandment of this
present Congregation";^- and likewise absolution is declared "in the Kama and
Authoritie of Jesus Christ with Consent of this hole Ministry £"ses,s\or\_J and
Church ^congregation^."5 Calvin, on the other hand, taught that excommunication
was to be exercised by the consistory (ministers and ruling elders) "with the
knowledge and approbation of the Church; but in such a manner that the multitude
1 Calvin, Institutes, 4:11:3.
2 G. Gillespie, CXI Propositions, Ho. 74.
3 Luther* s Worts (ed. Helmut T. Lehmann), Vol. 41, pp. 17-18; Luther1 s
Werke (Weimar ed.J^ Vol. XXX, ii, 16, "Von den Schlusseln".
4 "The Ordoure of Excoinmunicatioun and of Publick Repentance", Dunlop,
op.cit., p. 740.
5 Ibid. , p. 746.
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of people may not direct the px-oceedings." ' This position, set forth by
2 i
Rutherford and Gillespie, eventually found expression in the Westminster
Confession of Faith.
The Lord Jesus, as King and head of his church, hath therein appointed
a government in the hands of Church officers....To these officers the
keys of the kingdom of heaven are committed, by virtue whereof they have
powex* respectively to retain and remit sins.^
It is the second position which Hill adopts. He believes that Christ gives the
pov/er of disciple to church office-bearers and not to the people at large. This
position is not without contemporary advocates. Bultmann says that "Matt, i6j i9
and 18;18 testify that the authority 'to bind and to loose', i.e., a disciplinary
power, lay first in the hands of Peter, then in those...of the elders.
And B&rth contends that Christ gave the key not to the people but to the apostles
as the primary witnesses of the church,^
It is meaningless for us to commend Hill, for stating that the church's
power of discipline is to be limited by the sovereign authority of Christ, for,
according to Bannarraann, this is "plain and obvious." But we should note that
Hill also insists that this power is to be limited by the liberties of individual
Christians. This, perhaps, is not so obvious. For instance, A.G. MacDougal
believed that even Calvin missed this point. "In method he carried over to the
Reformation the mediaeval spirit of regulation in religion and morality at the
1 Calvin, Ins titute's2*; 12"; 7 •
2 Rutherford, Divine Right of Church-Government and Excommunication, p. 236.
"Christ hath not committed the keys to all, bub to Church rulers....we can shew
the keyes, and binding and loosing, and opening and shutting to be given to
Officers and Rulers." Cf. Peaceable Plea for Paul's Presbyterie, p. 7 J
Due Right of Presbyteries, p. 7.
3 G. Gillespie, Aaron's Rod Blossoming, p. 191. "This power of binding
and loosing belongeth neither to private Christians, nor to civil magistrates,
but to church officers."
^ Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter 30:1-2.
5 R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Vol. I, p. 61.
6 Barth, Church Dogmatics, l/2, p. 2*87.
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expense of individual liberty," Perhaps Hill's sensitivity to t'ns rights of
individual believers spx-ang from the rationalism of his ok age rather than
from Biblical principles; but regardless of the source, we can be glad that Hill
used his influence to curb the inquisitorial tendencies of earlier times. As
noted earlier, he sought to substitute for "rigor in discipline" a "temperate
exercise of discipline."2
It was, in part, on the ground of its inquisitorialiness that Hill opposed
the Roman doctrine of potestas 51axpTht,XT) , There were, however, more funda¬
mental reasons for his opposition. We mention several of these in Hill's
defense. First, as opposed to Rome, Hill taught that the power of the keys
exercised in exconmunicatior: refers only to the church. In voicing his opinion
to Rome at this point, he is only echoing the words of Calvin. "When Christ
promises that what his ministers bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, he
limits the power of binding to the censure of the church. "3 Most coiimentators
still favor this interpretation.^ '
Secondly, as opposed to Rome, Hill taught that only God can forgive sins.
Once again Hill reflects the refornsd position. Calvin argues that when Christ
enjoined the apostles to preach forgiveness, He did not convey to them what
was peculiar to Himself; "it is He alone who forgives sins.Outside the Roman
Catholic pale this is still the accepted interpretation, A.E.J. Rawlinson writes,
"only God can forgive man's sins against himself";^ and Barth reasons that if
1 A.G. HacDougail, The Power of the Keys (unpublished' PhJlJI thesis,
New College Library), p. T55»
2 Hill, Institutes, pp. 251f. 5 Calvin, Institutes, 4:12:10.
A F. Filson, op.cit., Matt. 16:19; Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/3/3>
p. 861; A.B. Bruce, Expositors Greek Testament, Matt. iSr18;" W.C. Allen,
International Critical Commentary, Matt. 16:19; Hoskyns, The Fourth Gospel,
John 20:23.
5 Calvin, Commentary on the Gospel of John, 20:23.
6 Rawlinson, op.cit., p. 91.
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men are loosed from their sins then this forgiveness must be accomplished by the
po?/er of Christ, "for what other power could do it?" ' It should be noted, however,
that this interpretation does not mean that the only forgiveness which the church
can preach is that of her own making, i.e., forgiveness in terms of the removal
of church censures. This certainly was not the case for Calvin, the reason
being that he always held the Y/ord of Christ and the forgiveness of Christ
in the closest possible relation: "all the power of binding and loosing, which
p
Christ has conferred on the Church, is inseparable from the word." True,
Christ did not give the power of forgiveness to men, but it does belong to the
Word of which He made men ministers.3 Therefore, as men preach the true Y/ord
of Christ, they preach the power of His forgiveness; or as Calvin himself put
it, "it is he alone who forgives sins through his apostles and ministers."^
Thirdly, Hill, because of the distinction implied in this interpretation,
opposes Rome by making a distinction between the declarative and authoritative
power of the church, or a distinction between the key of doctrine and the key
of discipline. This distinction is both significant and conmendable for several
(■reasons.0 In the first place, this distinction guarantees the presence of both
the declarative and authoritative power in the church. It would be detrimental
to the message of the church if the church conceived its power to be purely
authoritative; but it would be equally detrimental to the character of the
church if the church conceived its power to be purely declarative. Calvin
1 Bar'th7~Chur'ch Dogmatics, Tl/2., p. 442.
2 Calvin, Institutes, 3:4:14.
3 Ibid. , 4:11:1. "Strictly speaking, Christ has not given thi3 power
to men, but to his word, of which he has appointed men to be the ministers."
4 Calvin, Coninentary on the Gospel of John, 20:23.
5 For a comparison of the differences between the key of doctrine and
the key of discipline see Durham, Treatise Concerning Scandal, 93^•; Walter
Steuart, Collections, p. 202; Bannerman, Church of Christ, Vol. II, p. 194f.
6 Macpherson, op.cit., p. 146, "very disastrous results would follow
from a failure to observe the distinction."
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maintained that as Christ has given both powers to the church both should be
i -
exercised in the church. This distinction ensures that such shall be the case.
In the second place , this distinction is significant and commendable because
it does not permit the forgiveness of Christ and the forgiveness of the church
to become identified as one and the same thing. Although the two may overlap,
this is not always the case. There may be times when Christ forgives and the
church does not, and times when the church forgives and Christ does not. This
distinction allows for the difference. It acknowledges the fallibility of
humanity in the exercise of church power. On the basis of this distinction
O
Gillespie wrote, "unjust excommunication is void.'" Bannerman said, "If the
judgment pronounced by the church or its office-bearers...be inconsistent with
the mind of Christ,... then the decision is itself invalid."^ Cunningham,
contends that "all the judgments and decisions of ecclesiastical office-bearers
are...unless they are consonant to the word of God...of no force or vitality."^
Rutherford held that excommunication could not separate "a member from Christ's
Body, only unbelief doth that."5 This is exactly the position which Hill adopts,
and he does so on the basis of a distinction between the key of doctrine and the
key of discipline. In the third place, this distinction maintains a further
distinction between the ground of absolution in the exercise of declarative power
and the ground of absolution in the exercise of authoritative power. "The first
doth only absolve a sinner upon the condition of saving grace, but the other
doth absolve upon an outwsrd serious profession of repentance."^ According to
1 Calvin, Institutes, 4:1*1:1; Conmentary on Matthew, 1 ST 18, 18:18.
2 G. Gillespie, CXI Propositions, No. 74.
3 Bannerman, Church of Christ, Vol. I, p. 221.
4 Cunningham, Church Principles, p. 246.
5 Rutherford, Divine Right of Church-Government and Excoionunication, p. 262.
6 YtTalter Steuart, Collections, p. 202.
Macpherson this is the great contribution of this distinction, "for it would
be a very dangerous and hurtful thing were the church in the exercise of the
key of discipline to make saving grace rather than a serious profession the
condition upon which censure or absolution is pronounced."'' For these reasons
it is commendable that Hill maintained a distinction between the declarative
and authoritative power of the church.
Hill does not treat in detail either the procedure for inflicting a censure
or the procedure for removing one. He says generally that the church should
rebuke and admonish before excommunicating, and that the church should always
be ready to pronounce absolution "upon satisfying evidence of repentance."--'
This last statement contains an unfortunate phrase which points to an unfoi'tunate
weakness in Hill's position, that is, the principle of "satisfying the church."
One might think it strange to find any concex/t of satisfaction in Hill's doctx'ine
of potestas &ia.xp£rixr] especially in the light of his own condemnation of Rome
for teaching that "acts of penance" are to be "considered as a satisfaction for
sin.This principle, however, is not unique with Hill, but reflects a coranon
practice in the Church of Scotland, dating as far backas the First Book of
r
Discipline.-'' Nov/ the fact that a concept of "satisfaction" is found in this
document which clearly abhors the teaching of Rome forces us to ask in what way
the term was used. The central point to note is that the purpose of acts of
repentance was not to satisfy for sins but to "satisfy the church"; i.e.,
1 Hacpherson, op.cit., p. 1 l+bl
2 For such procedures see, "The Ordoure of Excoimiunicatioun and of Publick
Repentance", Dunlop, op.cit., Vol. II, pp. 70"lf.; "The Order of Proceeding to
Excommunication" and "The Order of Proceeding to Absolution", Alexander
Henderson, The Government and Order of the Church of Scotland, pp. 19f."The
Form of Process in the Judicatories of the Church of Scotland with relation to
Scandals and Censures" (ratified by General Assembly, 1707), Walter Steuart,
Collections, pp. 21+3f.
3 Hill, Institutes, p. 256. k Hill, L.I.D., Vol. Ill, p. 539.
5 I.M. Clark, A History of Church Discipline in Scotland, p. 150.
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manifest to the church the sincerity of repentance. According to Macpherson,
these early Scottish theologians, influenced by the principles of common sense,"
were not vailing to accept a mere verbal acknowledgement of sin.^ Such a
confession may be insincere; therefore, the only sincere profession was a visible
one. When a person was willing to fulfil the prescribed course of public acts
of repentance, he "satisfied the kirk" that his repentance was genuine and that
he was thus in a position to be freed from the censure and restored to the full
fellowship of the church.
No doubt this is the sense in which Hill spoke of the "satisfying evidence
of repentance." But in spite of the teaching behind the practice, the language
itself is highly questionable. To refer to "making satisfaction," even if only
to the church, is a dangerous way of speaking, for there is the eminent possibi¬
lity that people will think of such action in tax-ms of punishment which. atones
for the wrong coxanitted.^ Grace then becomes conditional as opposed to free,
and forgiveness is pronounced on the basis of merit. This language is
especially dangerous in the light of the fact that Hill and the Moderates
taught that repentance was prior to forgiveness. With this anti-Scriptural
doctrine ringing in their ears, people engaged in acts of satisfaction and
repentance could not help but think that such actions, at least in part,
v/ere the grounds from which forgiveness proceeded. This unfortunate practice,
to which Hill adhered, causes one to suspect that in a final analysis he used
discipline to bring men to repentance that they might be forgiven rather than
to aid men in responding to the forgiveness already offered them in the gospel.
1 Ibid., p. 159. 2 Macpherson, op.cit., p. 147.
3 Durham, Treatise Concerning Scandal, p. 78; "We say, Every verbal
Acknowledgment of a Fault, even tho' it have a Promise of amending, is not
sufficient."
4 Cf. H.S. Franks's discussion on Tertullian's phrases aut solvere aut
satisfacere, aut poena aut satisfactio, aut poena aut venia. The Work of
Christ, p. 80.
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C• I'he Distribution and Exercise of the Power Implied in Church Government
In dividing church power into potastas Soppo/ru xt}, fetaraxttxri, and 61c,xptrixri
Hill classifies it according to the objects which it embraces, namely, creeds,
canons, and conduct. At this point, however, Hill is not interested in the
objects of church power but in the administration of that power. This change
of emphasis calls for a change of classification - a classification based on the
"manner" in which church power is "distributed and exercised."^ This principle
of allocation results in a distinction between the judicial, legislative, and
executive powers in the church. The new arrangement does not mean that Hill
is treating a new power; he is simply treating a new aspect of the same power.
1. Judicial power
Judicial power refers to the right of exercising judgment on the basis of
law. The judicial power of the church appears most clearly in the infliction
2
and removal of censures. As noted above, Hill believes that this power is
entrusted to church office-bearers as opposed to the state or individuals
en masse. But it must be asked more specifically, to which groups of office¬
bearers is this power coranitted?
With regard to laymen, judicial power resides in the kirk session of the
parish to which the layman belongs. It is in this court, the most inferior
judicatory in the presbyterian system, that "judicial power...must originate."3
Although the minister, as moderator of the session, actually administers the
discipline, he does so only on the authority and with the approval of the whole
body. This procedure is of two-fold benefit to laymen. First, by it, they are
"secured from suffering by the caprice of an individual"; and secondly, because
1 Hill, Institutes, p. 22% 2 Supra, p. "473.™
3 Hill, Institutes, p. 230. Cf. J.T. Cox, Practice and Procedure in
the Church of Scotland, p. 302.
4 Cf. Cox, op.cit>, p. 302.
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they are placed lender the inspection of their own kirk session "no other
Ecclesiastical Court is entitled to interfere in the first instance*"^ However,
once a judicial matter comes before a kirk session, it "may ascend through the
2
gradation of judicatories, so as to be finally decided by the General Assembly.""
With regard to ministers, judicial power resides originally with the
presbytery.^ Because the office of minister is superior to that of an elder, and
because the minister is officially the moderator of his own kirk session, he
is not amenable to the jurisdiction of that body. He is, therefore, directly
responsible to his immediate superiors, the presbytery. Just as the session
exercises censorial inspection over its lay parishioners, so the presbytery
exercises censorial inspection over its ministers. But beyond this general
inspection the presbytery has the right to enquire in what mariner a minister
performs his official duty and what doctrine he teaches. And ministers, besides
being liable to the same censures as laymen, may also be suspended or deposed.-''
In consequence of the connection between church and state, a sentence of
deposition deprives a minister of his stipend and renders his parish vacant
in the eyes of the law.
2. Legislative power
Legislative power refers to the right of making laws. Every judicatory
in the presbyterian system has the right to make special rules to regulate the
form of its own proceedings. However, when Hill speaks about the legislative
power of the church, he is not speaking about the right of making such "partial
enactments," but about "the power of making standing laws concerning matters
of general importance which are binding upon all the members and judicatories
of the Church."^ From the first establishment of presbyterian government in
1560 standing laws proceeded from the sole authority of the G-eneral Assembly.
~~1 Hill, Institutes, p. 230. 2 Ibid. , p. 230. Of. Cox, op.cit. , p. 309.
3 16id., pp. 230-231. Cf. Cox, op.cit., p. 303.
2f Ibid. , p. 231. Cf. Cox, op.cit., p. 298.
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This procedure prevailed until 1697 •when the Church of Scotland passed an act
called the Barrier Act. Hill describes briefly the method of enacting
permanent statutes prescribed by that act.
The proposal of making a new general law, or of repealing an old one, which
in our ecclesiastical language, is an overture, originates with some
individual, who generally lays it before his Presbytery or Synod, that,
if they approve, it may be sent to the General Assembly as their overture.
The General Assembly may dismiss the overture, if they judge it
unnecessary, or improper; may adopt it as it was sent, or may introduce
any alteration which the matter or form seems to require. If it is not
dismissed, it is transmitted by the General Assembly, in its original
or its amended form, to the several Presbyteries of the Church for their
consideration, with an injunction to send up their opinion to the next
General Assembly, who may pass it into a standing law, if the more
general opinion of the Church agree thereunto.3
The Barrier Act, according to its own preamble, was intended "for preventing
any sudden alteration, or innovation, or other prejudice to the Church, in either
doctrine, worship, discipline, or government, now happily established therein."^
5
llill, as we might expect, considers this to be a worthy purpose. In fact,
"any person who considers the momentary impressions incident to all large
bodies of men in the heat of debate, or in their zeal for a particular object,
will not think it advisable that a court so numerous as the General Assembly
...should have the uncontroulled power of making standing laws upon the spur of
the occasion."^
Tot, it must be acknowledged that the operation of the Barrier Act produces
great tardiness in the legislation of the church - for several reasons. Some
presbyteries neglect to send opinions to the next General Assembly; some
presbyteries approve of the law in question only if certain sections are deleted;
1 The full text of the act is printed as Appendix I, Cox, op.cit. , p. .
The act is still in effect today in the Church of Scotland. Cf. Cox, op.cit.,
pp. 15, 98, 169.
2 Cf. Cox, op.cit., p. 97. 3 Hill, Institutes, pp. 234-235.
4 Ibid., p. 235. Cf. Cox, op.cit., p. 361.
5 Supra, p., 470. 6 Hill, Institutes, p. 235.
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some approve only if certain additions are made. The result is that years
may elapse before a majority of presbyteries settle on a lav/ acceptable to all.
Hill contends that the remedy to this problem is to be found in the "legislative
authority which the Barrier Act seams to reserve to the General Assembly."'
If the General Assembly has sanctioned an overture to be presented to the
presbyteries for their approval or disapproval, it has the authority, while
waiting for the judgment of the presbyteries to convert the overture into what
is called an "interim act."2 An interim act has the authority of a standing
law, but only temporarily; it is binding on the church only until the next
General Assembly, at which time, on the basis of the vote of the presbyteries,
it may reject the lav/ altogether, or establish it as a permanent statute.^
Hill thinks this is an excellent procedure. On the one hand, the power of
passing interim acts cannot produce irrevocable evil; yet on the other hand,
it has the effect of arousing presbyteries to consider the overtures transmitted
to them.*1"
3. Executive power
- Executive power refers to the right of executing laws. In terms of church
power it refers to the right of directing ecclesiastical business according to
the laws of the ecclesiastical constitution. From its first meeting under the
authority of Parliament in 1560 the General Assembly "assumed" this power. In
1578, however, the Second Book of Discipline specified that certain executive
5
powers should be relegated to synods and presbyteries. The suggestions made by
this document were confirmed as laws by an act of Parliament in 1592.^ But
1 Ibid., p. 236. 2 Ibid.,' p. 236. Gf. Cox, 'op.'cit. , p. 16.
3 ikid., pp. 236-237. Cf. Cox, op.cit., p. 16.
4 Ibid., p. 237.
5 Second Book of Discipline, 7:20. Cf. Dunlop, op.cit., p. 781.
6 The full text of this act is printed as Appendix II, Hill's Institutes,
pp. 426f. According to Hill it was "properly termed the law of the land
respecting our ecclesiastical constitution" (p. 239).
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despite the fact that some executive pov/ers have been given to the inferior
courts, "the supreme executive power remains with the G-eneral Assembly,"
It is essential to the presbyterian system that this be the case. Hill cites
with approval the words of James Finlayson.
The existence of this authority is essential to the unity and vigor of our
political system. Without it the Church of Scotland would soon lose its
glory, and separate into a number of petty independent judicatories,
scattered over the districts of the country, unepual to their own defgnce,
and insufficient for the purposes of an ecclesiastical establishment."
In exercising its executive power the General Assembly issues peremptory
mandates, summoning individuals and inferior courts to appear at its bar; sends
precise orders to particular judicatories, directing, assisting, or restraining
them in the performance of their duties; maintains soundness of doctrine by
checking irregularities; enforces the observance of standing laws throughout
all courts; and generally concerns itself to preserve the good order and to
3
promote the common weal of the whole church.
Obviously, it is impossible for a court which meets "only once a year for
ten days" to deal with all the matters brought before it. Besides, circumstances
may arise in the interval between General Assemblies which call for the exercise
of the supreme executive power of the church. "The constitution of the Church
of Scotland, therefore, is completed by the Commission of the General Assembly."'1'
Hill describes a commission of the assembly as "a court composed of the Moderator
and all the members, with the addition of one who is named by the Moderator,5
which meets after the Assembly is dissolved, without the representation of the
1 Hill, Institutes, p. 239. This fact, says Hill, caused James
Pinlayson to speak of the General Assembly as "the corner-stone of our ecclesias¬
tical government" (p. 241).
2 Ibid., p. 242. Hill indicates that the quotation comes from an article
Pinlayson wrote in 1797 supporting the General Assembly overture respecting
chapels of ease.
3 Ibid., p. 240. Cf. The Second Book of Discipline,' 7:23-24; Cox,
op.cit., pp. 188-189.
4 Ibid. , p. 244. Cf. Cox, op.cit., p. 190.
5 Cf. Cox, op.cit., p. 191.
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Sovereign, and may be considered as a Conraittee of the whole House." A
commission is legally constituted when at any time thirty-one of the commissioners
to the last Assembly, of which at least twenty-one are ministers, finding them-
?
selves assembled in one place, proceed to chose a moderator. Usually the
moderator of the last Assembly gives public notice of the intention to constitute
a commission; but the moderator, by withholding his compliance, cannot prevent
a commission from meeting. The Commission of the General Assembly is appointed
to meet on four stated days in the Assembly Hall, but it is also free to meet
wherever it choose as often as it thinks "fit and convenient.No private
processes, however, may be determined except at the four stated meetings.
Because the commission is a delegated court, its members are accountable for
all their actions to the next General Assembly, which may reverse their sentences,
and censure those who concurred in them, if it is determined that they have
exceeded their powers? "that is, have either meddled in any other matters than
what v,/ere committed and referred to them, or have acted contrary to the acts
and constitutions of the Church." Within these limits, however, the commission
is "vested with the executive authority of the General Assembly."4
But if the Commission of the General Assembly may err, so may the Assembly
itself. "As the decisions of the General Assembly, which constitute the common
law of the church, may give a false interpretation of the statute law, so the
orders of the General Assembly may infringe the constitutional liberties of the
separate judicatories. "5 When an opinion comes to prevail throughout the church
that the General Assembly has acted improperly, the representatives sent by
presbyteries to future General Assemblies may reverse the decisions of past
1 Hill, "institutes, pp. 244-245. Cf. Cox", op.cit., p. 191. ~ ~
2 Ibid., p. 246. Cf. Cox, op.cit., p. 191.
3 Ibid., p. 245. Cf. Cox, op.cit. , p. 191.
4 Ibid. , p. 247. Cf. Cox, op.cit., p. 190.
5 Ibid., p. 240.
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assemblies ana may pass acts applying the proper remedy to the abuse of
authority and preventing the repetition of that abuse. "The executive power may
err in the church, as in the State; and in both, the errors of the executive
are corrected by the voice of the legislative."''
Hill concludes:
Prom this delineation of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland, it
appears that the distribution of power amongst the Courts of which it is
composed, is artificial and skilful. The Judicial power ascends through
all the Courts, terminating in the General Assembly; The Legislative
both originates and ends there, with this restriction upon the exercise
of it, that, without the concurrence of' a majority of Presbyteries, the
General Assembly cannot enact any standing law: The Supreme Executive
is lodged in the General Assembly, whose orders direct and controul the
inferior branches, until the whole body declare that they are illegal.
In this distribution of power, there is sufficient energy and vigour for
the dispatch of business; there is a tardiness only with regard to that
which of all things requires the most deliberation, the enactment of
permanent laws; and there is a provision made for the constitutional
operation of that jealousy natural and proper in all republics, by which
the rights and liberties of the inferior branches are defended against
encroachment, and the General Assembly, however respectable by the
description of its members, and the various offices assigned it, is
effectually restrained from making innovations. This Constitution
gives the ministers of the Church of Scotland a voice in framing
those regulations which are enacted to direct their conduct: it
affords them such opportunities of displaying personal talents as are
unknown under Episcopal government, and it has a tendency to form that
manly, enlightened, and independent mind, which becomes all who are
employed in the ministrations of the sacred office.
Hill's exposition of the church's judicial, legislative, and executive powers
is consistent with that of normative presbyterian polity. Except for those parti¬
cular regulations arising fTora the relationship of church and state and the size
of the Assembly in Hill's own time, his explanation of these powers is identical
to that adopted by the Church of Scotland today. It is pointless to copy out that
explanation as it is so easily accessible in J.T. Cox's Practice and Procedure in
the Church of Scotland. The footnote references in the exposition of Hill's
position will direct the reader to parallel passages in that work which verify
our contention.





As specified in the Preface, the purpose of this thesis was to study th©
doctrine of the church in the federal scheme of theology. We conclude,
therefore, with a concise statement of the findings which have been reached
through an exposition and evaluation of George Hill's ecclesiology.
Though federal theology does not greatly effect the form and order of
the church, it produces far-reaching effects upon an understanding of the
nature, mission, and worship of the church. Perhaps it is best to formulate ,
the doctrine of the church in federal theology in terms of the effects which
the chief characteristics of this scheme have upon ecclesiology. Obviously,
in a system as comprehensive as the federal system, doctrines often effect
more than one aspect of ecclesiology, and aspects of ecclesiology are effected
by more than one doctrine; but to avoid repetition, we shall limit ourselves to
1
the most obvious connections.
1. Perhaps the chief differential of federal theology is the way in
which it replaces the one covenant God made for man with the covenant of
works and the covenant of grace. This distinction forces a dichotomy
between the sphere of nature and the sphere of grace - between creation and
redemption. The results for the doctrine of the church are two-fold.
(a). Only the church, as the sphere marked out by the covenant of grace,
receives the benefits of the mediatorial work of Christ. The rest of the
world is related to Christ only as the Creator. This means, then, that the
relationship between the church and the world, the church and state, cannot
be understood Christologically, but only in terms of natural and positive law.
(b). In the dichotomy between nature and grace, grace conforms to nature,
1 In formulating the following statements, I am end„ebted to the Rev.
J.B. Torrance who placed at my disposal a paper which he prepared for the
Committee on Worship of the Church of Scotland.
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or to put it another way, grace presupposes nature. The tendency, therefore,
is for the church to develop an "other worldly" attitude and manifest a lack
of concern for the ethical problems of this world.
2. A second distinction of federal theology is the way in which it
defines a covenant in contractual terms. Whereas a covenant brings its
obligations, a contract brings its conditions. This confusion between covenant
and contract leads to the notion of conditional grace, inverts the evangelical
order of forgiveness and repentance, and represents the Covenant-G-od as a
Contract-God. The effects on the doctrine of the church are four-fold,
(a). It effects the content of the church's evangelical proclamation. The
church cannot proclaim to all men unconditionally the costly, but free, grace
of God. The church can only preach the law in such a way as to produce
conviction of sin and fear of judgment so that it can call upon the sinner to
repent in order that he might receive the grace of God. The church cannot
in the name of Christ proclaim the free forgiveness of sins for all. (b).
It effects the church's worship. Worship appropriate to a Covenant-God is
radically different from that appropriate to a Contract-God. The one is a
worship of joy and gratitude; the other can be a worship of fear and anxiety.
The former is the true nature of the church's worship, the second is not; yet
it is the second which federal theology too readily encourages. (o). It
effects the purpose of the church's discipline. Whenever "evangelical repentance,"
where the order is forgiveness then repentance, is replaced by "legal repen¬
tance," where the order is repentance then forgiveness, the purpose of the
1 An illustration of this danger may be found in contemporary America.
Since God made men by nature black and white, and since grace does not destroy
nature but conforms to nature, justification is supposedly found for the fact
that black and white Christians should worship apart. It is precisely on the
basis of this dichotomy between nature and grace that "federal" churches in the




church's discipline is not so much to encourage a person to respond to the
forgiveness already offered in Christ, hut to aid the person in fulfilling
the conditions for receiving the forgiveness of Christ. Such a purpose is
foreign to the gospel. (d). It effects the church's interest so that it
becomes anthropocentric in its emphasis. Whenever a doctrine of conditional
grace is taught, emphasis moves away from what Christ has done for us to
what we must do if we would receive the blessing of God. This shift of
emphasis from the objective pole to the subjective pole results in the church's
placing less importance on the indicatives of grace and more importance on
2
the imperatives of repentance, man's faith and obedience.
3. A third characteristic of federal theology is the way in which
it substitutes for the doctrine of union with Christ the doctrine of forensic
relationship with Christ. There are five immediate results effecting the church,
(a). This results in a meagre concept of the church as the Body of Christ.
The loss of the idea of the church's mystical participation in Christ, together
with the anthropocentric emphasis, can and did lead to a voluntarist doctrine
of the gathered church. (b). The church is denied the true ground of its
unity, for its oneness is based upon its union with Christ. As there is only
one Christ, so there can be only one church united to Him as the earthly,
historical form of His existence. By interpreting this union in contractual
1 It was this which led Thomas Boston and the Marrow Men to reformulate
federal theology in an attempt to aleviate any doctrine of the "conditionality
of the covenant of grace."'
2 It is interesting to note that this feature of federalism produced
both eighteenth century Evangelicalism and Moderatism. Each in its own way
emphasized what the individual must do. The Evangelicals stressed the necessity
of meeting the condition of faith in the gospel; the Moderates stressed the
necessity of meeting the condition of obedience to the law. Though miles
apart in their mature formulations, both movements sprang from the same root -
the anthropocentricity of federal theology.
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terms, federal theology opens the way for the church's God-given diversities
to be corrupted into sinful divisions, (c). Separated from union with Christ,
the nature of the church degenerates from that of a living organism to that
of an external organization. It possesses no principle of life, only a
principle of order. It cannot grow up into the fulness of Christ, but can
only change its external appearance. (d). Interpreted in the light of the
church's judicial relationship with Christ, the sacraments lose their character
as evangelical ordinances proclaiming the grace of God, lose their purpose
as means of ingrafting believers into Christ and of nourishing that mystical
union, and become instead badges of one's personal covenant, signs of one's
intention to keep one's part of the divine-human bargain. (e). Because of
the loss of the doctrine of union with Christ, federal theologians, in their
doctrine of the church, can have no adequate understanding of the institutional
ministry as a participation in the one essential ministry of Christ. They
can only present the ministry in terms of its pragmatic usefulness to the
external society.''
4. A fourth definitive feature of federal theology is the doctrine of
limited atonement, the idea that Christ died only for certain elect individuals.
The effects of this anti-scriptural doctrine upon ecclesiology are two-fold,
(a). The doctrine of limited atonement drives a wedge between the visible
and invisible aspects of the church. In the federal scheme, the invisible
church is composed of the elect, whereas the visible church includes all who
have "made their covenant." At best this idea can only lead to the doctrine
°^* eccTesiola in ecclesia, a belief in the existence of a separate dlite,
a spiritual church consisting of elect individuals drawn from the ranksof the
church visible. At worst the distinction between the two aspects becomes
1 Once again we note, and understand, the concern of Boston and the
Marrow Men to recover the doctrine of union with Christ.
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so deep that the one church is split into two, a visible church and an invisible
church. Once this separation is effected, the visible church itself begins
to divide, and, as mentioned above, no effective remedy is offered by the
federal scheme. (b). The doctrine of limited atonement implies a loss of
the notion of Christ's solidarity with all men. This loss effects not only
the church's doctrinal emphasis in terms of overemphasis on the atonement at
the expense of the incarnation, but it also effects the extent of the church's
proclamation. Limited atonement means that the church cannot say to all men
unequivocally, "Christ died for you." Consequently preaching is often rele¬
gated to a place of secondary importance, and missionary zeal is hampered by
1
the fear of proclaiming a lie to the non-elect. Any church, therefore,
which separates the Person and work of Christ will find it difficult to fulfill
its divinely ordained purpose of proclaiming to all men the grace, and love,
and forgiveness of God in Jesus Christ.
Although every federal theologian will not necessarily manifest every
one of these weaknesses in his doctrine of the church (as the references to
the Marrow Men have indicated), our study of George Hill's ecclesiology has
disclosed that everyone of them is inherent in the federal scheme, and that
if the theologian is a consistent federalist, he will in fact give evidence
of them. We conclude, therefore, that the doctrine of the church in federal
theology is an impoverishment and restriction of Kew Testament ecclesiology.
1 As the Marrow Men clearly attest, there may be exceptions among
federal theologians at these points, but to the extent that great significance
is placed upon the preaching of the gospel to all men, these exceptional theolo¬
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APPENDIX D
George Hill's contribution to Scottish Theology .
George Hill was not, nor did he claim to be, an original thinker.
Yet despite the fact that his writing is not original, it is important if
for no other reason than the very fact that he did write it. It should be
remembered that Hill lived during a period when theological discussion was
generally disdained and theological writing was avoided. It is highly
significant, therefore, that Hill, going against the grain of popular opinion,
devoted his time and effort to the composition and publication of works such
as his Lectures in Divinity and his Theological Institutes. These works,
however, are significant in themselves for two reasons. (a). Precisely
because they were compiled when so little else was being written, they give
us insights into the theological thinking of the period which we would not
otherwise have. This is especially true with regard to the Moderate Party,
for all practical purposes Hill can be described as the only writing theologian
of the Moderate persuasion, (b). The Lectures in Divinity, because of it's
distribution and construction, was well arranged as a text-book in theology,
and so it served for several generations after its publication. Thus to the
extent that it was so widely read, though not whole-heartedly accepted, it





Abridgement of the Acts of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland,
"i5o0^l"o/j.Q5 Aberdeen, "TS52.
Acton, J. E. E.D. , The History of Freedom and Other Essays, London: Macmillan
and Co., 1919.
Acts of the General Assembly, 1638-182^2, Edinburgh: Edinburgh Printing and
Publishing Co., 1843"
Adams, James, The Snake in the Grass, Edinburgh; for the Author, 1719.
Alexander, A., Forces of Religious Thought, Glasgow; Maclehose and Jackson, 1920.
Allen, W.C., Gospel According to St. Matthew (l.C.C.), Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
1907.
Ames, William, Marrow of Sacred Divinity, London; House of Commons, 1645.
Anderson, J,24, Matriculation Roll of the University of St. Andrews, Edinburgh;
Scottish History Society, 19267
Anonymous, Review of Principal Hill's Theological Institutes, January, 1802+.
Aul&n, Gustaf, "The Church in the Light of the New Testament", The Universal
Church in God's Design (prepared under the auspices of the World Council
of Churche7)7~London; S.C.M. Press, 1948.
Ayton, Thomas, The Original Constitution of the Christian Church, Edinburgh;
John Pa ton, 1730.
Bacon, Francis, Collected Works (eds. Spedding, Ellis, and Heath), London; 1857.
Baillie, D.M. , God Was In Christ, London; Faber & Faber, 1948.
Baillie, John (Convener), Reports of the Commission of the General Assembly _of
the Church of Scotland on God's Will for Church and Nation, London:
S.C.M. Press, 194-6.
Baillie, Robert, Letters and Journals (ed. David Laing), Edinburgh;
Robert Ogle, 1841.
Ball, John, A Treatise of the Covenant of Grace, London; Edward Brewster, 162+5®
Bannerman, James, The Church of Christ; A Treatise on the Nature, Powers,
Ordinances, Discipline, and Government of the Christian Church, Edinburgh;
T. & T. Clark, 1S£B7*
Barclay, Robert, An Apology for the True Christian Divinity, As the same is Held
Forth, and Preached by the people, called in Scorn, Quakers, London;
T.S. Raylton, 173° (first published in 16757.
Barnes, R.P., and Grubb, K.G., "The Churches' Approach to International Affairs",
The Church and the International Disorder, London: S.C.M. Press, 1948.
508
Barrett, O.K., "Apostolic Succession", The Expository Times, Vol. LXX,
(eds. A.W. Hastings and K. Hastings), Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1959.
Barrow, Henry, A Brief Discovery of the False Churches, London; ~, 1707.
Barth, Karl, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Edinburgh; T. & T. Clark, 1936.
- The Church and the Churches, London* James Clarke <& Co., 1937.
- The Knowledge of Sod and the Service of God according to the Teaching of
the Reformation; recalling the Scottish Confession of 15 oO, London;
Hodder & StoughtonJ 193^.
- Church and State, London; S.C.M. Press, 1939.
- "The Living Congregation of the Living Lord Jesus Christ", The Universal
Church in God's Design, London; S.C. 14 Press, 1948.
- Church Dogmatics (eds. E.W. Brorailey, T.P. Torrance), Edinburgh;
T. & T. Clark, 1956-196k.
- From Rousseau to Ritschl, London; S.C.M, Press, 1959.
- Theology and Church, London; S.C.M. Press, 1962.
- Prayer and Preaching, London: S.C.M. Press, 1964.
Bell, G.K.A. , and Daissmann, A. (eds.), Mysterium Christi, London: Longmans
& Co., 1930.
Bell, G.K.A. , Christian Unity; The Anglican Position, London; Hodder and
Stoughton, 1948.
Bennett, J.C., "The Involvement of the Church", The Church and the Disorder of
Society, London: S.C.M, Press, 1948.
Berkeley, George, A New Theory of Vision and Other Select Philosophical Writings,
London; J.M. Dent & Sons, 1910.
- Commonplace Book (ed. G.A. Johnston), London; Faber and Faber, 1930.
Black, C.S., The Scottish Church, Glasgow: William McLellan, 1952.
Blair, Hugh, Sermons, Edinburgh; W. Greech, 1777-1801.
Bossuet, James Benigne, An Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church
in Matters of Controversie, London; -, 1685.
Boston, Thomas, Memoirs of the Life, Time and Writings of Thomas Boston, London:
W. Baynes, 1805.
- Works (ed. S. Kacmillan), Aberdeen; George & Robert King, 1848.
Bower, Alexander, History of the University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh: Waugh &
Innes, 1817.
509
Bromiley, G.W., Baptism and the Anglican Reformers, London: Lutterworth press,
1953.
. "
- The Unity and Disunity of the Church, Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Ferdmans, 1958.
Brown, Adams, "Covenant Theology1"", Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. IV
(ed. James Hastings), Edinburgh; T. & T. Clark, 1911.
Brown, P. Hume, History of Scotland, Cambridge: University Press, 1899-1909*
- A History of Scotland to the Present Time, Cambridge; University Press, 1911
Brown, Thomas, Church and State in Scotland, Edinburgh; Kacniven and Wallace,
1891.
Bruce, A.B., "The Gospel of Matthew", Expositors Greek Testament, Vol. I,
(ed. W.R. Nicoll), London; Hodder and Stoughton, 1897.
Bruce, P.P., Who are the Brethern?, London: Pickering and Inglis, 1962.
. Brunner, Enri.1, Revelation and Reason, London; S. C, M. Press, 1947.
- The Misunderstanding of the Church, London: Lutterworth Press, 1952.
- Truth as Encounter, London; S.C.M. Press, 19^.
"Brutus, Junius", A Defense of Liberty against Tyrants (a translation of the
Vindiciae contra Tyrannos by H.J. Laski)","London: G. Bell & Sons, 1924.
Buber, Martin, I and Thou, Edinburgh; T. & T. Clark, 1937.
»•
Buchanan, George, De jure Regni Apud Scotgs, A Dialogue Concerning the Rights
of the Crown in Scotland„ Edinburgh; Oliver & Boyd, 1843 (first published
in 1579).
Bultniann, Rudolf, Theolo.gy of the Hew Testament, London; S.C.M. Press, 1955.
Burleigh, J.H. S,, "The Presbyter in Presbyterianism", Scottish Journal of
Theology, Vol. II, Edinburgh; Oliver and Boyd, 192y9.
~ A Church History of Scotland, London; Oxford University Press, i960.
Burn-Murdoch, H., Church, Continuity and Unity, Cambridge; University Press,
1945.
Burrell, S.A., "The Covenant Idea as a Revolutionary Symbol", Church History,
Vol. XXVII, No. 4j The American Society of Church History, 1958.
Burton, J.H., The History of Scotland, Edinburgh; 'William Blackwood and
Sons, 1874.
Butler, Joseph, The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the
Constitution and Course of Nature , London: H.G. Bohn, 1852.
Cadoux, A.T., The Theology of Jesus, London: Nicholson and Watson, 1940.
510
Cadoux, C.J., The Historic ?:lission of Jesus, London: Lutterworth Press, 1941.
Caldervrood, David, The History of the Kirk of Scotland, Edinburgh; Edinburgh
Printing Co., 1843*
Calhoun, R.L., "Church, State, and Hunan Devotion", Church and State in the
Modern World, London; Harper and Brothers, 1937.
1s\
Calvin, John, Opera Selects, (ed. by Peter Barth), Muchen; Chr. Kaiser, 1926.
- "Draft Ecclesiastical Ordinances", Theological Treaties (Library of
Christian Classics, Vol. XXII), London; S.C.M. Press, 1954.
" Institutes of the Christian Religion, Philadelphia; Presbyterian Board
of Christian Education.
- Institutes of the Christian Religion (ed. J.T. McNeill, trans. Lev/is
Battles), "London; S. C.M. Press, 1960.
- Commentaries, Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1843.
- Commentaries (eds. David W. Torrance, Thomas P. Torrance), Edinburgh:
Oliver and Boyd, 1959.
Camfield, F.W., "Concerning the Ministry", Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. I,
Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1948.
Campbell, A.J., Two Centuries of the Church of Scotland, 1707-1929, Paisley;
Alexander Gardner, Ltd. , 1930.
Campbell, George, A Dissertation on Miracles, Edinburgh; Oliver & Boyd, 1812.
- Lectures on Ecclesiastical History, London; Thomas Tegg, 1840.
Campbell, P.C., The Theory of Ruling Eldership, Edinburgh: William Blackwood
& Sons, 1866.
Carey, K.M., The Historic Episcopate in the Fullness of the Church, Philadelphia;
Westminster Press, 1954.
Carlyle, A.J., "The Historic Episcopate", Towards Reunion, London; Macmillan
and Co., 1919.
Carlyle, Alexander, The Usefulness and Necessity of Liberal Education for
Clergymen, Edinburgh; W. Greech, 1793.
- Autobiography, Edinburgh: T.N. Foulis, 1910.
Carlyle, R.W., and Carlyle, A.J., A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in
the West, Edinburgh: Win. Blackwood and Sons, 1903-193^
Carr8, M.H., Phases of Thought in England, Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1949.
Cassirer, Ernst, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Princeton: Piinceton
University Press, 1951.
511
Cerfaux, L., The Church in the Theology of St. Paul , New York; Herder &
Herder, 1959.
Chalmers, Thomas, Prelictions on Butler's Analogy, Paloy's Evidences, and
Hill's Lectures in Divinity, Edinburgh: Sutherland and Knox, 1849.
Chamberlain, J.P., "The Mutual Obligations of Church and State", Church and
State in the Modern World, London: Harper and Brothers, 1957.
Chambers, Robert (ed.), Biographical Dictionary of Emminent Scotsmen, Glasgow;
Palaski & Son, 1855.
Church of Scotland, Interim Reports of the Special Commission on Baptism.
Clark, I.D.L., Mod eratism and the Moderate party in the Church of Scotland,
1752-18C5, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Kings College, Cambridge, 19^4^
Clark, I.K., History of Church Discipline in Scotland, Aberdeen: W. & W.
Lindsay, 1929.
Clarke, Samuel, Sermons, Vol. I, London: W. Botham, 1750.
Clarke, W.K.L., "The Origins of Episcopacy", Episcopacy Ancient and Modern
(eds. C. Jenkins and K.D. Mackenzie), London: SP.C.K. , 1930.
Clement of Rome, "First Epistle to the Corinthians", The Apostolic Fathers,
Vol. I (eds. A. Roberts and J. Donaldson), Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1867.
Cocceius, John, Summa Doctrinae de Foed6re et Testamento Dei, Genevae,
Sumptibus Ioann. Heriu. Widerhold, 1665 (first published in 1648).
- Opera, Vol. I, Amsterdam: no publisher, 1673.
Conolly, 14F,, (ed.) , Biographical Dictionary of Emminent Men of Fife, Edinburgh:
Inglis and. Jack, 18"6T6.
Constitution of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America
Cook, George, The Life of George Hill, Edinburgh; Archibald Constable & Co.,
1820.
Cooper, A.A. (3rd Earl of Shaftesbury), Characteristics of Men, Manners,
Opinions, and Times, London: 1711.
Cox, J.T. , Practice and Frocedure in the Church of Scotland (Fifth Edition,
ed. by J.B. Longmuir), Edinburgh; William Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1964.
Cragg, G.R., From Puritanism to the Age of Reason, London; Hoader & Stoughton,
1962.
Craig, T.C., "The Church of the New Testament", The Universal Church in God's
Design, London: 3.C.M. Press, 1948.
Craig, William, Sermons, London: J. Murray, 1775.
512
Cullmann, Oscar, The Early Church, London: S.C.M. Press, 1956.
- The State in the New Testament, London: S.C.M. Press, 1957.
Cunliffe-Jones, H. (ed„), The Congregational Ministry in the Modern World,
London; Independent Press, 1955.
Cunningham, John, Church History of Scotland, Edinburgh: James Thin, 1882.
Cunningham, William, Works, Edinburgh; T. & T. Clark,
" Discussions on Church Principles, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1863.
Cuno, P.W. , "Ramus, Petrus", The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia of Religious
Knowledge, Vol, IX (ed. S.M. Jackson), New fork: punk & Wagnalls, 1911.
Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechetical Lectures, Oxford: James Parker and Co. , 1872,
Dakin, Arthur, The Baptist Vie?; of the Church and Ministry, London: Baptist
Union Publication Dept., 1945.
Dall, John, "Presbyterianism", Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (ed. James
Hastings), Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark) 1918.
Davie, G.S., The Scotch Metaphysics, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Edinburgh
University Library, 1953.
- The Democratic Intellect, Edinburgh: University Press, 1961.
Dick, Thomas (1764-1857), The Philosophy of Religion, London: William Collins.
Dickson, David, Therapeutics Sacra, Edinburgh: Evan Tyler, 1664.
Dilli3tone, F.W., "Later Developments in the Ministry", The Ministry of the
Church (ed. S. Neill), London; Canterbury press, 1947.
Dix, Gregory, "The Ministry in the Early Church", The Apostolic Ministry
(ad. K.B. Kirk), London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1946,
Dodd, C.H., The Epistle of Paul to the Romans, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1932.
- The Apostolic Preaching and Its Developments, London: Kodder & Stoughton,
19367
Donaldson, Gordon, "The Polity of the Scottish Church, 1560-1600", Records of
the Scottish Church History Society, Vol. XI, 1955.
Dorner, J.A., History of Protestant Theology, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1871.
Douglas, Robert, The Duty of King and People, no Publisher, "A Sermon Preached
at Scoon, January first, 1o51. at the coronation of CHARLES the II. King of
Scotland, SngLand, Prance and Ireland."
513
Drysdale, John, Sermons, Edinburgh; A. Balfour, 1793»
Duncan, Alexander, A Preservation against the Principles of Infidelity,
Edinburgh; V/, Greech, 1774.
Dunkerley, Rodaric, The Ministry and the Sacraments, London; S,C.M. Press, 1937.
Dunlop, Ytrilliara (ed.), A_ Collection of Confessions of Faith, Catechisms,
Directories, Books of Discipline , .ate. of PubliclcAuthority in the
Church of Scotland, Edinburgh; James Watson, 1722.
Durham, James, Heaven upon Earth, Edinburgh; Andrew Anderson, 1685.
- The Dying Kan's Testament to the Church of Scotland; or A Treatise
concerning Scandal, Glasgow: Robert Urie & Co., 1740.'
Edwards, D.L., Not Angels but Anglicans, London: S.C.M. Press, 1958.
Ehrhardt, Arnold, The Apostolic Succession in the First Two Centuries of the
Church, London: Lutterworth Press, 1953.
- "The Apostolic Ministry", Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Paper,
No. 7, Edinburgh; Oliver and Boyd, 1958."
Erastus, Thomas, An Examination of That Most Grave Question, 'Thether
Excommunication, or the Debarring From the Sacraments of Professing Christians,
Because of Their Sins, Be a_ Divine Ordinance, or a_ Human Invention ("trans.
Robert Lee), Edinburgh; Myles Macphail, 1844 "("first published in 1589).
Erskine, Ebenezer, Sermon preached in 1732 be fore the synod of Perth and Sterling,
Edinburgh: Foot of West-Bow, 1732".
Erskine, John, Theological Pisserbations, Edinburgh; J. Pillar & Sons, 1808.
Erskine, John of Dun, "An Epistle Written to a Faithful Brother", The Miscellany
of the Spalding Club, Vol. IV, Aberdeen: Yfilliam Bennett, 1849.
Eusebius, "Church History", Nicene ana Post Nicene Fathers, Second Series,
Vol. I (eds. Philip Schaff and Henry Ware")")" Grand Rapids; W.B. Eerclmans,
1956.
Evans, Erastus, Erastianism, London: Epworth Press, 1933-
Fairbairn, A.M., "The Y/estminster Confession of Faith and Scotch Theology",
The Contemporary Review, Vol. XXI, London: Henry S. King & Co., 1873»
K
0 <*/
Fenner, Dudley, The Artes of Logike and Re thorite, Middleburgh, 1584.
- Sacra Theologia, Amstelodami; Sumptibus Henrici Laurenti, 1632.
Ferrfe, Nels F.S. Reason in Religion, Edinburgh; Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1963.
Field, Richard, Of the Church, Cambridge; University Press, 1847.
514
Figgis, J.N., "Erastus and Erastianism", Journal of Theological Studies
(©d. C.H. Turner), Vol. II, London: Macmillan & Co., 1901.
- "Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century", The Cambridge Modern History,
Vol. Ill, Cambridge; University Press, 1904.
- Churches in the Modern State, London; Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914.
Filson, F.V., A Coramentary on the Gospel accox-ding to St. Matthew, London;
Aaom & Charles Black, 1 yGO.
Fisher, Edward, The Marrow of Modern Divinity; Touching Both the Covenant of
Works and of Grace, Edinburgh; John Mosman, 1718.
Fleming, J.R., A History of the Church in Scotland 1843-1874. Edinburgh;
T. & T. Clark, 1927.
Flew, R.N., "The View of the Methodists", The Ministry and the Sacraments
(ed. by R. Dunkerley), London; S. C.M. Press, 19377"
- Jesus and His Church, London; Epworth Press, 1938.
Flew, R.N., and Davies, R.E., (eds.), The Catholicity of Protestantism,
London: Lutterworth Press, 1950.
■ Florovsky, George "The Church: Her Nature and Task", The Universal Church
in God's Design, London: S.C.M. Press, 1948.
Foakes-Jackson, F.J. & Lahe, K., The Beginnings of Christianity, London:
Macmillan and Co., 1920.
Forsyth, P.T., Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind, London; Hodder &
Stoughton, 1907,
- Theology in Church and State, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1914.
- The Church and the Sacraments, London; Longmans, Green and Co., 1917.
Franks, R.S. , The Work of Christ, London; Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1692.
Eraser, A.C. , Locke1s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford: Clarendon
Press," 18§4.
Fraser, Daniel, Church Establishmsnts; with special reference to the Church of
Scotland, Edinburgh; James Gemnell, 1885.
Fulbright, William, The Arrogance of Power, New York; Random House, 19&7.
Garbett, Cyril, Church and State in England, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1950.




Gillespie, George, A Dispute Against the English Popish Ceremonies Obtruded
on The Church of Scotland, Edinburgh: Oliver o: r>oyd,~TB44 (first published
in 16i+2).
- Aaron1s Rod Blossoming; or The Divine Ordinanee of Church Government
Vindicated, Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1844 (first pxunted in~Tb4o).
- CXI Propositions concerning the finistry and Government of the Church,
Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1844 (first published' 1647)1
-- A Treatise of Miscellany Questions, Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1844
(first published in 1o49j •
Gillespie, Patrick, The Ark of the Testament Opened; A Treatise of the
Covenant of Grace, London; R.C., 16&1.
- The Ark of the Covenant Orened: A Treatise of the Covenant of Redemption,
London: Thomas Parkhurst, 16T?.
Gladstone, W.E., The State in its Relations with the Church, London: John
Murray, 1841.
Gloege, Gerhard, Reich Gottes und Kircha im Neuen Testament, Gutersloh;
Bertelsmann, 1929.
Gore, Charles, The Holy Spruit and the Church, London: John Murray, 1924.
- The Ministry of the Christian Church, London: Longmans, Gx*een & Co., 193^.
Goudge, H.L., The Church of England and Reunion, London: S.P.C.K., 1938.
Gough, J.W., The Social Contract, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957.
Graham, H.G., Social Life in Eighteenth Century Scotland, London: Adam &
Charles Black, 1901.
Grant, Joseph, Account of the Proceedings and Debate in the General Assembly of
the Church of Scotland, 27th May 1794, Edinburgh; Alex. Lawrie, 1790^
Grave, S.A., The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, Oxford; Clarendon Press,
19^0.
- "Reid, Thomas", Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Paul Edwards), London:
Collien-Macmillan ,"~19S7^
Grierson, James, History of St. Andrevre, St. Andrews: G. S. Tullis, 1838.
Haddow, J., The Record of God and the Duty of Faith Therein Required, Edinburgh;
John Mosman & Co., 1719.
- The Antinomisnism of the Harrow of Modern Divinity Detected, Edinburgh;
John Mosman, 1721.
Haller, William, The Rise of Puritanism, New York; Columbia University Press,
1938.
516
Halyburton, Thomas, A Modest Inquiry Whether Regeneration or Justification has
the Precedency in Order of Nature, Edinburgh: A. Anderson, 1714.
- Memoirs, Edinburgh: H. Anderson, 1715.
Hamilton, Robert, Sermons and Lectures,'Hand-written Manuscript, Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Library.
Hamilton, William, Prelections Theologiese, Hand-written Manuscript, Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Library.
Hanson, A.T., The Pioneer Ministry, London; S.C.M. Press, 1961.
Hanson, Stig., The Unity of the Church in the New Testament, Uppsala:
Almgrist and Wirksells Boktrycken A. B., 19L&7~
Hawkins, L.M., Allegiance in Church and State, London: Geo. Routledge & Sons,
1928.
Hazard, Paul., European Thought in the Eighteenth Century, London: Hollis &
Carter, 1954.
Headlam, A.C., The Doctrine of the Church and Christian Reunion, London:
John Murray, 1920.
Hebert, A.G., The Form of the Church, London: Paber & paber, 1954.
Hegenback, K.R., A History of Christian Doctrine, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
1881.
Heim, Karl, Spirit and Truth, London; Lutterworth Press, 1935.
Henderson, Alexander, The Government and Order of the Church of Scotland,
Edinburgh; George Mosman, 16907"
Henderson, G.D., "Dutch Influences in Scottish Theology", Evangelical Quarterly
Vol. V, London: James Clarke& Co., 1933.
- The Scottish Ruling Elder, London; James Clarke & Co., 1935.
- Religious Life in Seventeenth-Century Scotland, Cambridge; University
Press, 193/.
- The Church of Scotland; A. Short History. Edinburgh: Church of Scotland
Youth Committee, 1939.
- Heritage: A.Study of the Disruption, Edinburgh; Oliver & Boyd, 1943*
- Church and Ministry: A Study in Scottish Experience, London:
Hodder & Stoughton, 1951.
- "The Church of Scotland", The Nature of the Church (ed. R.N. Plew), London
S.C.M. Press, 1952.
517
" Burning bush; Studies in Scottish Church History, Edinburgh;
St. Andrews Press, 1957.
Hendry, G.S. , "The Exposition of Holy Scripture", Scottish Journal of Theology,
Vol. I, Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1948.
- The Gospel of the Incarnation, London; S. C. M. Press, 1959.
Henson, H.H., Disestablishment, London; Macmillan and Co., 1929.
Hepburn, 3.7/., Christianity and Paradox, London; C.A. Watts and Co., 1958.
Heppe, Keinrich, Dopmatik des Deutschen Frotestantismus irn Sechzehnten
Johrhundert, Gotta: F.A. Perthes, 1857.
- Reformed Dogmatics, London; George Allan & Unwin, 1950.
Herraelink, H., "The Ministry and Sacraments in the Evangelical Churches of
German Today", The Ministry and the Sacraments, London: 3.C.M. Press, 1937.
Hetherington, 77.M., History of the Church of Scotland, Edinburgh: John Johnstone,
1842.
Hewison, J.K., The Covenanters, Glasgow: John Smith & Son, 1913.
Hickinbotham, J.P., "The Doctrine of the Ministry", The Ministry of the Church
(ed. S. Neill), London; Canterbury Fress, 1947.
Higgins, A. J.B. , The Lord's Supper in the New Testament, London: S. C.M. P-ess,
1960.
Hill, George, Instructions Afforded by the Present War to the People of Great
Britain, Edinburgh: John Balfour, 1793-
- "Sermon preached before the Society incorporated by Royal Charter for the
Benefit of the Sons of the Clex-gy of the Established Church of Scotland",
Scots Magazine, Vol. 56, 1794.
" Sermons, London: Strahan, Cadwell, and Davies, 179&.
~ Theological Institutes, Edinburgh; Bell & Bradfute, 1803.
- "Letter to the Editors", British Critic, Vol. XXII, No. 2, London;
C. & J. Rivington, 1803.
- Speech in the General Assembly, May 23, 1807, Upon the Motion for Thanking
His Majesty for His Support of the Protestant Establishment, Edinburgh;
Peter Hill, 1807.
- Lectures upon Portions of the Old Testament, Edinburgh: George Ramsay
& Co., 1812.
- Lectures in Divinity, 3 Vols., Edinburgh; V7augh & Innes, 1825.
- A View of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland (Third Edition) ,
Edinburgh: John v/augh, 1835".
518
- Manuscript Correspondence, St, Andrews: St. Andrews University Library.
« Manuscript Correspondence, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Library.
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, or the Matter Forme and Power of a Conrnonwealth,
Ecclesiastical and Civil, London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1914 (first published
iW.
Hobhouse, Walter, The Church and the World in Idea ana in History, London:
Macmillan & Co., 1910,
Hodgson, Leonard (ed.), The Second World Conference on Faith and Order,
Edinburgh^ 1957, London: S.C.M. Press" 19.5b. ~
Hooker, Richard, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1865.
Ho3kyn3, E.G. The Fourth Gospel, London; Faber and Faber, 1947.
Howell, 71,S., Logic and Rhetoric in England 1500-1700, Princeton; Princeton
University Press, 195"S.
Hume, David, Philosophical Works, Edinburgh: Charles Tait, 1826.
" A Treatise of Human Mature (ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge), Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 189^T
- Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge), Oxford;
Clarendon Press, 1902.
- Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (ed. N.K. Smith), Oxford;
Clarendon Press, 1935.
Hunt, G.L., and Crovr, Paul (eds.), Consultation on Church Union Digest,
Vols. 3 & 4, Fanwood, New Jersey; -,"1964, I9S5.
Hutcheson, Francis, An Inquiry into the Originals of our Ideas of Beauty and
Virtue, London: R. Ware, l753«
- A System of Moral Philosophy, Glasgow: R. & A. Foulis, 1755.
Irenaeus, "Against Heresies", Early Christian Fathers (ed. C.C. Richardson),
London: S. C. M. Press, 1953.
Jeffner, Anders, Butler and Huine on Religion; A Comparative Analysis,
Stockholm: Diakonistyrelsens Bakfarlag, 1967>.
Jenkins, Claude, and Mackenzie, K.D., (eds.)., Episcopacy Ancient and Modern,
London: S.P. C.K., 1930.
Jenkins, Daniel,.The Gift of Ministry, London; Faber and Faber, 1947.
Jeremias, Joachim, The Sucharistic "Words of Jesus, London: S.C.M. Press, 1966.
Johnson, A.?/., and Yost, F.H. , Separation of Church and State in the United
States. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, T9487
519
Johnson, Ernest, The Church and Society, New York: Abingdon Press, 1935.
Johnston, G.A., Selections from the Philosophy of Common Sense, Chicago:
Open Court Publishing Co., 1915.
. Johnston, George , The Doctrine of the Church in the Nevr Testament, Cambridge:
University Press, 1943.
Keller, Adolf, Church and State on the European Continent, London:
Epworth Press, 193b«
Keller, P.P., Studies in Lutheran Doctrine, St. Louis; Concordia Publishing
House, 1960.
Kettlewell, John, Of Christian Communion, -, 1693*
King, David, The Ruling Eldership of the Christian Church, Edinburgh:
William Oliphant and Sons, 1844.
King, Peter, An Enquiry into the Constitution, Discipline, Unity, ana Worship
of the Primitive Church, London: Seeley, Burnside, and Seeley, 1843
^Tirst published in 1b9l).
Kirk, K.E. (ed.), The Apostolic Ministry, London: Hodder & 3toughton, 1946.
Kittel, Gerhard, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (trans. G.¥.
Brorniley), Grand Rapids; Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 19^5).
Knox, John, Collected Works (ed. David Laing), Edinburgh; Thomas George, 1855.
Knox, John, "The Ministry in the Primitive Church", The Ministry in Historical
Perspective (eas. H.R. Neibuhr and D.D.Williams), New York; Harper &
Brothers, 1956.
Kroner, Richard, The Primacy of Faith, New York; Macmillan Co., 1943»
Kung, Hans, Structures of the Church, London: Burns and Oates, 1965.
Larape, G.W.H. , Some Asrects of the New Testament ministry, London: S.P.C.K. ,
1949.
Lang, Andrew, A History of Scotland, Edinburgh; ¥m. Blackwood, 1900.
Laurie, Henry, Scottish Philosophy in its National Development, Glasgow:
James Maclehose & Sons, 1902.
Leechman, William, The Nature, Reasonableness, and Advantages of Prayer,
Glasgow: Robert Poulis, 1743.
- The Temper, Character, and Duty of _a Minister of the Gospel, Glasgow;
R. & A. Foulis, 1755.
Leeming, Bernard, The Churches and the Church, Westminster, 153.: The Newman
Press, i960.
520
Leishman, J.P., Matthew Leishmart of Govan, Paisley: Alex. Gardner, 1924.
Lindsay, T.M. "The Covenant Theology", British and Poreini Evangelical Review,
Vol. XXVIII, Edinburgh: Clivez* & Boyd, 1879.
Church and the Ministry in the Early Centuries, London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1'903. ""
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, London: Ward, Lock, and
Co., (first published in 1u89)'
- "A Letter Concerning Toleration", Works, Vol. VI, London: 1U Otridge and
Son, 1812.
Lockhart, J.G., Peter's Letter to his Kinsfolk, Edinburgh: Blacky/cod, 1819.
Lorimer, Peter, John Knox and the Church of England, London: Henry S. King
& Co., 1875.
Louden, Stuart, The True Face of the Kirk, London: Oxford University Pr6ss,
1963.
Lowrie, Walter, Problems of Church Unity, London: Longsman, Green, and Co.,
1924.
Luther, Martin, Werke, Weimar: Hermann Boklaus Nackfolger, 1909.
- Works (ed. Helmut T. Lehmann), Vol. 4*1, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966.
McCosh, James, The Scottish Philosophy, London; Macmillan and Co., 1875.
McCrie, C.G., "Studies in Scottish Ecclesiastical Biography: III. Rev. James
Hog of Carnock and Principle Hadow of St. Andrews", British and Foreign
Evangelical Review, Vol. CXXX, Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, TS04.
- The Confessions of the Church of Scotland, Edinburgh; MacNiven and Wallace,
1907.
MacDougall, A.G., The Keys of the Kingdom, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, New College.
Library, 1964.
McGill, William, A Practical Essay on the Death of Jesus Christ, Edinburgh:
Mundell & Wilson, 1786.
MacGreggor, Geddes, Corpus Christi, London; Macmillan ana Co., 1959.
Mcllwain, C.H., The Growth of Political Thought in the West, New York:
Macmillan Co., 1932.
McKerrow, John, History of the Secession Church, Glasgow; A. Fullarton, 184*1.
- The Office of Ruling Elder in the Christian Church, Edinburgh; William
Oliphant and Sons, 1846^
Mackintosh, H.R., Types of Modern Theology, London: Nisbet & Co., 1937.
521
Mackintosh, Jair.es, Dissertation on the Progress of Sthical Philosophy,
Edinburgh; Adam & Charles Black, 1872.
Mackintosh, Robert, Albrecht Ritschl and Iiis School, London: Chapman and
Hall, 1915.
Kacleod, Donald, The Doctrine and Validity of the Ministry and Sacraments of
the National Church of Scotland, Edinburgh: 77m. Blackwood and Sons, T9O3.
Macleod, John, Scottish Theology'' in Relation to Church History since the
Reformation, Edinburgh; Publications Committee of the Pree Church of
Scotland, 1943.
McNeill, J.T., The History and Character of Calvinism, New York; Oxford
University Fress, 1954#
McNeill, J.T., "The Ministry in the Light of the Historical Situation",
Consultation on Church Union Digest, Vol. Ill, Fanwood,Nevj- Jersey, 1964.
KacPhail, W.M. , The Presbyterian Church, London: Hodder and Stougjiton, 1908.
Macpherscn, John, The Doctrine of the Church in Scottish Theology, Edinburgh:
Macniven and Wallace, 1903*
Madox, Isaac, A Vindication of the Government, Doctrine, and Dors hip of the
Church of England, London; A. Bettesworth, 1733»
Manning, Bernard, A Layman in the Ministry, London: Independent Press, 1943*
Manson, T.W., The Church's Ministry, London; Hodder and Stoughton, 1948.
- The Sayings of Jesus, London: S.C. 14 Press, 1949.
- Ministry and Priesthood; Christ's and Ours, London: Kodder and Stoughton,
1958. '
Manson, William, "The Doctrine of the Church of Scotland", The Ministry and the
Sacraments (ed. by R. Dunkerley), London: S. C. M. Press, 1937.
Martin, J.M., & Smith, J.S.B. (eds.), Religious Thought in the Eighteenth
Century, Cambridge: University Press, 1934.
Kascall, E.L., Corpus Christ!, London: Longsman, Green, and Co., 1953*
- Words and Images, London; Longmans, Green, and Co., 1957.
- The Recovery of Unity, London; Longsman, Green, and Co., 1958.
Kathieson, W.L., Politics and Religion in Scotland, Glasgow: James Maclehose
and Sons, 1902.
- Scotland and the Union: A History of Scotland from 1695-1747, Glasgow:
J. Maclehose & Sons, 1905.
522
Mechie, Stewart "Education for the Ministry in Scotland Since the Reformation",
Records of the Scottish Church HistorySociety, Vol. XIV, Glasgow:
R.E. Robertson, 19o3~.
Melville, James, Diary, 1556-1601, Edinburgh: The Bannatyne Club, 1829.
Metzger, Bruce, A Guide to the Preparation of _a Thesis, Princeton: Princeton
Theological Seminary, 1950.
Micklem, Nathaniel, 7/hat Is the Faith? London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1936.
Miller, Hugh, The Headship of Christ, and the Rights of Christian People,
Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1cfo1.
tiller, Perry, The New England Mind - The Seventeenth Century, New/ York;
Macmillan and Co., 1939.
Miller, Samuel, The ".Tarrant, Nature, and Duties of the Office of the Ruling
Elder in the Presbyterian Church, Edinburgh: Robert Ogle, 1642.
Mitchell, A.?., and Struthers, John (eds.), Minutes of the Sessions of the
Westminster Assembly of Divines, Edinburgh: Win. Blackwood &. Sons, 1674.
Mitchell, Alexander, "The Theology" of the Reformed Church with special Reference
to the Westminster Standards", Proceedings of tie Second General Council of
the Presbyterian Alliance, Philadelphia: Presbyterian Journal Co. , i860.
Moncrieff, Henry, Life of John SrsIcLne, Edinburgh: George Ramsay & Co., 1818.
Montefiore, H.W., "The Historic Episcopate", The Historic Episcopate (ed. K.M.
Carey), London: Dacre Press, 1954.
Moodie, William, Serrnons, Edinburgh: C. Stewart, 1813.
Morren, Nathaniel, Annals o£ the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland,
Edinburgh: John Johnstone, 1838.
Morris, Leon, Ministers of God, London: Inter-Varsity Fellowship Press, 1964.
Morrison, C.C., 'What is Christianity, Chicago; Willett, Clark, & Co., 1940.
Mosheim, J.L., An Ecclesiastical History, from the Birth of Christ to_ the
Beginning of the Eighteenth Century, London: Thomas Tegg, 1642.
Musculus, Wolfgang, Loci Communes, (no city, no publisher), 1560.
Neale, Daniel, The History of the puritans, London: 'Waugji & Fenner, 1754.
Neibuhr, H.R. , & Williams, D.D., The Ministry in Historical perspectives,
New York: Harper & Brothers, 195°T~
Neill, Stephen fed.), The Ministry of the Church, London: Canterbury Press,
1947.
- "The Historic Episcopate", Bishops (ed. G. Simon), London: Faith Press,
1961. —
523
Nelson, J.R., The Realm of Redemption, London: Spworth Press, 1956.
- ''Some Aspects of the Christian Ministry in the Light of New Testatment
Study", Consul.tation on Church Union Digest, Vol. Ill, Fanwood, New Jersey,
c.u.c.u.7 1965.
Newbigin, J.S.L. , Household of Cod, London: S.C.M. Press, 1953*
" rJ^-e Reunion of the Church, London: S.C.M. Fress, i960.
r\
Niebuhr, Rienhold, "Cod's Design and the Present Disorder of Civilization",
The Church and the Disorder of Society, London: S.C. IS. Press, 1948.
Nygren, Malcolm, "The Church and lolitical Action", Christianity Today, Vol, XIII,
No. 12, March, 1969.
Oldham, J.H., "A Responsible Society", The Church and the Disorder of Society,
London: S.C.M. Press, 1948.
Olevianus, Caspar, In Epistolam D. Pauli Apost. ad Calatas notag, Genevae:
Apud Sustathium Vie non, 1575".
Ong, Weft. ter, Ramus Method and the Decay of Dialo -no, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 195°.
- Rasmus and Talon Inventory, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University press, 1958.
Orr, James, David Hume and His Influence on Philosophy and Theology, Edinburgh:
T. & T. Clark, 1903.
Oswald, James, A Sermon, Pre ache d At the opening of the General Assembly of the
Church of Scotland, To v.bich are annexed Letters on some points of
importance contained in the Sermon, Edinburgh: Kincaid & Bell, "T766.
Faley, William, A View of the Evidences of Christianity (ed. T. Brink), London:
The Religious Tract Society," 18?4."
Palmer, R.C. (chairman), Report of the Archbishops' Committee on Church and
State, London: S.F. C.K., 19l7"
Peck, A.L., Anglicanism and Episcopacy, -: Faith Press, 1958.
Perkins, William, A Golden Chaine: or the_ Description of Theologie, Cambridge:
John Legat, 1600 (first published in 159757
- Works, London: John Leggatt, 1612.
Petrie, Alexander, A_ Compendious History of the Catholick Church, From the
Year 600, Until the Year 1b'00, Hague: Adrian Vlack, 1662.
Phythian-Adams, W.J.T., The People and the presence, London: Oxford University
Press, 1942.
Porteous, Beilby, Sunmary of Principle Evidences, Edinburgh; Adam and Charles
Black, 1850.
524
Potter, John, A Discourse of Church G-overnrnent, London: Thomas Tegg, 1839
(first published in 17077".
Preston, John, The New Covenant, London: Nicholas 3ourne, 1631.
Prince, Harold 3., A Form For Thesis siting, Decatur, Georgia: Columbia
Theological Seminary, 19oS.
Pringle-Pattison, A.S. (ed.), Locke's Sssay Concerning Human Understanding
(abridged), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928.
Prugh, J.W., The Theory and Practice of Discipline in the Scottish Reformation,
unpublished thesis, New College Library, 1959.
Quick, O.C., The Christian Sacraments, London: Nisbet and Co., 1932.
"* Doctrines of the Creed, London: Nisbet and Co., 1938.
Rainy, Robert, Three Lectures in Scottish Church History, Edinburgh:
Macniven & Wallace, 1863.
Rait, R.3., "Andrew Melville and the Revolt Against Aristotle in Scotland",
English Historical Review, Vol. XEV, London; Longsman, Green, &. Co., 1899.
Rankin, Alexander, The Importance of Religious Establishments, Glasgow;
David Niven, 1799.
Rawlinson, A.E.J., Problems of Reunion, London: Egre & Spottiswoode, 1950.
Raid, H.K.B., The Divinity Professors in the University of Glasgow, 1640-1903,
Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson, 1923.
Reid, J.K.3., "The Biblical Doctrine of the Ministry", Scottish Journal of
Theology Occasional Paper, No. 4, Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1935.
Reid, Thomas, Collected Works (ed. William Hamilton), Edinburgh; MacLachlan &
Stewart, 1872.
Relations Between Anglican ano_ Presbyterian Churches, Edinburgh; Saint Andrew
Press, 1957.
Richardson, Alan, History Sacred and profane, London: S.C.M. Press, 19^4*
Riesenfeld, Harald, "The Ministry in the New Testament", The Root of the Vine
(ed. A. Fridrichsen), London: Dacre Press, 1953.
Robertson, William, The Situation of the World at the Time of Christ's
Appearance, Edinburgh, William Wilson & Co., 1815.
Robinson, J. Armitage, "The Christian Ministry in the Apostolic and sub-
Apostolic periods", Essays on the Early History of the Church ana the
Ministry (ed. H.3. Swete ), London: Macmillan and Co., 1918.
Robinson, J.A.T. , "Kingdom, Church, and Ministry", The Historic Episcopate in
the Fullness of the Church, Philadelphia; Westminster Press, 1954.
525
Rodger, Elizabeth, A Book of Remembrance, Glasgow; James Maclehose & Sons,
1913.
Rogers, John, A Discourse of the Visible and Invisible Church of Christ,
London: Tho, 'Woodward, 1719.
- A Vindication of the Civil Establishment of Relirjon, London; William
& John Innys, 172b.
Roilock, Robert, Select "forks (ed. 7f.M. Gunn), Edinburgh: 7/odrcw Society, 1849.
. Rolston, Holmes, III, The Understanding of Sin and Responsibility in the
Teaching of John Calvin, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, New College Library, 1958.
Ross, J.M., What Is An Elder?, London: Publications Committee, Presbyterian
Church of England, 1955.
Row, William, The Life of Robert Blair, Edinburgh; Wodrow Society, 1848.
Rutherford, Samuel, A Peaceable and Temperate Plea for Paul's Presbyterie
in Scotland, London; Joan Bartlet, 1642.
- The Sue Right of Presbyteries, London: E, Griffin, 1o44«
~ ij0X) Kex, or The Law and the irince; A_ Dispute for the Just Prerogative
of King and People, Edinburgh; Oliver & Boyd, 1843 (first published 1644).
- The Divine Right of Church Government and Excoxanunication, London:
JonrT"Fie la, 164o. "
- The Covenant of Life Opened, Edinburgh; Robert Brown, 1655.
Ryle, J.C., Principles for Churchmen, London: Wm. Hunt and Co., 1884.
Schaff, Philip, The Creeds of Evangelical Protestant Churches, London;
Hodder and Stoughton, 1877.
Schlatter, Adolf, The Church in the New Testament Period, London;
S.P.C.K., 1955.
Schmidt, Karl Ludwig, "S xxkecac ", Theological Dictionary of the New Testament
(ed. Gerhard Kittel), Grand Rapids; Wm. B. Eerdmans publishing Co., 19^5*.
Schweitzer, Albert, The I.ysticism of Paxil the Apostle, London; A. & C. Black,
. 1931.
Schweizer, Eduard, Church Order in the New Testament, London: S.C.LI. Press, 1961.
Scott, C.A.A., The Church; Its Vorshir. and Sacraments, London; S.C.M. Press,
1927.
Scott, W.R., Francis Hutcheson; Life, and Teaching, and Position in the
History of Philosophy, Cambridge; University Press, 1900.
Sefton, H.E., The .Early Development of Hoderatism in -the Church of Scotland,
unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Glasgow, 1982.
526
Shaw, Duncan (ed.), Reformation and Revolution, Edinburgh: St.Andrew Press, 1967.
Simon, Glyn (ed.), Bishops, London: Faith Press, 19^1.
Simpson, F.C., Church Principles, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1923.
- The Evangelical Church Catholic, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1934.
Sjolinder, P.olf, Presbyterian Reunion in Scotland 1907-1921, Stockholm;
Aimquist <4 Wikseli, Ty'bl.
Skydsgaard, K.3. , One in Christ, Philadelphia; Muhlenberg Press, 1957.
Smith, N.K., The Philosophy of David Hume, London; Macmillan & Co., 1941.
Smith, W.R., prophets in Israel and Their Place in History to the Close of the
Eighth Century B.C. , Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 18o2.'
Somerville, Thomas, "On Oaths", The Scottish Pulpit, Edinburgh: Alex. Macredie,
1823.
- Own Life and Times, Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas, 1861.
Sorley, W.R. , A History of 3ritish Philosophy to 1900, Cambridge; University
Press, 19&5.
Sprctt, G.7f., The Worship of the Church of Scotland During the Covenanting Period,
1638-1661, Edinburgh: ¥m. Blackwood <k Sons, 1893*
Stahlin, Wilhelm, The Mystery of Cod, published for the World Conference on
Faith and Order, London: S.C.Li. Press, 1937.
Stanley, A.P. , Lectures on the History of the Church of Scotland , London:
John Hurray, 1872.
Stephen, Leslie, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, London;
Smith, Elder, & Co., 1oo1.
- (ed.), Dictionary of National Biography, London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1885.
Steuart, Walter, Collections and Observations Concerning the 7/orship, Discipline,
and Government of the Church of Scotland, Edinburgh; Dickson and Elliot,
Stewart, Dugald, Account of the Life and Writings of William Robertson, London:
A. Strahan, 1801.
Stewart, James, Heralds of God, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1949.
Stibbs, A.M., God's Church, London: Inter-Varsity Fellowship, 1959.
Stillingfleet, Edward, Irenicum, London: Henry Martlock, 1681.
Story, R.H., The Apostolic Ministry in the Scottish Church, Edinburgh; William
Blackwood & Sons, 1897.
527
Strong, A.H., Systematic Theology, Rochester: 3.R. Andrews, 1886.
Struthers, Savin, History of the Rise of the Relief Church, Glasgow: A. Pullarton,
1843.
Swete, H.3. (ed.), Essays on the Sarl3/ History of the Church and the Ministry,
London: Macraillan ana Co., 191b.
Sykes, Norman, Church and State in England in the 16th Century, Cambridge:
University irsss, 1934*
Symington, William, Messiah. the Prince; or, The Mediatorial Dominion of Jesus
Christ, London: T. Nelson and Sons, T8"81.
Ssegedin, Stephen, Loci Communes de Deo et Homing, Basile ae; Per conrad.
Waldkirchium, 1599 (first published 1585).
Taylor, A.E., David Hume and the Miraculous, Cambridge: University Press, 1927.
Taylor, ?.J., The Church of God, London: Canterbury i ress, 1948.
Taylor, 7/.M., The Scottish Pulpit from the Reformation to the Present Day,
London: Chas. Burnet d Co., 1887.
Telfer, William, The Office of Bishop, London: Darton, Longman, & Todd, 1982.
Temple, William, Christianity and the State, London: Macmillan ana Co., 1928.
Testullian, Apologeticus Adversus Gentes Pro Christianis (ed. J.P. Eigne),
Parisiis; Apud Gamier Pratres 7~1b7o.
Thornton, L.S., The Common Life in the Body of Christ, Westminster: Dacre Press,
1941.
- "The Body of Christ in the New Testament", The Apostolic Ministry, London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1948.
Tillich, Paul, The Interpretation of History, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1934.
Torrance, T.F., "Concerning the Ministry", Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. I,
Edinburgh; Oliver and Boyd, 1948.
- "Catholicity", Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 2, London; Oliver and
Boyd, 1949.
- Calvin *s Doctrine of Han, London: Lutterworth Press, 1949.
- "Royal Priesthood", Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Paper, No. 3>
Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1955.
- Kingdom and Church, Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1958.
- "Consecration and Ordination", Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. II,
Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1958.
528
- The School of Faith: The Catechisms of the Reformed Church, London:
James Clarke & Co., 1959.
- "The Doctrine of Order", Church Ouarterly Review, Vol. CLX, London:
S.P.C.K. , 1959.
-- Conflict and Agreement, 2 Vols., London: Lutterworth Press, 1959.
- "Introduction", Calvin Treasure (ed. 17.F. Keesecker), London: S.C.M. Press,
1963.
- Theology in Reconstruction, Grand Rapids; 7/m. B. Eerdmans, 1965.
- Theological Science, London; Oxford University Press, 1969.
Trinterud, L.J., "The Origins of Puritanism", Church History, Vol. ICC, The
American Society of Church History, 195*1.
Tweedie, W.K. (ed.), Select Biographies, Edinburgh: Wodrow Society, 1845.
Van Dusen, K.P., "Church and State Through Christian History", Church and State
in the Modern World, London: Harper and Brothers, 1937.
Vanstone, A'.H., "The Ministry in the Nev/Testament", The Historic Episcopate
(ed. K.M. Carey), London: Caere Pi*ess, 1954.
Vidler, A.R., The Orb and the Cross, London: S.P.C.K. Press, 1945.
Vine, A.R., The Congregational Ministry _in the Hodern Eorld, London:
Independent Press, 1955.
Vissen * t Hooft, 7/.A. , & Oldham, J.H. , The Church ana Its Function in Society,
London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1937.
Viseen ' t Hooft, 71.A., The Nx-etchedness and 'Greatness of the Church, London:
S.'C.M. Press, 1944.
-■ The Kingship of Christ, London: S.C.M. Press, 1948.
Wake, William, A Continuation of the Present State of the Controversy Betv/een
the Church of England and the Church of Rome, London: Richard Chriswell,
Tooo". — ~
Walker, James, The Theology and the Theologians of Scotland, Edinburgh;
T. & T. Clark, 1872.
Walker, Willis ton, The Creeds ana Platforms of Congregationalism, New York;
Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1o93.
Wallace, R.S., Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament, Edinburgh:
Oliver and Boyd, 1953.
- Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian Life, Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959.
Warburton, W., The Alliance 3etween Church and State, London: A. Millar, 1766.
Watson, David, Manuscript Copy of Lectures in Philosophy, St. Andrews:
St. Andrews University Library, 1778.
529
Wetson, J.3., (ed.) , The Church: A Symposium, London: Pickering & IngLis, 1949.
Watt, Hugh, Representative Churchmen of Twenty Centuries, London: James Clarke
& Co/, 1927.
Wedel, T.O., The Coming treat Church, London: 3.C.1!. Press, 1947.
Welch, Claude, The Reality of the Church, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1953.
Westminster Standards, Glasgow: 1733.
Whale, J.3. , "The Views of the Congregational Church", The T-inistry and the
Sacraments (ed. by R. Bunker ley), London: S.'C. 14 Press, 1937.
- The Protestant Tradition, London: Cambridge University Press, 1955.
'Willey, Basil, The Seventeenth Century Background, London: Chatto & Windus, 1934.
- The Eighteenth Century Background, London: Chatto & Windus, 1957.
Wilson, John, Index to the Acts ana Proceedings of the General Assembly of the
Ghui-ch of Scotland, Edinburgh; Win. Blackwood and Sons, 1S63.
Wilson, William, A Defense of the Reformation Principles of the Church of Scotland ,
Glasgow: J. Galbraith and Co., 1769.
Wirier, G.3.,.The Confessions of Christendom, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1873«
Witherspcon, John, Ecclesiastical Characteristics, Edinburgh; J. Pillans & Sons,
1802^
7/itsius, Herman, The Economy of the Covenants (trans, by W. Crookshank), London:
T. Tegg & Son, 183^
Wodrow, Robert, History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland, Glasgow:
Blackie & Son, 1841.
Woodhouse, H.P., The Doctrine of the Church in Anglican Theology, 1547-1303,
London: 3.P.C.K. , 1954.
Woozley, A.D., Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Wan, London:
llacniiilan and Co., 1941.
~ l'^ecry of Knowledge, London; Hutchinson's University Library, 1949.
Wotherspoon, E.J., & Kirkpatrick J,11., A_ Xanual of Church Doctrine (Second
ed., edited by T.E. Torrance and R.S. 7/right) , London: Oxford University
Press, 1930.
Zeuner, R.W. , "Church and State", The pulpit, Vol. XXXEX, No. 7, July-August, 1938.
